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Abstract 
 
The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) has recommended the 
implementation of operational risk management in universities since 2001.  This case 
study investigated risk assessment in this context, aiming to critically examine variety 
in different groups in a single institution.  Social Systems Theory formed a framework 
to create new insights into reflexive understandings of risk, utilising data from 
interviews, and group discussions during risk assessment training.  The study makes a 
significant contribution to knowledge about real-life risk assessment practices, revealing 
two parallel and unrelated systems.  Firstly, the formal process exhibited calculative 
difficulties.  Assessment discussions relied on qualitative data, historical events and 
narrative accounts to assess potential severity and frequency, with 19 of 20 participants 
unwilling to assign risk ratings.  Secondly, existing management controls demonstrated 
successful mitigation of risks, particularly in relation to funding access, but were not 
recognised as ‘risk management’, hampering the integrated approach recommended by 
HEFCE.  The influence of group illustrated that the rating of risk could vary, as could 
the type of risk that caused concern.  In addition, boundaries associated with group roles 
influenced the attribution of responsibility, illustrated by academic unwillingness to be 
involved with formal risk management processes. Risk acceptability differed between 
groups and individuals, making it difficult to establish a single risk appetite that 
reflected all organisational views.  Uncertainty was evident in the formal process in lack 
of clarity of strategic aims, absence of data and unpredictability of future events, 
particularly in relation to the actions of others.  Most significantly, risk prioritisation 
had to contend with conflicting perspectives and competing organisational aims, 
including those of the regulator.  In the context of ‘New Public Management’, metrics 
and assessment methods provided a focus for organisational change.  Risk mitigation 
was ongoing and evident, but completely disconnected from the implementation of the 
HEFCE risk management process.  
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Operational Risk Assessment in a Higher Education Institution: 
A Social Systems Perspective 
1 Introduction 
This introduction synthesises the motivating factors for the study and sets out the 
content and contribution that my research makes to the understanding of operational 
risk assessment practices in Higher Education Institutions.   It outlines the structure of 
this thesis and poses some fundamental questions such as; why this subject?  Why is it 
important?  How have I contributed to the body of knowledge in this area and what are 
my main findings?  Through the course of this thesis, I will elaborate upon these issues.  
In posing and addressing these questions, I acknowledge previous research in the field 
of risk assessment and my research findings are set in the context of those studies. 
 
1.1 The Research Problem 
The research questions are framed against the use of formal risk management 
models in an increasing number of organisations, in both the private and public 
sectors.  There is little literature that reveals how operational risk assessments, 
recommended by such frameworks, are performed.  The focus of the first 
research question investigates organisational practices to identify how risk 
assessments are carried out.   The literature suggests that risk interpretation 
differs between different groups and individuals within an organisation, and the 
second research question investigates whether the organisational setting of the 
risk assessment affects the way it is conducted.   The assessment of risk needs to 
be set in the context of what constitutes acceptable risk for the organisation, and 
the third research question examines what is tolerable risk to individuals in the 
University and what factors influence their understanding.  The nature of 
operational risk suggests that the likelihood and severity of potential risks 
occurring cannot be calculated using historical data to form statistical analyses, 
and the final research question examines the uncertainties apparent during risk 
assessment activities.  The careful development of these questions over the 
course of the study, provides the foundation to build a detailed exploration of the 
nature of operational risk assessment and the following sections outline in more 
depth the research problem that this study investigates.  
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1.2 The Aims of the Thesis 
The aim of this study is to describe, compare and analyse operational risk 
assessment activities in different groups within a single institution and to 
critically examine and understand the influences shaping them.  In addition, it 
identifies recommendations for the research sponsor and regulator, providing 
practical guidance to improve and embed the implementation of risk 
management in organisations. 
 
1.3 Setting the Scene 
Trends in public sector governance encourage the normative use of private 
sector models in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs).  The guidelines issued by 
the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) recommend the 
implementation of operational risk management in all Universities (HEFCE, 
2001; 2005).  Operational risk has been defined as a category that captures all 
organisational risks, in which the emphasis is placed on inclusion of less 
measurable and more qualitative aspects of risk (Mikes, 2009).  The 
recommended framework, derived from the private sector Enterprise Risk 
Management model, is described (HEFCE, 2001) as an integrated control 
system and risk is conceptualised as failure to achieve the aims of the 
organisation, with an emphasis on the ability to seize opportunities, and is 
consequently linked to organisational strategy.  This interpretation of risk forms 
the foundation for the exploration of operational risk within this thesis.  The 
process relies on the use of risk assessment to identify and prioritise 
organisational risks.  There is little available evidence about the use of such 
formal methods within organisations:  
However, in spite of all this normative emphasis on the use of formal 
analysis, surprisingly little is actually known about how it is used in 
practice in organizations, especially at the top management level 
(Langley 1998, p51). 
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Risk management as an idea and a more or less standardised set of practices is 
central to both private sector companies and public sector organisations (Miller 
et al, 2007; Power, 2007).   
Risk management is the formal process by which individuals, 
organisations and societies assess and address risks in accordance with 
overall objectives (Fone & Young, 2005, p15). 
The broad nature of this definition suggests that the concept of risk in an 
organisational context covers a wide range of possible threats and opportunities.   
'Risk' is often not clearly identifiable and manageable, but emerges and 
is constructed from complex and necessarily incomplete processes of 
organizational attention involving information systems, incentive 
structures and narratives of explanation which are the source of further 
uncertainties (Scheytt et al, 2006, p1333).  
This thesis investigates risk assessment, rather than risk management and 
mitigation as a whole, because the assessment process incorporates revealing 
features about how risks are interpreted, particularly in the identification and 
assessment stages of the process.  These, in turn, shed light on risk management 
practices more generally, including the strategy process and its contribution to 
local interpretations of organisational aims and how to achieve them. 
 
1.4 Motivations of the Study 
My initial motivations for undertaking this study came from the ‘world of work’ 
and my experience working as a Quality Engineer/Manager in a hi-tech 
engineering organisation1.  I became aware of the increasing use of risk 
assessment in an ever-widening range of activities, raising questions about how 
these models work in the absence of historical data.   Furthermore, it dawned on 
me that my role consisted of identifying and implementing process 
improvements (both for administrative and production systems), that were 
essentially risk management, but usually without any formal risk assessment, 
                                                
1 From 1986 at GEC Hirst Research Centre, merged into GEC Marconi Advanced 
Technology Centres in the 1990s, and transferred to BAE Systems, Product Assurance 
Group in early 2002 until 2003. 
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and not recognised as ‘risk management’.  I wanted to find out more and 
understand the relationship between these two facets of operational risk. 
 
At around this time, I gained the opportunity to study the implementation of risk 
management in a university.  The access enabled investigation of how private 
sector management techniques are implemented in the public sector, a change 
that has been described as ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) (Dunsire, 1999).  
These changes include the use of targets and measures to assess the performance 
of organisations, the efficacy of which has been questioned: 
Ironically perhaps, just as the targets system was collapsing in the USSR, 
the same basic approach came to be much advocated for public services 
in the West by those who believed in ‘results-driven government’ from 
the 1980s (Bevan & Hood, 2006). 
In addition, the mode of governance has shifted towards self-regulation (Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992) with associated monitoring based on self-reports and the 
study participants provide illustrations of what constitutes compliance from their 
perspective.  
 
The use of ‘best practice’ risk management is recommended by HEFCE (2001 
and 2005), mirroring private sector guidance.  When codes contain ‘best 
practice’, it implies that they describe ways of working that have proved 
successful.  The idea is to imitate certain exemplary companies, although there 
is much debate in the academic literature about what these practices should be 
(Taylor, 1911; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Mintzberg, 
1983; Deming, 1986; Kanter, 1989).  For many fields, those contributing to 
governance codes would possess particular expertise in that context.   Seidl 
(2007) notes that in contrast to many other areas of standard setting, the claim of 
expertise in risk management does not rest so much on scientific knowledge as 
on practical experience.  This study investigates what ‘best practice’ risk 
management looks like.  It does not assume an associated improvement in the 
performance of the organisation, but analyses how the participants view the 
formal process and its effectiveness. 
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In the case of the HEFCE risk management framework, non-compliance 
constitutes a risk to the organisation, and completion of the risk register satisfies 
the governance requirements, even if there is little other benefit to the 
organisation or group.  However, the functional benefit of the activity is unclear. 
In many cases, the ‘risk registers’ employed by universities in 
compliance with the Funding Council’s requirements are little more than 
exercises in institutional neurosis.  Such items as ‘low retention’ or 
‘student complaints about teaching’ are merely symptoms to watch out 
for in deciding whether things are going wrong, and whether we are ‘at 
risk’.  Used in this way, the concept of ‘risk’ tells us nothing about the 
likelihood of a danger occurring and the factors that might cause it; and, 
because it has little analytical value, it cannot provide a basis for 
effective action (Raban & Turner, 2006, p40). 
Broadbent & Laughlin (1997) question whether risk management models 
improve organisational performance in any context, but it is also important to 
consider whether private sector approaches are appropriate to an academic 
environment.  There is resistance to change in both sectors. 
New ideas, whether in the private or public sector, are often perceived as 
incompatible with the organizational context.  This is particularly the 
case when the phase of change moves from design to operationalization 
and implementation of the new ideas, leading to the need to perform 
organizational tasks and practices in new ways (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 
2007, p174). 
Implementation is the part of strategy that fails (Sillince & Mueller, 2007) and 
the introduction of risk management within HE faces a number of difficulties:  
In reality, planning from the top is one thing, implementation quite 
another and HEFCE is very thin with advice on cracking this particular 
problem, noting only that planning needs to be ‘embedded’ and that 
‘senior management teams need to consider what obstacles exist and 
how they will be managed’ (HEFCE, 00/24, p4) (Dearlove, 2002, p365). 
Furthermore, Dearlove observes that planned organisational change rarely 
works, and if it does not work for government and for big business, suggests that 
there are good reasons why it is even less likely to work in a university. 
Universities tend to be bottom-heavy, with solid professional authority 
held by academics in disciplines down in the departments.  The 
departments are invariably loosely coupled into a federal system in 
which the central administration lacks the capacity, and often the 
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inclination, to ever give an order because it knows that it lacks the clout 
to ensure compliance (Dearlove, 2002, p356). 
Increasing student numbers on many courses, and measures associated with the 
number and quality of research publications, place significant demands on 
academics; formal risk management activities constitute an unwanted addition to 
an already busy schedule. 
 
The use of risk management in the private sector is often conceptualised as the 
maximisation of profit, which would be inappropriate for institutions such as 
Universities.  However, failure to achieve the aims and goals of an institution 
can provide an alternative focus for risk in both the private and public sectors:  
Risk management is inseparable from strategy planning, from goal 
setting and implementation through to operational management 
(BS31100, draft for comment, 2007). 
The increased use of targets and measures within HE, against which rewards or 
sanctions can be applied, increases transparency and accountability in relation to 
organisational performance (Roberts, 2009).  Consequently, HEFCE’s aims 
become a source of risk for the HE sector, especially when they relate to funding 
and performance measures.  It is notable that the University Mission statement 
mirrors the stated HEFCE objectives.   
 
In-depth study was essential to investigate the chosen research questions, since 
universities are complex organisations (Perrow, 1986).  Complexity means 
being forced to select between elements and a multitude of possible actions, or 
no action.  Hyper-complexity exists when there are competing descriptions of 
this complexity (Luhmann, 2002), as is postulated to be the case between 
different groups in an organisation.  Such variations within the organisation 
result in differing emphases on the type of risks that cause concern.  The link to 
aims suggests the presence of competition and conflicting views within the 
institution, and the purposeful selection of workshop groups was designed to 
explore this notion.  
Situations of decision making under goal ambiguity are common in 
complex organisations (Cohen et al, 1972, p1). 
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The organisation has to manage the presence of competing, and in some cases 
conflicting aims.  The multiple and changing objectives of the organisation are 
reflected in risk identification, revealing institutional and local strategies through 
participant descriptions of organisational aims as a source of risk, shedding light 
on how strategy is communicated and understood. 
 
The ‘corporate risk register’ provides multiple views of risk and can be 
interpreted as an attempt to reduce uncertainty through pooling perceptions and 
judgments. 
In pursuing an understanding of organizational history, greater reduction 
in uncertainty can often be achieved by pooling observers than by 
pooling events, particularly if observers are relatively independent 
(March et al, 1991, p8). 
The HEFCE framework recommends the use of sub-group assessments.  
However, there is little guidance about who exactly should participate in the 
process.  The research investigates who participates and how participants 
describe the formal process, to examine the internal implementation of the 
governance.   
 
The HEFCE guidance (2001; 2005) suggests that risks should be rated and 
ranked, requiring values to be assigned.  Furthermore, to determine the need for 
mitigation, this measure should be compared to a pre-defined value denoting 
acceptable risk, placing emphasis on those risks that are most likely and have 
greatest impact.  This thesis investigates quantification difficulties, and 
questions the value of numerical or qualitative label outputs (low/medium/high) 
in operational risk assessments if such ratings do not represent a form of 
measurement (Power, 2004b).  This focus accepts broad issues, such of lack of 
clarity about the aims of the organisation, may contribute to failure to 
successfully embed risk management, but if the assessment process itself is 
flawed, we need to understand how and why.  If risk ratings are inflated, the risk 
register will contain many insignificant risks, forming an unwieldy and 
unhelpful document.  The opposite outcome would mean that narrative accounts 
of significant risks would be excluded from top-level risk reporting if the values 
assigned are below the acceptable threshold.  Utilising values to assess the 
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probability and severity of risks, assessments have to deal with problems arising 
from qualitative judgements:   
Risks are increasingly becoming a matter of our decisions or our failure 
to make decisions.  However, neither our own decisions nor the 
decisions of others are easy to calculate, because they are made in the 
flow of interacting networks.  The outcomes are not decidable in advance 
but emerge as a result of self-producing or autopoietic operations 
(Gregersen, 2003, p364). 
There has been a significant shift in the ontology of risk from its traditional use 
within the insurance industry.  In the 17th Century, actuarial approaches to risk 
assessment calculated the likelihood and severity of unwanted events using 
historical data.  In the past 50 years, the ontology of risk in organisations has 
drifted towards a meaning aligned with organisational achievement of aims, both 
beneficial and harmful.  Assessment of operational risk frequently lacks data to 
enable a quantitative assessment of risk that provides meaningful predictive 
values, yet faith in the numbers generated in the process remains linked to the 
earlier meaning of risk.   In this complex organisational context, the study 
considers how enforced use of qualitative data to assign risk values influences 
assessment outcomes. The perspective does not aim to evaluate risk assessment 
outcomes in relation to normative guidance or accuracy since:  
Statements about contingent events of the future cannot now be 
classified as either true or untrue, it can only be observed later 
(Luhmann, 1998, p50). 
Another factor preventing purely computational risk assessment is the fact that 
the definition of what is harmful is to a certain extent observer relative 
(Gregersen, 2003).  Academic literature contains many critiques of quantitative 
risk assessment and its limitations (e.g., Kunreuther et al, 1984; Horlick-Jones, 
1998; Feldman, 2004), but there is little evidence about the factors influencing 
qualitative assessment.  The discussions may provide useful and critical insights 
into risks and causes, forming a narrative contribution to the register, despite the 
difficulty of providing the definite answers desired (Kunreuther & Slovic, 1996).   
 
Furthermore, variation in the types of risk identified, not just the assigned 
values, forms another significant area of interest. Risk identification reflects the 
 Page 18 of 407 
organisational context and setting for individuals in different groups within the 
Institution:    
A risk is always a danger of something (sometimes natural, sometimes 
social) for somebody in a given social nexus.  In this sense, the meaning 
of risk conforms with the semiotic triangle as laid out by the pragmatist 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: A meaning means something (the 
content of meaning) for somebody (the interpreters) in a given situation 
(the context of meaning).  Thus, risks tend to crisscross the borderlines 
of the natural and the cultural (Gregersen, 2003, p356). 
This study explores how risk identification differs between groups within an 
institution and what factors generate meaning for local actors.  In such semiotic 
triangles, it is possible for the content of meaning to be interpreted differently 
because of differences in situation and the perspective of individuals within 
groups. 
 
Participant narratives illustrate what is acceptable risk to individuals and groups 
in the University, and what factors influence this understanding.  The idea that 
risk tolerance is linked to degree of control (Adams, 1995) draws responsibility 
and authority into risk management activities.  The study investigated whether 
risk acceptability displayed similar characteristics within and between groups.  
The use of narrative data enabled the influences behind such understandings to 
be drawn-out and analysed.  In addition, authority to act is an important factor in 
the selection of risks for mitigation activities, bringing the relative power of 
groups or individuals within the institution into the scope of this thesis. 
 
The qualitative aspects of operational risk assessment led to curiosity about 
uncertainty in the process.  In particular, what kinds of uncertainty were evident 
and how did risk assessment activities handle uncertainty?  Uncertainty related 
to lack of information, lack of clarity about achievement of objectives and the 
difficulty of predicting future events with any certainty. 
Risk is subjective.  It is a word that refers to a future that exists only in 
the imagination (Adams & Thompson, 2002, p1). 
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Case study data revealed the types of uncertainty present.  How research 
participants treated lack of clarity when assessing risk formed an important 
element of the study. 
What is needed is extensive empirical work to discover how human 
beings actually make choices in the face of uncertainty, especially 
uncertainty about the actions and reactions of other human beings 
(Simon, 1997b, p127). 
The HE sector exhibits characteristics that are particularly relevant to the 
investigation of unquantifiable risks.  Such organisations are a class of 
knowledge organisation whose asset base is predominantly intangible, and 
whose risks change and develop in response to the regulatory environment 
(Power et al, 2009).  
 
Also of significant interest are participants’ views of risk registers, illuminating 
the HEFCE model and the interpretation of governance aims.  Luhmann (1995a) 
suggests that social systems, such as organisations, are constituted on 
communicative events that provide a stimulus for action, a view echoed in 
research into organisational sense making. 
Organisations are built, maintained, and activated through the medium of 
communication (Weick, 1990; quoted in Allard-Poesi, 2005, p174). 
To answer the research questions, the study investigates communication about 
risk to reveal regularities and systematic associations in risk interpretation.  
 
1.5 Methodology & Method 
The methodology for the study takes a Middle-Range Thinking approach 
(Laughlin, 1995; 2004), in which it is acknowledged that it is not possible to 
study a positivistic, unchanging social world, where the truth can be established 
through careful research and experiment, but the contrary view that 
interpretation of findings provides insights but cannot draw more general 
conclusions is also rejected.  As the name Middle-Range Thinking suggests, this 
study steers a middle course between these and takes the view that some 
generalised observations linked to theory, contributing to knowledge, can be 
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made.  The approach requires the use of theory to reduce subjective influences, 
while accepting that it is not possible for the researcher to step outside the social 
world to study it, emphasising the importance of reflecting upon the role of the 
researcher.  This thesis takes a constructivist approach, in which differing views 
are considered equally valid from the perspective of the participants.    
 
The data collection was undertaken in two distinct phases from March to June 
2005 and from January to May 2007.  The first stage comprised semi-structured 
interviews conducted with senior staff in 20 Departments and Schools across the 
whole organisation.  With little prior theorisation in relation to analysis of 
operational risk assessment, preliminary analysis in Phase 1 was exploratory and 
not theoretically motivated.  A framework of risk types was used initially to 
confirm the validity of the chosen research problem, and to refine research 
questions for the study.  The first stage findings also provided input to second 
stage research sampling and choice of theoretical approach.  
 
While searching for suitable theories and models through which to investigate 
operational risk, the Director, Detector, Effector model (Hood & Jones, 1996) 
mapped onto the HEFCE risk management model, making it an ideal choice for 
normative assessment of the implementation of governance.  To examine risk 
meaning through risk identification and assessment a second theory was 
necessary, and Luhmann’s Social Systems Theory (1995a) provides a complex 
and comprehensive framework to investigate reflexive risk processes.   
 
The second stage gathered data from three groups selected from the University 
that forms the unit of analysis in this thesis, through provision of risk 
management training in workshops, based on HEFCE guidance (2001; 2005). 
Operational risk assessment workshops illustrate the way that individuals in 
institutions are subject to a complexity of pressures, reflected in their 
interpretations of risk.  Further perspectives were elicited during follow up 
interviews with workshop participants.   
 
All interviews and workshops were recorded and content analysis of 
transcriptions forms the method for generating the research findings and 
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research validity relies on faithful reproduction of representative quotes.   To 
prevent harm to the sponsoring organisation, this thesis content has been 
anonymised. The analysis utilised the theoretical framework developed to access 
the key themes from both phases of the study.  A cross-case analysis draws 
together the findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2 to address the research problem 
and questions asked. 
 
1.6 The Case Study Organisation 
The University is one of the oldest and largest in the UK with 13,800 
undergraduate students and 5,300 postgraduates in nine Schools of study 
(University web site 7/2/7).  The University has benefited from changes to 
research funding allocation; it is in the top group of universities for research 
earnings, with income from grants and contracts of more than £101 million 
during 2004-05 (University web site 7/2/7).  The University is a member of the 
Russell Group, an association of 20 research-intensive universities in the UK.  In 
2006/07, Russell Group Universities accounted for 66% (over £2.2 billion) of 
UK Universities' research grant and contract income and 68% of total Research 
Council income (Russell Group website 30/7/9). 
 
The implementation of HEFCE Risk Management governance led to the Risk 
Management Policy and production of a Corporate Key Risks document (Risk 
Register).  This represents ranked risks to the organisation, compiled by 
amalgamation of local Risk Registers.  At the University, annual completion of 
this document by each School or Department for review by the Principal’s 
Central Team (PCT) is an interpretation of governance aims.  Formal 
responsibility for preparation of local Risk Registers is assigned to Heads of 
School.  Case study analysis reveals the methods of implementation of the 
initiative in different parts of the University.  
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1.7 Outline of Thesis 
This chapter has highlighted the research problem; introduced the research topic; 
indicated the research objectives and outlined the underlying motivation behind 
the research.   
 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth review of the literature this study contributes to.  
It examines the evolution of risk management practices and the problematic 
nature of risk and risk management to illustrate the motivation for developing 
greater understanding of these practices in a real-life context.  It outlines private 
sector governance reforms and the adoption of private sector practices in Higher 
Education, including a review of HEFCE risk guidance, to provide the context 
for the study.  The chapter concludes by summarising existing empirical studies 
of risk to highlight the need for additional work in this field.   
 
Chapter 3 reviews the process of theory selection and the underlying reasons for 
adopting two theoretical approaches for the analysis.  The key theoretical 
aspects of each selected theory are elucidated to illustrate their use in this study.   
 
Chapter 4 explains the emergence of the research methodology used in the 
study.  It explicates the study focus and states the Research Questions.  The 
beliefs underlying research approach are explored in relation to ontology, 
methodology and Middle-Range Thinking.  It goes on to document the research 
process, including the case study design, data sources, narrative and document 
analysis, the development of the analytical frameworks used and cross-case 
analysis. The chapter concludes by considering the validity and research 
relevance of the study outputs.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the research findings from Phase 1 of the study. The chapter 
begins with an overview of the aims of the University, elicited during the 
interviews.  The subsequent chapter headings are derived from the research 
questions, with sub-sections developed from the interaction of data with theory, 
informed by relevant literature, to facilitate analysis of the narratives.   
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Chapter 6 presents the data gathered during Phase 2 of the study.  With the 
exception of the overview of aims, which were not elicited from individuals in 
workshop groups, it follows the format of chapter five, to facilitate data 
comparison.  It utilises the theoretical frame outlined in the methodology section 
of this thesis to draw out features of interest from the embedded cases.  
 
Chapter 7 brings together the previous two chapters to address the research 
questions specifically using cross-case analysis and highlights a number of 
significant findings. It follows the layout of the previous two chapters with the 
addition of normative analysis and a review of contemporaneous risk registers.  
 
The concluding Chapter 8, takes the analysis of data from the previous chapter 
to illustrate how the findings contribute to the literature discussed in chapter 
two.  It goes on to examine the value of the SST theoretical frame, the 
limitations of the research and makes suggestions for further work to build on 
these findings.  The thesis concludes with a summary of the significant 
contribution to knowledge that this study makes. 
 
1.8 Summary 
This chapter has introduced purpose and aims of this thesis, providing the 
justification and motivation for this research.  My unique access to the practice 
of risk management in one institution, the long-term nature of the data collection 
project and the use of theoretical perspectives to enable broad generalisations to 
be developed, contribute significantly to an area that is under researched.  The 
empirical contribution is important since there are few existing studies of this 
kind.  By overcoming difficulties of access and confidentiality, the study 
illuminates risk assessment practices and the implementation of risk 
management processes in a real organisation.  The next chapter provides an 
overview of the literature that informs the study, and critically examines the 
problematic nature of risk, the expansion of risk management practices in the 
private sector, the changing regulatory environment, HEFCE risk management 
guidance and previous studies of risk in organisations. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the academic literature in the field of risk, to which this 
study contributes, and sets the scene for the case study, identifying a need for 
critical examination of the influences shaping risk assessment activities.   The 
chapter will begin with a brief review of the evolution of risk management 
practices, leading into a discussion of the problematic nature of risk and risk 
management.  The next section will outline the requirements for adopting the 
private sector guidance, and how the HEFCE risk management governance is 
underlain by the private sector philosophy, most notably the Turnbull Guidance 
(ICAEW, 1999) that emphasises the relationship between a well-managed 
organisation and the ability to control risk. 
In the best-run organisations, risk management is synonymous with good 
management and good governance.  It is not considered as a bolt-on to 
existing practices, or a separate exercise simply to meet regulatory 
requirements (HEFCE, 2005, p2). 
The chapter moves on to examine regulatory changes and the elements of the 
HEFCE risk management guidance in the light of management control more 
generally.  Finally, the availability of empirical studies that examine how risk 
management systems function generally, and specifically in the Higher 
Education (HE) context, will illustrate gaps in the literature and demonstrate the 
need for in-depth case studies of risk management practice. 
 
2.2 Evolution of Risk Management Practices 
The study of risk has a long history and calculative tools began to emerge in the 
mid 1600s when the mathematicians Pascal and Fermat solved a problem about 
division of stakes in an unfinished game of chance, enabling people to make 
decisions and forecast the future with the help of numbers (Bernstein, 1996a).  
In 1730, Abraham de Moivre suggested the bell curve distribution and 
discovered the concept of standard deviation, which are essential ingredients for 
quantifying risk.  Probability theory was used to develop tables of life 
expectancies and by the middle of the 1700s, marine insurance emerged with 
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practical use of risk calculations (The Society of Lloyd’s of London was 
established in 1771).  In 1875, Francis Galton discovered regression to the mean  
(Bernstein, 1996a).  The basic tools for predicting risk were available, noting the 
proviso that such calculations require stochastic inputs or data for which a 
statistical distribution can be determined. 
 
As a management practice, project risk management began to emerge in the 
1970s.  Prior to this, risk was little discussed and its effects on organisations 
ignored (Merna & Al-Thani, 2008).  The US Environmental Protection Agency 
completed its first risk assessment document at the end of 1975.  As project risk 
management developed through the 1980s an emphasis on quantitative analysis 
predominated, with use of tools such as Programme Evaluation and Review 
Technique (PERT) focussing on time and cost objectives (Merna & Al-Thani, 
2008).  In the 1990s, the scope of risk management expanded to consider a 
wider range of risks, with a larger set of analysis tools, albeit in a fragmented 
way.   
 
To frame these changes from the perspective of a quality engineer2, I first 
became aware of risk assessment as an organisational control to satisfy Health & 
Safety and Product Safety requirements in the early 1990s (HSE, 1992).  The 
risk assessment rating and acceptability grid (Figure 2.1) became familiar for 
calculating probability and severity of physical hazards.  In the mid 1990s, 
collation of project risk data became part of my routine.  There was no 
integration of different types of risk to form an overall picture of threats to the 
organisation up until the time I left in 2003, when corporate risk registers began 
to be mentioned.  The internal management system audits that brought 
significant ‘deficiencies’ to senior management attention were not viewed as 
risk management controls, raising the question of what constitutes risk.  This 
brief historical overview provides the background for the discussion of the 
ontology of risk and it’s relationship to risk management that follows. 
 
                                                
2 Working for GEC-Marconi, later part of BAE Systems 
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2.3 Problematic Nature of Risk and Risk Management  
This section will review risk definitions and interpretations, linked to 
developments outlined in the previous section, and provide the basis for 
understanding difficulties associated with operational risk assessment and risk 
management.  All risk concepts have one element in common, the distinction 
between reality and possibility (Renn, 1992).  The question of whether risk is 
understood as a socially constructed idea is explored in this section, especially in 
relation to organisational control.  Operational risk is significant as an assembly 
point for existing risk management practices, as a category of attention and 
visibility for risks that were either ignored or made insufficiently explicit 
previously (Power, 2003).  This includes potential losses resulting from 
inadequate systems, management failure, faulty controls, fraud and error 
(Crouhy et al, 2006).  However, there is no agreed definition of risk in 
organisations. 
… there is a general lack of consensus on the definition of risk in the 
management literature, and numerous definitions have been proposed 
(Berry et al, 2005, p286). 
Within the HE context, a HEFCE study (HEFCE, 2001, see Figure 2.2), 
demonstrates that risks identified in 48 Universities include physical hazards, 
but these represent a small fraction of stated risk categories.  The majority relate 
to failure to achieve aims, and illustrate how risk identification relates to both 
internal and external goals.  Consequently, opinions and values influence ways 
of seeing and measuring outcomes, and these change recursively, forming 
iterative cycles of ‘socially constructed’ (Hacking, 1999) risk.  Adams (1995) 
describes risk as an 'interactive phenomenon'.  Risks have an iterative nature, in 
which individuals balance the rewards and dangers.  Risks are not static; rather 
they emerge and change over time (Berry et al, 2005).   
 
Furthermore, in preventing dangers, or first-order risks, organisations and 
individuals incur, by virtue of their actions or omissions, an unforeseeable array 
of second-order risks e.g., widespread use of antibiotics to cure infections 
increases the risk of bacteria developing resistance and becoming more deadly 
(Gregersen, 2003).  In HE, satisfaction of ‘widening participation’ targets may 
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increase financial risk associated with student progression targets.  In addition, 
risk to reputation presents a particular form of secondary risk pervading 
organisations.  Consequently, organisations and individuals become sensitive to 
releasing information that might lead to blame (Hood, 2007) resulting in a form 
of procedural risk aversion. 
 
Risk studies in cognitive psychology have investigated individual risk 
perceptions to understand how people reason under conditions of uncertainty 
(Slovic, 1987; Fischhoff et al, 1981).  Laboratory experiments found that when 
faced with complex problems involving probability or frequency estimates, 
people apply certain discernable rules of judgement, termed heuristics, to 
simplify the problem.  Slovic (1987) identified qualities that raise risk 
perception in relation to hazards, however, Gardner (2008) suggests their value 
is limited since the source of such judgments typically is gut; head will 
rationalize the decision, but is unable to access the black-box of gut, so we don’t 
really know what the reasons are.  
Slovic acknowledged that at the time they thought people were analyzing 
risk, in a thoughtful way, but subsequently realized they were not 
(Gardner, 2008, p70). 
The use of heuristics often leads to judgement bias.  The theory predicts that an 
event perceived as involuntary, new and catastrophic is more likely to be rated 
riskier than an event perceived as voluntary, old and chronic (Krimsky & 
Golding, 1992).  The psychometric approach has been criticised for failure to 
account for the context specificity of risk problems (Otway, 1992).  The use of 
‘risk perception’ or ‘risk’ throughout this thesis reflects a wider understanding; 
risks are not weighed in isolation, but are identified within a socially constructed 
context.   
In all cases, the concept of risk is bound to an experiencing subject who 
is vulnerable to harmful events in this or that respect, given these or 
those circumstances.  Risks are neither purely objective events nor purely 
subjective events; they belong to the objective-relational features of 
existence.  Risks appear in the dangerous zone of contact between 
physical events and social routines (Gregersen, 2003, p359). 
Consequently, risk means different things to different people (Hutter, 2005). 
 Page 28 of 407 
Risk managers in institutions recognise that perceptions of risk vary 
among managers, senior management, academics, students and the 
governing body.  For example, the personnel function will have a very 
different perception of risk to an academic department working in 
biotechnology research (HEFCE, 2005, p8). 
In investigating different perceptions of risk, many studies focus on public 
response to hazards such as cancer, BSE and engineering failures (Gigerenzer, 
2003; Rothstein, 2002; Pate-Cornell, 1996).  The topics in the July 2009 issue of 
the journal Risk Analysis included food security, influenza infection, chloroprene 
carcinogenicity, terrorism, location of nuclear-related facilities, and accidents 
and unpleasant incidents, illustrating a focus on risk as hazard.  Adams (1995) 
suggests that defining risk as a way to deal with physical hazards creates 
unnecessary misunderstanding, especially given the common usage of ‘risk’ and 
‘hazard’ as synonyms.  The reductionist approach of equating outcomes with 
physical harm neglects the multitude of negative outcomes that people associate 
with risks (Renn, 1998). 
 
A systematic classification of risk perspectives (Table 2.1) identifies seven 
approaches to risk management, dependent on academic discipline (Renn, 
1992).   
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Table 2.1  Systematic Classification of Risk Perceptions 
Source: Renn (1992, Figure 3.1) 
 
Technical analyses within these perspectives are linked to the narrow definition 
of undesirable effects, confining possibilities to numerical probabilities.  The 
need for integration of both social and physical factors in risk studies is 
advocated. 
As with most extreme positions, the positivistic view of risk and the 
social constructivist view are poor descriptions of reality (Renn, 1992, 
p54). 
Hacking (1999) illustrates how many ideas are not based on fact but social 
construction (eg: classifications such as dolomite and child abuse), but queries 
the value of stating things are socially constructed.  However, he suggests it may 
be relevant when the types are interactive ie: being aware of being categorised as 
‘abused’ may affect subsequent perceptions of self and behaviour.  Rocks so 
classified remain unaffected.  In this study, the emphasis is on aspects of 
operational risk linked to organisational aims (themselves a social construction) 
to which interactive and reflexive responses are expected.   
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The University performs some quantitative assessment of risks (e.g., chemical 
exposure).  The research does not plan to analyse the accuracy of such 
calculations.  The emphasis on qualitative contribution to the assessment process 
recognises that reliable data is often not available in relation to identified risks.   
Risks are culturally constructed not because people prefer make-believe 
to facts, but because, at the point of decision, insufficient ‘facts’ are 
available (Adams, 1995, p194). 
The recent emphasis on controlling risk within organisations reflects the 
distinction between risk and danger drawn by Luhmann (1990a, 2005) in which 
risk is understood as future damage that is linked to decisions (i.e. internal to an 
organisation or individual); danger is attributed to factors over which we have 
no influence.  Newspaper accounts reveal that organisations, and society more 
generally, link risks to decision-making (e.g., Northern Rock (2007); Icelandic 
Banks (2008); Lehmann Brothers (2008); CAA unprepared for volcanic ash 
cloud (2010); Goldman Sachs fraud charges (2010); BP oil spill (2010); RBS 
fined £5.6m for breaches in risk controls (2010).  Risk, as opposed to danger, 
implies a form of management oriented towards decision-making (Luhmann, 
1996; Power, 1997).   
 
This notion links to the idea that risks originate in the social organisation of 
knowledge and norms rather than in nature itself (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1998).  
An awareness of the impact of organisational decisions on society is reflected in 
the emergence of operational risk management.  Such a conception aims to 
reduce risks to organisations themselves, and consequently, to society.   
Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself (Beck 1992, 
p21). 
This view does not recognise the reduction of risks that also accompanies 
technological advancement.  Historical evidence indicates a positive correlation 
between the advance of science and technology and increases in longevity and 
material well-being (Adams, 1995).  It also raises the question of when 
modernisation commenced. 
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In contrast, some authors focussing on organisations consider risk in a positive 
light.  Anderson (1999) believes the traditional view of risk, that it is bad and 
something to be avoided is fast becoming outmoded.  A single definition of risk 
remains elusive, but for this study, with its emphasis on HEFCE governance, the 
regulatory description of risk is most relevant. 
The threat or possibility that an action or event will adversely or 
beneficially affect an organisation’s ability to achieve its objectives 
(HEFCE, 01/028, p5). 
This conception of risk as a social construct has serious implications for the 
calculability of risk outcomes.  The risk management process needs to take 
account of anything that helps or hinders achievement of aims.   
 
The analysis of risk has its origin in probability theory in which the uncertainty 
of outcome is incorporated.  It is instructive to recognise the properties of risk 
and uncertainty as distinctive categories.  Most importantly, uncertainty is a 
concept in its own right (Froud, 2003). 
By ‘uncertain knowledge’, let me explain.  I do not merely mean to 
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The 
game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the 
prospect of a Victory bond being drawn.  Or, again, the expectation of 
life is only slightly uncertain.  Even the weather is only moderately 
uncertain.  The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper or the rate 
of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, 
[…].  About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever.  We simply do not know (Keynes, 
1973, p213–4). 
Uncertainty exists when the consequences of decisions only emerge in a distant 
future.  Dynamic society undermines calculability in the long term, regardless of 
what is known now (Froud, 2003) since the future is a complex product of 
multiple decisions.  
The scientific approach to risk—the Royal Society approach to risk—
assumes that uncertainty is a problem that can be cracked by science 
(Adams, 1995, p195). 
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Predicting the future using historical data or events has an inherent weakness if 
causal factors are not understood, as illustrated by the example of chickens fed 
daily by someone who ultimately wrings their neck (Russell, 1912).  Skilled 
mathematicians are unable to predict future events.  Taleb (2007) provides an 
example that illustrates the problem well: Robert Merton Jr, and Myron Scholes3 
founded a large speculative trading firm called Long-Term Capital Management; 
a collection of people from the highest ranks of academia whose ideas of 
portfolio theory inspired their risk management of possible outcomes on an 
industrial scale.  Then, during the summer of 1998, a combination of large 
events, triggered by the Russian financial crisis, took place that lay outside their 
models.  The firm went bust and almost took down the entire financial system 
with it, as the exposures were massive.  Although it is clear with hindsight that 
the distribution of data they used for analysis was not known, their models ruled 
out the possibility of large deviations, and they allowed themselves to take an 
enormous amount of risk, while believing it to be small.  MBAs in business 
schools still learn portfolio theory, and the option formula went on bearing the 
name Black-Scholes-Merton (Taleb, 2007). 
 
A further complication for prediction arises from our need to make sense of the 
world.  Compression of information is vital and ability to remember requires 
information to be arranged and summarised.  As simplification occurs more 
order is put in and the world appears less random than it is.  Stories are easier to 
remember than statistics. 
We will tend to more easily remember those facts from our past that fit a 
narrative, while we tend to neglect others that do not appear to play a 
causal role in that narrative (Taleb, 2007, p70). 
Furthermore, conflict among divergent interests with alternative explanations of 
unreliable assessment calculations form another source of uncertainty (Grandori, 
1984). McGrew &Wilson (1982) identify some potential adverse effects in the 
management of uncertainty, such as the game of risk avoidance, the incentive to 
do nothing, allocation of risk responsibility to others (who may not have 
                                                
3 Jointly awarded The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel in 1997 
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authority) and the invention of false risks.  Furthermore, they suggest that in a 
highly uncertain environment, organisations invent complex means to share 
responsibility among many members, reducing the possibility of blaming any 
individual for errors.  In this context, it is interesting that risk management ‘best 
practice’ encourages the widespread involvement of staff. 
 
Availability of information is also a source of uncertainty within an 
organisation, defined as:  
The difference between the amounts of information required to perform 
the task and the amount of information already possessed by the 
organisation (Galbraith, 1977, p283). 
Uncertainty associated with lack of information, and uncertainty as described by 
Keynes, differ in the sense that an organisation has greater control over the 
former (Berry et al, 2005).  In addition, the aims of an activity, the expected 
outcomes and the means or how to achieve an aim, may lack clarity (Henry & 
Walker, 1991).  Uncertainty is not simply a lack of sufficient or pertinent 
information; it is also difficult to interpret too much data, including proliferation 
of policies, procedures and control requirements.  Ellis & Shpielberg (2003) 
found that information gathering increases uncertainty when information 
elaboration mechanisms are not used, and they suggest that information overload 
increases the risk of being unable to comprehend and use it effectively in a 
decision, e.g., a risk register listing 539 risks.  The possibility of reducing some 
forms of uncertainty, for example, by production or collection of data to support 
disclosure requirements can mask the inherent uncertainty underlying such 
outputs.   
 
This section has shown that the historical shift from statistical calculation of 
probabilities towards socially constructed notions of risk centred on 
organisational aims is problematic in relation to risk assessment outputs.  Since 
uncertainty underlies attempts to measure risks to organisations and defies 
mathematical analysis, there is little choice but to include less quantified 
approaches in assessing operational risk.   The following section goes on to use 
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examples from the HEFCE (2001) guidance to illustrate features of the 
assessment process itself. 
 
2.4 Assessing Risk 
This section provides an important critical evaluation of the risk assessment 
process, which forms a key part of risk management models.  It formed the 
focus for this study because identification and assessment of risk were expected 
to reveal detailed interpretations of risk management and control more generally.  
Furthermore, since the normative model includes formal risk assessment it is 
important to understand this stage in the risk management process.  A problem 
with one stage of a process impacts on overall process effectiveness (Slack et al, 
2009).  All risk assessments aim to estimate severity and likelihood of risks 
occurring in order to make comparisons with (usually pre-defined) acceptability 
criteria.  The following figure illustrates a ‘traffic light’ indicator of 


















Figure 2.1 Assessment Rating Grid  
(HEFCE, 2001, p19, Figure 5) 
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The guidance suggests mitigation of risks rated in the ‘A’ category.  Models for 
risk assessment range from quantitative (calculation of meaningful numbers), to 
semi-quantitative (some use of numbers integrates with value judgements, for 
example, about the efficacy of administrative control systems).  At the other end 
of the spectrum lies qualitative assessment in which words such as ‘rare’ or 
‘likely’ are used to describe the likelihood, and severity is classed in a range 
from ‘insignificant’ to ‘catastrophic’.  This process underlying formal risk 
management models is an essential step towards prioritising the vast array of 
potential risks. 
Whatever scale is chosen, it must be relevant to the institution, be easily 
understood and provide a common formula for participants to assess the 
risks.  It is a guide, and as such does not have to be an exact science 
(HEFCE, 2001, p20). 
The combination of frequency and severity provides a risk rating or score, and 
the HEFCE requirement of a ‘formula’ for assessment implies a calculative 
approach, but paradoxically they stress that accuracy is not important.  There is a 
general lack of agreement about the design of risk assessment processes. 
There is no commonly accepted definition of risk either among or 
between the professional and academic groups developing and using risk 
assessment, and there is no internationally agreed upon procedural 
standard defining steps of the risk assessment tool (Cowell et al, 2002, 
p879). 
The literature suggests that qualitative aspects of assessment are difficult to 
understand and predict, thus quantitative models are preferred where possible 
(Krimsky & Golding, 1992).  However, many weaknesses and difficulties are 
identified in relation to quantitative risk assessment itself.  
There is much empirical evidence of the lack of ‘scientific objectivity’ in 
risk assessment illustrated by a number of contrasting findings about the 
carcinogenicity or toxicology of chemicals in Britain and the United 
States (Horlick-Jones, 1998, p81). 
Estimating low-probability events is acknowledged difficult when calculations 
are possible, and Kunreuther et al (1984) suggest that there is no practical basis 
for precisely estimating the statistical chance and consequences of the 
occurrence of certain types of accident.  However, HEFCE guidance disagrees 
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about the difficulty of predicting frequency and states ‘assessing the likelihood 
of a risk occurring tends to be more straightforward’ (HEFCE, 2001, p20).   
 
The National Research Council Governing Board Committee on the Assessment 
of Risk highlights one way in which quantitative assessments present a source of 
risk. 
While quantitative risk assessment facilitates comparison, such 
comparison may be illusory or misleading if the use of precise numbers 
is unjustified (NRC, 1981, p15).  
Even for physical threats, most risk analysts recognize that risk estimation 
involves uncertainties and subjective judgements and that two risk analysts may 
therefore produce widely differing assessments of the same hazard (Kunreuther 
et al, 1984).  The defining characteristic of measurement in comparison to 
guessing or judging is that the former should not depend on who is doing it and 
is in principle replicable (Power, 2004b).  Consequently, most risk estimates are 
not true measurements.  Otway (1992) considers it is only possible to ‘measure’ 
relatively uninteresting risks for which there are statistical or epidemiological 
data, and suggests that the risk assessment process is useful, not for risk 
estimates generated, but for what is learnt about the system from the process.  
 
The emphasis on quantitative assessment requires a tacit assumption that risks 
can be treated as concrete physical entities that can be precisely defined and 
unambiguously measured in objective terms (Hood & Jones, 1996).  The 
ontology of risk indicates a fundamental problem with this premise, especially in 
the light of socially constructed aims and objectives as a focus for the HEFCE 
risk definition.  The recognition that not all risk are amenable to calculative 
models to produce probabilities or to estimate Value at Risk (VAR) provides the 
foundation for a critique of the application of a technical approach to operational 
risk management (Froud, 2003).  Refining scientific tools is unlikely to address 
this problem (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992).   
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In situations of uncertainty, quantitative methods are inappropriate, and risk 
assessment has little alternative but to include qualitative factors.  Consequently, 
the consistency of the numerical values relating to particular risks is not the sole 
interest; variability in the selection of the types of risks to be assessed is likely, 
since there are multiple aims within an organisation (Hutter, 2005).  Empirical 
support for this suggestion is evident in a recent case study of two UK banks. 
Many organizational actors consider risk to belong to realms beyond 
computation, and mobilize risk controls to serve other ends such as 
learning and ‘ammunition’ to capital allocation debates (Mikes, 2009, 
p21). 
This situation can result in competition and conflict between different groups in 
an organisation.  While the risk assessment process identifies the need for 
mitigating actions to reduce risk to ‘acceptable’ levels, these cannot be precisely 
defined to suit all perspectives.  Even in relation to physical hazards, acceptable 
levels of risk can never be answered just by explaining how nature and 
technology interact (Adams, 1995).  What needs to be explained is how people 
agree to ignore most of the potential risks that surround them and interact to 
concentrate only on selected aspects (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  The 
question of what constitutes acceptable or tolerable risk to members of an 
organisation and how this translates into risk management activity is 
fundamental to understanding the basis on which risk decisions are made (Hutter 
& Power, 2005; Mikes, 2009).  For organisations, risk acceptability is 
influenced by how external groups interpret outputs and the risk assessment 
process may be designed with stakeholders in mind (Hood et al, 2001).   
One important consideration in designing a risk management process is 
whether it will provide sufficient evidence to enable governors to support 
any disclosure statements they wish to make to reassure external 
stakeholders (HEFCE, 2001, p5). 
Consequently, organisations reassure outside audiences about risk concerns 
through disclosure documents, and Clarke (1999) conceives of such paperwork 
as fantasy documents that help organisations translate uncertainty into 
acceptable risk. 
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In other contexts, Adams (1995) illustrates that degree of control has a 
significant influence on the risks people are prepared to accept, and are iterative 
such that increased perceptions of control, such as seat-belts in cars, can result in 
less cautious driving behaviour and increased deaths.  Reactions to risk depend 
on the degree to which it is voluntary (scuba diving and other dangerous sports); 
unavoidable (public transport) or imposed (air quality, proximity of a nuclear 
power station); the degree to which we feel in control (driving) or at the mercy 
of others (plane travel); and the degree to which the source of possible danger is 
benign (doctor's orders); indifferent (nature) or malign (murder and terrorism) 
(Bjerkle, 2006, citing Adams).  Within organisations, degree of control draws 
authority and power into the formulation of risk perceptions since a lack of 
control serves to reduce tolerance to risk. 
Judgements about risks are very powerfully influenced by whether they 
are seen as voluntary or imposed (Adams & Thompson, 2002). 
Risk rating and risk tolerability are not the only factors to weigh in the 
assessment.  A decision to act on a risk problem depends less on the magnitude 
of the risk than on the organisational possibility of acting (Otway, 1992), 
emphasising that risk management activities require authority and power within 
the organisation.  In addition, the desire for uncertainty reduction is an influence 
on risk management outcomes (Bernstein, 1996a, Bradac, 2001), suggesting a 
preference for managing those risks that can be addressed easily.  
 
The search for possible risk mitigation actions is likely to cease when an 
acceptable solution is found, not necessarily the best solution, described as 
'satisficing' (Simon, 1997a).  In the case of operational risk management, 
assessment considers whether the rating been brought within acceptable limits, 
not whether the rating is the lowest achievable.  This contrasts with traditional 
safety risk assessments that aim to reduce risk to a level that is ‘As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) (Health & Safety at Work Act, 1974).  The 
risk ratings and risk acceptability criteria produce an expression of acceptable 
risk for the organisation, often termed ‘risk appetite’, against which risk ratings 
are measured.   
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The very idea of risk ‘appetite’, which is at the heart of risk management 
practice, is closely bound up with the neoliberal postulation of 
organizations as ‘enterprising’ selves.  Whereas a longstanding public 
sector tradition in health and safety has operated with the notion of risk 
‘tolerance’, the category of ‘risk appetite’ has a less precautionary 
connotation and is aligned with that of the enterprising actor (Power, 
2009, p2). 
While qualitative understandings of risk appetite are possible (COSO, 2004), the 
dominant conception is that of a quantitative benchmark such as maintaining a 
target level of financial capital (Power, 2009).  Within the HE sector the concept 
of risk appetite is under-developed and is not always clearly defined by 
institutions (HEFCE, 2005).  The conception of ‘appetite’ as a singular input 
into risk management models reflects the control system conception of risk 
management.  However, a model of institutionalized conflict between different 
‘appetites’ is possible (Hood & Jones, 1996).  
…preferences cannot be consistently aggregated and it is clear that 
organizations, as much as societies, are constituted by varieties of risk 
appetites which change over time and according to context (Power, 2009, 
p3). 
The organisation needs to assess and balance dynamic and evolving 
interpretations of operational risk.  This section has outlined the key elements of 
the risk assessment process. This study specifically chose to focus on these 
assessment activities, rather than risk management as a whole.  However, in the 
organisational context, management control systems influence risk 
identification, thus the broader aspects of risk management warrant discussion in 
the following section. 
   
2.5 Managing Risk 
This section will examine features of risk management that interact with risk 
interpretation to produce assessment outputs.  Reflecting the lack of an agreed 
definition of risk, interpretations of risk management also vary.   
The current trend toward integrated or ‘holistic’ risk management has not 
yet led to convergence or integration of the terms, concepts and models 
applied to the management of risk (Shimpi, 2001, p11). 
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The conception of risk as failure to achieve corporate aims (HEFCE, 2001) 
suggests organisations already manage many such risks and the risk 
management framework contributes to existing strategic control mechanisms.  
Simons (1994) suggests that resting on the foundation of internal control 
systems there are four ‘Levers of Control’ to drive business strategy.  Firstly, 
belief systems, which define basic values, purpose and direction to guide 
opportunity seeking; secondly, boundary systems, formally sanctioned rules and 
credible threat of punishment; thirdly, diagnostics control systems, monitoring 
organisational outcomes compared to preset standards of performance; and 
lastly, interactive control systems, which support decision-making of 
subordinates.  Studying the implementation of HEFCE governance, a strategic 
aim of the case study organisation, provides a window onto the operation of 
these levers.  
 
Some difficulties have been acknowledged in obtaining the buy-in of academic 
staff to the benefits of explicit risk management, particularly if the process is 
owned by a central administrative function (HEFCE, 2005).  The academic 
culture within universities is identified as a possible barrier to success in risk 
management implementation since many decisions about academic work are 
decided informally under the skin of established and formal arrangements, 
defying the reach of managerial control (Dearlove, 1998a).   
 
The involvement of a broad cross-section of staff in the risk management 
process is recommended (HEFCE, 2001), and the point is made that both non-
academic and academic staff have already been carrying out risk management 
without necessarily knowing it and may be more willing to be involved if they 
are made aware of this through training (HEFCE, 2005).  Many existing control 
systems perform a ‘risk management’ role.  
The management of risk is not a linear process; rather it is the balancing 
of a number of interwoven elements which interact with each other and 
which have to be in balance with each other if risk management is to be 
effective (Treasury, 2004, p13). 
Organisations deal with complexity via differentiated structures and procedures 
and consequently create sub-goals (Berry et al, 2005), providing a mechanism 
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for multiple and conflicting aims (Perrow, 1970; Mikes, 2004).  For the 
organisation as a whole, this can result in gaps in control systems with some 
risks being ignored by all, since they are seen to fall outside the job description, 
or operational umbrella of the group (Power, 2004a).  Krimsky (1992) takes the 
view that group and social context play the primary role in the selection and 
response to risk, suggesting that common viewpoints develop within sub-groups 
in an organisation.  The question arises as to whether role influences the way in 
which risk management is practiced, aims are balanced and control systems are 
implemented.   
 
A role is not a system of prescribed behaviours but a system of prescribed 
decision premises.  Roles tell organisation members how to reason about the 
problems and decisions that face them: where to look for appropriate and 
legitimate informational premises and goal (evaluative) premises, and what 
techniques to use in processing these premises (Simon, 1991). 
 
Studying the dynamics of risk management includes the interactions between 
risk and other management controls (Mikes, 2009).  Assessment ratings are 
recommended to reflect net risk by taking account of such management controls 
(HEFCE, 2001).  HEFCE define control or mitigating action as: 
… an action taken to reduce the likelihood of a risk occurring, or to limit 
its adverse consequences (HEFCE, 2001, p6). 
The underlying implication of the net risk approach is an organisational ability 
to assess and rate management control effectiveness.  There is variable 
understanding in the HE sector of the concepts of gross and net risk and some 
institutions were unclear as to what their ratings actually showed (HEFCE, 
2005).  Furthermore, it is interesting to note the asymmetry between the HEFCE 
definition of risk, stating possible positive and negative outcomes in relation to 
objectives, whereas the control or mitigating actions definition only reflects 
reduction of unwanted events, a more negative interpretation of risk.  This 
emphasis pushes the meaning of risk in the direction of a pessimistic notion of 
avoidance of unwanted events.  Consequently, the search for opportunities is not 
encouraged; the least risky approach may be to do nothing. 
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The impact of the effectiveness of internal controls introduces an additional 
measurement challenge, in requiring organisations to assess dynamic and 
interrelated processes.  Variability in risk identification also prevents the 
calculation of a ‘risk appetite’ that is appropriate to all organisation members, 
making acceptable risk difficult to establish.  
 
This section has illustrated the problematic nature of risk management, and 
points to some potential flaws in the model that the research questions have been 
designed to investigate.  The following section will describe the nature of 
governance reforms in the private sector, from which the HEFCE guidance 
derives. 
 
2.6 Private Sector Governance Reforms 
This section will review the emphasis of corporate governance on control of 
risks.  In the wake of several major financial scandals, such as Enron, the 
Maxwell group and Barings Bank, private sector4 financial governance was 
amended to include risk management.  In the UK, the formalisation of 
requirements for risk management activities for companies publicly listed on the 
stock exchange began with the Cadbury Code (1992), and culminated in the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2003) 
requiring a framework of ‘prudent and effective’ controls enabling risk to be 
assessed and managed.  The code recommends that ‘non-executive directors’5 
scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed objectives and 
monitor performance reports to satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial 
information and control and that systems of risk management are robust and 
defensible.   
 
                                                
4 Those organisations that are not owned or funded by government, including non-profit 
organisations, make up the private sector. 
5 A ‘non-executive director’ has no responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the 
organisation 
 Page 43 of 407 
The reports from the Treadway Commission (COSO, 2004) and the Turnbull 
Committee (ICAEW, 1999), advocate Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as a 
framework for capturing risks that are material from the point of view of the 
achievement of the strategic objectives of the enterprise (Mikes, 2009).  The key 
principles of the Turnbull guidance (1999) have been adopted by HEFCE and 
are discussed in depth in the following section (see Table 2.3).   
 
The recommended ‘best practice’ model utilises the ERM approach to holistic 
management of risk in organisations and introduces various institutional routines 
and decision aids to assess and control elements that can affect the survival, 
reputation, or shareholder value of an enterprise (Hood et al, 2001).  It is a 
structured and disciplined approach to aligning strategy, processes, people, 
technology and knowledge in evaluating and managing the uncertainties that an 
organisation faces (Berry et al, 2005).  This perspective acknowledges the 
attempt to control uncertainty, not risk.  Despite best practice claims, the 
implementation of ERM in the private sector has not been entirely successful.  
In a survey of corporate practices only 11% of companies claim to have fully 
implemented comprehensive ERM programs (Gates, 2006).  Another study 
(Deloitte, 2007) suggests that questions remain about the right organisational 
level of analysis (at enterprise level or different business unit levels).  A survey 
by Deloitte states that: 
For all the hype, however, ERM continues to be an elaborate concept 
that varies widely in definition and implementation, and reaching full 
maturity may take several years (Deloitte, 2004, p17). 
Consequently, although measuring operational risk in absolute terms is 
desirable, it remains ‘work in progress’ within the private sector.  Mikes (2005) 
suggests that ERM remains an elusive and under-specified concept and 
quantifying operational risks, which are largely dependent on unpredictable 
human responses, is difficult and may lack benefit.  
 
The Turnbull Guidance (ICAEW, 1999) has had a significant influence on ‘best 
practice’ contained in risk management models in both the private and public 
sector.  In 2004, a review of the guidance strongly endorsed retention of the 
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flexible, principles-based approach of the original guidance and made only a 
small number of changes (FRC, 2005).  The guidance outlines to directors 
appropriate internal controls to meet the requirements of the Combined Code 
(FRC, 2003) for listed companies.  However, its influence has been more far-
reaching, and it is recommended in the UK public sector generally (Treasury, 
2004; HEFCE, 2001). 
A company's system of internal control has a key role in the management 
of risks that are significant to the fulfilment of its business objectives. A 
sound system of internal control contributes to safeguarding the 
shareholders' investment and the company's assets (FRC, 2005, p3) 
The guidance requires an annual review of control system effectiveness, but 
does not elaborate on methods to use.  Evaluating control systems is 
fundamentally difficult because they are not static systems, but dynamic, self-
controlling systems (Otley, 2003), their effectiveness is consequently difficult to 
measure and there is little guidance on defined scales or targets against which to 
assess.  Perrow (1986) considers that organisations implement three different 
types of controls, illustrating varying degrees of accessibility to audit and 
measurement.  Direct controls are fully obtrusive ones, such as giving orders, 
direct surveillance, and rules and regulations (which are considered expensive 
and reactive).  Bureaucratic controls are embodied in specialisation, 
standardisation, and hierarchy, which are unobtrusive by comparison (and 
viewed as more efficient).  Fully unobtrusive controls are instituted by 
influencing the cognitive premises underlying action (a method that is even 
more efficient, but difficult to achieve).  Most organisations can readily identify 
direct and bureaucratic controls.  However, unobtrusive controls require in-depth 
case analysis to gain insight into the ways that such control mechanisms operate.  
In addition, for management control to function effectively, communication is 
necessary to ensure that organisation members are kept informed of policies, 
procedures and objectives to which they are expected to conform (Drury, 2005).  
Although policies and procedures may have been issued for a variety of 
processes, it remains unclear whether anyone knows about them without detailed 
investigation. 
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A particularly striking feature of the governance reforms relating to listed 
companies, is that they penalise inattention and incompetence just as much as 
deliberate malfeasance (Crouhy et al, 2006), consequently internal processes for 
demonstrating due diligence are required.   
All parties to discussion in the USA, UK and elsewhere agree that 
something known as ‘box-ticking’ is to blame for an excessively rules-
based approach to regulation and compliance.  This popularized critique 
targets a rigid, mechanical practice involving the use of needlessly 
detailed ‘standardized checklists’ and pursued without regards to 
weighing costs against benefits.  Yet, for all the stridency of these 
ubiquitous criticisms, and their near unanimous acceptance by both 
regulator and regulated, there is a striking and puzzling fact to explain: 
‘box-ticking’ as a finely grained process in some broad sense persists, 
with at best only incremental diminution (Power, 2007, p152). 
The quality of outputs generated by a checklist approach to compliance has been 
questioned.  
Risk reporting in corporate accounts is generally poor.  In Turnbull 
compliant companies information comes from the internal audit function 
and thus has a limited focus on what constitutes risk to an organisation.  
External risk and cultural risk tend to be omitted, yet these risks are 
important to investors and other stakeholders (CIMA, 2007, p29). 
Procedural alibis provide a form of bureaucratic insurance against increasing 
transparency requirements, described as ‘blame prevention engineering’ (Hood 
et al, 2001).   
 
The control system needs to be able to synthesise views from differing 
perspectives.  While there are multiple possibilities for ERM practice in 
organisations, there is a suggestion of conformity of approach; certain common 
features are evident, such as risk policy, rating grids6 and risk registers.  Similar 
structural features are expected in ERM implementation regardless of wide-
ranging differences in organisational context, particularly in relation to 
accountability, responsibility and transparency demands, while at the detailed 
implementation level, risks and risk assessment will vary considerably.  
 
                                                
6 Developed originally for use in assessing physical hazards, the model does not include 
a positive scale; hazards are potential negative outcomes, they do not include 
opportunity.  
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This section has traced the development of private sector governance reforms 
and their influence on risk management implementation and practice.  The 
recommended ERM model, adopted in both the public and private sector, is 
discussed in detail in section 2.8.3.  The following section examines the 
interaction between transparency demands and the identification of risk. 
 
2.7 Transparency, Accountability & Risk 
This section will explore the association between blame and risk identification 
within organisations.  Bureaucratic transparency includes various processes 
through which officeholders are watched by experts or agents such as auditors, 
regulators or tutelary bureaucracies of various kinds (Hood, 2007). 
Transparency has unintended effects such that the making visible starts 
to change that which is rendered transparent (Roberts, 2009, p2). 
The growth of risk management from the mid-1990s onwards (in law, business, 
banking, education, social work, medical practice, etc.) was less about managing 
risk as it is formally understood and more about creating auditable 
representations of due process (Power, 2009).  Monitoring and measurement are 
not new developments. 
Accountability directed toward controlling human performance through 
quantification and written assessments first emerged in education around 
the beginning of the 17th century (Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p5). 
However, recent demands for oversight of internal processes produce a 
particular type of transparency, some distance from notions of access to 
information and the use of statistics, such as infant mortality rates, to enable 
social action.  Risk management encompasses reactivity, such that demands for 
transparency change organisational behaviour in relation to disclosure 
requirements.  Roberts (2009) illustrates that the popularity of transparency as a 
method of control has stimulated many criticisms: 
As Strathern [20007] has observed, what is odd about our embrace of 
transparency is that ‘everyone knows’ about its inadequacies: that 
                                                
7 Dates in square brackets ([]) have been added to this quote from Roberts (2009) using 
references in the paper’s bibliography  
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transparency involves a simplistic abstraction and de-contextualisation 
from the complexity of the world (Strathern), that it undermines trust as 
it seeks to create it (Tsoukas [1997]), encourages deception as it seeks to 
make possible a complete visibility (O’Neill [2006]), promotes blame 
avoidance (Hood [2007]), and transforms organisational purpose into the 
mere management of performance indicators (Power [1997, 2007]). 
(Roberts, 2009, p12). 
In organisations, transparency is linked to accountability for satisfying the 
demands of external oversight, associated with potential for blame, therefore a 
risk.  Organisations cannot eliminate all risks, so they must defend risk decisions 
and produce visible signs of conformance.  Responsibility for risk management 
interacts with capability to mitigate and the potential for blame: 
… responsibility should be defined as discursively constituted by claims, 
accounts or attributions of duty, accountability and capability.  We 
define capability as the means to do the task in terms of authority, 
resources, and access.  We define accountability as the potential to be 
blamed for not doing the task properly (Sillince & Mueller, 2007). 
Accountability implies both implicitly and explicitly the notion of answerability 
and so is inextricably linked to questions of power, control and authority (Perry 
& McWilliam, 2007).  The literature reviewed in this section suggests that 
where authority is lacking, capability and risk tolerance are reduced, 
responsibility is undermined and a protective shield against accountability and 
blame is established through procedural conformance.  The following section 
explores how changes to the regulatory context in HE have placed increasing 
emphasis on transparency and the control of risk. 
 
2.8 The Regulatory Context in Universities 
This section will illustrate the background to risk management implementation 
and includes the transition to New Public Management (NPM) and enforced 
self-regulation with the use of targets and measures, which can be associated 
with accountability and the potential for blame outlined previously.  It goes on 
to examine in depth the recommended ERM model that forms the basis of the 
implementation being studied here. 
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2.8.1 New Public Management 
This section outlines the context for the introduction of risk management 
practices in HE, at a time of the lessening of differences between the 
public and private sector, with emphasis shifting from accountability for 
process to accountability in terms of results (Hood, 1995).  In 
organisational analysis, it is important to understand the context in which 
institutions operate (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Pugh, 1973).  A brief 
historical review of the HE sector provides the background for these 
changes.  In the period from 1962 to 1995, as the number of HE students 
rose five-fold to 1.7 million, public expenditure increased from £219 
million to around £6.5 billion (Dearlove, 1998a).  The increased number 
of students attending HE required changes to the distribution of funds.  
This trend has continued, the total HEFCE grant in 2008/09 was 
£7.073bn and the number of full-time students accepted on to 
undergraduate courses rose from 390,890 in 2006 to 413,430 in 2007 
(Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Press Release, 2008).  
The financial burden of the move from teaching a small elite at 
universities to mass education, essential to fulfilling societal goals, could 
not be sustained.  
Our aim is to promote and provide the opportunity of successful 
participation in higher education to everyone who can benefit 
from it.  This is vital for social justice and economic 
competitiveness (HEFCE web site 7/2/7). 
In England, until the 1980s, the regulatory model was that of state-
backed professional autonomy, where the major driver of the institutional 
framework of rules and incentives was the tradition of collegial 
governance and academic autonomy (Dearlove, 1998a).  Rather than 
government actions and market forces, the assurance of academic 
standards relied on use of professional values, as found, for example, in 
the external examining system (King, 2006).  Reduced funding per head 
in the 1980s required university management to focus on organising 
efficiently and doing more with less, and the announcement of changes to 
university funding in 2010, can be expected to continue this trend.  In the 
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1990s, issues of governance, accountability and openness come to the 
fore, accompanied by a transition to ‘managerialism’. 
Managerialism in universities refers to a process that has 
involved a power shift away from a bottom heavy, consensual, 
collegial democracy of rough professional equals towards a 
keener assertion of top down authority by the vice-chancellor and 
the senior management team of academic managers and full-time 
administrators (Dearlove, 1998b, p68). 
Alongside the emphasis on management control, the shift in regulatory 
approach introduces elements of competition and a market for services, 
and the adoption of ‘best practice’ guidance developed for use within the 
private sector.  The administrative changes in the management of public 
institutions has involved:  
A shift of concern from policy to management, emphasizing 
quantifiable performance measurement and investment appraisal; 
the break up of traditional bureaucratic structures into quasi-
autonomous units, dealing with one another on a user-pays basis; 
market testing and competitive tendering instead of in-house 
provision; a strong emphasis on cost-cutting; output targets rather 
than input controls; limited term contracts instead of career 
tenure; monetized incentives instead of fixed salaries; ‘freedom 
to manage’ instead of central personnel control; more use of 
public relations and advertising and the encouragement of self-
regulation instead of legislation (Dunsire, 1999, p373).  
In the University context, an important aspect of NPM is the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), extending the role of the private sector in the 
provision of what are generally considered public services (such as 
health, education, transport infrastructure, prisons and the administration 
of the functions of the state).  Universities sign contracts with private 
sector partners to design, finance, build and manage assets and to deliver 
associated services (Froud, 2003); Public/Private Partnership (PPP) is 
encouraged.  The Department of Health outline the arrangement:   
Private consortia, usually involving large construction firms, are 
contracted to design, build, and in some cases manage new 
projects.  Contracts typically last for 30 years, during which time 
the building is leased by a public authority (Department of Health 
website, Nov 2007). 
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Contracts have become a familiar part of NPM, and are evident in the 
PFI arrangements at the University.  Froud (2003) suggests that contracts 
assert and imply new relations and a control over the unfolding future, as 
well as signifying a new kind of management.  Contracts specify a series 
of outputs that private sector providers must make available, outlining a 
division of responsibilities, management and authority; potential risks are 
transferred between parties.  Such partnership arrangements provide a 
convenient property of spreading the blame when things go wrong, 
contributing to their current popularity in public management (Hood, 
2007).  Criticisms in the press (and Froud, 2003) suggest that, as with 
any form of hire purchase, buying a product over a long period is more 
expensive than buying it with cash up front, especially since 
governments can borrow cash at a cheaper rate than the private sector.  In 
addition, there is a question about how much risk is genuinely transferred 
to the private sector given the government's record of bailing out private 
companies managing troubled public services (Guardian, 15/1/03).  PFI 
aligns with UK Government policy both in its focus on risk management 
and in its emphasis on private sector practices within the public sector.  
 
There are both critics and supporters of NPM changes within the HE 
sector.  Some believe that corporate approaches improve institutional 
decision-making and response time, while others have documented 
disadvantages including lower morale, interpersonal and organisational 
conflict and loss of institutional values and integrity (Kesar & Eckel, 
2004).  Gorz (1989, in Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997) considers that some 
activities are rightly conducted according to economic reason whilst 
others, such as education, are not, and should not, be governed by such 
reasoning.  The paper ‘Management of Risk, Principles & Concepts’ 
(Treasury, 2004), identified private sector corporate governance as an 
appropriate agenda for public sector organisations to use in evaluating 
the risks they face in delivering services (Froud, 2003) and raises the 
question of the applicability of profit maximisation models to the HE 
environment.   
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The pursuit of risk is the source of profit and the management of 
risk is concerned with the avoidance of loss (Willman et al, 2006, 
p1371). 
Pursuing risk for increased profit does not ally closely with the ethos of 
universities, but the achievement of organisational aims involves aligning 
control systems with strategic objectives, providing a similar focus for 
risk management models in HE.  There is considerable variation in 
opinion about the impact of NPM on educational establishments.  
Any assessment of NPM will usually depend on the values of the 
assessor and only partly on hypotheses about causes and effects 
(Gruening, 2001, p21). 
Broadbent & Laughlin (1997) consider that NPM is driven in general by 
the desire to generate ‘good management’.  However, they make the 
point that there has been little empirical evidence to support the view that 
NPM results in more effective and efficient organisations.   
 
Since organisations have freedom of choice in how to comply with ERM 
demands to manage risks on an organisation-wide basis, and increasing 
transparency raises the spectre of individual responsibility, emphasis 
shifts towards risk (Culpitt, 1999).  The external environment in which 
HE takes place now records risk assessment outcomes on forms, utilising 
statistical methods in many areas where personal relationships would 
previously have formed the basis for decisions.  This is an example of  
‘action-at-a-distance’ (Foucault, 1979) in which "statistics, it is now 
argued, serve and sustain the disciplinary surveillance of professionals" 
(Culpitt, 1999, p56).  The expansion of this type of control is evident 
throughout the public sector, and there are concerns about potential 
negative outcomes in relation to performance measurement.  In the case 
of the death of ‘Baby P’, the Director of Children’s Services for the 
borough was described as ‘a bureaucrat more concerned with 
performance ratings and graphs showing progress than the welfare of 
children’ (Guardian, 1/12/08).  The Better Regulation Review Group 
(2004) recognise that measures associated with performance assessment 
can result in unintended consequences and that the problem is often 
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overlooked; while a proposal seems rational, they suggest that 
nevertheless institutions or their staff will respond in a way that is 
interpreted as irrational.    
 
This section has revealed the need for a more detailed understanding of 
the interrelationship between targets and the identification of risk.  The 
following section explores the regulatory mechanisms underlying the 
implementation of risk management ‘best practice’. 
 
2.8.2 Regulatory Approach to Risk Governance  
This section will examine an important mechanism to encourage 
implementation of risk governance in HE; the dual role of HEFCE, firstly 
as a provider of university funding and, additionally, as regulator of HE 
institutions (activities detailed in Table 2.2).   
 
Funding Regulation 
• Distribute money to universities 
and colleges for HE teaching, 
research and related activities 
• Fund programmes to support the 
development of HE 
• Provide money to further 
education colleges for their HE 
programmes 
• Monitor the financial and 
managerial health of 
universities and colleges 
• Ensure the quality of teaching 
is assessed 
• Provide guidance on good 
practice 
 
Table 2.2  HEFCE Activities  
(Source: HEFCE website 'What we do' downloaded 7/2/7) 
 
The introduction of governance through production of guidelines and 
‘best practice’ relies on organisations choosing to implement guidance in 
preference to enforcement through legal controls, and has been described 
as ‘self-regulation’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  HEFCE risk 
management governance is embodied in guidance and it is not a 
requirement for HE establishments to follow this advice.  Procedures are 
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not prescribed8 and the organisation is free to decide on the processes 
needed to achieve compliance with targets and guidelines established by 
the regulator.   
The benefits of risk management vary depending on how it is 
planned and implemented.  A minimalist approach is likely to 
deliver limited benefits and could well turn into a bureaucratic 
'tick box' exercise.  Conversely, a wholehearted though 
misguided approach could waste valuable time and resources, for 
example by an over-emphasis on data collection.  Each institution 
will need to decide what benefits it would like to derive from its 
risk management programme and, taking into account good 
practice, plan its approach accordingly (HEFCE, 2001, p6). 
Despite a lack of evidence in relation to risk management practices and 
claimed improvements, universities are encouraged to self-regulate and 
implement good practice guides, driven by the threat that it will be too 
late to catch up with competitors once the benefits are evident.  A review 
of HE risk governance implementation found that institutions are moving 
from achieving technical compliance with the Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 
1999) and with HEFCE recommendations (2001), and are now looking to 
realise the benefits of having implemented risk management, including 
the ability to take better-informed decisions about opportunities, and to 
constructively address new patterns of risk (HEFCE, 2005).   
 
In addition, the funding role of HEFCE maintains the threat of financial 
sanctions for non-compliant organisations.  Self-regulation is considered 
‘enforced’ when funding is linked to compliance.  Enforced self-
regulation is one way in which public policy can effectively delegate 
government regulation, representing a middle path between self-
regulation and command and control government (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992).  There is an increasing use of this style of governance within the 
public sector in both education and the National Health Service (Hood et 
al, 2001; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002).  
                                                
8 The term risk register is not mentioned in the HEFCE 2001 guidance.  Their 
production has been a common compliance response (HEFCE, 2005). 
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Regulated organisations must take account of regulatory guidance to 
ensure access to funding.  
To maintain support from important suppliers of resources, 
organisations constrain their actions to comply with the request 
of those with resource control (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p139). 
In this study, such a request is evident in the risk management guidance 
recommended by HEFCE.  In addition, some parts of an organisation 
interact more frequently with external groups than others, and are reliant 
on them for access to funds.  In the case study University, the focus here, 
Medical Schools have a close relationship with the NHS, and need to 
take account of their governance and aims, while other groups do not.  
Enforced self-regulation is a response to the administrative difficulties 
and reduction of innovation that can result from imposing detailed 
government regulations on organisations (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).   
Governments, too, in exercising accountability for the high levels 
of public resources expended on universities need to be careful to 
avoid excessive micro-regulation.  They have to balance the 
requirement for accountability with the recognition that 
creativity, intellectual dynamism and scientific development are 
dependent upon quite high levels of institutional and academic 
autonomy (King, 2006, p5). 
In contrast to command and control regulation (e.g.; Health & Safety; 
Hazardous Waste; road speed limits) where control is exercised through 
standards imposed and backed by the threat of legal sanctions, enforced 
self-regulation combines regulatory guidelines with organisational 
objectives (Baldwin & Cave, 1999), lessening the regulatory burden.   
 
In managing public funds, risk-based regulation has become increasingly 
popular (Rothstein et al, 2006b) in an attempt to ensure efficient and 
effective use of resources.  Such governance seeks to ensure 
proportionate responses in relation to risks, with the establishment of 
appropriate levels of control.  Risk-based regulation is:  
... exemplified by the incorporation of risk assessment and 
management procedures into decision-processes to manage, 
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among other things, organisational priorities, liabilities and 
reputation (Rothstein et al, 2006b, p1056). 
Risk-based self-regulation plays a central role in the administration of 
HE funding, and is linked to accountability within the regulated 
organisation.  
We will take an increasingly risk-based approach to ensuring that 
the public funds we distribute are well spent, relying more on 
well led, governed and managed institutions' own accountability 
processes (HEFCE strategic plan 7/2/7, on web site). 
The scope of this risk-based approach is wide-ranging and diverse 
(Power, 2007); a Treasury report lists 63 national regulatory bodies 
managing risks to the public in the UK (Hampton, 2005).   
 
The Better Regulation Review Group9 (2004) reviewed whether HE 
policies met the principles of good regulation and are of as ‘lightest 
touch’ as possible.  They welcomed the steady emphasis on reducing the 
burden of accountability, particularly in relation to long-term proposals 
for funders to apply a lighter-touch regulatory and accountability regime 
to well-run universities.  In 2008, HEFCE introduced a ‘single 
conversation accountability process’, implying an increasing use of 
statistics and pre-defined performance measures (HEFCE, 2008) 
consistent with the ‘action-at-a-distance’ approach (Foucault, 1979) in 
the context of enforced self-regulation.  The main purpose of the single 
conversation is to simplify the accountability process.  The framework 
puts institutions in control of the risk assessments made about them by 
HEFCE, providing a strong incentive to identify failure to satisfy 
external transparency demands as risks to the organisation and accentuate 
the aspects that are measured.  
For HEIs about which we have no major concerns or queries - the 
great majority of them - the main outcome will be a letter 
updating our risk assessment of the HEI, and data that benchmark 
                                                
9 The Better Regulation Review Group was set up by the Minister for Higher Education 
and Lifelong Learning in March 2003, to oversee the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Better Regulation Task Force Report, Higher Education: 
Easing the burden 
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its financial performance against the whole sector (HEFCE, 
15/2008). 
These changes aim to reduce the administrative costs associated with 
regulatory demands.  In 2004, PA Consulting estimated that the HE 
sector spent 3.6% of its total income (or around £223 million) on 
accountability issues each year and estimated that as a result of more cost 
effective regulation, this had reduced by some 25% since 2000 (HEFCE, 
2007).  
 
An indirect supervisory role for the state relies on HE institutions 
demonstrating a sound system of internal control.  Regulatory targets and 
measures of performance become the indicators of success or failure.  A 
reduction of complexity is valued for its own sake as the basis for a 
shared language to support decision-making and the use of qualities as 
quantities is common where there is a demand for metrics, giving 
measurement systems an ‘invented’ accuracy which reflects wider 
cultural anxieties and the need for numbers (Power, 2004b).  In risk 
assessment, the assignment of risk severity and frequency ratings is 
valued even though potential future events cannot be calculated in any 
meaningful way.  Despite the questionable basis of such measurement 
systems, they direct management attention and can have real 
consequences.  The introduction of managerial systems developed in 
private organisations fosters an approach in which recipients of public 
services (e.g., students and patients) have become customers who utilise 
statistics and league tables as measures of success in exercising market 
choices.  The customer provides the disciplining gaze, whose critical 
stare is internalised as a force of self-control and self-policing, and in this 
climate, schools, universities and hospitals are converted from utilitarian 
institutions into terrains of consumption (Gabriel, 2005).  While 
performance measures are evident in selective research funding, in the 
case of teaching, market forces are allowed to drive quality. 
There are currently no attainment-based public-funding 
implications as is the case with research (Glass et al, 2005, p122).   
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Teaching assessments are published in the Times Educational 
Supplement and league tables are expected to influence the student 
enrolment on which funding is based.  The notion of student as customer 
is reinforced by the payment of university fees.  
 
The introduction of risk management is taking place at a time of 
considerable change in the regulatory environment and technologies of 
control.  A lack of academic engagement with the implementation of 
accountability regimes may have negative outcomes for development of 
the regulatory framework. 
Higher education institutions are large organisations, staffed by 
intelligent people, and with powerful and influential connections.  
In no sense can they credibly cast themselves as innocent victims 
of the system.  If the accountability system is unsatisfactory, at 
least part of the cause lies in the willingness of institutions 
themselves to go along with it; either to refuse to engage at all in 
questioning regulation, or to do so looking solely at the interests 
of their own institution, rather than those of higher education as a 
whole (Better Regulation Review Report, 2004, p6) 
This section has illustrated how the dual role of HEFCE as a funder and 
regulator enforces self-regulation that adopts private sector best practice 
to facilitate access to funds.  The regulator relies on self-monitoring of 
internal controls by the regulated organisations for assurances and data 
outputs.  However, HEFCE had concerns, based on evidence, about the 
reliability of data from across the sector and the move towards ‘lighter 
touch’ regulation.  Universities were in control of the information 
gathered and provided, and unreliable reporting posed a risk to the 
regulator, a situation they describe as ‘not acceptable’, since funding is 
based on such data (HEFCE, 2007/11).  This literature review suggests a 
high potential for unexpected organisational responses to such demands 
for transparency and associated control through risk management to 
achieve organisational aims.  The following section overviews key 
aspects of the ERM model recommended in the HEFCE risk 
management guidance. 
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2.8.3 The HEFCE Risk Management Guidance 
This section details the governance requirements and the risk 
management framework that constitute the self-regulatory normative 
model for the case study institution.  In tune with the NPM pressure to 
adopt private sector practices, in 2001 HEFCE stated that the underlying 
principles of the Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 1999) had been accepted by 
HEFCE as appropriate for the HE sector, and in their Accounts Direction 
(HEFCE Circular Letter 24/2000), set a timetable for implementation.  
Risk management requirements for HE institutions are integral to the 
several key regulatory documents for the sector: the Financial 
Memorandum with HEFCE (HEFCE 2003/54), the Code of Practice for 
accountability and audit (HEFCE 2004/27), the annual accounts direction 
from HEFCE (Circular Letter 23/2003) and are elaborated on in HEFCE 
Circular Letter 12/2002 (HEFCE, 2005).  Compliance with these 
requirements is steered by the Guide to Good Practice Risk Management 
(HEFCE, 2001).  HEFCE risk management governance recommends 
‘best practice’ gleaned from the private sector (in which evidence of the 
benefits is slight at best), embodied as ‘requirements’ with a timetable for 
implementation.  As in the private sector, the guidance emphasises there 
is no single correct approach for all institutions; it rests on the 
organisation itself to define appropriate controls.  
 
The good practice recommendations utilise findings of a 1999 risk 
management survey of 91 HE Institutions to focus advice on the most 
significant areas.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the classification of risks into 
categories. 
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Figure 2.2 Categories of Risk Identified 
  Source: HEFCE, 2001, Figure 4 
 
The grouping of risk into categories has been described as ‘silo’ risk 
management, in which different calculative practices are developed to 
assess each risk type (Mikes, 2009).  HEFCE (2001) recommends an 
integrated approach to risk management, without considering the 
difficulty of reintegrating silos.  If financial losses or gains in each 
category cannot be accurately estimated, this becomes a complicated 
matter.  The guidance also cites key elements of the Turnbull Report 
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Disclosure requirements Assessment Aspects 
of Internal Controls  
Internal Control System 
Requirements 
The governing body 
acknowledges responsibility for 
the system of internal control 
The nature and extent of 
the risks facing the 
organisation 
Embedded in the operation of the 
organisation and form part of its 
culture 
An ongoing process is in place 
for identifying, evaluating and 
managing the significant risks 
The extent and categories 
of risk which it regards as 
acceptable 
Capable of responding quickly to 
evolving risks 
An annual process is in place for 
reviewing the effectiveness of the 
system of internal control 
The likelihood of the risks 
concerned materialising 
 
Procedures for reporting any 
significant control failings 
immediately to appropriate levels 
of management.  This needs 
extension to the governing body, 
where appropriate. 
There is a process to deal with the 
internal control aspects of any 
significant problems disclosed in 
the annual report and accounts. 
The organisation’s ability 
to reduce the incidence 
and impact on the 




Table 2.3  Key Risk Management Elements of the Turnbull Report  
(Source: adapted from HEFCE, 2001, p34) 
 
The table illustrates that the disclosure requirements, in Column 1, are 
auditable, provided responsibility has been acknowledged, and the 
required processes established, no consideration of their effectiveness is 
necessary.  The difficulty of obtaining measurement outputs in relation to 
Column 2, assessment aspects of internal control, form the particular area 
of interest for this thesis, and are discussed in detail within the findings 
chapter.  Column 3 contains elements that require an assessment of risk 
process embedment and responsiveness to risks, neither of which are 
easily measured; and requires a procedure for monitoring of significant 
control failings, which could be verified.  The design of management 
systems using this model is likely to focus on those aspects that are 
measurable or auditable. 
Because some aspects of performance are more difficult to 
quantify and measure, the main danger inherent in modern 
control systems design is that it is these aspects that get relatively 
less emphasis (Otley, 2003, p325). 
Such outcomes are described as ‘narrowing’ by Propper &Wilson (2003), 
characterised as concentration on parts of the process that are included in 
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summary measures linked to the aims of the regulator and access to 
funding, to the detriment of other tasks.   
 
HEFCE suggest that ‘given their expert knowledge and their 
independence’ (HEFCE, 2001, p30), institutions’ own internal audit team 
could usefully undertake the recommended annual review of control 
system effectiveness, placing emphasis on accounting controls.   
 
The trend towards measuring outputs, with professionals and 
organisations being held accountable for their achievement (Berry et al, 
2005) results in a link between the aims of the regulator and risk 
interpretation by members of an organisation.  Targets and assessment 
methods are defined by HEFCE, as the regulatory body.  Since 
operational risk is conceptualised as failure to achieve organisational 
aims (HEFCE, 2001), the research examines how the aims of the 
regulator are interpreted within the University during risk assessment 
activities.  Table 2.4 lists HEFCE’s stated strategic aims and their 
monitoring approaches evident at the time of the study. 
 
Aim HEFCE Monitoring Linked to 
Funding 




institutional audits  
No 
Widening participation and fair access Metrics reported No 
Enhancing excellence in research Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) 
Yes 
Enhancing the contribution of Higher 
Education to the economy and society 
None No 
Table 2.4  HEFCE Aims and Monitoring Measures10 
 
                                                
10 HEFCE updated their aims in June 2009 to include ‘Employer engagement and 
skills’.  The assessment of research excellence is also changing, the RAE will be 
replaced by the Research Assessment Framework, with proposed changes in assessment 
criteria, in 2014.  These provide examples of how aims and methods of assessment 
change over time, providing new sources of risk for regulated organisations.   
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There is a view that what gets measured generally gets done, what is not 
measured may suffer in comparison and prediction of outcomes is 
difficult (Otley, 2003).  Risks arise from pressures associated with 
increasing use of statistics and league tables.  The aims of the regulator 
illustrate the presence of competing and conflicting aims.  They are not 
mutually compatible; to satisfy one reduces success in achievement of 
another.  The conflict between different aims of the regulator can be seen 
in interpretations of fair access related to ‘merit’.  One interpretation of 
merit is examination grades; highest is best, compatible with the aims of 
teaching excellence, as measured through progression targets.  A review 
of access to  ‘widening participation’ found that examination grades 
remain a significant barrier to places in Higher Education. 
While participation by under-represented groups has increased 
significantly over the last 10 years, the gap in participation rates 
is still wide.  Its principal cause is the continuing pattern of lower 
prior attainment by young people from poorer backgrounds 
(Admissions to Higher Education Review, 2004, p18). 
The HEFCE aims provide an illustration of multiple aims and 
competition between them.  Pressure towards ‘widening participation’ 
requires consideration of factors other than academic grades for ‘merit’, 
factors that are not necessarily advantageous for the aim of ‘teaching 
excellence’ especially in the light of increasing student numbers.  
Satisfaction of one stated aim, such as teaching excellence (if measured 
as highest grade best), can reduce success in relation to others, for 
example, widening participation or research excellence.  
 
In addition, compliance responses may filter or distort the aims of the 
policy (Hood et al, 2001).  For example, HEFCE emphasise the link 
between high quality research and teaching, with two possible 
interpretations; improvement of research quality linked to existing 
teaching syllabuses, or closure of courses in areas that received poor 
RAE ratings.  The introduction of a market for students also makes some 
courses less viable than others.  In mitigating these risks, as HEFCE risk 
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guidance would recommend, closure of teaching departments in some 
universities is at variance with the actual intention of the government. 
A recent example of the tension between state encouragement of 
the market and corporate characteristics of universities, and state 
efforts to maintain strategic and political direction over them, is 
government concern at the closure, or proposed closure, of 
chemistry and language departments by institutions, taken on 
strategic and market grounds by the universities but with 
outcomes that the government perceives as disadvantageous for 
the country as a whole (King, 2006, p11). 
The funding council model creates contexts within which individual 
institutions have to determine how they are going to react; it is the 
responsibility of the institutions themselves to support or close chemistry 
or physics departments (Tapper & Salter, 2004).  The Better Regulation 
Group (2004) suggest that the slide towards a “compliance culture” in the 
HE sector finds difficulty in offering intelligent challenge to such 
external demands, or in effectively mitigating their damage during 
implementation.  Furthermore, they suggest that institutions have come 
to expect unreasonable regulation, and consequently regulated 
organisations interpret regulation unreasonably for themselves11.  It is 
paradoxical that in acting to reduce risks, in line with recommended 
guidance, institutions are seen as unreasonable, emphasising the 
importance of regulatory understanding of how institutions identify and 
prioritise risks. 
  
In 2005, the effectiveness of HEFCEs initial risk management guidance 
(2001) was reviewed by studying the implementation in 6 Universities 
and 3 Further Education colleges, in consultation with the Standing 
Conference of Principals and HEFCE.  The resulting advice, 
recommended by HEFCE, is contained in ‘Risk Management in Higher 
Education: A Guide to Good Practice’, by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(HEFCE, 2005), a major international accounting and consulting firm 
resulting from the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand.  
                                                
11 As exemplified in the production of Risk Registers that demonstrate compliance with 
HEFCE guidance, but are of no additional utility to the organisation. 
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It notes the development of the Combined Code (2003) in setting out 
principles of governance in the private sector, and states that while the 
Code is not mandatory, it builds on Turnbull and provides an important 
context for current requirements in the HE sector.  The guide provides 
‘practical and pragmatic guidance’ to HE institutions at all stages of the 
planning and implementation of risk management with the intention of 
improving organisational efficiency and the ability to grasp opportunities 
(HEFCE, 2005).  Figure 2.3 illustrates the recommended framework.  
 
Figure 2.3  Elements of an Institution-wide Risk Management Framework  
(Source: HEFCE, 2005, p6, Figure 1) 
 
To investigate how formal operational risk assessment is being carried 
out, and explore areas of interest identified in the research questions in 
this case, risk management training collects data from the activities 
depicted in the bottom right and left of the diagram (‘Operations Risk 
Review’ and ‘Functional Support Risk Review’).  This HEFCE 
framework provides the basis for the formal risk management process 
within the study organisation and illustrates the control system aspects of 
the model.  As data is gathered across the organisation, it is integrated for 
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providing input to mitigate risks, forming a control loop.  The risk 
assessment outputs are checked against pre-defined levels of 
acceptability to channel key information to senior management, who 
feedback to subordinates and enable mitigation to occur, where 
appropriate.  This cycle is repeated, and the risk focus changes in 
response to identified concerns.  A weakness in any stage of the process 
will have an impact on overall process performance.  It is instructive to 
note that the illustrated model does not clearly identify links to existing 
processes management controls, except risks embedded in strategic 
planning.  This section has summarised important aspects of the ‘best 
practice’ normative model that forms the basis for the risk management 
implementation investigated in this study. 
 
2.8.4 Summary of Regulatory Context of Case 
This overview of the introduction of private sector practices in HE, and the 
recommended risk management framework for the case, provides the 
background for the research problem that is being addressed here.  The next 
section places this study within the context of existing studies of risk 
management, highlighting gaps in the literature to be addressed by the empirical 
and analytical contribution of this case. 
 
2.9 Existing Empirical Studies of Risk 
This section will explore the literature in the field of risk, to which this thesis 
contributes.  The majority of academic literature identified for review during the 
literature search process equated risk to the probability of physical harm or 
danger (e.g., Fischhoff et al, 1981; Gigerenzer, 2003; Kasperson, 1992), which 
have a potentially measurable outcome (e.g., number of deaths, high radiation 
readings).    
Normally risk is defined by its autonym ‘safety’ and by its relation to 
practical affairs.  But this amounts to a paradoxical or at least ambiguous 
definition because in practical affairs there is no absolute safety 
(Luhmann, 1996, p4). 
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Several academic disciplines include the study of risk as hazard, although none 
provide in-depth studies of the qualitative aspects of assessment.  These include 
studies of the implementation of regulation related to hazards (Hood, 2007; 
Rothstein et al, 2006b), which highlight concerns about blame associated with 
risk decisions, but empirically these provide little evidence about operational 
risks.  The analysis of the Challenger shuttle disaster (Vaughan, 1996) illustrates 
the contribution of organisational norms and behaviour to decision-making that 
preceded the accident.  In relation to sociological perspectives, Renn (1992) 
observes that any attempt to classify studies of risk and link them to underlying 
theoretical concepts is like trying to find order in chaos.  The risk as hazard 
literature has yet to establish a consensual paradigm. 
 
A focus on financial risks has been the prevalent approach in academic studies 
of strategic risk management (Gates, 2006), but little has been published 
concerning the implementation of ERM models.  In investment banking, a study 
reveals that trader behaviour emerges from a web of circumstances and 
individual causes, such as attainment of bonus targets, that impact on risk taking 
and decision-making (Fenton-O’Creevy et al, 2004).  In financial markets, 
Willman et al (2006) suggest that large organisations make decisions that 
strongly influence the overall level of risk in the market, illustrating the link 
between risk in an organisational context and decision-making.  In a study of 
banking (Mikes, 2009, p28), a Director of Operational Risk remains cautious 
about the use of risk measurements, particularly since he considers that most 
losses are based on human behaviour and he queries “how do you measure it?”, 
confirming the need to include qualitative aspects in assessments.   
A significant remaining challenge is how to deal with risks that can’t be 
measured – not just the risk of uncertain events, but also the so-called 
soft risks such as failures of business ethics and reputation risk (Crouhy 
et al, 2006, p21). 
A study by PricewaterhouseCooper (2006) of 23 Finnish companies (excluding 
financial and insurance organisations), found that although risk management has 
gained considerable attention amongst the respondents, while it was seen as 
good governance practice and good for business, importantly, it was mostly still 
not really aligned with strategic and operative business decisions. 
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In the USA, an exploratory study based on data gathered from 123 
organisations, found that US organisations have less-developed ERM processes 
than international organisations, and suggests a number of factors that are 
positively related to the degree of ERM implementation, including industry 
sector, apparent strength of management support and the presence of a ‘Big 
Four’ auditor (Beasley et al, 2005).  
 
Mikes (2009) observes that ERM is a nascent management control practice and 
it remains unclear how it will ultimately benefit organisations that adopt it, 
indicating a need to study how such practices are implemented to identify 
potential limitations or benefits.  A survey of 271 companies found the greatest 
impediment to ERM implementation is ‘competing priorities’ and highlights a 
lack of academic studies in this area (Gates, 2006).   
We need to understand the contingent and conditioned nature by which 
critical events are processed by institutions.  How actual and possible 
events are perceived, classified, dramatised, made visible and mobilised 
will determine their relevance for risk management agendas (Power, 
2004a, p39). 
In addition, questions are raised about the consistency of process outputs, but 
there has been very little investigation of how risk assessments function in the 
absence of historical or statistical data.  Power has written extensively about risk 
management (2009, 2007, 2004a, 2003), the increasing pressure for auditability 
(1996, 1997, 1998) associated with a demand for numbers (2004b) and the 
appearance of control over uncertainty.  However, within this body of work 
there is little empirical evidence of how operational risk management is actually 
practised in organisations, providing the opportunity for an in-depth case study 
to contribute to developing deeper understandings of the issues that are 
suggested as significant concerns by Power.  The value of field research is to 
add to the overall picture by providing illustrations of the ways in which risk 
management and corporate aims interact to alter internal processes to reduce risk 
to the organisation and satisfy accountability demands.   
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The review of risk management implementation in HE by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, commissioned by HEFCE (2005), did not include a 
detailed study of the risk assessment process, and concluded from the evidence 
gathered that governance implementation was proceeding well, enabling 
organisations to improve their decision-making processes.  This thesis represents 
a more detailed critical examination of the transfer of knowledge in relation to 
HEFCE risk management governance, and the interpretation and implementation 
of ERM in one organisation, with a focus on the problematic nature of risk 
assessment itself, an area of concern that is skimmed over in the HEFCE 
evaluation.  
 
This section reveals gaps in the literature, significantly, a paucity of information 
about qualitative risk assessment, particularly in the context of operational risk.  
Furthermore, there is little empirical data in relation to what risk means in an 
organisational context and how risks are identified and assessed, confirming that 
this research makes an important contribution to the field.   
 
2.10 Summary 
This literature review highlights the need to examine how compliance with risk 
management guidance is understood and interpreted in an organisational setting.  
The focus on qualitative assessment and uncertainty in this thesis reflects the 
difficulty of predicting outcomes in social systems, and research question 1 
examines how the model proposed in the risk governance is interpreted and 
implemented, investigating the applicability of methods developed in the private 
sector.  This literature review provides critical perspectives on the problematic 
nature of risk and the implementation of governance that inform the analysis of 
how organisational members practice risk assessment. 
 
The changes to the governance context of HE influence the way in which risks 
are identified and assessed, not only in relation to HEFCE risk management 
guidance, but also to broader changes in accountability, transparency and 
technologies of control.  Self-regulatory governance implementation stimulates 
investigation of individual and group accounts of transparency in relation to 
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accounts of what others see and measure, including accountability for 
achievement of aims and targets, and how these impact on responsibility 
attribution, including the influence of organisational boundaries, authority and 
role on the management of risk.  In addition, the variance in ways of seeing 
within an organisation provides an important reason for research question 2 to 
consider whether group and role influence risk identification and management 
approaches.  The identification of sub-goals and competing aims from 
regulators, partners and other funding bodies illustrates why the organisational 
setting can influence risk assessment outcomes. 
 
The literature reveals how external views, in concert with risk tolerance and 
degree of control, influence what constitutes compliance and research question 3 
investigates what constitutes acceptable risk to members of the organisation.    
 
Finally, a critical evaluation of the nature of operational risk prompts research 
question 4 to examine the role of uncertainty in the assessment process, 
including lack of clarity about aims and how to achieve them, lack of 
information and whether such outputs constitute a form of measurement.  If 
outputs are not replicable, this review suggests the value of the recommended 
HEFCE framework is seriously undermined. 
 
The monitoring of compliance with guidance, or best practice rules and 
procedures, is an important aspect of risk related to control systems. 
Technologies of control can be thought of as manufactured sets of ‘extra 
eyes’: rules and procedures are designed to point human eyes and 
behaviour in designated directions; surveillance technologies are 
designed to supplement the human eye and cognitive capacity by 
revealing in detail what the human eye cannot see (Vaughan, 2005, p37). 
Against this background, this study seeks to investigate both the implementation 
of governance and how monitoring aspects have an impact on control practices.  
March (1981) suggests that organisations rarely change in a way that fulfils the 
intentions of a particular group. The organisational responses to HEFCE risk 
management guidance are expected to reveal unexpected and unforeseen 
outcomes.  Implementation may place emphasis on the process to provide 
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records to justify actions taken (or not taken) in the event of litigation, or for 
external assessors, resulting in ‘tick-box’ compliance (Power, 2006), in 
preference to the governance aim of directing and improving organisational risk 
management.    
 
Exploring ERM practices, as embodied in the HEFCE guidance, within an in-
depth case study enriches understanding of management control and strategy 
implementation more generally.   
It seems essential that more emphasis should be placed on the study of 
real control systems as they operate in practice (Berry et al, 2009, p32).   
This literature review illustrates how the study contributes to the debate on the 
regulatory, corporate governance, management control and accountability issues 
that are emerging  (Mikes, 2009) by investigating how risk assessment operates.  
This thesis contributes to the literature concerning operational risk assessment 
and management, and through its focus on organisational context, adds to 
studies in the field of organisational control, regulation and HE.  In addition, the 
link between aims and risks enables the study to consider the effects of targets 
and enforced self-regulation on risk assessment activities. 
 
The next chapter describes the process of selection of theoretical frameworks, 
the reasons underlying those decisions and outlines key aspects of the selected 
theories that were used to develop the analytical framework for the study. 
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3 Selection of Theoretical Approach  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter elucidates the theoretical perspectives that enable the researcher to 
“stand on some conceptual infrastructure” (Jonsson & Macintosh, 1997, p378) 
to develop explanations of empirical findings that have wider relevance than 
purely interpretative accounts of a case can provide.  The first section describes 
the process of identifying suitable frameworks for the analysis of risk narratives.  
The second details the Director, Detector and Effector model (Hood & Jones, 
1996) and the benefits of utilising such a theoretical viewpoint for the analysis 
of normative elements of the study.  The third provides a comprehensive review 
of Social Systems Theory (Luhmann, 1995a) and illustrates the features of a 
reflexive approach that contribute significantly to analysis of talk about risk in 
the study.    
 
3.2 Selection of Theoretical Approach 
The adoption of a particular theoretical approach recognises that analysis 
requires reduction or simplification of the real world, however, the benefits for a 
complex system, such as the transformative process of Higher Education, is in 
the ordering of data to gain an insight into factors influencing risk interpretation.  
The analysis forms part of a reciprocal process directed by expectations from 
theory towards factual investigation and then reaction of the results of this 
investigation on the theory (Parsons, 1937).  
 
Since time, opportunity and money are limited, the investigation requires a 
choice of theory that enables explanations to be developed within these 
constraints (Denscombe, 2002).  The search was on for a theory offering a 
system of concepts and statements, models, or principles, which, in concert, 
would make the empirical world of risk assessment more intelligible (Krimsky, 
1992).  
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3.2.1 Review of Possible Theoretical Approaches to Investigation of Risk 
I sought a theoretical approach that would enable the research questions 
to be evaluated within the complex organisational context of the case 
study.  Systems Theory, which was developed by social theorists centred 
on Talcott Parsons in the 1950s and 1960s, sought to integrate 
developments in fields such as biology, psychology and economics into 
sociological theory.  Systems Theory is useful in examining relationships 
within and between component parts of a whole, as this study aims to do.  
Several different approaches to systems analysis have been developed 
within the Social Sciences. 
 
The first type of systems analysis approach examined for possible use 
within this study was Soft Systems Methodology developed by 
Checkland (1981).  This type of methodology is well suited for use in 
action research, in which system changes are planned, implemented and 
reviewed.  The method builds purposeful activity models as devices to 
structure analysis and is used mainly for systems problem solving 
(Checkland & Scholes, 1999). The applied aspects of the project contain 
elements of ‘action research’ with a focus on practical problem solving in 
a social situation with a view to improving the quality of action within it 
(Burns, 2000) and reflexive concerns associated with this approach are 
discussed in the Chapter 4. Whilst acknowledging some similarities with 
action research, this study emphasises a wider academic aim of 
knowledge production linked to theoretical generalisations, requiring a 
more structured analytical approach.  The Soft Systems Methodology is 
weak in relation to theoretical analysis and is thus unlikely to lead to 
research outcomes that can be generalised. 
 
The next type of systems analysis investigated for use has been utilised 
by Hood & Jones (1996) for analysis of control systems, in a risk 
management context.  They describe control systems as ways of 
gathering information (Detector), ways of setting standards, goals or 
targets (Director), and ways of changing behaviour and enforcement to 
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meet standards or targets (Effector).  The Detector, Director, Effector 
(DDE) model provides a close parallel to the Elements of an Institution-
wide Risk Management Framework (HEFCE, 2005, see Figure 2.3 of 
this thesis) being investigated in this study.   The risk reviews are a form 
of Detector, the strategic risk assessment with risk embedded in strategic 
planning represents Director activity and Feedback and Actions act as the 
Effector element. This alignment provides an ideal lens through which to 
focus on the control system specifically related to risk governance.  This 
conceptual approach suggests one of the important epistemological issues 
in systems theory.  Is the system ‘closed’ or ‘open’ in relation to the 
environment?  The DDE model is conceptually an open system detecting 
and utilising information sources external to the system, and the 
boundary is permeable to signals from the environment.  This topic will 
be explored further in relation to SST and reflexive systems. 
 
The elements of the DDE model can be visualised as an iterative spiral, 
in which the process aims to reach an acceptable level of risk for the 
organisation.  The diagram below (Figure 3.1) illustrates how the model 
maps to a generic risk management process.  














Figure 3.1 Director, Detector, Effector: Risk Management Process 
Model  
(Source: adapted from Hood & Jones, 1996 and Boehm, 1988) 
 
The figure uses the concepts of Director, Detector, Effector (Hood & 
Jones,1996) to illustrate interaction of risks and risk management 
controls with reference to a model used for software design when the 
requirement is continuously changing as the software develops (Spiral 
Model, Boehm, 1988).  My placing of the aims and objectives within this 
iterative spiral reflects and acknowledges their changing nature.  This 
model provides a good basis for analysis of the normative HEFCE risk 
management framework.  The themes arising from the literature require a 
more complex theoretical lens to examine those aspects of risk that are 
not directly related to the governance control system, such as 
organisational context (King, 2006; Hutter, 2005; Dearlove, 1998a); trust 
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2005; Mikes, 2004); and reflexive interpretation of risk (Gregersen, 
2003; Adams, 1995).   
 
The choice of an additional theoretical approach now began to focus on 
the ontology of operational risk, in which reflexive concerns are at work.  
Recursivity-based studies provide advantages for exploring the depth and 
dynamics of organisation that other approaches do not offer (Hernes & 
Bakken, 2003).  Two theoretical approaches that incorporate recursive 
considerations were reviewed: Giddens; Structuration (1986) and 
Luhmann; Social Systems Theory (SST) (1995a).  Both perspectives 
have common themes: 
Luhmann’s autopoiesis and Giddens’ structuration theory are 
convergent in several ways.  First, they converge on the view of 
the significance of recursivity.  Second, they view recursivity 
with structure as being both a constitutive and constituting entity.  
Third, there is the view that constitution happens though self-
reference, something that is reflected in Giddens’ reproductions 
and in Luhmann’s autopoiesis (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p1526). 
Structuration theory primarily aims at recursiveness between the two 
levels of structure and action (Hernes & Bakken, 2003; Leydesdorff, 
2010).  One of the difficulties in the use of structuration for this case 
study is that structure is considered “outside of time-space” (Giddens, 
1981, p171).  This presents a problem in relation to empirical 
investigation of the questions asked within the study relating to 
organisational context, governance aims and existing control systems.  
Structure cannot be assumed to change itself, so there is a missing link 
needed to explain structural change; in contrast to Giddens’ two-level 
theory, Luhmann incorporates the levels of events and processes, which 
allows greater understanding of how structure is changed in recursive 
operations (Hernes & Bakken, 2003).  
A system that is bound to use meaning as a medium constitutes 
an endless but complete world in which everything has meaning, 
in which everything gives many cues for subsequent operations 
and thereby sustains autopoiesis (Luhmann, 2002, p84). 
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Luhmann’s SST (1995a) draws from biological theory and uses 
autopoiesis to explain structural change in a way that is easier to grasp 
than is the case with Giddens’ structuration theory.  
Luhmann took Maturana and Varela’s vision of how a cell works 
as his prototype for how to conceptualize social systems.  In the 
same way that molecules produce other molecules in a circular 
process, communications produce communications.  The ability 
to abstract from the individual that this provides allows him to 
make descriptions of modern society that are compelling to a 
degree matched by few if any other theories (Viskovatoff, 1999, 
p491). 
It is suggested that much of the power of autopoiesis is as a source of 
‘creative lateral thinking’ (Kickert, 1993).  However, the key issue here 
was the alignment of the theoretical framework with the research 
questions, the data sought and the complexity of the phenomena being 
investigated.  Of all contemporary social theorists, Luhmann has best 
understood the centrality of the concept of meaning to social theory and 
has most extensively worked out the notion’s implications (Viskovatoff, 
1999).  Against this background, I felt most comfortable utilising SST to 
provide the explanatory lens through which the in-depth case study could 
be examined and explained.  The two-tier approach places normative 
assessment within the DDE analytical framework, allowing SST to focus 
on reflexive concerns that reveal underlying influences on the normative 
outcomes.  Luhmann’s work stimulates my interest and informs my 
understanding of why social systems are unique and vary in 
unpredictable ways.  The following section outlines key aspects of the 
theory that form the basis for the analytical frame in this thesis.  As part 
of this review of SST, the criticisms that are levelled at Luhmann’s work 
are also examined and relevant critiques are discussed.   
 
3.2.2 Social Systems Theory (SST) 
Niklas Luhmann is widely recognized in Germany as the most 
noteworthy contemporary social theorist (Viskovatoff, 1999), yet in 
much of the Anglo-Saxon world he is virtually unknown among 
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professional social scientists (Bechmann & Stehr, 2002).  Social Systems 
Theory (1995a) was published in German in 1984, and represents an 
ambitious framework designed to investigate social systems in many 
contexts.  Works available in English demonstrate the wide range of 
Luhmann’s contribution to the Social Sciences, including Religion 
(1977); Trust and Power (1979); Differentiation of Society (1982); Law 
(1985); Love as Passion (1986); Ecological Communication (1989); 
Essays on Self-Reference (1990c); Political Theory in the Welfare State 
(1990d) and Reality of the Mass Media (1995b).    
 
Social Systems Theory (SST) has been described as a ‘grand theory’ 
aimed at explaining society, and the applicability of such a complex 
framework has been questioned in relation to a single case study.  
Conceptually, as with biological sciences the complexity of cells appears 
to increase when using a microscope, this in-depth single case and the 
nature of risk is sufficiently complex to warrant a comprehensive 
theoretical lens.  Looking deeper will reveal more complexity.  Through 
developing an understanding of SST, a potential framework for 
examining complex and contextualised organisational characteristics 
from the viewpoint of participants emerges.  The concept of the system is 
Luhmann’s essential starting point (Bechmann & Stehr, 2002).   
Speaking generally, we can divide the development of systems 
theory into three stages: (i) the theory of closed systems; (ii) the 
theory of open systems; and (iii) the theory of observing or self-
referential systems (cf. Luhmann, 1995[a]: 5–11).  My 
considerations derive especially from the third and last stage of 
the development of systems theory (Luhmann, 2006, p37). 
With the influence of Maturana & Varela’s work (1980), Luhmann’s 
autopoiesis makes an important distinction between two basic types of 
systems: psychic and social systems.  Psychic systems form the basis of 
meaning creation.  In the psychic system, thoughts are the basic elements 
of reproduction.  Only these closed systems can know. 
It has been known for quite some time already that the brain has 
absolutely no qualitative and only a very slight quantitative 
contact with the external world (Luhmann, 1990b, p439). 
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Social systems, on the other hand, operate through the medium of 
meaning, and their autopoiesis takes place through communication 
(Hernes & Bakken, 2003).  A social system is constituted as an action 
system based on communicative happenings (Luhmann, 1995a). In this 
way, Luhmann (1990b) considers that the intervention of systems theory 
can be described as a de-ontologisation of reality.  The way we think and 
speak about things in the world is not determined by the nature of these 
things.  It makes no difference whether these things are concrete items in 
the outer world or mental items in the inner world (Christis, 2001).  
Giddens finds that Luhmann’s epistemes are too contingent and lack 
‘ontological security’ (Hernes & Bakken, 2003).  However, in a 
continually changing world with reflexive considerations forcing 
acceptance of multiple realities this ontological position enhances 
research into complex phenomena such as risk.  I am freed from the 
distinction of real risk/false risk to investigate instead communication, 
interpretation and reflexive views of risk. 
 
Luhmann (2002) describes autopoietic systems as products of their own 
operations, with properties such as dynamic stability, maintaining self-
reproduction as long as possible. ‘Autopoietic’ systems are operationally 
closed, i.e. they contain all the elements required for self-reproduction.  
Closure, in this context, does not mean that such systems are not able to 
experience contact with their environments but that the only mode to get 
in contact is based on their own operations (Nassehi, 2005).   
An internal reference or self-reference and an external reference 
are processed more or less simultaneously.  In other words, the 
system can switch from one side to the other at any moment—but 
only by means of internal operations.  This explains the 
difference between the environment of a system from the 
standpoint of the observer and the environment as defined by the 
system itself as it oscillates between self-reference and external 
reference, or as it chooses specific emphases in one or the other 
direction for a certain amount of time but always under the 
condition that they may and can be revised and changed 
(Luhmann, 2006, p50). 
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Social systems are unreliable machines, to be distinguished from 
allopoietic systems that manufacture something other than themselves, 
such as assembly lines that use fixed programmes to transform inputs to 
outputs.  They rely not on tight coupling, but on loose coupling to move 
from one state to the next, and this makes it possible for them to evolve 
into different structural types according to random links between the 
system and its environment.  A sociological analysis of organisations 
classed Universities as above average complexity and loosely coupled 
systems, where 'errors are endless and frequently interact, there is a great 
deal of slack to prevent rapid propagation of errors' (Perrow, 1986, 
p146), showing marked similarities to Luhmann’s description of 
autopoietic systems.   
 
An autopoietic system reproduces, continuing unaltered, unless 
stimulated to change by communication from its environment that is 
recognised as a threat to system well-being or survival, e.g., failure to 
achieve organisational aims. 
 
Communication is treated as information only if it is not just an existing 
difference; it is information only if it instigates a change of state in the 
system (Luhmann, 2006). An interesting suggestion that arises is that in 
organisations the communication of ignorance makes non-liability 
legitimate, implying that lack of awareness of risks relieves authority and 
responsibility (Luhmann, 1998).   
 
Self-referential systems acquire information with the help of the 
difference between referring to self and to something other, and this 
information makes possible their self-production (Luhmann, 1995a).  
Information theory is also often conceived of in terms of a theory of 
difference and can be traced back to Gregory Bateson’s formulation that 
information is ‘a difference that makes a difference’ (Bateson, 1972), and 
can be likened to ‘management by exception’ (Drury, 2005).  
The most radical assumption of Luhmann’s mature theoretical 
approach is his emphasis on differences, more precisely on 
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distinctions that are no longer seen as objective differences but as 
constructions (Bechmann & Stehr, 2002, p69). 
Luhmann also utilises the notion of a distinction proposed by Spencer-
Brown (1969) who conceives of a distinction making sense because it 
separates i.e.: ‘marked space’ (selection) and ‘unmarked space’ (set of 
possibilities).  Technical communication devices have a defined message 
(technically constrained), in the case of social communication, the set of 
possibilities are socially constructed (in Luhmann’s terms, conditioned). 
 
Systems can be conceived as containing elements and relations.  
Conditioning of these systems occurs such that interpenetrations are not 
merely relations among elements; the connections are somehow 
regulated through conditions of possibility (Luhmann, 1995a).   
Social systems consist not merely of communications but also of 
expectation structures, even though that is not how Luhmann’s 
theory is usually presented (Viskovatoff, 1999, p500). 
The concept of expectation structures, in which the more explicit the 
expectation the more insecure it is, influences the output of risk 
assessments.  In relation to risk management, the clearer the statement of 
an aim, (for example, recruiting 12 students, or between 9 and 15 
students) the easier it is to fail to achieve it; expectational ambiguity can 
be seen as a strategy for creating relative security and for providing 
protection from environmentally conditioned disturbances (Luhmann, 
1995a).  Relations among elements can condition themselves 
reciprocally, enabling the system to produce and react to an unclear 
picture of itself.  Conditioning within systems will influence risk 
identification in reflexive interpretation of external stimuli.  SST is 
particularly helpful in explaining why some long-term issues that are 
‘normal’ are ignored, even though they threaten local aims, since the 
system is conditioned to ignore such stimuli.  Successful system 
conditioning works as a constraint (Luhmann, 1995a).   
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Luhmann’s (1995a) notion of double contingency provides a semiotic 
framework in which the initial speaker provides information, and 
receives a response, but between both parties, there is the possibility that 
what is communicated is understood differently and the meaning is 
altered, although both parties believe successful communication has 
occurred.  Understanding is never a mere duplication of the utterance in 
another consciousness.  Consequently, interpretations of communication 
about risks within the University can be expected to produce a range of 
perspectives.  It should be noted, that this theoretical perspective 
embraces a wide range of potential methods of communication, e.g., no 
action or response can be interpreted as ‘information’. 
 
Formal organisations regulate their boundaries primarily by membership 
roles and admission to membership, thus handling themes as something 
that can be expected from the system members because of their 
membership (Luhmann, 1995a).  The SST perspective conceives of 
boundaries to systems as specific mechanisms whose purpose is both to 
separate and connect.  
No system can perform operations outside its own limits.  If new 
operations are integrated it means that the limits of the system 
have been extended.  Consequently, the system cannot use its 
own operations to connect itself with its environment since this 
would require that the system operate half within and half 
without the system.  The function of boundaries is not to pave the 
way out of the system but to secure discontinuity (Luhmann, 
1990b, p440). 
The systems approach enables the groups to be defined and differences to 
be explored, both in relation to the system self-image and interaction 
with systems that form the environment for the group (both within or 
external to the University).  Interpenetration is reciprocal (Luhmann, 
1995a). 
An autonomous domain of the social does indeed open up before 
one, with human actors being situated, as Luhmann stresses, in 
the environment of social systems instead of composing them, as 
one has tended to suppose until now (Viskovatoff, 1999, p487). 
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Systems interact through interpenetration (not a general relation between 
system and environment but an intersystem relation between systems that 
are environments for each other).   
 
Competition is present in an organisation when one system’s goals can 
be attained only at the expense of another’s.  Consequently, in 
organisations, hierarchy takes the place of physical force in channelling 
chances of conflict, and the initiation of conflict is discouraged; only 
superiors are free to say ‘no’ (Luhmann, 1995a); they decide which aims 
to emphasise.  Consequently, the planner is never in complete agreement 
with observers about the value ranking of goals, probable effects and 
what constitutes acceptable risk. 
 
In Risk: A Sociological Theory (Luhmann, 2005) uses SST to analyse and 
explain social responses to risk.  In earlier epochs people thought of good 
or bad fortune rather than of risk (Luhmann, 1996).  Unpredictable 
events were explained and neutralised by attribution to an external 
source.  In recent times, risk has come to be associated with decision-
making, particularly in organisations (Power, 2004a, Vaughan, 1996).   
Since decisions are always operations of a system, be it an 
individual person or a social system, we can characterise risk by 
the internal attribution of possible harm.  A possible harm caused 
by the environment has to be externally attributed and can be 
called danger (Luhmann, 1996, p6). 
Risk evaluation is not simply a problem of avoiding error.  There is no 
safe way to make decisions since they are inextricably linked to 
uncertainty.  
Decisions try to give a structure to the future.  They cannot 
determine the future state of the world or the system but they can 
project a difference into its open horizons.  The standard 
terminology for this is goal, objective, end, aim … (Luhmann, 
1996, p12). 
Furthermore, Luhmann (2005) suggests that risk is understood as future 
damage that can be linked to decisions.  From this perspective, the 
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responsibility for making decisions can be associated with accountability 
and the possibility of blame.  The decision-making system takes into 
account that others are observing its decisions and that there will be 
reactions, as part of the risks of the decision (Luhmann, 1996). 
 
The concept of risk gets away from the idea of there being only one 
plausible judgement in relation to achievement of aims.  It unifies 
uncertainties and multiple aims in the present and solves them through 
rational risk management; in the event that the unforeseen occurs, the 
decision can still be viewed as risk-rational (Luhmann, 1998).   Negative 
aspects of the internalisation of risk are exemplified by strategies to 
defend against risks including: 
‘vain planning, vain applications, drawn out appraisal processes 
and above all the risk of not exploiting opportunities’ (Luhmann, 
2005, p196).   
The outputs of such processes form blame-protection shields for 
individuals and groups within the organisation. 
 
Temporal elements within a system (events, actions) always contain an 
aspect of surprise, are always new combinations of determinacy and 
indeterminacy and linked to this is the concept of expectations 
(Luhmann, 1995a).  The expectation creates the alternatives of 
conformity or deviation.  In part, this concept is used as a component of 
roles and norms and can be linked to decision theories (McGrew & 
Wilson, 1982).  The implementation aims of governance are understood 
through internal interpretation of requirements, through the process of 
double contingency, and may result in unintended outcomes, lack of 
response or compliant behaviour.  In complex organisations (Perrow, 
1986), processes and feedback loops can be difficult to trace and 
understand and may interact in unexpected ways, sometimes resulting in 
unwanted changes, or in insufficient change in relation to the desired 
effect.   
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The outcomes may hence be counter-intuitive for participants, 
and unintended consequences of purposeful action can be 
expected to prevail in a networked environment (Leydesdorf, 
2010). 
The networked environment provides a changing landscape of competing 
and conflicting goals, and the system ignores communication that is not 
interpreted as a threat to its well-being, to enable a focus on those that 
are. The aims of the regulator are recognised as ‘information’ by the 
system, and reflexive interpretation emphasises compliance demands 
linked to funding access, to enhance survival of the system. 
 
The temporal aspects of the risk assessment process are exhibited in the 
way in which decisions are contingent upon previous decisions and are 
expected to be influenced by existing organisational structures or control 
systems.  The concept of a process designates an increase in selectivity of 
a special kind: an increase in selectivity that enlists time (Luhmann, 
1995a).  A succession of events is a process if, and only if, it fulfils the 
characteristic of increasing selectivity.  Risk assessment is intended to 
result in actions that mitigate risks i.e., selected actions. 
 
Since human beings, understood as self-grounding subjects, can choose 
the distinctions through which they dissect the world and designate what 
is to be observed (Luhmann, 2002), risk discourse provides access to 
ways in which meaningfully self-referential systems observe and analyse 
other such systems, within, and external to, the organisation.  Processes 
of self-observation make the difference between the system and the 
environment available within these systems themselves, and both 
influences are reflected in risk identification and assessment.  This 
theoretical framework forms the conceptual architecture for the analysis 
of narratives within this thesis. 
 
It would be wrong to provide the impression that the theory is without its 
critics, and this section goes on to outline and reflect on these critiques.  
Even the basic premise of Luhmann’s SST is questioned, since it is 
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constructed around the system/environment distinction.  Rodrigo (2001) 
suggests the problem lies in the distinction itself because most 
sociologists do not work with this distinction.  However, in considering 
the theoretical perspective earlier in this section, it is clear there is a 
tradition of systems theory use within the Social Sciences (Parsons, 
1937; Checkland, 1981; Hood & Jones, 1996), with an additional body of 
work, specifically linked to SST, in the studies cited below. 
 
A further claim made against Luhmann’s work is that it cannot be made 
empirically relevant.   
Although Luhmann’s theory often gets characterized as a very 
abstract and over theorized sociology, it is in fact a remarkably 
empirical theory because it is interested in the basic processes in 
which social systems occur and in which structures come into 
being (Nassehi, 2005, p181). 
Brans & Rossback (1997) observe that Luhmann’s theory of 
‘autopoiesis’ has inspired a great number of empirical analyses in a 
variety of contexts.  They cite examples in the work of Stichweh (1994) 
in the sociology of science; Hutter (1989) on the ‘structural coupling’ of 
economy and law as subsystems of society; Baecker (1991) on economic 
steering through banks; Teubner (1991) and King & Trowell (1992) on 
the workings of the legal system; and Schiepek in social psychology (for 
example, Schiepek & Schaub, 1989).  In addition, Seidl (2007) has 
drawn on Luhmann’s work to examine the effectiveness of governance 
codes and Knudsen (2005) analysed the development of the Danish 
healthcare system. 
 
Habermas and Luhmann produced long and detailed critiques of each 
other’s works (Habermas & Luhmann, 1973).  Habermas criticised 
systems theory in terms of its methodological orientation with the view 
that systems theory tied to empirical-analytical procedures is inadequate 
as a research program (Holub, 1991).  This reflects the emphasis on 
critical analysis, politics and participation as important elements in the 
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social research of Habermas.  Luhmann saw practical problems with this 
approach: 
The well-known attempt of Jurgen Habermas to extend 
participation to all those who are concerned about and affected by 
decisions including even future generations, clearly overburdens 
the traditional machinery of democratic representation (Luhmann, 
1996, p17). 
There are critics and adherents of both camps.  This thesis does not have 
space for a more detailed discussion of their mutual critiques. 
 
A further criticism that is levelled at Luhmann’s theory is that it does not 
explain the historical system-states from which the further autopoiesis 
proceeds. 
The concept of autopoiesis itself explains next to nothing, except 
this beginning with self-reference: an operation that possesses 
connectivity (Luhmann, 2006, p48). 
This problem can be overcome to some extent by establishing the 
organisational context through internal documents and analysis of 
communication by organisational members, and is an aspect of the 
theoretical model that can be explored within this study. 
 
The reticence of Luhmann to ‘subjectify’ the subject has earned him 
criticism in sociology (Hernes & Bakken, 2003). 
Individualists try to reduce the social to the actions and mental 
states of individuals, while collectivists argue that there is 
something irreducible about the social that cannot be expressed at 
the level of individuals.  A commentator has recently observed 
that “it might be argued that Luhmann’s systems theory 
represents the most radical attempt yet seen to exclude the human 
actor from any account of structure and system” (Hamilton 1996, 
p506). 
Some of this criticism stems from separation of social and psychic 
systems discussed above.  Luhmann (2002) states that mixing of the 
autopoiesis of the two systems never comes about, yet a high degree of 
co-evaluation and practiced reactivity does.  However, perceptions 
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remain locked up in the activated mind and cannot be communicated.  
This does not mean to say that SST excludes human actors since they are 
central to communication.  Individuals are relevant to society to the 




This chapter provides an overview of the selection of the two theoretical 
frameworks that provide the conceptual basis for two analytical frameworks, and 
their key elements.  The use of different theoretical lenses has important benefits 
for the analysis of the implementation of risk management governance.  There 
are two levels of interest.  Firstly, how the HEFCE guidance is understood and 
implemented by organisation members, revealing how compliance with the 
normative requirements is achieved.  Secondly, a broader view of the risk 
management implementation requires reflexive interpretations to reveal how 
risks are identified, what factors influence risk assessment and acceptability, and 
the role of uncertainty when participants attempt to predict future outcomes.  
The following chapter explains how both theories contribute to the study outputs 
within a Middle-Range Thinking paradigm and outlines the methodological 
choices made, ontological position and methods used to gather and analyse the 
accounts of risk and risk assessment and describes the benefits of using a case 
study to investigate organisational practices. 
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4 The Research Approach, Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This methodology chapter provides the epistemological perspective surrounding 
the theoretical frameworks outlined in the previous chapter.  It explains the 
presuppositions about social reality that guide the selection of methods used in 
the case study, the theoretical, ethical and practical issues, and the 
appropriateness of the methods used to obtain the research data (Silverman, 
2005).  The first section provides an explanation of the study focus and states 
the research questions to be investigated in this case study.  It goes on to explore 
ontology and introduces Middle-Range Thinking (Laughlin, 1995; 2004), 
outlining the principle characteristics of this methodological approach, and how 
it is used in this thesis.  The second section describes the research process, 
including the case study design, data sources, narrative and document analysis, 
and the development of the analytical frameworks used.  The chapter concludes 
with a reflexive consideration of data validity and research relevance. 
 
4.2 Emergence of the Research Methodology 
This research methodology evolved over the period of study from an initial 
positivistic approach following traditional case study methodology (Yin, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) reflecting prior beliefs associated with engineering and 
science.  However, awareness developed of the ontological and epistemological 
problems associated with positivistic approaches that apply methods of scientific 
experimentation in studies of human actions.  In contrast with ‘hard’ sciences, in 
which laws are developed through repeatable experiment and observations that 
are unified by theory, Social Sciences can only hope to achieve hermeneutic 
interpretation (or understanding) of a changing social world in which all 
knowledge is therefore contingent (Johnson, 2008).   
 
Consequently, I began to question how to combine a structured approach to data 
gathering with a more interpretative analytical method and the methodological 
perspective shifted to a position that has been described as Middle-Range 
 Page 89 of 407 
Thinking (MRT) (Laughlin, 1995), and the way this perspective is adopted 
within this research approach is discussed later in this chapter.   
 
This chapter explicates ontological, epistemological and methodological 
underpinnings of the research approach, with the aim of producing a consistent 
and coherent way of undertaking this empirical research (Laughlin, 2007). 
 
4.2.1 Investigating the nature of risk  
Academic studies illustrate the interactive and dynamic nature of risk that 
generates empirical patterns in relation to risk assessment in 
organisations; risk means different things to different people.  An 
emphasis on reflexive understanding of risk favours qualitative 
techniques in preference to survey data, statistical analysis or quasi-
experimental designs (such as those used in risk perception studies).  
Qualitative research emphasises an understanding of the issues being 
researched, including the social situation of those involved.  
…the study of the social world, which seeks to describe and 
analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and their groups 
from the point of view of those being studied (Bryman, 1988, 
p46). 
In seeking to describe and interpret the world, qualitative research does 
not require researchers to strive for objectivity and distance themselves 
from research participants; sensitivity to subjective aspects of 
relationships with the research participants is an essential part of the 
research process (King, 1994).  My three-year full-time involvement with 
the organisation and participants: 
… acknowledges the fact that culture needs to be understood in 
its context by those who have access to local practices, lived 
experiences, and shared meanings in that context (Soin & 
Scheytt, 2006, p66). 
In addition, the interactive role of the researcher is an important aspect of 
the overall research design. 
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Once the ontological and theory choice is made, it has 
implications for the assumed role of the observer/subjectivity in 
the resulting empirical engagement (Laughlin, 2004, p272). 
The researcher-as-participant role necessitates reflexivity on the part of 
the researcher to recognise personal influences on the analytical interplay 
between narratives and theory.  
 
Consequently, it is important to reflect upon my interaction with 
participants in developing an understanding of operational risk.  
Waddington (1994) suggests four possible categories of observer.  
Firstly, the complete participant operates covertly, concealing the 
intention to observe the setting, raising ethical concerns.  Secondly, the 
participant-as-observer forms relationships and participates in activities, 
but makes no secret of intentions to observe events.  Thirdly, the 
observer-as-participant, maintains only superficial contact with the 
people being studied.  The final role is the complete observer, who stands 
back and eavesdrops on the proceedings.  Since I was simultaneously a 
PhD student (not deliberately watching but immersed in University 
practices), a member of team of four producing recommendations on the 
implementation of risk management to the Principal’s Central Team in 
the University and a training consultant during the four-year period of the 
study, the roles were complex.  I participated in the interviews and 
workshop sessions, and consequently influenced the ensuing discussions.  
The trainees were aware of the data collection activity within the 
sessions, and I consider my role was participant-as-observer.  However, 
relationships were complex since the type of participant varied in relation 
to interpretation by others.  I could be viewed as a PhD student, a training 
consultant, using experience gained in industry, a compliance enforcer 
working on behalf of the Internal Audit Department, or any combination 
of the three.   
 
From a reflexive point of view, some participants were interested in the 
research, and communication with the College Council, viewing me as a 
student, anticipating study outputs that would represent their perceptions.  
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Others focussed on the implementation of governance treating me as a 
management consultant, placing more emphasis on my experience and 
advice, with a consequent ability to shape their implementation of 
governance.  Concerns about administrative load and integration with 
existing processes link to a compliance role, and participants took the 
opportunity to emphasise negative aspects of the framework and its 
implementation.  In all cases, the narratives provide valuable and 
worthwhile perspectives, since the interpretation of my role represented a 
reflexive facet of their understanding of risk management and the 
governance. 
 
 I played multiple roles (Goffman, 1959) during participant interactions 
and, in addition, provided a conduit for feedback to Internal Audit on 
particular implementation issues, and in this role can be seen as a 
member of the compliance team, with similarities to ‘action research’ 
(Checkland, 1981).  Three major concerns relating to action research 
have been proposed; uncontrollability, contingency12 and subjectivity 
(Kock, 2004). As a student, there is little control and limited input to 
management decision-making, reducing subjectivity in relation to the 
type of change being instigated.  Awareness of the contingent nature of 
organisations influenced the search for suitable theoretical frames, one 
focussing on normative aspects, while the other explores a social system 
that is changing and represented by multiple perspectives.  Subjectivity is 
a perpetual difficulty that all social scientists have to wrestle with, 
regardless of the methodology adopted, emphasising the importance of 
reflection on explanations and adoption of prior theory to guide analysis 
towards less personalised interpretations.   
 
A methodology seeking to change systems may improve things for one 
group at the expense of another, making it important to be clear about the 
motives behind the study and the potential ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.  The 
University intended to improve the effectiveness of risk management 
                                                
12 Contingency exists when future outcomes are uncertain. 
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implementation in their institution.  I sought data that would contribute to 
significant findings, using representative accounts of participants; 
highlighting potential ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the narrative analysis.   
 
The research combines a variety of data collection methods; document 
analysis, interviews and observations to access understandings of risk.  
The desire to study operational risk identification and assessment in a 
real life context, is informed by the nature of the subject under 
investigation and is reflected in methodological position, ontological 
beliefs and the theoretical viewpoints adopted. 
 
4.2.2 Study Focus and Research Questions  
This section outlines the aim of the case study in seeking to explore the 
questions that have been carefully chosen to investigate operational risk 
assessment in the HE context.  In Phase 1 of the study, the research 
question remained broad and asked “What risks are identified by senior 
management in a University?”.   This exploratory phase enabled a 
preliminary analysis of the first stage interviews, providing input to 
inform the development of research questions used for Phase 2 of this 
study, including a reanalysis of the Phase 1 data.  In addition, the 
managers were asked to identify organisational aims, to enable the link 
between aims and risks to be reviewed and confirmed.   
 
The research questions that address the research problem in this thesis 
are presented below.  The links between the questions, the literature and 
SST are summarised in Figure 4.1. 
 
Research Question 1 asks ‘How are operational risk assessments being 
carried out in the University?’.   
 
Research Question 2 asks ‘Does the organisational setting of the risk 
assessment affect the way it is conducted?’.   
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Research Question 3 asks ‘What is acceptable or tolerable risk to 
individuals in the University and what factors influence this 
understanding?’.  
 
Research Question 4 asks ‘What uncertainties are apparent during risk 
assessment activities?’   
 
Figure  4.1 below illustrates how the questions relate to key aspects of 
the Chapter 2 literature review and Social System Theory (SST) 
(Luhmann, 1995a) providing guidance for the structuring, investigation 
and analysis of interview, observation and workshop data.   The DDE 
theory utilises the explanations developed using the SST lens to provide 
a normative assessment of the HEFCE risk governance in the cross case 
analysis, facilitated by the MRT approach adopted. 






















Figure 4.1 Enquiry Focus of Research Questions 
The formulation of the questions was a key stage in the research process.  
They focus the identification of potential data sources and collection 
methods on those most appropriate to accessing empirics that can be 
expected to address the particular features of interest in the case, while 
also providing the framework for analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  MRT 
facilitates the use of two theoretical frameworks as interpretative tools 
within a narrative analysis, providing the ability to normatively assess 
Literature Perspectives              Research Questions                     SST Theoretical Perspectives 
Limitations of governance 
framework 
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Desire for uncertainty 
reduction  
 
Process control effectiveness 
How are operational risk 
assessments being carried 
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implementation of governance, through accessing reflexive risk 
understandings within their contextualised organisational environment.  
The strength of the MRT approach is to encourage a structured approach 
to research, without mandating the structure, enabling the methodology 
to be tailored to the questions being investigated, while encouraging 
reflection on the researcher’s role in the interpretations developed 
through narrative analysis.  The questions guide research efforts towards 
study outputs that are valid, enabling this case study to draw conclusions 
in Chapter 8, to illustrate the significant contribution to the literature this 
thesis makes.   
 
4.2.3 Beliefs underlying research approach 
The initial beliefs influencing methodological selection were heavily 
dependent on the contingent nature of social systems, in which future 
outcomes are not solely dependent on organisational practices and 
decision-making, but are a product of unpredictable events in interacting 
networks of systems.  The approach must draw the context of the 
organisation into the study as an integral part, implying a reliance on 
reflexive influences within the organisation in the interpretative frame.   
 
The research approach accepts that there are ‘real’ risks and ‘socially 
constructed’ risks, both of which can pose threats to an organisation.  The 
link between individual accounts and social action forms an important 
element of this approach. 
If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences (Merton, 1995, quoting Thomas & Thomas, 1928, 
p572). 
The beliefs underlying the research approach guide the methodology 
towards a critical analysis in the interplay between narratives and theory 
in a constructivist manner, within a limited real-life setting. This chapter 
describes the research strategy used to capture multiple realities, with 
each view adding richness to the overall picture, as exemplified in the 
film Rashomon (Director, Kurosawa, 1950).   
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Just as it raises questions about the nature of truth, the film 
Rashomon illustrates the benefit of each approach to the idea of 
‘truth’.  The viewer is bound to be left wondering which version 
of the terrible rape and murder is ‘correct’ and the film 
encourages the viewer to ask this question (Roth & Mehta, 2002, 
p 169). 
The theoretical approach interprets all conflicting opinions as valid, when 
viewed from the perspective of the respective participants.  This position 
is not well suited to positivist approaches to analysis in which true/false 
is an important distinction in relation to theoretical propositions.  The 
descriptive approach can be extremely effective, as the McGovern 
campaign manager stated on a panel discussion: 
… the most accurate and least factual account of that campaign.  
(Frank Mankiewicz describing Fear and Loathing on the 
Campaign Trail '72 by Hunter S Thompson) 
It is not important to establish whether comments are factual since the 
aim is to provide a rich description of what risk means to the research 
participants.   
 
4.2.4 Ontology, Methodology and MRT  
There are advantages to making deliberate theoretical and 
methodological choices before data collection, tailoring the research 
approach to successfully address the nature of the subject being 
investigated. 
… all empirical research will be partial, despite any truth claims 
to the contrary, and thus it would be better to be clear about the 
biases and exclusions before launching into the empirical detail 
(Laughlin, 1995, p65). 
Since empirical research in organisations is only partial, and we cannot 
step outside the social world to study it, theoretical and methodological 
choices are made with or without acknowledgement.  
… the very idea that one can be a mere neutral recorder of the 
way others see the world is an impossibility.  Like the proverbial 
monkey-on-the-back, theoretical presuppositions always come 
along for the ride (Jonsson & Mackintosh, 1997, p378). 
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In Laughlin’s 1995 “Middle-Range Thinking” article, a review of the 
dominant schools of thought highlights distinctions between possible 
approaches to the study of social systems.  These range from a 
positivistic world in which general patterns and unchanging truths are 
awaiting discovery, through a mid-position, in which “skeletal” 
generalisations are held possible, towards the extreme interpretative 
recognition of the contextualised and contingent nature of social systems, 
in which generalisations are not possible.   
… positions on these continua are assumptions, which leads to 
what is deemed to be ‘understanding’ (a less emotive word than 
‘facts’— constructed or otherwise) of an external reality by the 
community adhering to these assumptions (Laughlin, 2004, 
p264). 
Laughlin’s 1995 and 2004 papers argue a case for researchers adopting a 
mid-point in the ontological positions, on each of three continuums 
(theory, methodology and change), described as Middle-Range Thinking 











Figure 4.2  Dimensions on the Choice Process for Empirical 
Research  
(Source: Laughlin (1995) Figure 1) 
 
The figure illustrates choices to be made in developing a study approach 
and the possible positions in relation to theory, methodology and change 
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should lead to change or not and how to make this decision is described 
as key to MRT.  As Laughlin (2004) observes, it is only after some level 
of understanding is achieved, under the assumptions that follow from the 
theory and methodology dimensions, that it is possible to decide what 
should be done about what is discovered. This study adopts the MRT 
notion of a stance that encourages change that is based on improved 
understandings. 
 
The value of the MRT approach has been questioned.  Lowe (2004) 
suggests that the choice of a middle position on the three dimensions 
amounts to nothing more than an assertion that this somehow avoids the 
‘problems’ that can be found in other research approaches.   He goes on 
to argue that we may be just as likely to be combining the worst elements 
of other approaches and that Laughlin’s (1995) representation of theory, 
methodology and change choice, all a legitimate part of the research act, 
are somewhat contrived.  The paper provoked a response from Laughlin 
(2004) that expands the choice framework, and sheds light on the reason 
for a novice researcher such as myself to find the framework valuable.  In 
my struggle to piece together diverse research approaches into a coherent 
whole (Laughlin, 2004) the explicit consideration of the dimensions and 
my position in relation to each was an important stimulus to thinking 
more deeply about my research approach and brought clarity to a tangled 
web of theoretical and methodological choices. 
 
Furthermore, one of the key aspects of MRT is to develop insights that 
are quite general in order to contribute to theory development (Teece, 
2010), one of the aims of this study, embracing local meanings at one 
level, but through a reflexive lens providing broader interpretations of 
social systems.   
[MRT] provides an analytical framework that can be used to 
understand change processes in all organisations but does not 
either belittle the importance of the detail of these changing 
situations or is unnecessarily restrictive forcing the empirical 
detail into the theoretical categories (Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2005, p9). 
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In this case, SST interacts with the data to form analytical frameworks to 
develop contextualised interpretations that form categories for empirical 
illustration of reflexive influences on risk assessment.  The DDE analysis 
utilises these findings to focus on normative aspects of the recommended 
risk management model (HEFCE, 2001; 2005).  The following table 
illustrates the research approach adopted in this case study, and how it 
utilises MRT in choice of methodology and methods. 
 
 Middle-Range Thinking  The Approach in This Study 
Theory characteristics 
Ontological belief Skeletal generalizations possible Skeletal generalizations possible 
Role of theory Skeletal theory with some broad 
understanding of relationships 
Contextualise theory to develop broad 
understanding of relationships  
Methodology characteristics 
Role of observer and 
human nature belief 
Observer is important and always 
part of the process of discovery 
Observer is important and participates 
in the process of discovery 
Nature of method Definable approach but subject to 
refinement in actual situations, 
invariably qualitative 
Structured approach, subject to 
refinement in actual situations, 
including opportunistic data 
gathering, qualitative  
Data sought 
 
Longitudinal, case study based 
Heavily descriptive but also 
analytical 
Little longitudinal data, case study 
based, emphasis on risk narratives in 
real life context 






University and Regulatory 
documents, semi-structured 
interviews, workshop observations 
and meeting observation 
Data Analysis Qualitative with prior theoretical 
terms and concepts evident 
Qualitative, narrative rich, with prior 
theoretical terms and concepts 
evident, constructivist, multiple and 
conflicting perspectives valid 
Conclusions derived Reasonably conclusive tied to 
skeletal theory and empirical 
richness 
Reasonably conclusive tied to skeletal 
theory and empirical richness 
Validity criteria Meanings: researchers and the 
researched 
Meanings: researchers and the 
researched, accuracy and 
representativeness 
Change characteristics Medium emphasis, 
Open to radical change and 
maintenance of status quo 
Reliant on research relevance 
Open to radical change  
 
Table 4.1  MRT and Case Study Research Approach  
Source: Adapted from Laughlin (1995, p80 and 2004, p272) 
 
As outlined earlier, DDE and SST provide complementary frameworks 
for the analysis of governance implementation and risk interpretation in 
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societal systems.  Mapping the elements of DDE (Figure 3.1) onto the 
HEFCE risk management framework extends the analytical capabilities 
of the DDE model to facilitate analysis of the recommended risk 
framework (see Figure 7.3).  In addition, SST provides a skeletal 
framework for analysis and illustration of risk identification and analysis 
in organisations, building conceptual patterns that form the section 
headings for the narratives.  The empirics allow both documented 
processes and narratives that form part of our constructed reality to flesh 
out these skeletal theories.   
 
One of the strengths of MRT is the ability to combine prior theorisation 
and well-planned data collection, following traditional positivistic 
methods, with interpretative examination of a multiplicity of views by 
including participant perspectives without testing them for ‘truth’ or 
‘validity’ and without a loss of research coherence.  Conceptual 
frameworks resting on foundational theories have a powerful potential to 
amplify interpretations and seek out new ones (Dey, 2001).  
 
The use of MRT has been inextricably linked to German Critical 
Thinking, and Habermas in particular, in the work of both Richard 
Laughlin and Jane Broadbent (Laughlin, 2004; Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2005), building a framework of interpretative frames, design archetypes 
and sub-systems as heuristics to understand and identify the nature and 
order of organisational change.  This framework has been utilised to 
study accounting change in different contexts including; changes in the 
NHS (Broadbent, Laughlin & Read, 1991); resistance to NPM in Schools 
and GP Practices (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1998) gender in accounting 
(Broadbent, 1998); unwanted changes in medical practice in the UK 
(Broadbent, Jacobs, Laughlin, 2001); and PFI (Broadbent & Laughlin, 
2002).  Some difficulties with the approach are evident in a study of 
accounting in the NHS by Broadbent (1992) illustrating fragmentation, 
with different members of the organisation holding different interpretive 
schemes (described as a schizoid organisation), furthermore the study 
noted that changes in interpretative schemes may be out of step with 
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design archetype development.  Utilising the same skeletal framework, 
Soin (1996) expressed concern with the difficulty of defining 
interpretative frames and design archetypes coupled with an inability to 
explicitly draw power into the skeletal framework.  A study of 
accounting and accountants utilising MRT (Richardson et al, 1996) also 
identified a weakness in the Habermasian framework developed by 
Laughlin & Broadbent in relation to hierarchy and power. 
 
As emphasised by Laughlin (2004), MRT does not prescribe the theory 
to be adopted, but outlines the characteristics of a research approach that 
encourages the researcher to select appropriate prior theories for the topic 
being investigated.  A study by Gurd (2008) illustrates the use of an 
alternative theory within MRT by incorporating structuration (Giddens, 
1986). 
 
My approach utilises two alternative theoretical frames, developing the 
emphasis on critical analysis.  To understand this shift it is important to 
consider what constitutes a ‘critical theory’ (Chua, 2004).  Critical theory 
rests on certain essential strands, elucidated by Geuss (1981).  Firstly, 
critical theories are aimed at producing guides for human action that 
produce enlightenment and are inherently emancipating, reducing self-
imposed coercion; secondly, critical theories have cognitive content and 
are forms of knowledge; finally, critical theories differ epistemologically 
from natural sciences and are reflective rather than objectifying.  
A critical theory, then, is a reflective theory which gives agents a 
kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and 
emancipation. (Chua, 2004, p259). 
The use of a theory (SST) that incorporates reflexivity in the framework 
has significant advantages for fabrication of knowledge in this context, 
especially when accompanied by a more traditional systems analysis to 
establish normative aspects of the risk management model.  A critique 
(Chua, 2004) suggests that the genesis of MRT from the work of 
Habermas is a red herring since the meaning of Laughlin’s middle 
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derives solely from its ‘spatial position’ from the constructed alternatives 
and its derivation owes little to critical theory, inviting the use of 
different theoretical approaches within the MRT framework.  To flesh 
out skeletal frameworks it is assumed that the skeleton is appropriate to 
understanding the setting and is not the wrong size or missing a limb and 
Gurd (2008) argues that Laughlin’s MRT framework is insufficient to 
explain organisational change and has limitations that an alternative 
theory might overcome. 
 
A further issue in MRT relates to the timing of prior theorisation.  
Laughlin (1995) proposes the adoption of skeletal theory before 
immersion in the empirical domain; this approach requires the researcher 
to be well-versed and immersed in critical theories (which I was not).  It 
also suggests that no attempt is made to ‘ground’ (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) the theoretical foundations in the research findings (Dey, 2001).  
An alternative is for the researcher to ground theories in the data to flesh 
out theoretical frameworks, developing a critical narrative and then apply 
these conceptual frames and interrogate new explanations by returning to 
the empirical domain a second time (Jonsson & Macintosh, 1997).  This 
research was undertaken using the latter approach, with an initial study 
stage to enable grounding to take place and inform the development of 
the research questions and theoretical frames for the analysis of data 
from both stages of the study. 
 
A criticism in relation to the emphasis on change in MRT observes that 
the difference between ‘change’ and ‘status quo’ assumes the existence 
of a unique reality within which it is easy to judge whether an 
organisation has ‘changed’ or remained the ‘same’ (Quattrone, 2004).  
This constructivist study accepts that social systems do not move from 
one clearly identifiable status to another, and the researcher cannot 
assume that changes observed are causally linked to an identifiable 
factor.  Quattrone (2004) suggests that questions about whether one is for 
or against change are probably misleading, and this aspect of MRT is 
discussed later in this chapter when considering research relevance. 
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This section has outlined the key ontological and epistemological aspects 
of the case, and how MRT combines with selected theoretical 
frameworks to provide a critical and methodologically sound approach to 
the case.  
 
4.2.5 Ethical Considerations 
The University Research Ethics Committee approval is required for 
research involving human subjects and, having obtained consent to 
proceed, I accept responsibility for the ethical obligation to ensure there 
is no harm to participants (Crow, 2000).  All individuals were asked to 
consent to their participation before interview or training.  To gain 
‘informed’ consent, an information sheet (Appendix 1) aims to build a 
shared understanding of what is involved. 
It is extremely difficult to present prospective participants with 
absolutely all the information that might be required to make an 
informed decision about their involvement (Bryman, 2004, 
p512). 
Five elements are important: information, understanding, voluntariness, 
competence of potential participants and actual consent to participate 
(Kent, 2000).  In this project, an aspect of informed consent that cannot 
be ignored is whether participation is voluntary. 
The boundary between tactical persuasion and duress is 
sometimes very fine and is probably easier to recognise in 
practice than to stipulate (Social Research Association, 2003). 
Since the College’s senior management were sponsoring the project, 
individuals may have felt obliged to participate.  The information sheet 
emphasised that involvement was voluntary, and would stop at the 
request of the individual at any time during the project.  Consequently, 
agreement to participate in the study is interpreted as ‘informed consent’. 
 
Obligations to the research subject include privacy, veracity and fidelity 
(Crow, 2000).  Privacy may be difficult to achieve.  The  research 
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compares Departments and Schools, and the steering committee could 
guess the identities of those involved, despite the use of anonymity 
coding.  
 
In addition, in this study, by making privileged data public, harm to the 
sponsor of the project is possible.  Confidentiality was important to 
enable free access to information within the research site.  To fulfil my 
obligations to the organisation, as to any research subject, research 
publications will take account of this concern and maintain anonymity as 
far as possible.  
 
Overall, the project does not face substantial ethical concerns in 
comparison with the study of medical treatment or vulnerable (e.g. 
school children) groups.  However, an awareness of the areas of concern 
is important to enable the research methods to minimize potential 
impacts on individuals, whilst maximizing opportunities to gather 
valuable information with the aim of knowledge production. 
 
4.3 Case study approach 
There is a considerable tradition of the use of single case studies in management 
and organisational analysis (e.g. Taylor, 1911, Bethlehem Steel Company; 
Mayo, 1945, The Hawthorne Studies; Selznick, 1945, TVA; Emery & Thorsrud, 
1976, Norsk Hydro; Vaughan, 1996, Challenger launch failure).  Case studies 
are the most appropriate methodology when contemporary events are being 
examined and are open to a number of different research strategies (Yin, 2003).   
As opposed to other qualitative or quantitative research strategies, such 
as grounded theory or surveys, there are virtually no specific 
requirements guiding case research.  This is both the strength and the 
weakness of this approach.  It is a strength because it allows tailoring the 
design and data collection procedures to the research questions.  On the 
other hand, this approach has resulted in many poor case studies, leaving 
it open to criticism, especially from the quantitative field of research 
(Meyer, 2001, p329). 
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This research uses existing theory in a new context to interpret empirical 
findings; to generalise at the theory level, while the empirical data remains 
illustrative and contextual. 
 
In this case study, the funding for the research is provided by the organisation 
that forms the unit for of study, therefore case study selection is pragmatic.  The 
boundary is defined by the limits of the University.  The project sponsor 
provided privileged access to organisational members over a three-year period 
and findings reflect the views of participants during that time. 
 
A review of case study methods (Piekkari et al, 2009) confirms that Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Yin (2003) are the main authorities on the case study in business and 
management studies and have legitimized the use of case studies as a scientific 
method, providing researchers with specific guidelines for conducting rigorous 
case studies.  There is an emphasis on proposition testing in their 
recommendations, such that statements of the type "if x, then y" or "the more of 
x, then the more of y," assume that important relationships have already been 
explored through the empirical work of others (Bourgeois, 1979).  The lack of 
previous studies of operational risk within organisations, and particularly in this 
context, undermines this assumption.  Furthermore, a critique of this approach 
suggests the value of case studies lies in their ability to produce particularized 
causal explanations for the observations produced by the case under 
investigation.  
The assumption here is that explanations must take context into account 
to be meaningful: Explanation is necessarily local and ‘‘historical’’ 
rather than law like (Piekkari et al, 2009). 
Despite the largely positivist tradition of propositions and hypothesis testing to 
ensure validity of case studies, a number of good examples of case studies that 
utilise in-depth narrative analysis have been cited (Piekkari et al, 2009).  This 
thesis combines the structured approach recommended by Yin (2003) with 
interpretative data analysis and presentation of findings. 
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The selection of purposively sampled sub-groups within an overall case 
(embedded design) is recommended for case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibb-
Dyer & Wilkins, 1991).  In this study, the single study concerns the whole of the 
University; with empirical findings derived from whole group sampling for 
initial interviews, interacting with a second stage of selectively sampled 
embedded risk workshop cases and follow-up interviews, as illustrated in Figure 
4.3.  The embedded units are those Schools and Departments within the 
University selected for risk assessment workshops (selection criteria are 
discussed later in this chapter).  This study relies on direct contact with 
organisational participants in real tasks and formal interviews, focusing upon 
their organisational contexts and narratives as researcher-as-participant (Parker, 
2008).  This strategy exploits the contextual nature of a case study and its 
strength in addressing contemporary phenomena in real-life contexts (Meyer, 
2001), particularly the application of governance.  
The most effective analysis of the way organisations handle societal 
steering regulations is through detailed in-depth case studies due, largely, 
to the empirical detail that is needed to thoroughly understand the 
subtleties of organisational reactions (Laughlin, 2007, p286). 
A case study is well suited to investigation of research questions that seek to 
understand how a contemporary set of events, such as the introduction of risk 
governance, is interpreted and enacted by participants.   
 
4.3.1 Case Study Design 
The case study design provided the structure within which to select and 
use the methods of data gathering, combining multiple data sources 
within the analysis.  To frame the case study, Figure 4.3 conceptualises 
the case study organisation, illustrating relationships between internal 
groups and suggesting possible sources of risk. 
 





























 Funding Governance Funding     Law              Reputation 
 (NHS) (HEFCE/NHS) (HEFCE,  
   ESRC, PFI) 
 
        Potential Risk Sources 
  
 *Selected workshop cases (see Table 4.4 for abbreviations used) 
 
Figure 4.3 Schematic View of Case Study & Potential Sources of Risk 
 
The data gathering was undertaken in two distinct stages from March to 
June 2005 and from January to May 2007.  The design and linkage 
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Second Stage  
Training & Interviews 













Figure 4.4 Research Design Overview 
The study took a holistic approach within a limited setting, in which case wide 
views of risk interpretation provided the grounding to identify contrasting 
embedded cases to explore risk identification and assessment in different groups 
within the same organisation. 
 
4.4 Case Study Documents 
Internally published documents and web data at the University provided 
background information and the history of the case study institution.  The 
University risk management documents made an important input to the study, 
representing the outputs of the formal implementation of risk governance.  The 
risk management policy provided information about the allocation of 




   Schools    Departments 
                                 Embedded Cases  
 
      Humanities   Dentistry Biomedical Estates/Facilities 
      (Academic)   (Medical) (Academic) (Administration) 
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constituted valuable data for comparing the formal risk assessment process 
outcomes with the views expressed during workshops and interviews.  In 
addition, during the period of the study, there were two iterations of the risk 
register enabling comparison over time, providing an element of longitudinal 
study within the thesis findings. 
 
The HEFCE risk management guidance was detailed in the literature review 
chapter, and provides the normative element for risk assessment processes being 
studied.  Additional information about the implementation of risk management 
systems and the governance context was obtained by reviewing corporate 
documents from other organisations.  
  
4.4.1 Case Study Data Sources 
Table 4.2 details the types of data used and their sources. 
Data Type Data Source 
Interview 
transcriptions 
20 semi-structured interviews with Heads of 
School and Department 
Interview 
transcriptions 




4 recorded workshop sessions 
Feedback forms Training attendees 
Observation notes 1 management meeting 
Document University Risk Management Policy 
Documents University Corporate Risk Register (3 iterations) 
Documents Local Registers (2 iterations) 
E-data Websites: University, HEFCE, ESRC, 
Department of Health, Russell Group, Treasury 
 
Table 4.2  Data Sources 
 
4.5 The Research Process 
To clarify the research process Table 4.3 illustrates the stages of the research 
that form the basis for this thesis.  The study was undertaken full-time from 
October 2004 to September 2007, and on a part-time basis thereafter. 
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Date Activity  Scope 






The protocol outlines questions and prompts to elicit 




Pilot interview Pilot with Academic Manager to check interview protocol – only 





Semi-structured interviews with Heads of 9 Schools and 11 
Departments. The aim of these interviews is to produce a general 






All recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, and sent to 







Content analysis of transcripts comparing descriptions of 
organisational aims and using risk categories identified by 
HEFCE (2001).  This analysis provides initial confirmation of 
the link between organisational aims and operational risk, and 
lack of qualitative data surrounding these threats, providing 
input to the definition of the research questions for Phase 2 of 






The collection of narratives was coincidental with the update of 
the 2005 local and corporate risk registers.  The analysis 
provides insight into the formal process by identifying gaps and 






The Phase 1 findings were summarised and presented to the 
study steering committee. 







• Phase 1 findings and preliminary literature review used to 
define Research Questions. 
• Literature Review Chapter drafted. 
• Development of Methodology. 
• Embedded Case Study selection 
• Selection of Phase 2 Theoretical Approach and development 








Investigations into the possibility of providing a resource for 
Internal Audit to deliver this training on their behalf, while 
gathering data during the workshop sessions. 
September 
2006 




Pilot delivered to a group studying risk, in which my supervisor 
worked.  The trainer from Internal Audit attended to check that 
data collection would not compromise the training activity, and 
that my interpretation of the material was consistent with his.  
Permission to proceed granted.  Feedback from the group of risk 











All Schools and Departments contacted by letter to offer risk 
management training.  None responded.   Selected cases 
contacted by telephone, and agreed to proceed (Humanities, 
Biomedical & Health Sciences, Dental Institute and Estates & 






Training attendees selected by local management.  The training 
comprised presentations of the risk management guidance 
provided by HEFCE (2001) with breaks for 2 workshop 
sessions.  The first workshop asked participants to identify risks 
and the second built on this activity, assessing identified risks.  
Recorded data was derived from these workshop sessions. 






Feedback forms analysed and copied to internal audit.  Follow-






A course feedback form was used to gain agreement from 
participants for follow-up interviews (12 out of 20).   The semi-
structured interview investigates their perceptions of the 
workshop sessions.  In addition, they were asked to identify the 
most serious threat to their group to enable comparison with risk 








During the course of the risk management training, the Head of 
the School invited me to attend one of their planned executive 
meetings, to observe the inclusion of risk management in 
discussions, providing feedback to the group.   I attended as 
participant-observer, and did not record the session, but used 






Workshop audio recordings transcribed and cross-checked with 
filmed recordings to enable attribution of comments. 






Workshop narratives compared with coincidental 2007 update of 
risk registers.  This is a replication of the activity performed in 





Phase 2 data 
analysis 
Content analysis of transcripts from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the 
study.  Analytical framework derived from SST and literature 
review used to identify and group narratives and to structure 
findings chapters for each phase.  This was an iterative process 
with the analytical framework being adapted through interplay 
with the empirics.  Once completed, the two datasets were 
integrated, and risk register data was added, to enable a cross-




MPhil to PhD 
Upgrade  












Viva successfully completed February 2010.  Examiners 
comments incorporated in final revision of thesis. 
Table 4.3 Overview of Stages of the Study 
The following sections outline in further detail these stages, following this 
sequence of events.  
 
4.6 Phase 1 of the Research 
This PhD formed part of a larger project, and in Phase 1, an interview protocol 
for the Phase 1 interviews was designed by four researchers working together to 
gather initial illustrative descriptions of organisational aims and risks.  At this 
exploratory stage, the research question remained broad and asked “What risks 
are identified by senior management in a University?”.  The protocol was 
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designed to explore the range and type of risks identified by interviewees, and 
potential opportunities for follow-up research access (Appendix 2).  It should be 
noted that questions 9 and 10 were not successful and elicited little data.  A pilot 
interview was conducted with a willing Head of Department, within one of the 
Schools, by myself and another member of the team.  The pilot confirmed the 
protocol elicited the type of data sought, requiring no major changes, and that 
the recording could be successfully transcribed. 
 
Protocol design considers language and socio-cultural differences.  I am familiar 
with hazard analysis, risk assessment and risk mitigation, but these terms may 
not mean anything to University staff generally.  Consequently, the questions 
were designed to be as free from jargon as possible, and were revised using data 
from a pilot interview before the first stage of data collection.  For example, the 
word ‘risk’ was replaced by ‘threat’ for those participants who did not appear to 
understand or respond to questions about risk.  In addition, ‘risk’ can be 
interpreted narrowly to mean ‘H&S risk’, and the use of the phrase ‘what 
threatens achievement of your aims’ prompted interviewees to talk about 
broader concerns, to investigate the link between risk and objectives suggested 
by HEFCE.   
 
The Phase 1 interviews started with very open questions, with prompts being 
used if the required information was not elicited.  The participants were 
encouraged to give narrative responses, not yes/no answers.    
In the unstructured interview, rambling can be viewed as providing 
information because it reveals something about the interviewee’s 
concerns (Bryman, 1988, p47). 
Semi-structured interviews were preferred to questionnaires or structured 
interviews for both parts of the study.  This predominantly open approach aims 
to obtain unexpected responses, providing greater understanding of issues from 
the participants’ point of view (May, 2001).  However, the use of some structure 
ensured that the interviews focussed on risks within the University.  All 
interviews were tape-recorded enabling the interviewer(s) to concentrate on 
successfully covering the questions on the protocols (Appendices 2 & 7), with 
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the use of standard prompts where appropriate, and eliciting interviewee 
responses in the time frame allowed.  Interview skills require the ability to be 
flexible, objective, empathic, persuasive and a good listener (Fontana & Frey, 
2000).  Following each interview, the interactions were reflected upon, building 
up contextual awareness in relation to each participant. 
 





Sciences & Engineering  
Health & Life Sciences*  
Biochemistry* (BHS) 
Nursing (link to NHS) 
Psychiatry (link to NHS) 
Dental (link to NHS) (DI) 
Medicine (link to NHS) 






Human Resources (HR) 
Information Systems & Services 
(ISS) 
Health & Safety 
Resources 
‘University’ Business Ltd13  
  * Adjacent groups merged after first stage of study  
 
Table 4.4  University First Stage Data Collection Areas 
The semi-structured interviews of Phase 1 of the research gather data from 9 
Schools (one chose not to participate), and 11 functional Departments within the 
University14.  The wide coverage was made possible by sampling only the Head 
of School or Department, gathering senior management views of risk across the 
University.  Of the twenty interviews conducted, I was sole interviewer on four 
occasions and participated in a further 11, the remaining 5 were undertaken 
jointly by two other members of the University study team. 
 
4.6.1 Transcription of Phase 1 interviews 
I transcribed all recorded data verbatim, providing the benefit of familiarity and 
closeness to the data before analysis (Meyer, 2001).  Any inaudible material was 
                                                
13 Name changed to maintain anonymity 
14 Two of the Schools and two Departments were merged during the period of study 
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marked [unclear] in the transcription.  Narratives from interviews are verbatim 
transcriptions, except where hesitations such as ‘um’, ‘er’ ‘you know’, or word 
repetitions, were removed to improve readability.  The department role function 
(Academic, Medical or Administration) was used to preserve anonymity, since 
to identify department would mean identifying an individual.  To distinguish 
quoted academic texts from those of interviewees, transcribed comments from 
participants appear in italics. 
 
4.6.2 First Stage Case Analysis 
The analysis of the Phase 1 transcripts utilised content analysis to 
compare responses about organisational aims, and used identified risk 
categories to provide a preliminary overview of the data.  Since few 
similar studies were available, a ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) approach was used to provide confirmation of the value of 
investigating operational risk assessment, and to develop appropriate 
research questions and inform the selection of theory. 
 
In order to provide clarity and structure for comparison of data from 
different interviews, the initial framework for content analysis was 
derived from an illustrative list of risks for HEIs (Figure 2.2). The initial 
work to obtain valid empirical views from interviews involved 
transcription, re-reading transcriptions and continual listening to 
narratives, resulting in highlighted quotes with thematic codes assigned.  
Key word content analysis identified relevant narratives in the 
transcriptions and the patterns in the data began to emerge, as 
representative quotes were selected.  This analytical framework did not 
provide a strong theoretical lens for understanding risk management 
processes, but fulfilled its role in confirming that there was a valid 
concern about the qualitative nature of operational risk through the link 
to organisational aims, and guided embedded case selection through 
identification of sub-goals within the organisation that present varying 
interpretations of risk between groups.   
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4.6.3 Phase 1 Narratives & 2005 Risk Register Analysis  
To compare participant narratives and formal process outputs, the 2005 
University risk registers provided a comparison with research narratives 
that were contemporary to their issue, illustrating differences between the 
formal documented process and narrative accounts of risk. These 
different data sources provided contrasting views of the formal risk 
management system and informal views of risk and risk assessment.  The 
gaps and overlaps were evident.  The absence of data on a topic is an 
important feature of this comparison.   
 
4.6.4 Phase 1 Research Outputs 
The initial analysis provided input to a preliminary report to the project 
steering committee, and the empirical data informed the definition of 
research questions and pointed to key features needed in a theoretical 
frame for second stage analysis.  With little available prior theory or 
existing empirical evidence to draw on, this was a necessary first step in 
the case study.   
 
4.7 Phase 2 Data Collection 
As the study moved into the second phase, I began to work alone to investigate 
the research problem, defining the research questions, developing the 
methodology, and planning and undertaking the data gathering.  The opportunity 
to record staff participating in risk identification and assessment discussions, 
whilst acting as trainer for the delivery of planned workshops, provided a 
serendipitous access method for gathering narratives about operational risk.  I 
was invited to attend an Internal Audit risk management training session to 
familiarise myself with the course, with a view to acting as a resource for 
Internal Audit to deliver the training.   
 
I acknowledge that this approach to accessing talk about risk was opportunistic 
rather than planned, since the training was being organised by Internal Audit and 
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required a resource.  However, in acting as training consultant, there was a risk 
of bias when participants asked for guidance and clarification about 
requirements.  Reflexively, this bias was difficult to guard against, but since the 
course material being presented was already designed and derived from HEFCE 
best practice guidance, personal influence was somewhat reduced.  
 
4.7.1 Risk Training Workshop Pilot Study 
Prior to commencing training a pilot study was undertaken to verify the 
appropriateness and practicality of the data collection method (see 
Appendix 3).   The pilot session, held with members of the Risk 
Management Centre, enabled me to check my interpretation of the 
material with the person who developed the course, who attended the 
pilot training to provide feedback.  Nonetheless, in subsequent sessions, I 
was careful to ensure that responses were consistent between groups, and 
clarified any unclear aspects with the Internal Audit department, 
providing e-mail feedback to participants subsequent to the training 
where required.  The pilot confirmed the benefit of tailoring workshop 
presentations to focus on risks that were relevant to the group being 
trained, to encourage discussions as similar to a real risk assessment 
sessions as was possible. 
 
4.7.2 Workshop Sample Selection 
At the time of Phase 2 of the study, the introduction of local risk registers 
as part of an annual University risk review was accompanied by 
provision of risk management training for Schools and Departments  (see 
slides in Appendix 4) providing an unusual and interesting opportunity to 
gather data.   
 
The risk workshops came about by offering training to all Heads of 
Schools and Departments (memo dated November 2006, from the Head 
of Administration) to support the requested update of local risk registers.  
No Schools or Departments contacted me to ask for training.  
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Consequently, selectively sampled areas were contacted to arrange 
training sessions.  The Departments and Schools visited during the initial 
stages of data collection form the candidates from which the embedded 
cases for risk management training were selected.  Sampling enabled the 
study to investigate group risk accounts that theoretical perspectives 
suggested would vary, without expending the effort of data gathering in 
all groups.  It was a pragmatic response to time constraints.  Candidate 
cases for workshops were screened to ensure sufficient Department size 
to enable replication of the workshop sessions within each area.  History, 
size, objectives, administrative systems, environment and individual 
traits are expected to influence reflexive systems.  In addition, Handy 
(1993) notes that physical location can affect group interactions, and the 
study aimed to cover all major University sites.  Three Schools and one 
support Department were identified, to provide data from widely 
differing groups within the organisation.  The selection process 
considered influences suggested by the theoretical approach: site; nature 
of work; external links; use of H&S risk assessments; and history of the 
group.  Consideration of these factors results in the selection of the 
Schools and Departments shown in Table 4.5. 



















Joint working with NHS, 
opportunity seeking (from 
initial interviews), history 










Reorganised with some 
course closure and loss of 
staff.  Research focussed 









Group goals not directly 
related to key aims of 
teaching & research.   
Humanities16 No Site 4 Academic 
Non-
Scientific 
Long standing area, desk 
based study, research & 
teaching focus. 
 
Table 4.5  Workshop Case Study Areas  
 
These areas were contacted between December 2006 and March 2007, by 
letter and telephone.  All groups contacted (Humanities, Estates & 
Facilities, Dentistry and Biomedical & Health Sciences) agreed to 
participate in the training programme and research study. One particular 
research question motivating the sampling asks whether the 
organisational setting of the risk assessment affects the way it is 
conducted.  The study follows the advice of Yin (2003) in following 
replication, not sampling logic, with each case being chosen carefully, to 
shed light on the contextual influences.  This strategy is an important 
aspect of the case study, while quantitative sampling concerns itself with 
representativeness; qualitative sampling seeks information richness and 
selects the cases purposefully rather than randomly (Crabtree and Miller 
1992).   
                                                
15 Both Departments were included to provide sufficient numbers for repeat sampling, and during the 
course of the study they were integrated into one organisational unit. 
 
16 The School of Humanities agreed to participate, and selected senior academics to attend, but was 
unable to get more than one participant to join the Head of School and School Administrator on two 
suggested dates, so no sessions were held. 
 Page 119 of 407 
 
Having chosen the embedded cases, the selection of attendees must be 
addressed; the study cannot sample all members of each group. 
Even when the cases for a study have been chosen, it is often 
necessary to make further choices within each case to make the 
cases researchable (Meyer, 2001, p335). 
In this study, the use of planned internal training sessions meant that the 
selection of attendees was dependent on School/Department nominations 
for training, and the voluntary attendance of the individual concerned.  
This revealed differences in approach regarding who should to be 
trained.  Such choices act as proxy data for senior management 
perceptions of responsibility and accountability for risk management.  
Since I did not influence the composition of the groups, there was an 
additional benefit of observing organisational activity as it occurred.  
Seven training sessions were arranged and four were held, being 
dependent on availability of staff. The cancellation of planned training 
meant that no sessions were held in one of the selected areas; 
Humanities.  The following section provides an overview of the nature of 
the groups that participated in the training workshops, and the roles of 
attendees, to allow the reader to contextualise narrative responses. 
 
4.7.3 Embedded Case Study 1: The Dental Institute 
The Dental Institute (DI) was based on Site 2 (Figure 4.3), with 
approximately 125 full-time and 80 part-time staff.  There were 800 
undergraduate and 260 post-graduate students in the School.  The group 
had a history of organisational change through mergers with other 
Institutions.  The arrangements within the Institute were very complex, in 
terms of who pays for what, with different income streams from the 
University and the NHS, which are constantly under review.  The link 
with the NHS requires joint working arrangements. 
Our staff all have duality of appointment, the College staff have 
all got honorary NHS appointments, and the NHS staff have 
college appointments, and everybody bears teaching, clinical 
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service provision and some form of research with differing 
proportions.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Table 4.6 gives a summary of the training group profile. 
Group Characteristics The Environment 
Training attendees: Professors & 
Senior Management Staff 
Aim: To be World Class 
Five previous mergers 
260 PG & 800 UG students 
Site 2 
Hospital and laboratory sites 
Links to Health Organisations 
Complex inter-group relations 
 
Table 4.6  Dental Institute Group Profile 
The first training session was held here (T1), and the Head of School 
selected members of the Institute Executive Committee to attend.  There 
were 5 trainees and 2 agreed to follow-up interviews.  The Head of 
School requested that the risk training was tailored to consider risks 
associated with a merger, and did not consider it would be necessary to 
train any additional staff members in the area.  Consequently, repeat 
sampling was not possible.  Most representatives on the Executive 
Committee were senior academics with responsibility for management.  
The training group, with one exception, were familiar with H&S 
assessment, indicating acceptance of the administrative responsibilities of 
senior managers, in contrast to responses of interviewees in other 
academic areas. 
 
4.7.4 Embedded Case Study 2: Estates & Facilities Department 
The Estates & Facilities Departments (E&F) were merged during the 
course of the study, and were based at multiple sites, with responsibility 
for the entire estate, including Halls of Residence and Sports Grounds.  
There were over 350 staff in the group (80 from Estates).  The Estates 
staff spent a lot of time managing external groups since most of the 
building work was actually done by outside consultants, agents or 
contractors.  The Facilities group provided support services in buildings, 
including security, cleaning and administrative arrangements such as 
room bookings for Halls of Residence.  In addition, they liaised 
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extensively with Ecovert, a PFI partner organisation providing 
subcontract support for facilities at some of the University academic 
sites. 
 
Table 4.7 gives a summary of the training group profile. 
 
Group Characteristics  The Environment 
• Training attendees: Senior 
Management Staff 
• Aim: To provide infrastructure 
to support Research & Teaching 
• Integration of Estates and 
Facilities Departments 
• 350 Staff 
• All sites 
• University, Halls of Residence 
and Sports Sites 
• Internal links to Schools and 
PCT 
• External links to legal 
compliance bodies, Ecovert 
and building subcontractors 
 
Table 4.7  E&F Group Profile 
Two training sessions were held (T2 & T3) in the E&F Department at 
their office at Site 2, and this group were responsible for all sites (Figure 
4.3).  The Head of Department nominated himself and senior managers 
in the group to attend.  This was the only area in which two training 
sessions were held, and the same training material was used for both 
groups.  It was tailored to focus on risks arising from compliance with 
'green' legislation in relation to buildings.  The same content was 
presented at both sessions.  However, attendance in the first session was 
reduced to 3, because a flood resulted in a power cut in the West End, 
affecting one particular site, requiring staff to be elsewhere on the day.  
This limited the scope of discussion in that workshop, and suggests the 
need to have at least 5 attendees to enable exchange of views. 
There were not enough people to have a real workshop.  There 
were only 3 of us.  [T2A3 Manager interview] 
The site closure dominated discussions in this group.  One of the 
heuristics or biases identified in the field of cognitive psychology has 
been characterised as ‘availability’ (Slovic, 1987, Bazerman, 1994).  An 
event is judged likely, or frequent, if instances of it are easy to imagine or 
recall.  The biasing effects of memorability and imaginability pose a 
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barrier to open, objective discussions of risks (Barnes, 1984).  
Consequently, it is possible that this group overlooked other significant 
risks in their area, by focussing on the current problem.  However, the 
opportunity to discuss issues associated with the incident was seen by 
participants as a beneficial exercise.  
I think the most useful thing was applying them to the situation 
that was actually happening on that day, in the [name].  We had 
a live sample to look at.  [T2A3 Manager interview] 
The second session had the expected attendance of 5 staff, with the 
addition of a member of staff from the Finance Department17, who 
requested permission to join the training.  This had the benefit of 
enabling comparison of views between groups, and highlighted the fact 
that assumptions about responsibility in relation to certain activities are 
not necessarily valid. 
We always assumed, since there was no evidence of that process 
going on anywhere in Finance, I’d always assumed that that 
process went on in Estates somewhere.  [T3 Manager] 
This raised the question of whether the HEFCE framework encourages 
the involvement of members of different groups in risk assessment 
sessions, and highlights one of the potential benefits of doing so.  Of the 
7 E&F attendees 5 were familiar with H&S risk assessment.  The 5 
follow-up interviews were conducted with staff from both training 
sessions. 
 
4.7.5 Embedded Case Study 3: School of Biomedical & Health Sciences  
This School was formed around the time of the first stage interviews, 
when the Biochemistry group and Health & Life Sciences group were 
merged.  The School of Biomedical & Health Sciences (BHS) had about 
120 academic staff, about 90 technical staff, 40 administrative staff and 
about 300 research staff.  There were 2,100 undergraduate students and 
                                                
17 This attendee had to leave before the end of the session, and no feedback form or 
follow-up interview was completed 
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465 post-graduates within the School, making it one of the largest in the 
University. 
 
The majority of the staff were based at Site 2, with additional research 
activity based at Site 3 and a small group at Site 1 (Figure 4.3).  Despite 
becoming part of the Medical Schools, through reorganisation during this 
study, there was no suggestion that this group adopt joint working with 
the NHS, although some staff were based at NHS or Trust sites.  
Consequently the group was regarded by the researcher as an ‘academic’ 
group.  
 
Table 4.8 gives a summary of the training group profile. 
Group Characteristics The Environment 
• Training attendees: Technical 
Management Staff 
• Aim: High Quality Teaching and 
Research 
• Internal reorganisations, with some 
staff losses and department closures 
• 550 staff 
• 465 PG and 2100 UG students 
• Sites 1, 2 and 3 
• Hospital and laboratory 
sites 
• Internal links within 
department across sites 
• Interface with Health 
Organisations 
 
Table 4.8  Biomedical & Health Sciences Group Profile 
BHS nominated two groups to attend training.  The first (T4) comprised 
7 PhD qualified technical managers, and was attended by the 7 invited 
participants, 5 of whom agreed to follow-up interviews.  The majority 
did not form part of the School’s senior management team, and were not 
aware that a risk register existed before the training.  Only 2 of these 7 
attendees indicated prior awareness of H&S risk assessment on the 
feedback form.  In liaison with a BHS administrative manager, it was 
agreed the session would focus on risks arising from the aim of excelling 
in a wide range of research subjects and taught courses.  The second 
planned session for administrative managers was cancelled owing to 
other commitments. 
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4.7.6 Phase 2 Training Sessions 
Training comprised a presentation (Appendix 4) outlining the HEFCE 
(2001) guidance, broken by two workshops, in which participants firstly 
identified risks, and secondly, assessed them.  The training material was 
tailored prior to delivery, to focus on a particular risk identified by each 
Head of group, to facilitate realistic discussions.  For these workshops, 
the voice data was initially transcribed and then cross-checked with video 
data, to attribute individual comments correctly, which was difficult 
using voice data alone.  Nonetheless, it was not possible to attribute 
every comment, and where such data is used, only the session 
information is provided.  Selected quotes were attributed to individuals 
through use of anonymity coding (Appendix 5).  The approach enabled 
consideration of interactions between participants and whether certain 
individuals dominated some sessions (see Appendix 6).   
 
To access risk understandings the researcher needs to establish 
cooperation and collaboration with organisational members (Burns, 
2000) and the opportunity to be involved in risk management training 
represented a significant breakthrough for research access, particularly 
when the focus of interest is risk assessment.  It also opens up the 
possibility of enlightenment through awareness of reflexive issues for the 
participants, as recommended within a critical theory approach.  
 
4.7.7 Analysis of Feedback Forms 
The forms (Appendix 7) were developed by Internal Audit to assess the 
quality of the training delivery, and 19 of 20 attendees completed the 
form.  Around 95% of these rated the course as ‘Good’ or ‘Very Good’ 
(Appendix 8).   Comments provided by 50% of participants indicated the 
training was helpful, useful or good, and no negative feedback was 
received.  The forms also provided data about attendees, including role 
and familiarity with H&S (see Appendix 5).  
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4.7.8 Phase 2 Follow-Up Interviews 
As a follow-up to the training sessions, I conducted short semi-structured 
interviews with all twelve of twenty participants who indicated 
willingness to participate on course feedback forms (Appendices 7 & 8).  
All training sessions provided some interviewees.  The interview 
protocol (Appendix 9) was my own design, developed as part of the pilot 
research, and includes a question to check whether participants felt 
coerced during the workshops and links to the initial interviews by 
asking about most serious threat to the group, to enable an element of 
longitudinal research. 
 
4.7.9 Observation of Dental Institute Executive Meeting 
While providing risk management training, the Head of the Dental 
Institute invited me to attend their next Executive Meeting, to provide 
feedback to them about risk management activity that occurs normally in 
their existing management reviews.  Reflexively, this indicates the 
group’s business focus and their treatment of me as a free management 
consulting resource.  During this meeting, my role was deliberately less 
participative, as the aim was to observe naturally occurring behaviour, as 
far as possible.  I consider myself to play the observer-as-participant role, 
since I sat around the table with the meeting attendees.  Despite having 
minimal interaction, I could not claim to be a complete observer, since 
my presence could lead to modifications in attendee communication and 
behaviour.  This role has less influence on the participant discussions, 
since I made no verbal contribution to the meeting.  I recorded a 
summary of topics in my meeting notes and gave feedback to the Head of 
School after the meeting, and provided a copy of my notes subsequently. 
 
4.7.10 Transcription of Phase 2 workshops and interviews 
The transcription method remained the same as that used in Phase 1 of 
the study.  However, in this stage, the anonymity of individuals was 
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protected through assignment of codes to each participant, designating 
training session number and attendee number, in addition to role type 
(Appendix 5).  This enabled group and speaker to be identified to 
interpret comments in their context. 
 
4.8 Phase 2 Narratives and 2007 Risk Register Analysis 
Phase 2 workshop and follow-up interviews were compared with the 
contemporaneous 2007 University risk register (a replication of the Phase 1 
analysis).  Once again, this illustrated differences between the formal 
documented risk register and participants’ identification and assessment of risk. 
 
4.9 Phase 2 Analytical Framework 
This section details aspects of the analysis of narratives and how they were 
linked to the narrative categories that emerged during the data analysis.  It is 
worth noting that the purpose of the risk rating scale used in the workshop was 
to foster group discussion about risk severity and frequency.  Whilst risk scores 
and ratings produced during workshops could be tabulated, this reflected a very 
small sample that was not intended to represent a population (Morgan & 
Krueger, 1998), and such data was not analysed; the emphasis was on obtaining 
narrative data.  Reflexively, this decision was fortunate since the workshop 
sessions revealed an unexpected reluctance to assign values to ratings; if the 
study had relied on analysis of this type of evidence, there would be little to 
discuss. 
 
The headings used in chapters 5, 6 and 7 were derived from categories evident in 
the narratives when framed by the chosen theoretical lenses and informed by 
literature in the field. This was an iterative process, as I interacted with the data 
using theoretical perspectives to tease out interesting features of the case.  The 
boundaries of the categories provided a focus for further definition, clarification 
and occasionally indicated a need for an additional focus.   
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The analysis also recognises that not only what individuals do in a group 
depends on the group context, but also that what happens in any group depends 
on the individuals who make it up (Morgan, 1997), and exposed aspects of this 
interplay in the workshop data.  Quote selection represents the wide range of 
views elicited.  When confidentiality prevented use of a quote, a descriptive 
paragraph was used in its place. 
 
4.9.1 Analysis of Research Question 1 
Question 1 asks: 
How are operational risk assessments being carried out in the 
University?   
SST forms the framework using autopoiesis as a concept to reveal how 
actions in social systems are stimulated by communicative events.  The 
use of a reflexive framework as an interpretative tool enables 
identification of the way that participants identify risks, in both formal 
and informal systems.  The details of processes in both types of control 
system were magnified and failure to identify opportunities formed an 
additional focus. The DDE framework facilitated normative assessment 
of the implementation of the recommended model utilising the empirics 
drawn out through SST perspectives. 
 
4.9.2 Analysis of Research Question 2 
Question 2 asks whether the organisational setting of the risk assessment 
affects the way it is conducted.  The SST framework enabled the 
psychic/social system interaction to inform differences between groups 
and individuals and their environment.  Narratives revealed how 
organisational members treat communication as ‘information’ that makes 
a difference in organisational contexts, or ignore it.  In exploring 
membership roles, the boundaries that separate and connect highlighted 
the way that interpenetration of systems influenced reflexive responses in 
systems that form environments for each other.  Furthermore, the 
framework explored hierarchy and ability to resolve conflict; an 
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important aspect of risk mitigation, through selection and prioritisation of 
actions. 
 
4.9.3 Analysis of Research Question 3 
Question 3 asks what is acceptable or tolerable risk to individuals in the 
University and what factors influence this understanding.   The analysis 
of acceptable risk utilised the SST ability to explain why many long-term 
threats were ignored, through system conditioning, and how expectations 
and the development of immune systems influenced tolerability, 
alongside degree of control.  Lack of agreement about value ranking of 
many risks can be linked to the roles explored in the previous section, 
and comes under the microscope as reactions to the reactions of other 
form a reflexive cycle in assessing the acceptability of risk.   
 
4.9.4 Analysis of Research Question 4 
Question 4 asks what uncertainties are apparent during risk assessment 
activities.  The role of double contingency revealed uncertainties linked 
to the interpretation of external aims and how to satisfy them.  Risk 
assessment activities were contextualised as reflexive reactions to unclear 
goals as the organisation reacts to an unclear picture of itself and 
interpenetrating systems.  Uncertainty was also analysed in the context of 
a defensive mechanism, the communication of ignorance providing 
protection against uncertain outcomes.   
 
Uncertainties about the effectiveness of internal control systems were 
evaluated to shed light on how poor internal control was identified, and 
to critically expose how risk concerns increased when participants were 
unsure about policies and processes. 
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4.9.5 Development of Narrative Discussion Framework 
The interplay of SST theory with the research questions and the data is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5.  The categories derived form the framework for 
the narrative findings that were informed by the theoretical perspectives 























Figure 4.5 A Schematic Representation of the Interaction of the 
Theoretical Lens, Research Questions and Narrative Topics 
 
SST Theoretical Lens                    Research Questions                          Narrative Topics 
Action system based on 
communicative events 
Process – before/after difference 
is what counts 
Difference system/environment 
Psychic and social systems 
Information ‘makes a difference’ 





Fit for Audit 
Communications in the 
Organisation 
Boundaries to separate/connect 
Operational Risk Interpretation 
Conflicting perspectives 
Competition between groups 
Boundary Effects Interpenetration of systems that 
form environments for each other 






Never complete agreement on 
value ranking of goals or effects 
Reactions of others  
 
Conditioning 
Existing control systems 
Influence of external views 
Degree of control 
Double contingency 
Communication of ignorance 
System reacts to an unclear 
picture of itself 
 
Risk Assessment is not a form 
of measurement 
Uncertainty & process control 
Uncertainty reduction 
How are operational risk 
assessments being carried 
out in the College? 
Does the organisational 
setting of the risk assessment 
affect the way it is conducted? 
What is acceptable or 
tolerable risk to individuals in 
the College and what factors 
influence this understanding? 
What uncertainties are 
apparent during risk 
assessment activities? 
Unclear aims and objectives 
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The DDE model explores the normative risk assessment process, utilising 
empirical findings developed through SST analysis.  The mapping of this 
theoretical frame is less complicated, and is illustrated in Figure 7.3.  The 
two-layered theoretical approach in this case study was facilitated by 
MRT, through use of methods and theories that were appropriate to the 
questions being investigated.  Selected prior theories reflect the 
researcher’s beliefs and ontological position, aiming to provide 
transparency for readers and rigour in research findings recognising their 
influence on data presented.   
 
Furthermore, the literature review provided an important input to the 
identification of research questions, and understandings developed during 
that process were inherently incorporated in the interpretations developed 
in the analysis.   However, the analytical frame that provides the structure 
for the empirical findings did not explicitly draw the relevant literature 
into the presentation of narratives, thus requiring a further stage of 
analysis, drawing together the research findings to highlight their 
contribution to the development of knowledge in relation to the extant 
literature, presented in Chapter 8. 
 
4.10 Reflections on Methodological Choices 
In this case, the thesis integrates views from participants to provide a picture of a 
complex system from varying perspectives, building rich descriptions of 
multiple realities.  This constructivist approach implies that knowledge is always 
knowledge that a person constructs, and multiple interpretations are open to 
construction (Larochelle & Bednarz, 1998).  This epistemological position 
represents a break with empirical-realism that claims access to reality in terms of 
tangibles that are independent of observers, and my position leans further 
towards this perspective than is recommended within MRT as a middle position.  
In challenging the belief that the facts speak for themselves, problems are posed 
for a positivist approach to validity checking.  However, MRT enabled 
theoretical structure interacting with narratives to increase the explanatory 
power of the interpretivist approach, creating understandings that contribute to 
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knowledge production. The privileged access over an extended period, provided 
a rich and complex set of data, from different sources, to shed light on 
operational risk in organisations more generally. 
 
Furthermore, I wished to present a case that provides insights that readers 
recognise and will be able to interpret in new ways, penetrating their own 
understandings, described as an ‘a-ha’ moment. 
More than once we have had an "aha" experience when reading such 
[case] studies because the rich descriptions have unveiled the dynamics 
of the phenomena and have helped us identify similar dynamics in our 
own research or in our daily lives (Gibb-Dyer & Wilkins, 1991, p617). 
The study aims to illustrate how the understanding inherent in the theoretical 
frameworks utilised here is of practical significance to the analysis of 
organisations.  Both theories have been developed to align with the research 
questions being asked, to build understandings of theoretical constructs in 
unexplored domains.  Narrative illustrations develop understanding of causal 
links to improve the predictive power of the theory.  The empirical data 
interacted with the theories to extend the skeletal SST and DDE models as 
frameworks for analyzing key aspects of risk governance implementation and 
organisational change. 
 
This methodology enabled critical assessment of differences in response to 
environmental stimuli in reflexive concerns of groups.  Differences and 
similarities within and between individual views of risk were expected, and the 
study did not aim to privilege one view over another.  In addition, expressed 
understanding of regulatory aims and compliance mechanisms was drawn-out 
and explored.  Valuable new perspectives opened up through the linking of 
external environmental and self-referential systems, unravelling and explaining 
complex webs of meaning.   
 
4.11 Cross Case Analysis 
The data sets from both stages of the study were loaded into Excel and quotes 
organised around the emerging themes, the theoretical frame and research 
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questions.  At this stage, the Phase 1 data was reviewed as a whole data set, 
while each workshop group remained separate as the embedded cases were 
explored in-depth.  The next step was to integrate the Phase 2 findings to 
facilitate comparison between embedded cases.  Reflecting the difference in 
approach to data gathering in the stages of this study, the initial interviews 
remain illustrated as a separate analytical section.  
 
The cross-case analysis of the interview and training narratives draws both 
phases of the data collection together to examine the research questions in the 
light of the overall study findings.  This involved organising themes and 
comparing these emergent findings against each other, starting to establish links 
for the findings to the relevant literature.  The cross case analysis represents the 
unit of analysis for the study and pulls findings together for discussion to draw 
conclusions.  It was at this stage that some generalisations at the theoretical level 
became possible as understandings of contextualised responses to environmental 
changes were developed.   
 
Longitudinal change was examined by comparison of the replicated risk register 
analyses.  Thus, the data from 2005 and 2007 were compared, highlighting gaps, 
similarities and features of the risk assessment process, providing an opportunity 
to examine changes in an ongoing and developing risk management 
implementation. 
 
4.12 Validity & Research Relevance 
In many research studies, validity is demonstrated by utilising triangulation of 
data from different sources.  However, Searle (1999) argues that triangulation 
only makes sense from within a positivist framework.  Triangulation has no 
relevance for genuine interpretivists, and would involve subscription to 
inappropriate ontological and epistemological positions in this case study.  
However, source triangulation is suggested when several participants say 
approximately the same things about the same issue (Baxter & Eyles, 1999) 
enabling common themes to be identified.  For the study, the unit of analysis 
was the University, and cross-case data took the form of narratives from 
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workshops and interviews, and documents such as the University Corporate 
Risk Register, utilising theoretical perspectives.  
The idea behind cross-case searching tactics is to force investigators to 
go beyond initial impressions, especially through the use of structural 
and diverse lenses on the data (Meyer, 2001, p342).  
The in-depth case study narratives develop internal validity through improved 
understanding of organisational processes and contexts. 
… qualitative data are particularly useful for understanding why or why 
not emergent relationships hold.  When a relationship is supported, the 
qualitative data often provide a good understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the relationship, that is, the "why" of what is happening.  This 
is crucial to the establishment of internal validity (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p542). 
The narratives act as clear illustrations of the how and why of risk management 
that current studies and literature have not captured in-depth.  Such validity is 
founded on faithful reproduction of participant narratives (Christians, 2000), and 
that the transcribed narratives are representative of the range of views expressed 
in the interviews and workshops.  A reflexive consideration of interactions with 
and between workshop participants is also important (see Appendix 6).  
 
The issue of practical irrelevance of management research findings to 
practitioners has been the subject of discussion for quite a number of years and 
there have been considerable attempts to bridge the relevance gap (Rasche & 
Behman, 2009).  The chosen topic must be relevant, either in terms of current 
interest or in terms of usefulness for research or business practices.  The 
interplay between the rational design of risk management models and socially 
constructed realities makes the study of regulatory control systems, such as risk 
management governance, both challenging and interesting (Berry et al, 2009).  
The investigation of risk governance is an important current academic theme.  
Given the theoretical debates and sectoral differences about the meanings 
of governance, the environmental turbulence facing universities, the 
increasing complexity within universities, and the growing expectations 
for good governance practices and improved organizational performance, 
there is a growing need to reflect on governance (Bradshaw & Fredette, 
2009, p125). 
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The usefulness of the study findings to practitioners is more difficult to assess. 
Relevance cannot be decided upon prior to application but rather, and 
most of all, is an outcome of application.  Thus, a large part of the 
relevance problem in management studies is bound to the difficulty of 
controlling the context of application of scientific knowledge (Rasche & 
Behman, 2009, p249). 
For the research to be relevant, it needs to be communicated and understood, 
emphasising the importance of this aspect of research to align with the change 
perspective of MRT.  Participant narratives illustrated points embodying the 
perspectives of those implementing risk management in the study, enabling the 
academic and practitioner perspectives to interact and produce meaning that is 
potentially more accessible to either, encouraging interpretation by both 
management academics, regulators and practising managers.  To use research 
for knowledge generation, the outputs need dissemination through research 
papers, seminars or books.  Recommendations for the project sponsor 
summarise implementation concerns that emerge from this thesis and suggest 
possible local improvements in the application of the HEFCE risk management 
guidance (Appendix 10).  Additionally, recommendations for the regulator, 
based on deeper understanding of risk management implementation, aim to offer 
critical insights that can improve HEFCE guidance (Appendix 11).  Reflexively, 
my background as a management consultant placed emphasis on relevance to 
practitioners and regulatory bodies. 
 
4.13 Summary 
This chapter has traced the research process and explained ontological and 
methodological choices that influence the content of the study and methods used 
to gather and analyse the data, leading to a constructivist presentation of 
narratives.  The reflexive approach encouraged by MRT enabled the researcher 
to find a balance between ethnographic focus on understanding and the critical 
focus on explanation (Dey, 2001) using a combination of positivistic approaches 
evident in the use of prior theory in the research design and structured data 
collection alongside interpretative techniques used in analysis and presentation 
of empirical findings.  The researcher interacted with participant’s narratives and 
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theoretical perspectives to develop interpretations of their views.  Qualitative 
methods place reliance on building a complex and rich understanding of a 
research topic.  This chapter also explained how I obtained and selected 
narrative quotes for inclusion within this thesis from the body of field data, 
developing theoretical categories reflexively through interaction with the data.   
One cannot ordinarily follow how a researcher got from 3,600 pages of 
field notes to the final conclusions, sprinkled with vivid quotes though 
they may be (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p16). 
To facilitate this understanding, reflexive views in relation to methodology have 
been outlined and possible biases in the presentation of data made evident.  In 
particular, selection of case study areas, data collection and subsequent analysis 
was elaborated.  During the process outlined in this chapter, the adjustment from 
management consultant to academic researcher, via novice post-graduate, has 
not been easy.  
For those for whom the training comes mid-working life, an 
uncomfortable time may lie ahead, with conflicts abounding between the 
(research) centre’s models and strictures concerning the ethics and 
practice of research and neophyte’s common sense derived from the 
world of work and other experiences (Sanger, 1996, p9). 
This hard won shift of perspective has enabled a structured empirical analysis of 
the regulatory environment in a University, exploring how the technologies of 
control are evident in organisational behaviour, in addition to revealing the 
problematic nature of risk itself, through critical interpretative analysis.  This 
chapter has provided an overview of the chosen methodological approach.  The 
following two chapters will present descriptive illustrations of the empirical 
findings, providing a valuable resource and illustrating key themes that emerge 
in the case.   
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5 Phase 1: Interview Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents semi-structured interview narratives to illustrate risk 
understandings of senior managers in the University.  It begins with an analysis 
of the interpretation of organisational aims as described by the interviewees, 
conducted during Phase 1 of the study.   Its initial purpose was an exploratory 
investigation of the definition of risk that links to organisational aims.  Here, it 
provides an overview of differences in interpretation of aims that set the scene 
for the narratives that follow. 
 
The remainder of this chapter presents the interview narratives as seen through 
the analytical framework built around key concepts of SST and incorporating 
perspectives derived from the literature review chapter.  The main chapter 
headings relate to the four research questions, and within each section, the 
theoretical framework interplaying with the data led to the definition of the sub-
section headings (see Figure 4.5).    
 
Firstly, the ‘How’ of risk assessment utilises SST to examine the organisation as 
an action system based on communicative events through interpretation of the 
HEFCE governance and communication within the organisation.  It investigates 
how autopoiesis influences responses to competing aims; explaining a 
preference for compliance process outcomes that are ‘fit for audit’.  The risk of 
not exploiting opportunities is illustrated, as the desire for uncertainty reduction 
comes into play.   
 
Secondly, the organisational setting of the risk assessment is explored, utilising 
the notion of the interactivity of social and psychic systems to detect information 
that makes a difference, combined with membership roles and group boundaries.  
The role of hierarchy in resolving conflict and competition is also examined.   
 
Thirdly, what constitutes acceptable or tolerable risk is explored, and through 
the perspectives of system conditioning, the role of expectations.  Furthermore, 
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the inability to obtain complete agreement on the value ranking of goals, the 
influence of degree of control and awareness of the reactions of others illustrate 
the complexity of defining the risk appetite of the organisation.   
 
Finally, the analysis explores the nature of uncertainty, encompassing unclear 
aims and how to achieve them, the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of 
internal processes, a lack of statistical data and ‘unknowability’, to reveal that 
operational risk assessment is not a form of measurement. 
 
The chapter sub-headings investigate different aspects of each research question, 
reflecting the influence of the data interplaying with the theoretical framework 
and illustrate the development of more complex understandings of the broad 
questions asked at the outset of the study. 
 
This chapter identifies the interviewee in relation to group role, since identifying 
the School or Department would identify an individual.  The categories assigned 
are based on the selection criteria for sub-groups chosen for the embedded case 
studies in Phase 2 of the study: Academic, Medical (i.e. working jointly with the 
NHS) and Administration, to enable functional comparisons to be made. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the data in a logical and coherent manner 
that builds towards the cross-case analysis in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
 
5.2 Aims of the University 
This section provides a brief overview of interviewee interpretations of 
organisational aims, since it is postulated that failure to achieve aims replaces 
profit maximisation as a source of risk in public institutions (Hutter & Power, 
2005; HEFCE, 2001).  The interviewees’ descriptions of the aims of the 
University revealed some differences between the objectives of the academic 
and administrative parts of the organisation.  Administrative interviewees 
commonly referred to ‘broad education’ and ‘service to society’.  
I would have thought research, teaching, learning and the knowledge 
that it produces for some external good.  [Administration] 
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Academic respondents, who were more focussed on research and teaching 
excellence, less commonly mentioned this.   
We have that dual mission, as does the rest of the college, to do research 
and to teach, and to do both at the highest level.  [Medical] 
Figure 5.1 provides an illustration of the overlaps in the conceptualisation of 




















Figure 5.1 Overlaps in the Description of Aims 
 
 
All respondents mentioned two or more stated aims of the college mission 
statement. 
[The University] is dedicated to the advancement of knowledge, learning 
and understanding in the service of society (University web page Jan 07). 
 
The omission of ‘service to society’ by eight interviewees could relate to 
‘narrowing’ (Propper &Wilson 2003) reflecting the current lack of measures in 
place to monitor this activity.  In addition, the inclusion of external measures, 
such as position in ratings, provided an example of self-regulation, driving 
competitive responses through pseudo-market measures.  
 
Teaching & Research 
(6) 




                                                      Strategic Plan (3) 
Research-led 
Teaching (2) 
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This brief overview of aims described by interviewees provides a background to 
the following sections that present the Phase 1 interview findings, enabling the 
reader to place operational risks in the context of contemporary organisational 
aims. 
 
5.3 The ‘How’ of Risk Assessment 
Research question 1 investigated how operational risk assessments were being 
carried out in the organisation, and this section explores both formal and 
informal risk management activities, to provide a window onto risk management 
as practiced in the University.   
 
5.3.1 The Interpretation of HEFCE Governance 
The Phase 1 interviews did not directly examine the implementation of 
risk management governance, but one interviewee illustrated how the 
potential financial impacts linked to HEFCE guidance provided a self-
regulatory impetus for compliance.   
My view of guidance from HEFCE is that, it’s not really 
guidance, because even though they say ‘if you don’t do it, it 
won’t affect your grant’, that’s what they say today, but you can 
be jolly sure that the likelihood is that if it’s important, it will at 
some point.  [Administration] 
The control of funds enforces self-regulation, and the potential for 
introduction of sanctions for non-compliance was sufficient to focus 
attention on regulatory guidance as ‘information’.   
 
5.3.2 Competing Aims 
The interviews were more revealing about the need to establish priorities 
between competing aims.  The increasing use of targets to measure the 
performance of the University was evident, creating drivers that were not 
necessarily related to the primary organisational aims of education or 
research. 
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The ‘Trust’, they are being driven increasingly by central 
government, their priorities are meeting expectations and targets.  
[Medical] 
The targets do not take much account of the need to educate for 
future generations.  [Medical] 
In the Medical Schools, this resulted in a conflict of aims between 
NHS/Trust targets and RAE targets, requiring a balance to be achieved in 
order to satisfy both goals.  
… we have, for example, a Health Services Research 
Department, which the Trust thinks is absolutely wonderful, 
which the Department of Health thinks is marvellous, but which 
the RAE reviewers were not that impressed by, and I don’t know 
how we move forward with that.  [Medical] 
For many areas, organisational links with external funding bodies 
entailed adherence to a mixture of regulations, both external and internal. 
We have got a triple burden, because we have got NHS 
regulating us, we’re caught between… we’ve got HEFCE 
regulating us and we’ve got the college regulations, so it’s a 
triple whammy.  [Medical] 
In addition, NPM introduced performance measures for funding bodies 
such as ESRC, which, in turn, translated into objectives for HE 
Institutions.  
The ESRC has encouraged the timely completion of thesis 
through the operation of submission rates, which incorporates a 
sanctions policy.  The sanctions policy currently requires 
institutions to achieve an overall 'four-year' submission rate for 
its ESRC-recognised departments of 60 per cent.  This policy has 
dramatically improved the ESRC's overall submission rate from 
less than 30 per cent in the early 1980s to its present level of 75 
per cent (ESRC web site October 2007). 
The target for PhD completion within 4 years was generally seen as 
being manageable and some viewed it positively. 
Although in a sense it was driven by, what was seen as external 
pressures, like the need to hit Research Council targets, and so 
on, I think it’s a wholly positive direction.  It’s mechanistically a 
good idea in terms of producing what we want to, which is 
successful PhDs, but what we’ve just been saying, I think is true, 
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it is a better learning environment, and more supportive, and 
positive.  [Academic] 
The external target was considered, accepted, and even improved upon.   
We try and finish all our PhDs in 3 years.  Well, that’s the goal 
we set, 3 years not 4 years.  [Academic] 
The adoption of University-wide processes, including regular supervisory 
meetings, formal 6 monthly reviews of PhD progress, and time limits for 
upgrades provided examples of change to support this goal. 
We have noticed academic staff are better at ensuring that the 
forms are filled in, that has certainly improved in the last year or 
so, whether it is actually having any effect on the product is a 
debatable point.  [Academic] 
Two academic interviewees expressed concern that tighter timeframes 
might reduce the quality of PhD outputs.    
I don’t think it’s just a matter of completing in four years; it’s 
also having the quality product.  [Academic] 
I’ve certainly encountered people in some departments who say 
‘a decent PhD in my area cannot be done in under five years, and 
if I put people under pressure to complete in 3 or 4 they will be 
doing inferior work’.  [Academic] 
There was support for this view. 
Some of the recent external examining I’ve done, the PhDs have 
been crap.  [Academic] 
When asked if they saw it as a problem if a student took 6 years to 
complete, one interviewee stated. 
I would simply because you get punished.  [Medical] 
Satisfying the target became the primary aim (an autopoietic response), 
despite threatening the goal of high quality PhD theses.   
 
Research and teaching quality were both perceived as vital to reputation.   
People are always using the phrase ‘research-led teaching’.  
[Academic] 
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However, interviews revealed that these aims compete for resources, 
resulting in tension between them.   
There are all sorts of major threats to teaching success.  I think 
the biggest is handling the threats to research/teaching interface.  
[Academic] 
The influence of funding and enforced self-regulation was evident. 
If teaching quality and professionalisation of staff were as 
directly tied to T money as R money is to the RAE, no question, 
we would just do it.  [Academic] 
The outcomes of the RAE were high risk/high benefit metrics, whilst the 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) assessment of 
teaching was accorded a lower priority. 
While there is so much emphasis on the next RAE, all these new 
posts that we are desperate to put out, those are not in the 
direction of teaching; they were essentially research oriented 
posts, finding the mechanism to ensure that alongside this big 
push for research success, we don’t throw out the teaching…  
[Academic] 
Although the interviews emphasised research excellence, to the detriment 
of teaching, teaching peer review and a move towards formal 
qualifications for HE lecturers within the University were evident.   
In the end, it may be completely obligatory to ensure that all staff 
of every sort have got explicit qualifications, and I think that that 
bangs us up against a more old-fashioned perspective of what 
teaching is about.  All aspects of this, both the qualification side 
of things and the idea of peer observation of teachers, and all 
that.  It’s usually the old fogies around who think, ‘I’ve always 
done it like this, why not just let me get one with my teaching, and 
not be told how to do it, I’ve learnt on the job?’.  I think it’s a 
genuine culture change that they have to get used to, that we 
can’t continue running like that, but quite how strong that will 
become, to apply pressure in political terms, from outside, I’m 
not sure.  [Academic] 
Resistance to interference with teaching practices was recognised, 
requiring external pressure to enforce change.  There were no other 
references to teaching assessment and qualification during the interviews, 
implying a lack of engagement with or support for these changes.   
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The need for space and time for research activities also poses problems 
when combined with teaching. 
My personal view is that we are teaching too many 
undergraduates; because if you want to be excellent in teaching 
and research then you have to get your teaching load into proper 
balance with the research expectations that we’ve got; because if 
you don’t, you’re doing too much teaching, and there’s no way 
you are going to deliver the research outcomes.  [Administration] 
As student numbers increase, the workload for high volume courses, 
especially with the requirement for double marking, reduces availability 
of research time.  In addition, some interviewees perceive an increase in 
needy students, related to ‘widening participation’.  
Now, you can’t have a widening entry gate without any costs to 
the system because the more you expand that the more burden 
and toll we put on the internal staff to get people through and to 
keep the attrition rates relatively low.  [Medical] 
Several interviewees are concerned about heavy workloads and high 
levels of stress. 
I think there’s a general sense around that academics feel 
themselves to be under stress.  We do have some extremely good 
Departments, in terms of their research ratings, and they feel 
under a lot of pressure to retain or improve those ratings.  
[Academic] 
The stated ideal for academics is to teach and undertake research, and 
manage the associated administrative burdens.  This problem was not 
solely the preserve of academics. 
We’ve got such a lot on across a wide range of things that we try 
to tackle all at once, and that in itself creates risk.  
[Administration] 
In addition to risk management governance, other, non-academic, aims of 
the regulator compete for management attention.  The HEFCE Pay & 
Modernisation initiative required job grading to be implemented across 
the University, with tight timescales.  
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A big cost risk as well as anything else about disaffected people, 
be it managers or staff, or whoever, it’s actually quite tricky.  
[Administration] 
The existence of sub-goals within research aims was also evident.  RAE 
criteria favour certain types of academic research, based on the number 
of publications and prestige of peer-reviewed journals, in preference to 
applied research.   
I think the metric that is most conspicuous by its absence but the 
most difficult to pin down, comes back to this particular part of 
our agenda, which is translational research.  [Medical] 
This highlights a conflict of aims between HEFCE objectives in relation 
to research excellence and knowledge transfer.  Poor assessment 
outcomes can be the result, even when the organisation commissioning 
the research is very happy with the study outputs. The narratives 
indicated that applied research was not rated as highly as purely 
academic or theoretical work. 
I have felt under pressure, there are all sorts of issues about the 
RAE, but you give equal weight to performance research, 
because there’s a perception that the stuff that really counts is 
lab based, modern genetic research, and many of our people, 
who are the one’s who really deliver the teaching, retain more 
clinical research.  [Medical] 
Schools have to decide whether this type of contract should be avoided in 
favour of less applied research, to improve RAE ratings.  However, other 
factors were acknowledged as important. 
So, of course, we want to do well in the RAE, but it mustn’t be at 
the expense of everything else, because it is only part of the 
balancing act.  [Medical] 
All this regulation, and there is a lot of it, as you know, is all 
about a third of our expenditure.  I mean [University] is a well 
over a £1 million, I mean we spend over £1 million a day, I 
always think of that, because it reminds me how big we are, but 
only a third of that comes from the government.  [Administration] 
RAE outcomes are very important in gaining central research funding, 
and maintaining academic reputation, but the University also needs to 
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satisfy customers who fund other research, so achieving this balance is a 
difficult compromise, since both are tightly linked to funding.  
 
These narratives illustrate that aims and targets provided conflicting and 
competing sources of risk, and that the balance was tipped strongly in 
favour of compliance with governance measures that were clearly linked 
to funding.   
 
5.3.3 Implementation is ‘Fit for Audit’ 
The need to comply with transparency requests placed emphasis on how 
the organisation was assessed and audited, and was characterised as a 
game. 
If you don’t play the game, you get penalised.  [Administration] 
If we don’t play the game, the erosion of our core funding for 
teaching will go down.  [Academic] 
One interviewee suggested that the regulator was aware of unintended 
outcomes associated with targets and measures. 
They are going to not tell them how they are going to assess 
them, because performance management is driving indicator 
chasing.  [Medical] 
However, the rules of the RAE game were difficult to bend or break. 
That’s the major difference in [University], that if you regard it 
as a game play, you know the rules of the game you are playing, 
it’s a far less energetic prescription, so, there is a much wider 
range of viable game options, than there are in RAE terms.  It’s 
quite difficult to evade the rules of the game of RAE, and end up 
with the money.  [Academic] 
Compliance required making systems auditable. 
We are very much scrutinised.  [Administration] 
This entailed providing evidence in a suitable form. 
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There is a whole bureaucratic process that goes with it, that is 
becoming a job in its own right.  [Administration] 
The transition to audit based compliance involved additional, and from 
an internal perspective, unnecessary paperwork. 
I don’t have a problem with accountability, I think that’s 
absolutely fine, it’s just sometimes you have to employ another 
person to do that, but then, that’s the same everywhere.  
[Administration] 
These changes were seen to be widespread.  The influence of NPM 
caused reflexive anxiety ahead of external assessments, and internal 
systems for demonstrating due diligence were required. 
I think we’ve got the policies and procedures, I hope we have, 
where I worry is the audit.  [Administration] 
The development of bureaucratic routines to satisfy transparency 
demands eased reflexive concerns since the paperwork was in the drawer 
in the event of an external assessment.  
 
5.3.4 Communication in the Organisation 
The theoretical focus on communication in social systems encourages a 
focus on this aspect of the organisation.  There was general agreement 
that internal communications were poor. 
I’ve often thought that the information flow is good as far down 
as the College Committee.  [Administration] 
The interviewee elaborated. 
Between the Principal’s Central Team and the College 
Committee, the communications are fine.  I’ve got a feeling that, 
rather than being a conduit, it’s a terminus.  [Administration] 
Another observed a weakness in internal communications. 
We could do a lot more to tighten up the way in which we are 
informed.  [Administration] 
This view was confirmed specifically in relation to risk awareness. 
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I don’t think there is anything that has come down from what is 
now [name]; let’s call it the centre in general, over the past 20 
years that has given any indication of the risks whatsoever.  Most 
of the things have been picked up from outside.  [Academic] 
The comment implied that the interviewee interprets this as an indication 
that the University is not genuinely concerned about risk management.  
The external environment was recognised as a source of information in 
relation to risks.  Another individual illustrated the lack of feedback in 
relation to risks flagged within the University. 
I raised this with the College Council a few years ago, and it 
caused a little bit of a ripple at the time, but I don’t know what 
has happened after that.  [Administration] 
No response represented a communication and reflexive interpretation 
reduced the incentive for action and future communication on the topic. 
 
Communication also included availability of records for reference.  
Training records were considered a risk in relation to H&S.  In the event 
of an incident, it may be impossible to provide evidence that an 
individual has received the appropriate training. 
The risk to the individual, obviously, there is not sufficient safety 
training going on.  The essential risk there, and this probably has 
been a risk to [University], because if we had a major accident 
here, and if the H&S executive said ‘right, let’s have a look at 
your records’ I mean, I’m not an expert in this area, but I have a 
strong feeling that would be a problem.  [Administration] 
This comment also illustrated awareness that some risks pose different 
threats at the individual and organisational level.   
 
Lack of formal communication structures can lead to reliance on 
individual relationships to access information and get things done. 
My ability to do my job is very dependent on my personal 
relationship with the principal.  [Administration]  
The senior managers described internal communication and feedback as 
poor, and it is reasonable to suppose this situation worsens for those 
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lower in the organisation’s hierarchy, making aims difficult to interpret 
and hampering implementation of initiatives.  
 
5.3.5 Uncertainty Reduction 
A desire to reduce uncertainty is associated with the internalisation of 
risk associated with decisions.  Interviews provided an example of 
organisational ability to improve chances of achieving an aim by making 
the target wider.  In this case, a project management plan with a modular 
work programme.   
Once the project budget is set, the project budget is set.  We have 
to have a strategy, if there is something comes out of the 
woodwork, we’ve got to take something out, and you could say 
that’s the effective value and risk management.  [Administration] 
This approach reduced risk in relation to the aim of compliance with 
budgeted spend, as a response to control of budgets.  Planned spend was 
monitored against actual spend, but was unlikely to check progress 
against the schedule of works, so the approach ensured compliance with 
target spend, but did not ensure the completion of all planned work for 
which the budget was agreed.  Since unexpected overspends are always 
unpopular in organisations, the senior management may consider this a 
useful approach to control of estates expenditure.  However, while 
uncertainty about budgeted cost has been reduced, the cost for 
completion of the overall programme of works had increased. 
 
Use of external resources was a method of reducing internal liability. 
We’re actually using an outside agency to vet all our contractors.  
[Administration] 
The interviewee indicated that uncertainties associated with sub-contract 
arrangements were reduced by placing responsibility for checks 
elsewhere.  If something subsequently goes wrong, such practices help to 
justify the decision. 
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5.4 Influence of Organisational Group 
Research question 2 investigated whether the setting of the assessment affected 
the way it was conducted and this section explores aspects of operational risk 
assessment that shed light on similarities and differences between organisational 
groups. 
5.4.1 Interpretation of operational risk assessment 
The HEFCE guidance (2001) recommends assessment of operational 
risks, utilising likelihood and severity to produce a risk score, enabling 
the organisation to prioritise risks.  Some interviewees recognised the 
wide range of risks the organisation faces. 
I think if you were to look at what we actually do 90% of it is risk 
management, one way or another.  [Administration] 
The organisation recognised risks without the use of a risk assessment. 
I would say there isn’t necessarily a formal risk assessment 
process.  [Administration] 
I think if you asked most of the staff in my department they 
wouldn’t see that as risk analysis or risk management, it’s 
continual improvement, but they know that’s what’s expected of 
them.  [Administration] 
The lack of local use of the risk register was clear. 
I suppose the real test, let’s be quite honest, would be what 
happens if we have to actually look at the risk register and see 
what the disaster plan is for any particular thing.  
[Administration] 
So, risk management was associated with resolving problems after an 
event. 
I don’t know how HEFCE define risk management, but my 
working life consists, to varying degrees of crisis management.  
[Administration] 
The use of the term risk led to confusion with H&S assessments. 
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If you asked a lot of people in that building, talked about risk, 
they wouldn’t think about academic risk, it would be, ‘am I being 
exposed to carcinogens?’.  [Academic] 
In most Schools, the responsibility for H&S was delegated to an 
administrative member of staff.   
H&S, they tend to be the administrators.  [Academic] 
 Specialist experts took responsibility for H&S (Hutter, 2005). 
 [We have] an individual responsible for H&S, and he’s very 
active, he’s got certification and so on.  [Administration] 
The term ‘risk’ was associated with H&S, with which academics were 
not concerned.  The issue of academic and administrative division of 
responsibility was illustrated in the following description. 
The idea is that administrators do as much as they can in terms 
of work load, also, if its an administrative thing, they do it, 
academics don’t have to, but, of course, there’s a limit to that, so 
there are tensions when other people think academics should be 
doing things, which … so it’s difficult.  [Academic Administrator] 
Academics resented the intrusion of managerial approaches in the 
University.   
Professors don’t like that sort of thing, they are not used to it, 
they are used to, kind of, govern themselves.  [Medical] 
Whilst academics believe they should govern themselves, narratives 
provide evidence of reluctance to take on managerial and administrative 
roles (Dearlove, 1998b).  
 
The guidance states a desire to improve opportunity taking.  The need for 
operational risk to encompass more than risk reduction was recognised 
by one interviewee.   
If I do everything through risk management, I think I would come 
across as being too cautious, reactive rather than what I really 
ought to be doing, is being pro-active, a bit more 
entrepreneurial.  Clearly in being that way, I must assess the risk, 
no omelette without cracking eggs, and we need to take some 
risks to get where we want to go.  [Medical] 
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This statement illustrated an interpretation that places responsibility with 
senior managers, as part of the strategic decision-making process, but 
was not the common interpretation in the narratives.  
 
5.4.2 Conflicting Perspectives 
The interaction of social and psychic systems results in different 
interpretations of the same risk.  The achievement of the recruitment of 
planned student numbers posed different types of risk to Schools.  In 
some, the availability of the desired quality of students was limited. 
There is always danger that you take people who, frankly, may 
not quite be in the category of excellence that you would, of 
course, want.  [Medical] 
By contrast, over-recruitment could result in overcrowded lectures, and 
more work for teaching staff, without any additional teaching funds.   
We have a different problem, the ‘A’ level grade inflation means 
that you are over-recruiting because everyone over-succeeds.  
[Medical] 
There were tight timescale issues in relation to these targets, increasing 
the difficulty of achieving the stated aim.  In addition, the Health related 
disciplines have NHS recruitment targets translated into internal targets.   
Essentially, you have to engage in a kind of form of Olga Korbut-
like gymnastics in order to be able to squeeze your quotas and 
your selection procedures, and manage and manipulate those, so 
that you can actually make those targets.  [Medical] 
There were different perspectives between and within Schools. 
I think in some Schools, the balance between a School view and a 
Departmental view is quite different; the dynamic is quite 
different.  [Academic] 
Research Management Advisory Group (RMAG) played an important 
role in preparing Schools for external Research Assessments, ensuring 
that ratings were maximised.  These reviews resulted in mixed feedback.  
Some interviewees perceived the process in a negative way.  
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Some think the RMAG has been punitive, I don’t think they see it 
as being a facilitative device at all, it creates very much, a kind of 
‘us and them’ mentality, and that’s maybe partly as to how it’s 
managed.  [Medical] 
Another felt the ineffectual process risked increasing staff disaffection.  
(We) had to go through the process again, of justifying our 
existence, and saying how we would do better in the RAE and 
producing all the documentation and we never had an official 
response, it was completely unsatisfactory.  [Academic] 
However, another thought it reduced risk by sharpening research focus. 
…research, we’re getting stronger all the time, with RMAG, and 
the research assessment exercise that has been introduced by 
HEFCE over the last 20 years has certainly strengthened 
colleges like [University].  [Academic] 
The interviewee that had been through mergers and reorganisations was 
more familiar with, and open to, change.   
It’s interesting that the schools that have moved the most are the 
schools that have actually been involved with the mergers that 
we’ve been through.  [Administration] 
For the interviewees from Schools where little has changed for a long 
period, conditioning suggests that proposed changes are unnecessary, 
since it has worked that way for many years, and the system has endured.   
 
These examples illustrate differing opinions about aims and processes 
resulting from interpretative variance between groups within the 
University. 
 
5.4.3 Competition between Groups 
Competition brings additional facets of organisations into play, those 
relating to power and access to financial resources. 
One of the reasons that I’m not very happy with the current 
system is that it is almost setting research and teaching against 
one another.  [Medical] 
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Managing the teaching/research interface represented a serious problem. 
I don’t want warfare to break out, there’s too much at risk.  
[Academic] 
The introduction of a divisional structure, with matrix management to 
enable access to teaching staff, was viewed as a potential threat. 
The problems about the line management of academics being 
through research divisions, … a consequent problem is how does 
your head of a teaching programme, of all the teaching 
programmes have any muscle to say ‘you will do a course on my 
programme’.  [Academic] 
Competition between groups was evident. 
It’s a mistake to give those people too much power.  [Academic] 
Academics wanted control and influence within the organisation. 
One needs to have the Heads of School with reasonable 
authority.  [Academic] 
Others agreed academic focus was essential. 
We have to decide as an institution, we are an academic 
institution, what are the drivers, and if you come up with an 
answer other than academic, then let’s go home, because we are 
not here for the benefit of the accountants.  [Administration] 
However, unsuitability of academics for the management role was cited 
as the reason that others have authority. 
The criticism has been that finance runs the college, and this is 
why; in the absence of strong academic management, someone’s 
got to run the college.  [Administration] 
Nonetheless, the narratives show academic aims win the competition 
against estates and infrastructure investments for access to resources.   
 
One interviewee expressed a general concern about lack of IT 
investment. 
There is a risk, a more fundamental risk in my view, and that is, 
as an institution, we don’t invest enough in IT systems, compared 
with our competitors.  [Administration] 
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Provision of IT support was a concern across the University.  
IT support itself is obviously an issue, as it is for anybody else.  
[Administration] 
Investment in IT infrastructure and support was not directly related to the 
aims of teaching and research, and it was accorded a lower priority in 
budget allocation, particularly in relation to research funding.  This same 
emphasis was evident in relation to poor buildings on some sites, 
including halls of residence, with the use of basement rooms for 
teaching.  There were competing demands for the limited space. 
It’s always difficult because of the fight for space, academic 
space, teaching space, research spaces, then there’s support 
services.  [Administration] 
Lack of maintenance was cited as a threat in relation to attracting and 
retaining both staff and students.  There was a negative impact on 
commercial dealings.   
We have to interact with people from industry and from investors, 
and finance community.  When they come for a meeting here it 
immediately sends out a message ‘they have no money so we can 
get hold of whatever it is we need to do quite cheaply’.  It 
actually puts you on the back foot when you negotiate, and 
perception is very important.  [Administration] 
However, spending remained focused on investment to improve 
academic standing. 
It’s all gone into academic staff, and academic initiatives, there 
isn’t a single penny gone into the infrastructure this first year 
and it’s all meant to be for the structure.  [Administration] 
The organisation must find ways of balancing competing perspectives in 
different groups, and emphasised those identified with most financial 
benefit or loss, identified as RAE research performance. 
 
5.4.4 Boundary Effects 
The Follett Review (Follett & Paulson-Ellis, 2001) made a number of 
recommendations regarding appraisal, disciplinary and reporting 
 Page 155 of 407 
arrangements for senior clinical academic staff.  A key principle is joint 
working to integrate separate responsibilities requiring interaction across 
the organisational boundaries.  However, this demands additional 
resource levels and paperwork for joint reviews. 
Joint appraisals, you’re sitting through half of it and you’re not 
really desperately interested in the details of the clinical role of 
the individuals.  I’m interested in, for example, how they are 
getting on with their research and papers being published, but 
the NHS person is not really interested in that at all, very much, 
but then we will find sometimes where the NHS commitments are 
actually seriously interfering with their ability to research and I 
do become very interested.  So, there is definitely a gain there but 
there’s definitely a problem in the lack of equal interest in every 
aspect of the appraisal.  It’s a very banal thing, actually, you are 
wasting time, you are getting 3 people together.  [Medical] 
It was recognised by the interviewee that joint responsibility made 
integration important in preventing some issues falling into a gap 
between the NHS and the University, but entails duplication of work. 
There are some issues where, incident reports, sometimes you 
find you have to report it 2 or 3 times.  [Medical] 
The boundary can act as an irritant and barrier. 
IT treats NHS staff who provide our teaching as non-standard 
accounts, which means that they have to renew annually even 
though they’ve been teaching for 25 or 30 odd years.  [Medical] 
Internal boundaries were evident, and assumptions were made about 
other group functions and roles.   
There are issues, I think, about where responsibilities begin and 
end, and about what people think happens.  [Administration] 
This campus doesn’t have a very good connection with the rest of 
the empire, so we don’t have the support that you have 
necessarily at [site names] or whatever.  [Administration] 
Unfounded assumptions can increase risk to the organisation. 
It was something that we hadn’t anticipated would happen, and if 
we’d been asked, we would have probably thought that there was 
a mirror image.  [Administration] 
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When data was lost it emerged that there was no backup.  Two 
interviewees express lack of understanding about the functional split of 
IT into two groups. 
Somehow, technical support is separated from ISS, which is 
something I can’t understand  [Administration] 
I think the college’s support for IT could be much more effective 
than it currently is, because as you know, it’s split between the 
Computing Centre, which is part of ISS, and Management 
Information Services in the Department of Resources, and they 
do have, what seems to me sometimes to be conflicting priorities.  
[Administration] 
Departmental boundaries were interpreted as a barrier, with different sub-
goals apparent to others.  The internal organisational boundaries exhibit 
both overlaps and under-laps, with dual processes and gaps in 
responsibility. 
 
5.5 Acceptable Risk 
This section will examine the factors that influence whether risks are acceptable 
to individuals, groups and the organisation as a whole and to investigate the idea 
of a ‘risk appetite’. 
 
5.5.1 Conditioned Expectations 
An ‘immune system’ enables organisation members to ignore many 
potential risks, by default they are acceptable.  For example, pre-RAE 
poaching has been experienced in the past, as those individuals with good 
publication records were tempted to join another university, whose RAE 
rating was thereby improved.   
Well, two years before the RAE, of course, there are some 
retention issues everywhere … [Academic] 
The loss of staff in this way was not presented as a threat, but rather as a 
normal operational problem.  Similarly, another interviewee illustrated 
that funding cuts are not a threat if they are routinely expected. 
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This is the first year ever since I’ve been in here, 12 years that we 
have not had a cut in the unit funding of students.  So, is it a 
threat?  Well, no.  Why?  Because we expect it.  [Administration] 
However, some risks that were faced regularly could be ignored. 
It’s a risk that you can become immune after a period of time.  
[Administration] 
Theft was a regular problem at most sites, since access was unrestricted.   
Like every other Department, we have been subject to theft.  
There was one on this floor, some months ago, and things like 
laptops were stolen.  [Administration] 
The majority of incidents were considered opportunistic.  One successful 
risk reduction measure was cited.   
An attempt was made to break in, but was foiled by the steel 
doors; they got through the outer conventional wooden framed 
doors.  [Administration] 
The majority of interviewees felt that sensible precautions by individuals 
to protect property remained preferable to the introduction of controlled 
access to sites, which was viewed as impractical and undesirable.   
Express college policy is not to utilise card control during the 
day, with 20,000 students.  [Administration] 
Narratives suggest resistance to the use of swipe card control amongst 
academics, discussed in Section 6.4.1.   
 
One research concern present on the risk register was associated with the 
achievement of planned grants, and the associated funding balance, with 
some contracts providing full overhead recovery, and others not. 
Academics are not applying for the right sorts of grants, and/or 
are not winning the right kind of grants, so there is an issue of 
portfolio.  [Administration] 
A lack of academic focus on finance was implied, reflecting role 
conditioning. 
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A risk for the college is that its academics are not engaged 
enough, or understand the importance of what, I suppose, we 
term the ‘enterprise agenda’.  [Administration] 
This has resulted in the need to financially support research by other 
means. 
We subsidise it by people working additional hours, academics 
doing secretarial tasks, and all the rest of it, and the building 
falling apart.  [Medical] 
The problem was mitigated by existing working practices that prevented 
the shortfall being evident. 
 
Transparency requests focused attention on data integrity (grants, RAE 
data, students). 
It has been the constant cry of a number of academics over a 
number of years: ‘the data is wrong’.  [Administration] 
One academic confirmed HEFCE (2007/11) concern about the validity of 
accountability data. 
The college figures are just complete nonsense, you don’t rely on 
them, they’re a bad indicator of virtually everything.  [Academic] 
In many areas, separate databases were maintained, as central data was 
not trusted, resulting in duplication of effort and a question of which data 
is ‘right’. 
I would always check anything like that with the School office, 
who, I think, are more on top of that kind of data than the central 
data systems.  [Academic] 
The lack of confidence in the validity of data in the University provided 
an additional source of risk.  One interviewee stated that if such data was 
used to calculate PhD completions within 4 years, Schools could fail to 
achieve targets because agreed deferments were not included in the 
centralised data; leading to unnecessarily poor outcomes in relation to the 
target measure.  In addition, statutory returns (e.g., student numbers) 
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based on unreliable data could result in infringements of the reporting 
requirements. 
For 15 years since I’ve been here, I’ve always wanted to press a 
button, and see what our student numbers are, and I can’t do it 
still.  [Academic] 
The risk could have an impact on both reputation and finance should the 
University be accused of fraudulent reporting student of numbers.  This 
risk appears to have penetrated the conditioning that the narratives above 
reveal, since it has been identified for action (at a meeting, not using a 
risk register) and the MyUniversity database has been designed with the 
intention of improving data reliability.   
 
Data storage and backup remained major concerns in some parts of the 
University. 
Data management generally is a very high risk, and I have to say, 
when I arrived here, I was surprised at the lack of administrative 
systems and data capture systems.  [Administration] 
The University sites were geographically separate and multi-site access 
remained difficult.  
It’s so annoying that we can’t access data wherever you go, and 
so one of the things that we’re looking at is secure, that’s the rub, 
is a secure way of having a data repository where you can access 
your important information.  [Administration] 
Some IT functions were not available at all sites.  
We don’t have access to certain things like MyUniversity at the 
moment, or the Research Gateway.  [Medical] 
Many interviewees found the e-mail system slow and unreliable.  
I find my e-mail system very frustrating a lot of the time.  
[Academic] 
My role as a student within the University provided many examples of 
this view during the 3-year study period, not only during interviews, but 
also from staff and students in normal day-to-day activities.  The routine 
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types of risk associated with slow networks, lack of backup facilities and 
poor e-mail performance were not included in risk registers; Schools and 
Departments accepted these as normal.  Catastrophic failure of IT servers 
was, by contrast, a recognised corporate risk. 
 
Seven floods have occurred across the sites in recent years. Conditioning 
acts to focus attention on things that can be recalled. 
I think you have to consider flood, but it was, it seemed remote, 
but once it’s happened, it’s no longer remote.  [Administration] 
The majority of these incidents were perceived to be a result of lack of 
funding for maintenance. 
... always a risk of the buildings in this place, floods and things 
like that, I put that under risk management, but I wouldn’t put it 
under affecting the School achieving its objectives, other than in 
the short-term, although I do think that not having good buildings 
has a detrimental effect.  [Academic] 
Poor maintenance illustrated two levels of concern and control; 
unexpected malfunctions causing disruption were expected and 
acceptable; vague notions of long-term negative outcomes were ignored.  
The effect of conditioning was evident in awareness of common 
problems, if they are usual, then communication on the topic was not 
treated as ‘information’, the risk was tolerable.  Furthermore, risks not 
encountered previously were also ignored in risk identification activities. 
 
5.5.2 Existing Management Control Systems 
Many existing organisational structures and control systems act as risk 
management systems and this section includes descriptions of these 
activities, highlighting the existence of informal risk management, but 
not recognised as such by participants.  
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We don’t have a risk management committee per se, but a lot of 
what we do is institutional, a lot of our management is thinking 
ahead and seeing risk issues and putting in place arrangements 
to minimise risk.  [Medical] 
In the academic areas, traditional controls included admission, exam and 
marking processes.  Recent initiatives to reduce risk were also evident, 
e.g, the RAE had triggered internal RMAG reviews as a preparation for 
external inspection of research quality, and PhD completion targets were 
managed through the widespread implementation of a formal review and 
upgrade process and the establishment of a Graduate School.   
We were congratulated, by the central teaching committee, for 
many of our processes, and we’re very process driven.  [Medical] 
The narratives reflected increased managerialism associated with NPM.  
One of the associated problems was the addition of layers of protective 
record keeping. 
We are likely to over-bureaucratise ourselves, in that what we 
end up doing, under each of these situations, is learning from a 
past problem and we invent a new form, a new rule, a new 
signature that solves that one problem, but doesn’t make sense to 
the system as a whole.  [Medical]   
The long-established Health and Safety (H&S) management controls 
received a mixed review.  Two interviewees were concerned about it; 
seven others did not perceive it as a major risk, either because of the 
system in place or because of the low-level of risk in the area concerned.   
I think that there is a variable approach to H&S amongst 
management.  [Administration] 
Estates spending allocation was influenced by the need to ensure areas 
comply with H&S law.   
It doesn’t address any of the business critical, it just keeps the 
principal or the teacher out of jail, so it doesn’t keep the business 
going.  [Administration] 
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There were different H&S regimes within the University, and the 
interviewees suggested that those areas that were not solely office based 
had formal systems and risk assessment procedures in place to reduce 
risks to acceptable levels.   
 
Plagiarism was considered to have increased with the advent of internet, 
and was often easy to spot, but, even so, required effort on the part of 
teaching staff to take formal action.   
One runs into problems because almost nobody ever gets failed 
outright, even in the most outrageous cases of plagiarism, 
because the college is scared of litigation.  So, they tend to be 
allow to re-sit at a later stage, and that’s demoralising for the 
academic staff, because they think ‘well, why should we bother, if 
they’re just going to be allowed to get away with it?’  [Academic] 
There was a perceived lack of effectiveness of the formal plagiarism 
process, in terms of punishment to deter others, providing little incentive 
for academics to continue to report incidents. 
 
The process to protect Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) was considered 
ineffective, and a payment of £35,000 to a student to recover IPR was 
cited.  Academics were often unaware of the need to protect their work 
and the problem was exacerbated by the lack of funding for patents.     
It’s up to the individuals to identify and we’re actually at that 
position now, so we have some data that isn’t patented but 
there’s two industrial concerns that are interested in it.  
[Academic] 
The increased emphasis on IPR within the University reflected pressures 
to adopt commercial approaches to their activities.  The establishment of  
‘University’ Business Ltd provided academics with support in relation to 
IPR, patents and contract management.  This structural organisational 
change was not triggered by the formal risk management system.   
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There were control systems in place to ensure compliance with 
legislative requirements.  In some parts of the University, it was a major 
task to remain abreast of current legislation. 
There’s a whole raft of legislative risks, which of course, increase 
week by week.  [Administration] 
The recent introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (2000) caused 
some concern in relation to animal rights. 
I have grave concerns that the Freedom of Information Act will 
allow the animal rights movement greater information about our 
experiments with animals and quite possibly could involve the 
college in protests and threats that could threaten its very 
existence.  [Administration] 
As NPM seeks to make public bodies more transparent in their 
operations, it increases the secondary risk of damage to reputation 
through disclosure of information.  In contrast, the Data Protection Act 
was not perceived to pose a risk to the University, except in relation to 
workload, as an additional administrative task to be managed. 
 
An example of change in the legal environment, linked to an increased 
threat of terrorist activity in London, was the requirement for security of 
some hazardous materials, requiring existing management control 
systems to be modified.  The responsibility for ensuring safe storage of 
particular restricted chemicals was unclear at the time of the preliminary 
interviews, but training data confirmed such controls had been 
implemented, once again, without the use of a risk register to identify the 
risk.  Most risk management activity within the organisation has nothing 
to do with the formal risk management policy; it is embodied in existing 
management controls and successful delegation of responsibility to 
individuals, who undertake their ‘duty of care’ to reduce risks to an 
acceptable level. 
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5.5.3 Influence of External Views about Risks 
The increase in external targets, league tables, a perceived increase in 
litigation and the implementation of governance produces a complex web 
of external oversight.  Transparency increases the importance of 
measures that provide a simplified view of organisations.   
The problem is that if these league tables counteract our 
reputation, they can also enhance it, but they are not very 
scientifically based.  [Administration] 
A suggestion of using of aptitude tests to replace uninformative inflated 
‘A’ levels for student selection revealed how league tables influence 
decision-making. 
Now, from an academic point of view, that’s the right answer, but 
from a league table point of view, that’s a problem.  
[Administration] 
The organisation cannot ignore these external reports.   
Of course, everybody says ‘oh, you don’t want to listen to league 
tables’ which is fine, if you’re at the top, and I think the Principal 
is quite happy with where we are in terms of league tables, 
although he does bang on about quite of lot of them.  
[Administration] 
External reports indicated that more post-graduates were needed in most 
Schools.   
If you look in the league tables in the Russell Group for post-
graduate numbers, I think you’ll find that [University] as a whole 
is underperforming relative to Russell Group competitors.  
[Medical] 
 Internal goals were linked to league table and statistical performance in 
competition with other universities.   These goals aimed to reduce these 
risks to acceptable levels. 
 
Some interpretations of external views of risk resulted in risk avoidance, 
as individuals and groups attempted to avoid culpability for risks.  
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If people don’t understand what Freedom of Information and 
Data Protection means, then they perhaps feel constrained in 
what they do.  I would hate to think that academic colleagues are, 
for example, not putting challenging ideas in front of their 
students because they are worried that the students might think, 
‘oh, are you allowed to say those sort of things’.  
[Administration] 
In addition, e-mails did not mention individuals’ names. 
You even try to avoid naming people, you sort of adopt bizarre 
cryptic references to, ‘do you remember the person we were 
talking about yesterday, well, do you realise they’ve now gone 
and …’ [Medical] 
This approach was seen to be necessary. 
We clearly need to have a culture of being a little bit more 
careful what we say in e-mails, about whom, to who, etc. 
[Medical] 
The concern related to available evidence and blame. 
It’s not always a good idea to have e-mails going back, there is 
always the problem of being compromised, it could be better that 
they are not there.  [Medical] 
Additionally, this was reflected in an unwillingness to provide references 
that say anything about the student.  The marking of course work and 
examinations has also been affected, with some areas recommending no 
comments on submitted papers, perceived to facilitate disagreement by 
the student in the case of a formal complaint.   
 
Reflecting the transition to private sector practices, students were 
described as customers or consumers (Gabriel, 2005), and their 
expectations could be difficult to match. 
When they pay over the money, they think they are buying a result 
and not a service.  [Administration] 
Customer focus was evident in changes triggered by student feedback. 
It will show that we respond to customers.  [Administration] 
NPM has increased the market orientation. 
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The place must become run, like other universities, much more on 
a business footing, and much more sense of the consumers and 
the market.  [Medical] 
The introduction of ‘top-up’ fees was seen as likely to increase student 
expectations.   
We will expect students who are already quite demanding, in 
terms of quality and service, to be even more demanding of 
quality and service.  [Academic] 
Failure to deliver what was promised may result in student complaints or 
litigation. 
These characters will have a much sharper sense of what 
represents value for money.  [Administration] 
Consequently, there has been an increase in student appeals in recent 
years. 
I think what we are seeing is the tip of the iceberg.  As recently as 
2 years ago there were no appeals against our admissions 
decisions at all, and the numbers are still small but they are 
growing.  There are now appeals against decisions to do with 
student progress, student examinations, and we’ve not had any 
appeal that was based on poor teaching yet, but it’s a matter of 
time.  Some other institutions have, I know some institutions who 
have paid out quite huge sums of money, like £30,000, to a 
student, because they’ve admitted poor teaching.  
[Administration] 
This risk entailed financial penalties and indirect financial loss through 
damage to reputation if a complaint was upheld.   
Our reputation is to an extent the source of our income.  
[Administration] 
However, reputation was difficult to control or influence and understand. 
I know colleagues in other schools find this, that quite often 
[name] will be perceived from outside as better, but quite why it 
is …  [Academic] 
Historical control systems for managing reputation were viewed 
critically. 
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[University] has been extremely lax over the years, in terms of 
managing its reputation … there are even examples of papers 
where the journal hasn’t been bothered to find out where the 
centre is and has credited [name].  [Administration] 
A lack of emphasis on the ‘branding’ of Schools within the University 
failed to take advantage of historical information. 
If we’re going to really attract those students and advantages 
that they bring with them and also the challenges, then we’ve got 
to be more clever in our marketing, I think.  [Medical] 
The influence of NPM introduced market-forces and the treatment of 
students as potential customers revealed how their views influenced what 
was acceptable.  For example, poor facilities may communicate a 
negative impression. 
You never get a second opportunity to create a first impression.  
[Administration] 
Comparisons with other Universities provided the context for concern. 
... we do well at keeping students, but it is again an area where I 
think the college has to be careful.  There is no room for any 
complacency, and as the students begin to pay top-up fees, will 
poor facilities for students …, because I see student 
accommodation and student sport’s facilities and general 
facilities are not able to compete with some of the newer 
universities, somewhere like [name], and campus universities, 
lovely sport’s facilities, nice accommodation.  [Medical] 
This view illustrated awareness that it is not only the educational aims of 
the organisation that were important in a competitive HE environment, 
presentation of other aspects of the organisation influenced views of 
external observers, including potential customers. Furthermore, defensive 
approaches represented a way of reducing risk to an acceptable level. 
 
5.5.4 Degree of Control 
The narratives revealed increased concern about risks over which it was 
difficult to exert control (Adams, 1995).   
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The things I can’t control make me more stressed than the one’s I 
can control.  [Administration] 
I worry about it, I’d love to have influence over it, but I’ve no 
management direction on it.  [Administration] 
The ability for senior management to exert centralised control was 
questioned.   
There’s a culture at [University] in certain areas, well, I think it 
does exist, this is a caricature, where people will say ‘yes, 
Principal’ and go and do as they like, and I think that’s got to be 
changed.  [Administration] 
Furthermore, responsibility and accountability were not always aligned. 
There’s a delicious irony in all this, I get blamed for the quality 
of the data in the student database, but have no responsibility for 
inputting it.  [Administration] 
The poor quality of data within the central systems could be linked to 
this narrative, since those responsible were not accountable, and blame 
was apportioned elsewhere. 
 
An incident of research fraud was cited as a possible threat to reputation 
and consequent funding, providing a different interpretation of one of the 
sources of operational risk suggested by Crouhy et al (2006).  In a HE 
context, the risk of fraud was not limited to falsification of financial 
records.  The effort required to cross check all research data was not 
available, therefore, researchers needed to be trusted, so management of 
this potential threat was difficult.   
 
NPM delegation of risks through PFI arrangements reduced the degree of 
control and attempted to shift responsibility. 
You delegate the responsibility for the safe management and 
operation to a contractor, but I think at the end of the day, if you 
ended up in hospital on a drip for 10 days and you wanted to sue 
someone, you would be suing [University].  [Administration] 
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Degree of control varied within the organisation.  Physical threats 
represented a problem at one site, where psychiatric patients are treated, 
but were not mentioned elsewhere. 
I think the bigger risk for our staff probably comes from people 
from the public, who wander in off the streets, who may be 
affected in all sorts of ways, we share 3 hospital sites, including 
[names], so there are people around on hospital sites who are 
obviously suffering in one way or another.  [Administration] 
In this case, the risk affected one of the Schools in the University, but 
had little or no influence on the remainder of the University.  However, 
in relation to reputation, an incident relating to injury to a student in one 
part of the organisation may reflect badly on the institution as a whole, 
despite other groups’ inability to control the risk. 
 
In one School, local IT management had been implemented to prevent 
data loss, enabling increased control. 
Everything here is backed up over night for everyone, so people 
don’t have to back up their own files, which they have to do 
everywhere else in the college.  [Medical] 
The influence of degree of control in reducing risk was evident in the 
description of improved effectiveness under local management.  The 
narratives illustrated lower tolerance to risks that lay outside of their 
direct influence.   
 
5.6 Uncertainty 
This section illustrates the presence of uncertainty within interview descriptions 
of risk.  Since interviewees did not undertake risk assessment, the focus is on 
general comments about uncertainty that shed light on the activity. 
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5.6.1 Risk Assessment Output is not a Form of Measurement 
Interviewees were aware that inadequacy of information poses a risk in 
itself. 
The risks are that we don’t know what is going on, where there is 
a lack of information, a lack of communication.  [Administration] 
Incomplete information formed an inadequate basis for risk assessment.   
I don’t know whether there is any data available as to the 
frequency and quality of appraisal in practice, I don’t know 
whether that data exists.  [Administration] 
In addition, narratives revealed that some risks were not amenable to 
quantification. 
The things that have given me most stress have been HR issues, 
to do with people’s performance and complaints and things of 
that sort.  [Medical] 
The actions of others were unpredictable. 
HEFCE wakes up one morning and changes its mind; the 
government wakes up one morning and changes its mind ‘we 
won’t put money into research’.  [Administration] 
This included the actions of those within the organisation. 
A great example of being wise after the event, many times, but 
trying to second guess what people might do, and might think is a 
sensible way of dealing with an issue, with 5,000 staff, it’s quite a 
challenge actually.  [Administration] 
Very few of the risks could be sensibly quantified, either in terms of 
financial loss or gain, or in terms of likelihood of occurrence.   
Managing your reputation in a big sense is extremely difficult to 
predict.  [Administration] 
Risk identification was further complicated by need to consider different 
stakeholder views and values. The interviews illustrated the problematic 
nature of risk assessment in the light of uncertainties associated with 
identified risks. 
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5.6.2 Uncertainty Surrounding Aims and Objectives 
An awareness of double contingency in communications suggested that 
interpretation of governance posed risks in relation to understanding 
requirements.  
We interact with the Quality Assurance Agency, interpret, as best 
we can, their usual madnesses, and try to apply them.  
[Administration] 
Another concern was how governance aims were assessed and measured, 
and, in particular, the composition and expectations of RAE panels. 
… it’s not simply that we don’t get the students, or we don’t hit 
the target, it’s also that either the college or the government 
changes its funding rules.  It’s that the RAE panels get quirky, 
and as has happened throughout the college, Departments have 
suddenly suffered quite severe losses in income, when you could 
argue, unjustifiably another Department has got a huge increase.  
[Academic] 
A risk in relation to HEFCE governance was highlighted by the 
ambiguity of external requirements in the face of outcomes that were 
unpredictable.  
It’s just that sometimes we can all get driven so much in a 
direction, and a couple of minor changes or reading the ether 
wrongly, can lead to an assessment that doesn’t feel fair 
sometimes.  [Medical] 
Methodological doubts about evaluation and rankings co-exist 
with acceptance of the powerful facticity they generate and 
towards which management effort must be directed (Power et al, 
2009, p178). 
When interpreting external aims was problematic, there was difficulty 
translating them into internal aims and communicating them to staff.   
One of the things that we are excellent at is writing strategic 
plans.  What we’re poor at is implementing them.  
[Administration] 
Since risk is conceptualised as failure to achieve aims, this lack of clarity 
provides an additional uncertainty for the assessment process to cope 
with. 
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5.6.3 Uncertainty Associated with Process Control 
Internal organisation structures increased uncertainty through reliance on 
individuals or personal relationships to get things done. 
It’s individuals, I think the only way this business works is its 
people.  [Administration] 
The University had established a policy zone on the website, so access to 
internal policies was easy, but gaps are noted.   
Many of our policies, which have been widely accepted for some 
time, are actually not written down anywhere.  [Administration] 
Furthermore, when policies did exist many interviewees were not aware 
of their availability.   
 
Since it is impossible to prevent all risks, procedures were needed to 
mitigate potential effects.   
People can be left to deal with very difficult and sometimes risky 
situations, and we need to ensure that they are properly prepared 
to deal with those, and that they have other people to call upon, 
should they be at risk.  [Administration] 
However, disaster-planning remained poorly developed in most areas, 
contributing to negative outcomes in the event of an incident. 
Well the whole issue of disaster recovery presents some 
challenges.  [Administration] 
This may be related to limited funding, leading to a reactive rather than a 
proactive approach to spending. 
 
A lack of standardised processes throughout the University was observed 
as a potential threat to the organisation. 
We’ve also identified the risk of different Schools doing the same 
thing differently, and at different times and so on and so forth, 
and we’ve moved to standardise that, there’s one or two Schools 
out there still kicking and screaming, but we are actually moving 
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in the right direction, so I mean, we’ve not centralised anything.  
[Administration] 
The question of whether standardisation or centralisation of academic 
management would reduce administrative risks may be a matter for the 
College Council to consider.   
A refusal in the universities to give rational discussion of their 
administration a high priority must result either in tyranny 
mitigated by muddle or in time-wasting reduplication of effort 
(Dearlove, 1998b). 
Participants described an increase in risk associated with poor process 
control, and the variability of approach across the organisation made it 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of management controls as an input to 
the net risk calculation. 
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has provided an illustration of the findings from Phase 1 of the 
study, in relation to each of the research questions.  The Phase 2 narratives will 
be similarly detailed in the following chapter.  Both sets of findings will be 
integrated in the analysis chapter to follow, to explore the links to theoretical 
perspectives and make clear the significant contribution these findings make to 
the field.  
 
The following chapter illustrates the findings from Phase 2 of the research 
investigating how the process operates within the organisation during risk 
management workshops, with additional data from follow-up interviews.   
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6 Phase 2: Embedded Case Studies Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
The findings from Phase 2 of the study are presented in this chapter to illustrate 
aspects of each of the research questions.  The theoretical motivations for the 
sub-headings in this chapter remain consistent with the previous chapter.  An 
overview of these can be found in the introduction to Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
The data illustrated in this section was collected during planned risk 
management training, and was supplemented by follow-up interviews with 12 of 
the 20 individuals who attended, covering all training sessions.  The training was 
based around a presentation with two breaks for workshop sessions.  The 
majority of data was taken from the workshop sessions, supplemented by 
queries and comments raised by attendees during the presentation section.  I 
attempted to remain outside of the workshop discussions to reduce personal 
influence, interjecting occasionally to show engagement.  The nature of each 
embedded case and selection criteria are detailed in section 4.7.  The individual 
providing the narrative can be identified through their assigned codes, 
designating training session number and attendee number, in addition to role 
type (see Appendix 5).   Each section contains narratives from each of the 3 
embedded groups, enabling differences and similarities to be observed.  The 
format facilitated the analysis presented in the next chapter, which draws these 
findings and Phase 1 data together with organisational documents to address the 
research questions. 
 
One of the differences between Phase 1 and Phase 2 reflects less ability to 
structure responses in workshops, in comparison with interviews.  Consequently, 
the workshops did not directly ask individuals to describe their aims, and a 
preliminary analysis of aims is not included in this chapter.  While participant 
narratives do not explicitly include their interpretation of aims, these can be 
identified within risk understandings. 
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6.2 The ‘How’ of Risk Assessment 
Participation in risk identification and assessment activity provided rich 
descriptions of how the formal process operates.  In addition, they illustrated 
many features of informal risk management, and encouraged examination of 
detailed aspects of the ‘how’ research question. 
6.2.1 The Interpretation of HEFCE Governance 
Contrasting with Phase 1 interviews, DI was aware of the introduction of 
formal risk management in response to HEFCE guidance.  One 
interviewee describes the risk management model as another passing 
management fad18 (Abbott, 1991). 
I mean the buzzword a few years ago was SWOT 
[Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats] analysis.  [T1A2 
Academic/Manager] 
I explained, in the workshop, that this analysis tool was suggested for use 
within the Risk Management framework, and could form part of the 
overall implementation, but acknowledged that models recommended as 
‘best practice’ change over time.  Reflexively, I was careful to be 
guarded in my response, attempting to avoid influencing group 
perceptions, particularly since discussions indicated their treatment of me 
as a free management consulting resource, and consequently, viewing me 
as an ‘expert’.  Another DI interpretation of HEFCE guidance was a 
focus on risk reduction and auditability.  
You can argue that if you’re critical of HEFCE, that it’s a 
document that takes a reactive stance, rather than saying we’re 
coming to audit you looking for opportunity.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
Consequently, DI expressed the concern that the risk management 
framework encourages inertia and risk avoidance. 
We could tick the boxes and say we’ll stay here and never change 
anything, don’t fix it, it ain’t bust.  Just keep our heads down, just 
                                                
18 A fad is “a practice or interest followed for a time with exaggerated zeal” (Merriam 
Webster’s, 1996) 
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tick the boxes, and be seen as good guys with low risk, but would 
fail.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Within the DI workshop the rating system was difficult to apply in 
assessing opportunity risk, reflecting the focus on risk reduction, since 
both positive and negative aspects were being weighed against each 
other, and there was only one scale available.  If, for example, there was 
a high probability of a merger, with expected long-term benefits, utilising 
the HEFCE guidance for risk rating it would be classed ‘High’ risk (High 
impact/High probability) and would have negative connotations, 
whereas, this would represent a potential positive outcome for the 
organisation.   
 
The risk management process addressed only potential negative 
outcomes. 
Now it sounds as if it is the threat bit from the SWOT analysis 
that is now called risk, which is now called risk management.  
[T1A2 Academic/Manager] 
The interpretation of HEFCE risk guidance as threat control was shared 
by all members of the DI training session.  The emphasis on reducing 
risk was discussed in a negative light, reflecting the local DI 
interpretation that risk should be embraced to secure potential gains for 
the organisation, reflecting the idea that risk is not necessarily a bad thing 
(Anderson, 1999).  It is ironic that although the HEFCE (2001) definition 
of risk embraces both positive and negative aspects of risk, and matches 
DI understanding of risk, the formal guidance and associated practices 
result in a DI interpretation of the model as focussing on risk reduction. 
 
The recommended model does not combine risks for an overall level of 
acceptability to be calculated.  This was desirable in the view of one E&F 
attendee. 
It’s sort of a consolidated view, as well, because you’ve got 3 
mediums and that’s not acceptable, if you’ve got 3 lows and 1 
high, that might, there is something about the mix of them as 
well.  [T3A5 Manager] 
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The attendee reflected a concern that combinations of interrelated risks 
pose threats to organisations. 
Manifestations of strategic risks tend to be relatively rare events.  
80% of companies with largest stock-price losses had been hit by 
2 or more risks that were interrelated (Gates, 2006, p82). 
The HEFCE framework and the private sector publication, Enterprise 
Risk Management: An Integrated Framework (COSO, 2004) do not 
provide any guidance on this aspect of assessment, although I was aware 
that such techniques could be used within probability calculations for 
reliability engineering.  However, given the lack of data to support the 
assignment of values, this is unlikely to be a serious criticism of these 
frameworks. 
 
The link between risk management and decision-making was identified 
in E&F as an important aspect of the governance (Luhmann, 2005). 
Someone once said, in terms of what you do, especially at 
management level, you are not paid for turning up, you are not 
paid for your technical knowledge, you are paid for the quality of 
your decisions, and that’s really what you do, and that ties back 
into this.  [T2A2 Manager] 
In the context of the HEFCE guidance, the question underlying this 
statement was whether the implementation of the risk management 
framework improves the quality of decision-making within the 
organisation. 
 
Since the majority of the BHS group were unaware of the risk register, 
the Risk Management Policy and HEFCE risk management governance 
there was no discussion of HEFCE governance during the training or 
follow-up interviews in their workshop. 
 
The groups displayed considerable discrepancy in awareness, 
understanding and interpretation of the HEFCE risk management 
governance.  The DI provided a critique of the model and reviewed how 
to implement it; E&F were aware of the HEFCE initiative, but not the 
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model; and the BHS group remained completely unaware of HEFCE 
ambitions, with the exception of one who was aware of the risk register, 
but not of its link to the regulator. 
 
6.2.2 Competing Aims 
This section describes how competing aims require trade-offs to be 
made.  The goals of the external organisations linked to the DI were 
significantly different to local aims, requiring consideration of the needs 
of partners. 
They’re not so worried about the academic standing, they’re 
worried about how many patients will it bring in, how many 
outpatient and inpatient fees.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
When organisational goals were not congruent, or even conflicted, it 
posed additional difficulties in the balancing of risk priorities.  
 
In E&F, there was a perception of unfairness about the distribution of 
resources within the organisation in relation to estates, with an emphasis 
on achieving research goals in favour of other aims. 
They decide they want to bring somebody down from Oxford, and 
they want to put them here, and they want to throw millions at it, 
to get them to come down, to make us this global player, but the 
problem is it’s failing elsewhere.  [T3A1 Manager] 
BHS confirmed the emphasis on research excellence. 
All the money now gets put into research.  [T4A1 Technical 
Manager] 
The need to balance the teaching and research aims was acknowledged. 
The tension between teaching and research, in that you are a 
research-led university, but a lot of our kudos actually comes via 
the teaching environment and there is always a tension between 
the two of them.  This is a problem.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
The attendee described a collibration mechanism (Mikes, 2004) in which 
attention swings between opposing objectives over time.  
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I think that probably it is a pendulum, it will swing, no doubt it 
will swing back the other way, eventually, but we are going in the 
direction of research.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
Another felt that the main thing was to ensure the University had 
funding, from whatever source. 
I suppose as long as the money comes in whether it is via 
teaching or research … [T4A6 Technical Manager] 
Reduced emphasis on teaching might have long-term impact in BHS. 
It may feed back eventually.  We may actually get lower and 
lower ratings from the Schools, so that the Head of Science, or 
whatever it is will say, ‘yes, it’s very nice but I wouldn’t go 
there’.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
However, on reflection he noted that the number of high quality students 
applying for many courses reduced the impact of the risk. 
So, it is going to take a very long time before you don’t get 
anyone applying to Medicine, the same with Pharmacy.  All of 
these career oriented posts, you are always going to get people 
applying for them.  You don’t actually have to do anything to get 
them to apply.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
In BHS there was concern that the nature of the University was being 
fundamentally challenged by recent research emphasis (Tapper & Salter, 
2004). 
They are now finding people to do the teaching, which is getting 
contracted out, but the problem with that is, it is not a University 
then.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
The attendee reiterated a threat to the whole ethos of the University. 
They have to because it is a University, and it is seen as 
something that we have to give lip service to, to keep the title.  
Otherwise, it would just be called the Research Institute of 
[University].  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
Other workshop attendees indicated agreement with these statements.  
An increasing use is made of teaching assistants and temporary, often 
part-time staff, to relieve active researchers from teaching duties.  
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Teaching is less valued than research (Elton, 2000).  The lack of prestige 
associated with teaching was clear. 
The risk is that the general public find out that no one gives a 
toss about teaching.  [T4A6 Technical Manager] 
This participant perceived a long-term threat because of the population 
profile of staff in the University. 
At the moment, it is still at a level where we’ve got a lot of people 
who just do teaching, and they enjoy it and that’s what they are 
here for in the first place.  Apart from research, they are all 
getting quite old and they are all going to go.  Then that’s going 
to create a difficult situation because we are not recruiting.  
[T4A6 Technical Manager] 
Despite the technical role of the attendees in this group, they showed 
more concern about teaching and research balance than the attendees in 
the other two embedded case studies, reflecting preliminary interviews, 
suggesting this concern was not tightly linked to seniority within the 
organisation.  However, it should be noted that high quality teaching and 
research were the aims chosen for focus of the risk workshop and may 
influence the participant responses.  Nonetheless, the findings confirmed 
that balancing these aims was a major concern for BHS attendees, 
reflecting anxiety about changes to the local system associated with 
School reorganisation and the establishment of Research Divisions.   
 
The findings reveal that the DI expressed concerned with balancing 
educational and NHS aims, E&F focused on access to estates funding 
and BHS emphasised threats to teaching aims, confirming an emphasis 
on sub-goals to identify risk within the organisation.  All narratives 
confirmed that risk management has to incorporate ways of balancing 
competing objectives. 
 
6.2.3 Implementation is ‘Fit for Audit’ 
In an autopoietic system, responses to risk governance compliance would 
exhibit outputs that are fit for audit.  In the DI, awareness of the 
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possibility of audit and external oversight in relation to governance was 
clear. 
I think if HEFCE were to pay a visit to look at our risk register it 
might be incumbent upon us to actually look at it, and make sure, 
that other people have looked at it.  [T1A5 Academic/Manager] 
Locally the document provided a safeguard against audit. 
We should be aware that there may be a need at some stage, for 
the college to say to HEFCE 'we do it and we can see it works'.  
[T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
It was with an eye to the possibility of audit that compliance issues were 
considered.  A DI criticism related to the paper trail required to 
demonstrate adherence to risk governance. 
It seems to me there are two sides to this, and one is to do it and 
recognise that we are doing it, and by doing so there may well be 
areas that we identify and should be included, or, and in our 
minutes, we need to have the words risk management there 
somewhere, on occasion.  The second thing is an audit trail, 
because how the heck do you know and distinguish between an 
institution, which has a systematic culture of risk management, 
versus an institution that has not?  [T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
There was resistance among DI staff against the implementation of a 
system solely for the purposes of demonstrating compliance. 
It’s the sort of thing that drives me mad, I have to say, because 
it’s one thing doing it and quite separately showing that you do 
it, and to actually alter what you do to show somebody else.  
[T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
One attendee expressed concern about the University emphasis on the 
risk register as a compliance tool. 
That’s the thing with these risk registers, that’s the tool that the 
college is using to show what risks we’ve got.  [...]  It’s 
interesting because you see the only thing they are doing is about 
whether we have got a risk register.  [T1A3 
Administrator/Manager] 
Senior management communications showed concern about complying 
with HEFCE guidance, embodied in a requirement for local risk register 
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completion by a given deadline, but there was little emphasis on risk 
management as an aid to improving performance in Schools and 
Departments.   
 
Within DI, there was a view that risk assessment did not stimulate the 
production of contingency plans and the approach was to hope none of 
the potentially serious threats materialised. 
We’d do the risk assessment and hope there wasn’t a serious 
terrorist attack on [name] Station, or a major structural flaw in 
the tower, or a student passing on HIV to a patient.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
Since the risk register was the proxy used to indicate compliance, the 
lack of action resulting from assessment was interpreted locally as further 
indication that the process was a purely compliance based exercise.  In 
addition, whilst the DI workshops revealed that risk management activity 
formed part of their normal business practices, they illustrated that the 
risk register did not provide information about how risk was actually 
being managed locally. 
The college has put out something asking for an index and 
actually it has already been reported back to the audit committee 
that certain Schools haven’t filled in a risk register.  The 
assumption underlying that report is that they are not doing it, 
and actually as a result of this seminar, what we might do is 
actually say exactly, that is how we do manage risk, so that it 
isn’t important that there is nothing on the register.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
Senior management emphasised compliance, rather than an integrated 
approach intended to improve management decision-making.  
 
The E&F Department did not discuss risk register completion, but 
focused on compliance with the legal requirements in relation to 
buildings, including H&S, and this environment was continually 
changing. 
And they are changing legislation like my wife changes shoes.  
[T3A1 Manager] 
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One example of recent change was provided in relation to compliance 
with new fire regulations. 
Never did before, when it used to be somebody would report a 
fire door, but now we’re being asked to look at them 3 monthly, 
check all the fire doors […] and prove we’ve done it, keep 
records and audit trail and all that kind of thing.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
There was no suggestion that these changes made the buildings safer, but 
the need for procedural compliance had been addressed (Rothstein et al, 
2006a). 
 
One interviewee took a more personal view of risk, related to job 
function, requiring compliance with H&S risk assessment processes. 
My job is actually about keeping people out of prison.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
The attendee went on to illustrate how procedural compliance deflected 
responsibility when authority was lacking. 
We actually practice that, but without the risk register, because 
what we actually do is, that if there is something which is a 
known risk, we actually tender it, we actually put the report 
together and then it goes into the system, so that if the HSE come 
knocking on my door and say ‘why haven’t you done this?’  I go, 
‘there’s the report that went in, I haven’t got the authority’.  It’s 
prescriptive because you follow risk assessment and as long as 
you can demonstrate you’ve followed the procedure, then there’s 
little more you can do.  [T3A1 Manager] 
The adherence to the procedural requirements of H&S enabled 
individuals to reduce risk to themselves, and to transfer responsibility to 
the individual with authority for funding.  
 
Legal compliance with H&S requirements dominated the management of 
risk in E&F. 
We guessed around the backlog of maintenance services would 
be in the order of £70 million, and I think it came out to about 74.  
Yes, but the problem is the college has given us £6.8 million to 
deal with the problem, so the way that we deal with that risk is 
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that we categorise it into 3 separate categories, statutory, 
business critical and anything else.  So, we never get to the 
anything else, because all the money is virtually taken up by 
statutory and we take risks on the business critical.  In fact, one 
of the areas that you alluded to earlier, which is the computer 
centre in the [name] is one of the areas of business risk, and 
unfortunately the college have got caught twice this year, and 
now realise how big that risk is.  [T3A1 Manager] 
There was little alignment of estates spending with strategic aims; 
compliance with legal requirements took precedence.   
 
The BHS group had not been involved in the risk register process, and 
the only implementation issues discussed related to H&S compliance.  
There are a lot of control systems in, and the only way that we’ve 
found of controlling risk is money, and if students do projects that 
are paid for by the School via their supervisors, they will not get 
the money unless a risk assessment is signed by the student.  
Which means, at least, they may not have read it, but they have 
signed it.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
Another attendee was sceptical about the efficacy of such processes. 
It works in terms of ticking boxes, but whether it actually works, I 
doubt it.  [T4A6 Technical Manager] 
All three groups used risk assessment processes, focussed on local aims, 
as an autopoietic response, to enable conformance with procedural 
requirements to protect the institution or the individual, rather than 
serving to support other functional aims (Rothstein et al, 2006a). 
 
6.2.4 Communication in the Organisation 
The workshops proved very revealing about not only the 
communications that have been received, but also how reflexive systems 
interpret and react to these signals, including a lack of feedback.  The 
risk register process fed data upwards within the hierarchy, with little 
evidence of feedback to the management team in DI.  One attendee 
commented. 
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So, it should have been a 2-way process.  Should the college be 
reassuring us that they are dealing with ISS, estates, terrorist 
attack, flu epidemic, whatever, to say ‘yes, there is a risk, 
analysis has been done, and there’s some thoughts about a 
contingency plan, to cover these things’, because I don’t know if 
the college has got these things or not.  I don’t know what the 
risk register and the risk assessment for the e-mail is … hopefully 
there’s some backup.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
In the face of the lack of information, the DI response was to assume the 
responsibility lay elsewhere, and to hope it had been addressed. 
 
There were examples of poor feedback to E&F about decisions in 
relation to financial approvals. 
We understand from the Principal’s Central Team that [name] 
has been able to find a £1 million for the roof, but we don’t know 
for sure, I mean, that’s a decision that he may or may not have 
taken yet.  [T3A4 Manager] 
The lack of feedback about financial decision-making resulted in staff 
having to assume that the request had not been approved. 
What I have a problem with is the fact that you are not telling the 
people that you are not going to spend the money.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
Poor internal communication increased difficulty for those involved in 
some E&F roles. 
There is a problem.  I know they are striving to improve 
communications and I think it is starting to happen now, but this 
has been the problem, communication flow to those that need to 
know and particularly those on the front line.  [T3A4 Manager] 
The distribution of documents was another aspect of communication that 
was cited as a problem in E&F in 2007. 
As I can recall the Minutes of the last meeting were January 
2006, nothing since then.  It’s not good.  [T3A4 Manager] 
The draft strategy for the E&F Department provided an illustration of 
this issue. 
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Have you seen a draft of the Estates strategy yet?  I have only 
seen a draft, but there is nothing in there about sinking fund.  [T3 
Manager] 
E&F attendees confirmed they had not seen the document, indicating that 
the strategic planning process was not penetrating even as far as senior 
management levels of the hierarchy.  The attendee who had seen it was 
from the Finance Department.  There was also a lack of involvement in 
decision-making. 
I’m not always involved in all these discussions.  [T3A4 
Manager] 
Several E&F attendees identified the failure of internal communication 
processes as a source of risk. 
I think one of the greatest risks from the college is from itself, 
because it is not really a coherent organisation.  There are 
problems with communication that I’ve certainly noticed, and 
lack of consistency of approach across the patch to try to get, to 
really engineer the college itself, so it is fit for this century.  
[T2A3 Manager interview] 
There was variability in policy and procedural implementation across 
different parts of the University.   
 
Lack of response to risk concerns was evident. 
What if you just, when you raise a risk, it is just like battering 
your head against a brick wall?  [T2A1 Manager] 
At the other E&F workshop, the idea that raised risks may be ignored 
was reiterated, but the formal risk register can be interpreted as a form of 
communication that transfers responsibility. 
It is quite interesting, because if you came up with a risk register 
with all these different things on it, and kept presenting it, again 
and again, at PCT and at [unclear] committee, and it’s very 
difficult, you have covered all your responsibilities.  You have 
done everything you can, and the buck stops much further up.  
[T3A5 Manager] 
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Another highlighted the use of risk assessment outcomes to transfer 
responsibility to others through the passing of information.  
That could be the benefit of a formal risk analysis, couldn’t it, 
because I’ve pointed this out, but it is probably in an e-mail to 
somebody, and they’ve probably, you say ‘I’ve sent that e-mail 
saying it was dangerous’.  Well, so what, but if it was a formal 
risk assessment that went forward, you say, ‘well, you can look at 
this now and the decision is yours’.  [T3A2 Manager] 
An interesting question is whether the recipient of the message interprets 
the communication in this light, and takes responsibility for action.  The 
narratives from E&F indicate this was not the case, and in the event of a 
problem, the individual who thought the responsibility had been 
transferred elsewhere was required to manage subsequent events.  The 
E&F interpretation of senior management lack of concern about risk was 
expressed about a consultant's review. 
He raised loads of very interesting questions which would not 
bother them in [name].  I mean, they’d be bothered if they 
thought about it.  [T3A2 Manager interview] 
Local risk concerns were not treated as ‘information’ by the higher 
echelons of the organisational hierarchy.  When data had been gathered 
and disseminated by E&F, the outcomes had not been positive. 
Because what we do is not tell people.  In fact, as you know, we 
paid a consultant to come in and do a whole risk assessment, and 
we shall say no more than the documentation was not 
forthcoming.  I must be careful what I say, because I think the 
story in it was too … [T3A2 Manager] 
A further example related to risks in the Halls of Residence. 
There are all sorts of aspects with residential accommodation.  It 
is not just alcohol, there’s also drug taking as well.  [T3A4 
Manager] 
The E&F attendee was aware that senior management had been informed 
about these concerns. 
And that can affect all sorts of things, emergency situations and 
we are aware of these risks.  I know the college has received 
documentation about certain things that go on in residential 
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accommodation, and that went to the Principal.  It did go to the 
Principal’s Central Team, but what action they’re taking I know 
not.  [T3A4 Manager] 
This lack of feedback from the PCT illustrated how absence of 
communication can function to discourage action on the part of members 
of the E&F team.  A risk to the organisation in terms of legal compliance 
was identified.  
Basically the college should report this to the police, it is still 
illegal to be taking Class A drugs, Class B drugs, and if the 
college is aware that crack/cocaine is being taken, OK cannabis 
is looked upon as slightly softer, but they are all dangerous drugs 
in my view.  The college is, I know this is being recorded, but the 
college does tend to turn a bit of a blind, Nelson’s blind eye to 
this.  It is a difficult one actually, because ‘Duty of Care’, looking 
after them and what have you.  [T3A4 Manager] 
The contentious nature of this risk discouraged inclusion in a widely 
circulated document, since disclosure to the press could influence the 
parents of students and consequent choice of University, should the 
reputation for drug-taking be linked with the organisation.  A potential 
terrorist threat on campus further illustrated concern about formal 
recording of risks. 
I might not say it in an open forum, we do have quite a high 
Muslim population, within [the University], and we have a 
Muslim prayer room downstairs, that up until 6 months ago was 
free access, and we found that we had people coming in off the 
street to use it.  There was a fire exit on the back of that at street 
level, which on occasion was being used, and people were 
coming in and out covertly.  And you just think, well, we don’t 
want to restrict movement for our own Muslim student 
population, but we don’t want people who are not in college 
coming in to use these facilities, and if you are doing that, well 
what is the risk, and who is assessing that risk?  We had on one 
occasion, I know they have tightened up on it now, the Islamic 
students society had on occasion got in speakers, into this 
building, who were preaching fundamentalism, and were 
attracting in, it is public access, again, you just think, did 
anybody really…?  So, terrorist threat I think is one that should 
be taken into account.  [T4A5 Technical Manager interview] 
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There was clear reluctance to express such concerns in a written 
document, or even to discuss in an open forum such as a risk assessment 
meeting, and the risk was only revealed during a one-to-one interview.  
 
Communication of the Risk Management Policy has failed to cascade 
down to members of the BHS group.  Participants, with one exception, 
were unaware of the existence of the risk register before training. 
I found out there was a risk register.  [T4A2 Technical Manager 
interview] 
All Schools and Departments have submitted the risk register over the 
previous two years.  However, the staff considered suitable for the 
training course in BHS were not, and do not expect to be, involved in the 
process.  
We are not even sure if they are letting us see the thing [risk 
register].  It doesn’t make any sense at all.  [T4A6 Technical 
Manager interview] 
The process did not indicate whether they would be included in the 
circulation of the Corporate Risk Register or the local section of it. 
Well, the fact that we might get to see the risk register, which 
would make the whole thing worthwhile, because without seeing 
it, it is pretty pointless doing it, to be quite honest.  [T4A2 
Technical Manager] 
Furthermore, the impact of authority and seniority was reflected by one 
trainee’s comment. 
I don’t really think they would take any notice of anything that we 
said anyway.  [T4A6 Technical Manager] 
BHS demonstrate that it is going to be difficult to involve more junior 
staff in the process, both in terms of risk disclosure and authority to act.   
 
In relation to the central server failure, a BHS interviewee cited 
communication from the Principal. 
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The server in the last couple of years has gone down for 24 hours 
or longer, on a couple of occasions and the Principal has said 
that that is a major problem, which he wants to address.  [T4A5 
Technical Manager] 
It was unclear where this feedback came from, whether it was a formal 
communication to staff, cascaded through management, or was received 
informally through talking to other staff.  
 
Taking the SST perspective that the training could be interpreted as 
senior management communication about risk within the organisation, 
some changes in the DI trainees’ perspectives were identified because of 
attendance. 
We do a lot of this discussion about risk at the time, but perhaps 
don’t think of it, when you are discussing it, and I think it really 
just helped us, to put that in your mind when you are having a 
discussion, to think about the risk sort of side as well.  [T1A3 
Administrator/Manager interview] 
The information provided in the training enabled recognition of risk 
management practices. 
I mean, for us, the most important thing was to recognise that we 
are actually doing it anyway.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager 
interview] 
This encouraged the group to include the concept self-referentially. 
 
In the E&F follow up interviews, it was evident that process changes had 
been made, linked to the training activity. 
We all sat round to put our two-penn’orth in, as to what we 
thought regarding the Department’s risk register.  [T3A3 
Manager interview] 
The feedback from the study to senior management was seen as a 
potential stimulus for tailoring risk management processes in a way that 
would be appropriate to the institution. 
I know you are doing this as part of a PhD thesis, aren’t you, 
with Internal Audit?  So I would be hopeful that from this, the 
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spin off is that ‘well, let’s look at this, and how can we adapt and 
fine tune’.  [T3A4 Manager interview] 
One of the E&F attendees welcomed the information about increased 
focus on risk management. 
It is good that the college is looking at it, and about time, I would 
say.  [T3A2 Manager interview] 
The training helped people understand the purpose of the organisational 
change. 
Inertia comes in.  I mean, nobody likes change, but if we can see 
the reason for it and we can understand that through this change, 
things are going to improve, improve for students, improve for 
our researchers, and also the staff, because I think staff morale 
has not been particularly good in the last couple of years.  [T3A4 
Manager interview] 
Since the BHS group were unaware of the risk register’s existence, and 
had not been involved in the risk assessment process.  
I hope to see the risk register.  To be quite honest, until then, I 
don’t think that I will take anything forward from it, because I’ve 
got enough to do anyway.  [T4A2 Technical Manager interview] 
In contrast with other groups, they saw little likelihood of follow up 
action. 
 
Poor communication within the organisation resulted in varying levels of 
awareness of policies and procedures.  Lack of feedback generally 
illustrated how ignorance is propagated and can relieve responsibility 
and the narratives illustrated how formal risk communications can 
function to enable blame avoidance within the organisation. 
 
6.2.5 Uncertainty Reduction 
The first two workshops suggested that the assessment process is itself a 
means of reducing uncertainty, through the assignment of ratings and 
mitigating actions, to provide a contribution to organisational decision-
making more generally.   
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When you’ve got numbers, it does force you to try and make a 
comparable level of risk.  [T1A2 Academic/Manager interview] 
I think it forces you into a decision, which you might not 
otherwise make, and probably for that reason, it may be a good 
thing.  [T2A3 Manager interview] 
The ability to compare different types of risk is a supposed benefit of 
using numbers or categories in risk assessment, despite the questionable 
basis for such assessments.  The use of numbers stimulated curiosity 
about mathematical techniques. 
Do you use a standard equation for the probability of risk 
happening?  [T2A2 Manager] 
One E&F attendee identified an advantage to using numbers in the 
assessment. 
I think it is a fair way of doing it, I think you’ve got to have some 
way of judging, and I think people are comfortable with numbers.  
[T3A1 Manager interview] 
Another E&F trainee recognised that the assessment process is not a 
form of calculation, but nonetheless, felt the use of numbers was helpful 
in identifying the greatest threats. 
I think it does help to put numbers against things because 
otherwise, it just becomes a bit vague, and if you don’t try, I 
mean, it is not an exact science, you can’t just sit there and say 
‘well, what are the chances of this event happening?’  You have 
to make a guess at it sometimes, but it does help to put some 
numbers against it, otherwise no one really knows what to 
concentrate on, as the biggest area of risk.  [T3A3 Manager 
interview] 
When asked about the usefulness of numbers, one BHS trainee was 
unsure about the benefit, and provided an example of a scenario based 
risk assessment. 
Someone said the other day, ‘oh, we need more first-aiders in this 
building, because, we could have an explosion and you could get 
8 or 9 people injured at one time’.  Well, I’ve been here 35 years, 
I’ve not had 2 incidents at one time, so yes, there is that risk, but, 
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I don’t know, is the answer to that.  [T4A6 Technical Manager 
interview] 
The difficulty in this case is the shortage of resources generally, so, if 
there is no such incident, the money could have been spent elsewhere.  
However, if the event occurs, the organisation will avoid the blame that 
can be associated with lack of preparation for incidents, and may save 
lives.   
 
Contrasting with these comments, there was general reluctance to assign 
risk assessment values in all workshops in all case study areas.  One BHS 
attendee did provide a qualitative rating. 
It would be a medium risk, I would have thought, because the 
impact is expense, OK, […] and the impact would also be to 
reduce the quality of the teaching.  [T4A4 Technical Manager] 
The BHS trainees agreed that it was difficult to be too dogmatic about 
which rating a risk should fall within. 
It is very difficult to actually decide whether you are going to 
have a 3 or a 4.  It’s helpful, yes.  [T4A4 Technical Manager 
interview] 
Despite the lack of clarity about how to assess the risk in numerical 
terms, the use of numbers was still perceived as useful by this 
interviewee. 
 
In contrast, a couple of other BHS interviewees thought that it was not 
helpful. 
No, no, I never think they do anything.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager interview] 
I’m not sure whether it is valuable.  [T4A6 Technical Manager 
interview] 
One BHS attendee expressed concern about increased confidence in 
ratings, expressed as numbers. 
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People think it is really absolute.  Yes, so these are the scores, 
likelihood of it occurring and severity, you see, there’s risk 
scores there.  [T4A3 Technical Manager interview] 
This echoes concerns expressed by Power (2004b): 
Use of qualities as quantities is common where there is a demand 
for metrics, gives measurement systems an ‘invented’ accuracy 
(e.g. risk assessment score) which reflects wider cultural 
anxieties and the need for numbers.  Notwithstanding the 
questionable first-order foundations of such measurement 
systems, they nevertheless direct management attention and have 
real consequences (Power, 2004b, p776). 
 
Furthermore, there is danger in thinking that since calculations have been 
made the risks are managed (Bernstein, 1996b); the risk register is in the 
drawer and risk management activities are complete for the year.  
 
One E&F attendee confirmed that the decision to mitigate a risk may be 
based more on the desire to reduce uncertainty by choosing to act on a 
risk that can be managed locally in preference to a more difficult one 
(Bernstein, 1996a). 
Well, I would say, because it is easy it is worth doing.  [T2A1 
Manager] 
Consequently, the local ability to reduce uncertainty by taking action 
confirms the role of authority or power in risk mitigation.   
 
This section highlights one of the surprising findings in this study, the 
general preference for the use of numbers, as a means of comparability to 
increase confidence in assessment outputs, reducing uncertainty, 
alongside the near universal unwillingness to assign such values. 
 
6.3 Influence of Organisational Group 
In the light of HEFCE risk guidance (2001; 2005), the ability to integrate risk 
registers from different groups, to form a corporate risk register, makes it 
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important to understand how the organisational setting influences the assessment 
of risks and acceptance of responsibility for action. 
6.3.1 Interpretation of operational risk assessment 
This section reveals how this interpretation has important implications 
for the implementation of formal risk management systems.  Within DI, 
there was lack of clarity about the scope of operational risk. 
I am having difficulty with the definition of the term risk.  I mean, 
it seems to me I came here and I think I can understand risk in 
terms of H&S, and live with that.  If you say how many of your 
laboratory reagents are carcinogens, right, I can identify them, 
then we get the resignation of the Chief Executive from the Trust, 
now you are saying that’s a risk.  [T1A2 Academic/Manager] 
The training feedback from E&F illustrates that several members of staff 
came to the session with the view of risk as synonymous with H&S. 
I think the most useful thing was just sitting down and thinking 
about risk as being more than just H&S risk.  That it covers all 
areas of the college’s business as a whole was most interesting, 
and making us think about how we plan our works and rather 
than this assumption that we can just carry on and everything 
will be fine, and college carries on for ever.  [T3A3 Manager 
interview] 
The BHS group exhibited similar confusion in relation to H&S and 
operational risk illustrated in the other cases. 
Of course that’s the first thing I thought, was, I thought it was 
going to be all about safety.  [T4A4 Technical Manager 
interview] 
I suppose it’s just raising the general awareness of the subject 
and making you think about it and thinking ‘yes, we ought to do 
something about that’.  Just trying, just looking at it from the 
point of view of business risk, rather than H&S risk.  [T4A5 
Technical Manager interview] 
One BHS individual expressed concern about implementation of risk 
management in view of confusion between operational risk management 
and H&S, and the resulting interpretation of risk assessment. 
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The trouble is the word ‘risk’ is used, and we already have a 
whole flotilla of things under risk assessment.  I know your thing 
is different, but those are mandatory, and we have to do those 
every year, and it is a real bore, so to put this on top of it, it 
would almost be better if it had a different name.  [T4A3 
Technical Manager interview] 
The routine nature of H&S risk assessment was evident, and viewed as 
an administrative process, in which academic staff would not be 
involved.  This conflation of H&S and operational risk has implications 
for understandings of responsibility, and was apparent in all groups. 
 
One of the initial difficulties in the DI training session related to the 
‘Risk Management of Everything’ (Power, 2004a), illustrated by the 
comment. 
Where do you start, and where do you stop?  [T1A3 
Administrator/Manager] 
A member of E&F was aware that the operational risk umbrella covers 
all organisational activities. 
Everything that we do, or are involved in, in terms of core or 
non-core business, has a risk attached to it.  [T2A2 Manager] 
The wide range of risks to be considered can act as a barrier to 
assessment, since the task appears too large and time consuming to 
undertake.  There was concern that the scope of operational risk would 
result in very lengthy documents. 
We could sit around here and identify 165 risks.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
I suggested that the inclusion of a risk should indicate that the Principal 
ought to be aware of a risk that was being locally managed, if it may 
result in a negative outcome, or to ask for help where the risk cannot be 
addressed by local action, responded to by the following comment. 
Well, he might say ‘do you want me to do anything with it?’ and 
we might say, ‘no, we are managing it’, or ‘we really need your 
support’.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
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This enabled DI attendees to have a more focussed view of what to add 
to the list. 
The way you are talking, our risk register might be limited to half 
a dozen things.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
The attendee proposed a way to integrate the activity with existing 
business processes. 
It seems a bit unclear, but what we were trying to do for the 
college is something that has maybe 5 or 6 things, but we 
internally review from time to time, maybe a standing item every 
two or three months about risks and there will be a standard set 
of them, flood, power, pandemic of some illness or something.  
We could probably list them, a standard set of things, some 
catastrophe or whatever, and should there be anything we should 
add on, should we have a backup, a contingency plan, what 
would we do if a floor were taken out by fire.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
Gathering data from subordinates could use a pyramidal approach to risk 
assessment. 
I think what you want from each of us is our top 3/4 major risks.  
[T1A2 Academic/Manager] 
The DI management team took the opportunity to consider how to 
integrate risk management processes into existing business practices, 
indicating acceptance of responsibility for the task. 
I think that is a reasonable way to approach it, sort of get some 
initial ones down and then the groups to add their slant on the 
key risks.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager] 
Explicitly integrating risk management within existing local management 
forums was considered. 
From time to time, we should have a standing item of risk.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
The DI administrator was concerned with outputs and compliance. 
I think we will look at our Minute taking, or note taking and 
maybe more overtly record where we’ve sort of discussed a risk, 
but certainly, for me it will follow up, because we do need to sort 
of use that as a basis to set it down for our documentation to 
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provide for the college.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager 
interview] 
The University aimed to achieve an integrated risk management system, 
and these discussions illustrated a positive move towards that goal, 
although ultimately the compliance paperwork remained an 
administrative chore.   
 
The management of opportunity risks may require acceptance of a 
possible downturn for a longer-term gain. 
That is exactly the discussion we have had, and we’ve probably, 
without being able to quantify, we probably say we have to take 
the hit now to get the benefit later.  [T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
The DI attendees generally took the view that to grasp new opportunities 
some initial downturn in financial performance might be expected, but 
that it would be necessary to improve long-term viability.  One sensitive 
area, that could be difficult to add to a widely circulated risk register, was 
the possible loss of staff over time. 
Let’s say carrying more staff than we may need because, don’t 
tell anybody, there may be some rationalisation of staff, and there 
has to be some efficiency savings somewhere, you’ve got to carry 
them until some folks retire, or decide to move on and then you 
restructure, so carrying all the staff may put you over budget on 
staffing for 2/3 years.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
In contrast with what might be expected in the private sector, there was 
no reference to redundancies.  Business-planning processes could be used 
to gain agreement for such deficits. 
We will do a detailed business plan that might show a negative 
for a couple of years before we start showing real growth beyond, 
we might do.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
However, a critical evaluation of the emphasis on ‘might’ suggests the DI 
business plan would not necessarily be presented this way.  The 
implication was a lack of confidence in the PCT to approve potential 
short-term losses. 
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One E&F perspective explained their emphasis on H&S risks when 
compared to business risks. 
You know, you can repair things, buildings can be repaired, but 
obviously, people can’t, so we’ve got to.  The people are 
important, they’ve got to be protected and looked after.  [T3A4 
Manager interview] 
This statement reflected the primary aim of E&F to keep individuals safe 
while in University buildings, providing the impetus for compliance with 
H&S legislation. 
It’s largely keeping the college out of trouble, or keeping the 
Principal out of trouble, out of court.  [Administration] 
One individual, who was familiar with H&S assessments, suggested that 
operational risk management should not be difficult. 
If you look at the college as a project, its activities are a project, 
then all you do is risk assess it and prepare a risk register, and 
then you break the risk register down to the individual component 
parts, in terms of who deals with what, and then you manage it.  
[T2A2 Manager] 
In addition, the individual, familiar with H&S, felt that the way that Risk 
Management was presented created an overly complex impression of 
what was needed. 
There is a whole lot of sort of ‘juju’ surrounding it and, you just 
need the risk register, you need to identify the risks, put a risk 
register together and then delegate each risk and a way of 
monitoring that risk to the individuals in the departments and 
away you go.  Over-managing it, if you know what I mean, put 
some terminology to it and create a science.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Other attendees were more aware of the difficulty of assessing less 
tangible risks and aggregating local data into a high-level document. 
 
In BHS, the complex nature of involving more staff in assessing risk 
within the organisation was a concern. 
Once you have to consult with a larger audience that makes it 
even more complicated.  [T4A5 Technical Manager interview] 
 Page 200 of 407 
The process is less difficult to manage if it is restricted to senior staff, but 
less information is gathered.  The involvement of additional staff 
members increases time spent on the task, and the cost/benefit to the 
organisation is difficult to estimate. 
 
The BHS staff chosen to attend the training were not involved in the 
development of local risk registers. 
We haven’t contributed, because no one has asked us to.  [T4A1 
Technical Manager] 
People who contributed, in their turn, expected to see the output of the 
process. 
Do we get to see the college risk register?  Because we don’t 
know what is on it.  If they want us to take the training, we should 
see the register, but it might not need to go any further than that 
and if you want to see them take it further, then we would be in a 
position to sit down with staff in our buildings who were 
interested, and say ‘well, look, these are the issues, and do you 
think there are any others.  Have we got it right’, but our 
School’s must be set in the context of the college one.  [T4A5 
Technical Manager] 
The only BHS attendee aware of the risk register reiterated the lack of 
engagement with the process. 
We did it just over a month ago.  […] I haven’t looked at it 
because I have better things to do.  [T4A1 Technical Manager] 
The narratives illustrated BHS risk register completion as an 
administrative task. 
It all got left a bit late, and then one of the administrators had 
just done it.  [T4A4 Technical Manager interview] 
This was not an isolated example, and over the period of study, it was the 
most frequently cited method for risk register completion, reflecting 
senior management perceptions that risk assessment was H&S related, 
and the task was delegated accordingly.   
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This section provides an important illustration of how the interpretation 
of operational risk influenced participation in the risk assessment 
process, with significant implications for formal process outputs. 
 
6.3.2 Conflicting Perspectives 
The three embedded cases enabled the conflicting individual, group and 
organisational perspectives to be explored. The DI worked with quite 
particular system interfaces, tightly linked with external organisations.   
We’re a tripartite organisation, [names], and our executive has 
to be mindful that they make sure that the perspective of [the 
University] would, say, get ahead with this [the merger].  From 
the academic point of view, it is potentially a win/win situation, 
academically for the Trusts who are part of the organisation, and 
our NHS streams here, they may see the risk as something 
different.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
This required joint working arrangements and inclusion of partner 
organisations’ perspectives, with control being shared between parties. 
 
In contrast to views expressed in the other 3 workshops, where access to 
a widely circulated risk register would be welcomed, the senior managers 
in DI were very concerned about circulation of documented risks. 
Meetings I have directly with my line manager, in confidence, 
verbally to say I am worried about the threat or challenge from 
whatever, and it is registered, but just the nature of the forms, 
they are not marked as ‘Private and Confidential’.  Although, it 
doesn’t seem to make a lot of difference whether it is anyway but, 
it seems a very open process, and indeed, under data protection, 
etc, could other people insist that they see it?  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
In DI, increased transparency and public access to data posed a potential 
threat. 
If I saw you, as a member of my staff, as a risk to me because of 
your behaviour, or whatever, I could put down, problem because 
of so and so’s behaviour, and you would have a right to see that.  
[T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
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Conformance with the legal requirements relating to transparency may 
result in risk aversion, protecting the institution against the threat of 
disclosure.  There is a genuine concern that documenting DI risks could 
pose a risk itself. 
The risk of putting it down on paper anywhere, because if it gets 
out, say, that they are wetting themselves in relation to the 
prospect of the RAE, or leaving, or whatever.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
The control of primary risks gives rise to the potential for secondary 
risks, such as disclosure of information that generates negative publicity, 
and is a recognised feature of risk management activities (Power, 2004a).  
 
In the E&F sessions, there were differing views about how limited 
maintenance budgets should be allocated. 
But the roofs at the [site name] are leaking, and it gets pushed 
that way, well, it’s funding, the college refuses to put the funding 
into it.  [T2A1 Manager] 
Given the recent refurbishment of this site, it might be expected that the 
work would have been approved.  The 2005 Corporate Risk Register 
mentioned leaks on the 5th floor as a risk in relation to IT servers.  
However, it remained a problem at the time of these interviews in early 
2007.  A hierarchical conflict was evident.  To E&F attendees the lack of 
investment in estates maintenance appeared unacceptable. 
The lift there again doesn’t work properly, the cost for that comes 
down to minimal cost, I think less than £20,000, […] because it is 
a very heavily used building, you can’t move, you’ve got staff 
actually man handling bags of waste up and down the stairs 
because they can’t use the lift, and these are unacceptable risks.  
[T3A4 Manager] 
But the failure to act indicated locally that the University’s senior 
management considered the risk tolerable.  The control of budgets and 
allocation decisions play a role in selecting which, if any, risk mitigation 
activities are approved, demonstrating the impact of power relations in 
the risk management arena. 
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One E&F interviewee was aware that from individual or sub-group 
perspectives it was important to demonstrate effective allocations of 
funds. 
I suppose there is a risk that we might not be perceived as 
spending the money as wisely as we could.  [T3A3 Manager 
interview] 
The comment indicated worry in relation to NPM arrangements linked to 
outsourcing and use of contract staff alongside increased performance 
measures and transparency.  The risk was felt at individual level in 
relation to job losses, linked to increasing use of sub-contracts and 
outsourcing arrangements (e.g. Ecovert). 
I suppose, not to put too finer point on it, there is always the 
chance that one day senior college management might decide 
that they could get an outside firm in to do what we do cheaper 
and more effectively.  Which if the reason is because we 
genuinely aren’t very efficient, well that’s our own hard luck.  If 
the problem is because of the way the college actually operates 
… [T3A3 Manager interview] 
This interpretation of the risk was unlikely to be shared by senior 
members of the management team, who would regard such decisions as 
reducing risk for the organisation, through a focus on core business 
activities, illustrating potential conflict between individual or group and 
organisation-wide risk management. 
 
The multi-site operation of BHS meant that some staff were in old 
buildings with outdated plant and equipment, whilst others worked in 
high quality, new and refurbished sites, leading to contrasting views.  In 
addition, some staff were based in buildings managed by the NHS Trust 
and other organisations. 
Different for different areas.  Well, I’m in a Trust building, and 
the Trust are responsible for the maintenance, and it’s not good.  
[T4A2 Technical Manager]  
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Consequently, for some members of BHS, estates maintenance issues 
posed a risk to local teaching and research aims; for others in new 
laboratory facilities there were no such concerns. 
 
The narratives confirmed different risks to individuals, groups and the 
organisation in relation to the same type of threat, such that a particular 
risk mitigation plan may be favourable to some, of little interest to others 
and unwelcome to the rest.   
 
6.3.3 Competition between Groups 
In the University, groups competed for access to scarce funding.  The 
competition for resources presented particular difficulties when 
comparing operational risks in an area, such as DI, with clinical 
associations.  
The clinical areas take priority.  [T4A1 Technical Manager] 
There was a sort of parallel existence for people like me, and the 
NHS.  Then I’m always in difficulty in stressing the amount of 
risk if a piece of equipment goes down, compared with somebody 
who is trying to say we need a new life support machine.  [T1A2 
Academic/Manager interview] 
In this scenario, there was a proper emphasis on medical care and 
facilities.  However, lack of infrastructure investment had a potential 
impact on business continuity, and to ignore those risks could have 
unforeseen impact on patients. 
 
From the E&F perspective, the organisation consisted of a collection of 
sub-groups, with some common views and ways of working, and some 
major differences.  Competition between parts of the University was a 
recognised feature. 
The college is essentially a collection of fiefdoms, with everyone 
guarding their own interests.  [T2A1 Manager] 
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Another E&F attendee perceived that some groups have more power than 
others. 
And then there’s a question of the authority of the Department, if 
you are one or two pegs down the chain […] your decisions 
won’t be supported.  [T2A3 Manager] 
The rewards for research excellence influenced the internal power 
balance between research and teaching through financial authority and 
control in BHS. 
Research Divisions have the money.  [T4A1 Technical Manager] 
The hierarchical structure was both informal and informal, but more than 
one attendee supported the view that some areas were more powerful 
than others.  Successful risk management was seen to rely on clear 
delegation of responsibility and, crucially, authority. 
But it’s responsibility/authority and that is the authority is really, 
really quite important.  [T2A2 Manager] 
In E&F, the limited allocation of funding to maintenance was regarded as 
a sector-wide problem. 
I think one of the problems has been, and it’s not, [University] is 
not alone in this.  If you go back 10-15 years, what used to 
happen was, the money would come from HEFCE to the 
University, and the University would spend as little as it possibly 
could on maintaining its buildings and its services, and therefore 
now it is payback time.  [T3A1 Manager] 
The case study revealed that research, then teaching, continued to win the 
competition for funds, following this tradition. 
 
Some of the recent mergers had resulted in gains and losses in different 
groups.  Some had expanded, while others had lost staff.  Consequently, 
some staff in BHS saw another School within the University as a threat 
to their ways of working, based on the relative power and authority of the 
groups in the University. 
 Page 206 of 407 
I suppose if we were equal in power, then we’d say, ‘do what you 
like mate’, but ‘don’t affect us while you are doing it’.  [T4A6 
Technical Manager interview] 
Power relations are an important aspect of the ability to act, and is a 
significant aspect in the implementation of any type of organisational 
change, including risk management, especially in the selective allocation 
of limited funds. 
 
Competition with external groups was evident in concern about the 
organisation’s ability to respond in a timely manner in relation to 
competitors. 
I think our biggest threat is loss of our competitive edge and 
perception by other institutions that we’re not up to the mark or 
we are slow to make, well, slow to make progress.  I mean, Pay & 
Modernisation, it’s one of those things again, you see, once you 
get a reputation, it is very difficult to change that around, even 
though you may be doing wonderful things again, the perception 
is that we are a little bit slow.  [T3A4 Manager interview] 
In E&F, there was an awareness of ‘best practice’ approaches to risk 
mitigation actions in external groups related to emergencies, and 
preparation for dealing with them. 
I think it is preferable or helpful to have some sort of practical 
run through, and the NHS, they are always practising, Red Alert, 
Yellow Alert.  [T2A3 Manager] 
Such trial runs enable organisations to hone responses to potential 
infrequent events.  There was little evidence of any such activity at the 
University in accounts given during the workshops.  The individual was 
aware that other universities undertook such activities. 
He was in charge of their IT Department.  He came in one day 
and the security men just ushered him into a room, with lots of 
his other colleagues and said, ‘right it is 9 o’clock in the morning 
and we want to you imagine that the campus, that particular 
building has been damaged by fire, what are you going to do 
about it?’ and they did a real life exercise.  [T2A3 Manager] 
The expressed concern was that the University would fall behind 
competitors.   
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This section revealed the presence of individual, group and functional 
competition for access to funds within the organisations, with hierarchy 
determining the outcomes, and exposed pseudo-market competition with 
external groups as an influence on risk identification. 
 
6.3.4 Boundary Effects 
Risk assessment relies on interpretation of risk communications in the 
light of perceived boundaries to authority and responsibility.  There was 
an underlying assumption in DI that where responsibility was not local, 
other areas were performing risk management. 
Well, you see, we all rely on each of these departments to manage 
risk in the way that we all do.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager] 
Responsibility and authority were linked to DI group role. 
I think they are thinking about it, and trying to think laterally, but 
I don’t think that is our area.  I think our area is more looking at 
our operational needs within the umbrella.  [T1A4 
Academic/Manager] 
The DI discussions illustrated assumptions that others were responsible, 
based on role boundaries, despite local impact of risks. 
We would assume that the Principal and his team are thinking 
the unthinkable in terms of function of the college, and being able 
to pursue objectives like the permanent loss of the building, 
whether that happened to be by flood, falling down or a plane 
going into it, like the complete collapse of the e-mail system, on a 
permanent basis, which wasn’t foreseen, and yet has had, will 
have, a major impact on us, in terms of delivery of our distance 
learning.  [T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
During the DI workshop, it emerged that such assumptions might not be 
valid. 
I suppose there are a few things we are at risk of that we are 
assuming that we have some contingency or backup for an 
activity that we do, and it may not be there.  So, that needs some 
thought.  [T1A5 Academic/Manager] 
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Lack of communication on the topic indicated to the autopoietic system 
that no DI action was necessary, and the discussions illustrated 
extrapolation of the interpretation to mean that others, outside the group, 
have taken action. 
 
Some internal action taken to mitigate risks was informal, in attempting 
to exercise influence over others, both within the University and in 
external groups that interface with the DI. 
Well, we could get in quick and say when they appoint somebody 
new; we want somebody that, if we found him overcautious and 
too many savings in place, we want somebody who is more 
entrepreneurial or something.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
The DI raised an unusual aspect of security threats, requiring reliance on 
another group in the organisation for mitigation.  The discussion 
concerned squatters in disused areas of the building. 
  If they don’t make that a secure area where people can’t take the 
padlock off the door and put a mattress down, it is a risk.  It is not 
going to do us any good if somebody dies up there and we don’t 
find them for a couple of weeks.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
This potential scenario was evidence based, in the sense that down-and-
outs had been found using the area already.  The need for liaison with 
other parts of the University system to address this concern illustrated 
that some controls require actions that cross group and functional 
boundaries. 
 
Within E&F, the influence of partners on organisational activity was an 
important aspect of risk identification, since they were aware that other 
sub-groups were often interdependent. 
We’re totally entwined, [University] and the Medical School.  I 
mean, we need them, and they need us, so that any activities that 
take place on the campus can have an effect on both sides.  [T3 
unattributed] 
There was an awareness, in E&F, of boundaries between Departments 
and Schools, acting more as barriers than connecting interfaces . 
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I think it is fragmented across the college.  In certain areas it 
works better than others, and certain Schools.  We’re central 
departments, and the old administration, and I know we’re now 
professional services, but the interaction between the Schools 
and the professional services isn’t always apparent, or doesn’t 
work as well as it should.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Top-level co-ordination of activities would be necessary to prevent 
boundaries leading to gaps in control processes. 
Where should that level of decision-making be made?  There is a 
sort of pyramid here isn’t there?  So, first of all, there is a 
decision at Estates strategy level where you say we really need to 
do this, and this is the scale of problem that will happen if you 
don’t but, then, from where I’m sitting, I see there’s a gap then.  I 
don’t see the link, and I’ve been to one of the Estates strategy 
committee meetings, and there doesn’t seem to be a link between 
that and whatever comes next.  [T3A5 Manager]  
The fragmented nature of the organisation was reflected in the view 
expressed by one E&F attendee. 
Well, that’s what I thought was the ultimate aim; to have some 
kind of, dare I use the word in the context of [University], joined 
up thinking, with regard to what happens in an emergency.  
[T2A3 Manager interview] 
Responsibility for such mitigation was unclear, but was considered to 
extend beyond the boundaries of the E&F group. 
Which brings us back to the whole issue of disaster planning, and 
who is to sort that out.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Many attendees felt there was a need for such plans to be prepared by 
someone, but not their group.  When asked who should be responsible for 
contingency planning, one E&F attendee replied. 
The Principal, the College Council.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Although such incidents had an impact on local groups within the 
organisation in different ways, responsibility was thought to reside with 
those at higher levels in the University hierarchy.  The question arises as 
to whether the PCT were in a position to consider how an event, such as 
central server failure, affected local groups. 
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Individuals focused on risk within their role as part of risk management 
activities. 
We look at the risk that we are responsible for in our job 
descriptions.  So we manage those risks, somebody in academia 
will go and look at their risk and risk to the students, somebody 
else will go and look at theirs and there’s nothing joined up, that 
is the problem, it isn’t joined up.  [T3A1 Manager] 
As this E&F attendee highlighted, the focus for each group is different.  
Local areas assumed that they did not have authority outside the 
boundaries of their group, and consequently expected the issue to be 
dealt with by others, resulting in gaps in the risk management system. 
 
A couple of E&F attendees suggested the use of existing resources within 
the University to help develop risk management processes, for example, 
in relation to security. 
We’ve got one or two Departments that are also clued up in those 
sort of areas of risk, which the college could also consult.  [T3A4 
Manager] 
This type of internal arrangement would cross internal boundaries and 
require senior management commitment in supporting such initiatives.  
One attendee observed that the training and this study were good 
examples of utilising local resources to help other areas across the 
organisation. 
 
The complexity of co-ordination had increased in some BHS areas 
because of mergers. 
The School is getting very, very big now, as well.  It is more 
impersonal, I would say.  [T4A4 Technical Manager interview] 
Multi-site working posed additional risks for the group. 
You don’t spend enough time on some sites.  [T4A1 Technical 
Manager] 
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Communications necessitated extra time and effort to maintain a 
coherent BHS group. 
It takes a certain amount of time out of the day, in that if you are 
going from site to site, which a lot of us do… you do, I do.  [T4A3 
Technical Manager] 
The additional complexity of multi-site operation was a feature of the 
organisation, and this was unlikely to change, even in the long-term.  
There was a perception in BHS that the associated risks needed to be 
managed.   
We try and get people across to swap sites, because when we first 
merged there was a general feeling in both areas that the other 
site ate babies there, but trying to work this through, inevitably 
there’s still some tension there.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
It was difficult to gauge the success of attempts to integrate groups 
across multiple sites. 
As I am trying to make it happen, I obviously think it has been 
quite successful, well, you would, wouldn’t I, but you need to talk 
to people at the lower end to see if they think it is actually real, or 
not.  An effort has been made, certainly.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager] 
The effort to integrate aimed at merging boundaries between BHS groups 
that did not previously work together.  This type of risk reduction took 
place as part of normal everyday group activity, and was not triggered by 
a formal risk assessment.  
 
Descriptive accounts reveal that groups perceived boundaries to their role 
and responsibility that resulted in gaps within the risk management 
system, as risks that ran across boundaries were ignored.  It was assumed 
that responsibility for action lay elsewhere, and more surprisingly, others 
were therefore addressing mitigating actions. 
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6.4 Acceptable Risk 
In all workshops, it was evident that there was no stated level of risk tolerance to 
reflect organisational risk appetite, for assessment outputs to be reviewed 
against.  Consequently, this section explores how understanding acceptable risk 
is more complex than a simple comparison between risk value and risk appetite. 
 
6.4.1 Conditioned Expectations 
In the workshops, the concept of conditioning revealed how risk 
assessment needs to take account of blind spots.  One DI attendee was 
aware that existing ways of working were what they were used to and, 
consequently, unlikely to be considered as risks. 
Yes, some things, it’s difficult for us to see the wood for the trees, 
because we are head down.  We are dealing with issues day to 
day[…] just because you have been away from it for a while and 
you come back, you say ‘there’s a bad smell round here, and we 
ought to do something’.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
The risk posed by external assessments was recognised, and the use of 
unconditioned perspectives was suggested as a risk reduction measure. 
There is maybe value in getting someone in from outside from 
time to time, independently of the visits, as a safeguard.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
The DI narratives acknowledged the reflexive nature of responses to the 
environment, and recognised that someone from outside the group may 
have a different interpretation of similar information.  However, it might 
be difficult to accept external views. 
It’s a bad morale thing.  It is difficult, to somebody else who is 
auditing us, we teach the way we teach, the way we research, the 
way we, kind of, conduct ourselves, etc., difficult sometimes to 
sell this, to say this could be really positive thing if this person 
came in and flagged up to us, and we’ll be big enough to take the 
criticism that from an external perception we don’t get this right.  
[T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Group and individual self-image was resistant to change and was loath to 
accept the possibility that criticism of existing practices may improve 
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performance; except for groups that have been used to utilising such 
information.   
 
Awareness of previous funding cuts in DI provided expectations of future 
events that stimulated identification of risk. 
It has to be the financial threat, that funding has been pared 
down, step by step over the years.  [T1A2 Academic/Manager 
interview] 
This concern remained, despite the interviewee's perception of a more 
stable current environment. 
The funding for clinical placements, at the moment we seem to be 
on a more even keel.  [T1A2 Academic/Manager interview] 
The funding uncertainties associated with HE generally were exacerbated 
for areas with the additional concern of changes to Health Services 
provision.  The DI expected future unexpected stimuli from the NHS that 
formed an important part of their environment.  Such changes were 
expected have negative local impacts, influenced by historical events 
they were able to recall. 
 
The discussion about a potential DI merger reflected their long history of 
mergers within the group. 
All the mergers we’ve done, we’ve done 5.  [T1A4 
Academic/Manager] 
The DI interpreted previous mergers as having a favourable impact on 
the group’s reputation and, consequently, the group was open to, and 
welcomed, such organisational changes. 
 
There was a view in E&F that the organisation had a definitive character, 
which could make it difficult to get things done, unless you were familiar 
with its idiosyncrasies.  
Love it or hate it, [University] has got a very definite culture 
which you have to get used to in order to make the whole thing, 
keep the show on the road.  [T3A3 Manager interview] 
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The culture of the organisation influenced the way that E&F individuals 
reacted to and handled risks. 
No mention of support, because for people to assess risk and then 
take the risk, they need to be working in an environment that 
appreciates the way they’ve assessed the risk and then supports 
the decision, be it right or wrong, at the end of the day.  [T2A2 
Manager] 
There was a lack of confidence in senior managers to retrospectively 
support decisions in the event of a problem.  This type of conditioning 
increased individual staff members’ focus on blame avoidance, 
encouraging ‘tick box’ compliance. 
 
Site security was a major concern for several of the BHS attendees.  Free 
access to most buildings within the University increased concern in 
relation to particular threats.  
Security in all aspects, from the animal lib people to terrorism.  
[T4A2 Manager] 
One E&F attendee raised the contrast between non-clinical and clinical 
sites, and linked the resistance to swipe card control to an interpretation 
of academic freedom. 
At [name] you have to, because it is a hospital, and the hospital 
site, you go into the white ward wearing your card, but [name] is 
non-clinical, a different atmosphere completely.  […]  It is an 
attack on academic freedom.  [T2A4 interview] 
This view was reiterated in the BHS group. 
Well, the academics don’t like it.  We had it all here, when we put 
swipe in on these doors, and it’s the most bizarre interpretation 
of academic freedom […] because academic freedom, in my 
mind, is the freedom to research into whatever area they like, not 
to walk into a building, at any hour of the day, without any 
restriction.  [T4A5 Technical Manager interview] 
Anecdotal evidence illustrated that, although there was resistance to 
change, when people were aware of the reason for restricted access, they 
were willing to use swipe cards. 
 Page 215 of 407 
There was moaning from certain people when we installed the 
system, because we had an ex-convict who used to break into one 
of the labs, smoke, drink the beer that people were experimenting 
with, and watch television, and it sounds funny, but he left an 
empty wallet one day, and his discharge papers, which is how we 
found out who it was, and I mean, I’m out and about, I’m always 
the first person in, in the morning, and he was in.  So, I felt very 
threatened.  I ended up having to go to the security guards and 
get them to come up with me.  That was the push to get the system 
in, so everybody understood why it had to be done, but if you 
notice the doors we came through, not the first ones we came 
through, but the second one, they are basically in the middle of 
the two biggest Departments.  So, to get between a lab and your 
office, you’re swiping in and out, but because people recognised 
the need for security, they accepted it, with a little bit of whinging 
and people always whinge.  They do get used to it.  [T4A2 
Technical Manager interview] 
In this case, the local resistance to access control has been reduced or 
eliminated for the majority of staff through communication that enables 
the aims of the change to be understood.   
 
One BHS interviewee doubted the validity of reasons for not using swipe 
card access, citing benefits for implementation. 
They say, ‘oh, it puts a barrier between the student and the 
academics’.  Well, those students who are doing projects in 
research labs, will get in, because we will give them the access 
on their swipe cards, for a limited period of time.  So, they’ve got 
it for as long as they need it.  If they want to see their academics, 
and, I know we did this, before I came over here.  We did it on 
the [name] campus, so it is the same old rubbish, when it was 
trying to be introduced, but the college insisted on it, and after 
about 12 months, people were saying ‘this is really good, I’m 
able to manage my day beautifully now, I’m not constantly 
pestered by students’, and the students aren’t complaining that 
they can’t get to see their supervisor.  They just turn up and make 
an appointment, apart from the hardliners who were so 
outspoken about it in the first instance, they will complain about 
it until they retire.  [T4A5 Technical Manager interview] 
The comment also illustrated that some people are more willing to adapt 
to change than others.  Overall, the resistance to controlled access on 
several sites reflected a desire for status quo, conditioning was expressed 
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in views that vague negative outcomes would result from changes to 
existing ways of working. 
 
A short-term approach to funding approval for estate projects was usual 
and expected. 
Once we actually put a new building up, we don’t commit to say 
we are now going to keep that in good condition, we basically 
say, there is no sinking fund, I mean, when we took on the [name] 
Library, a classic example, I put the budget together for the 
maintenance of the [name] Library, the first two things that were 
struck out, without any discussion, were the sinking fund, because 
that’s a Grade 1 listed building, and it’s going to have massive 
[unclear], and the second thing that was taken out was the 
£30,000 per year for redecoration.  [T3A1 Manager] 
This continued a long-standing approach to estate maintenance funding.  
Since the University was continuing to do well, the risk may be less 
serious than those responsible, but without financial authority, considered 
it to be. 
 
E&F staff were well aware the risk of central server failure could be 
reduced, but were conditioned to irregular disruptions. 
If there’d been a mirror server somewhere, then at least the e-
mail and web could have kept going then, frankly, it would 
probably have been managed quite well.  [T2A1 Manager] 
However, there was no mirror server.  In BHS, IT systems were accepted 
the way they were. 
You get used to it, that’s what you were saying.  [T4A6 Technical 
Manager] 
One attendee raised the interesting idea that lack of money provided an 
excuse for not taking action. 
Sometimes it’s an easy answer, and glib, ‘oh well, where’s the 
money coming from?’.  [T3A4 Manager] 
In E&F, money was usually found if there was a legal requirement to 
undertake estates maintenance.  This observation is not unique to the 
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public sector, one study concluded with respect to the difference between 
British and German styles of accountability that the British view places 
emphasis on financial performance objectives, and strategic ambitions 
are much more important than the repair of a leaking roof (Ahrens, 
1996).  The continuing reluctance to spend on building projects was 
congruent with the idea of a system that replicates and maintains status 
quo, in which shortage of resources justifies inaction, with conditioned 
responses to requests for funding. 
 
Post-training reflection by one BHS interviewee suggested an omission 
of one of the major potential risks to the University from the workshops: 
floods owing to the proximity of a river.  The risk from rising river levels 
was not identified in any of the workshop sessions or Phase 1 interviews. 
Subsequently, I was thinking about this the other day.  Although, 
flood risk, well flooding was mentioned, we never pursued the 
discussion on flood risk, and yet a lot of the campuses of 
[University] are right next to the [river] and we’ve got climate 
change.  [T4A5 Technical Manager interview] 
It was unclear to the interviewee whether this risk had been assessed, 
utilising Environmental Agency flood maps, to evaluate which buildings 
were most at risk, and whether contingency plans had been considered.  
Since there were no anecdotal accounts of previous river flooding, the 
threat was ignored by all other study participants. 
 
In all workshops, there was empirical support for the idea of system 
conditioning and the development of an ‘immune system’ within 
organisations; long-term low-level risks were ignored, existing ways of 
working could not be critically reviewed within the system and risks that 
had not been encountered before were not on the risk horizon. 
 
6.4.2 Existing Management Control Systems 
The workshops revealed many existing management control systems that 
acted to bring risk to acceptable levels in the organisation.  In DI, 
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operational risk assessment covered areas that form part of their normal 
business activities. 
We are having discussions about this initiative, and we are not 
sitting down and saying we are doing the risk assessment today, 
but we discuss the initiative.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Such informal assessments were not immediately associated with risk by 
DI attendees. 
When we discuss any issue like this, we will at least be mentally 
rehearsing the advantages and disadvantages, the unknowns, the 
uncertainties, but we don’t document it as risk assessment.  
[T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Several DI attendees felt that formal risk management processes were not 
necessary. 
You would be able to discuss those things anyway, and you don’t 
need the outcome of some workshop.  [T1A3 
Administrator/Manager] 
As the DI workshop discussion unfolded, participant involvement in the 
activity became clear. 
We’re indirectly doing quite a lot of risk management.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
Control systems that parallel the risk register process were evident. 
We do actually put key risks in our business plan, our 3-year 
business plan.  [T1 unattributed] 
Lack of integration of the risk register with existing practices resulted in 
duplication of effort and dual processes.   
 
The business planning process did not reward success or discourage 
failure. 
If you take opportunities, you don’t necessarily get rewarded for 
them, and, similarly, if there is risk you get bailed out.  Until 
there is a real business planning process, where you take the 
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consequences of your risk and then you manage them properly, 
no one takes them seriously.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager] 
The effectiveness of formal systems represented a form of 
communication within the organisation, in this case, encouraging DI to 
disregard processes that had had little or no impact on the group 
previously.  In addition, it reflected the business orientation of DI in their 
expectation of the way business planning should function.   
When you do a bid you have to do this sort of cost/benefit 
analysis, saying, what was the cost of doing nothing?  What is the 
cost of doing this and the cost of doing that?  But it is looking at 
the 2 together and, of course, the college doesn’t ever look at 
those 2 things together.  The only time we get a chance to do it is 
our business plan and, of course, we don’t.  Nobody looks at that.  
[T1A3 Administrator/Manager] 
Formal management processes were fragmented, and information was 
not available to enable decision-making to consider relevant factors; tick-
box compliance was evident in the business planning process.  
 
One E&F attendee pointed out that the organisation did little to ensure 
local compliance with organisational processes. 
I can’t see anybody in the college saying to a member of staff 
‘don’t worry about switching off that bit of machinery, just get in 
there and sort it out’.  We would never dream of doing a thing 
like that, but where we do have a problem, I think, we are not 
very well organised in terms of having written policies and 
procedures, for a number of areas, and where we have got them, 
making sure we enforce them, and actually do them, and I think 
my worry is that, touch wood, we have never had a serious 
accident, all the while I’ve worked here, and I think that safety 
records stretches back quite a long time, but if there was an 
accident, I wonder sometimes just how at risk the college might 
be to a prosecution.  [T3A3 Manager interview] 
In this context, the lack of adherence to, for example, record keeping 
procedures could have implications for H&S compliance.  
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In order to establish the acceptability of funding proposals for estates 
development, one E&F trainee spoke strongly in favour of the use of full 
life costing. 
You’ve got to go through a proper analysis of the whole of that 
building and talk about the fire alarms, the lighting.  You’ve got 
to go through the analysis, because nobody is going to thank you 
when they have spent all this money on the roof and then turn 
round and say, but then you still need to spend another £3/4 
million on the services and stuff.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Existing methods used for costing proposals do not include longer-term 
costs in financial estimates.  Yet, these could be significant in terms of 
overall cost. 
What are the service implications?  What are the disposables for 
those?  Suddenly you find out that this thing, that you’ve got a £1 
million for, has put a burden on you of something like £3/4 million 
a year and it’s ‘oh, my God, how did this happen?’.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
The long-term costs were ‘acceptable’ by default, when requests were 
approved.   
We don’t do anything that you would expect to see in a financial 
institution, which is my background.  You don’t do NPV, or IRR, 
or cash flow.  [T3 Manager] 
The acceptance of increased long-term costs was viewed unfavourably 
locally. 
It’s now costing, it saved money initially but, long-term, it is now 
going to cost the college.  [T3A1 Manager] 
At the level of the individual, the risk took the form of having to give bad 
news to another staff member, if the additional costs were subsequently 
untenable. 
I was told that the problem I had, was that I didn’t understand 
what the college were trying to do.  That we have to spend the 
money on these super laboratories and things to get the right 
people, to get the image of college up, and I listened to the 
argument, and I didn’t have any disagreement with the argument, 
but the problem I had, was that I was the one that was having to 
tell this professor, who’d just had all these lasers installed, 
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‘sorry, old son, but there’s nothing to connect these to’.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
The allocation request process required forms to be completed by the 
requesting staff member, few of whom would be familiar with 
accounting techniques, indicating a link between capability and 
responsibility, in this case, for the provision of the appropriate data to 
enable risk decisions to reflect the organisation’s risk appetite.   
 
The use of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to monitor performance 
within the organisation was the subject of some discussion in the second 
E&F workshop.  The use of such performance measuring tools in 
contract arrangements reflected the trend towards use of private business 
practices within HE.  They were perceived to be a potentially useful tool 
to measure service delivery. 
We’re quite keen on SLAs, but nobody further up has ever 
thought to ask us to produce one.  [T3A3 Manager] 
There was a view in E&F that communication of performance for a given 
expenditure would increase transparency of what was being provided.  
However, the low level of funding was considered to set some existing 
service provision levels below the expectations of the recipients. 
When we create our SLAs, we say and promise what we will 
deliver, based on the resource that we have and, of course, the 
expectation of the residential people, well, we are sure you can 
do better than that.  Well, we can if we’ve got more resources.  
[T3A1 Manager] 
A criticism in relation to the use of SLAs, both for internal service 
delivery and with partners, such as Ecovert, related to the consequences 
if required levels were not achieved. 
And we don’t have the big sticks that if we don’t deliver SLAs, 
what happens after that?  Nothing.  [T3A5 Manager] 
The use of performance measures was only seen to be effective in 
reducing risk to acceptable levels if sanctions could be made.  
 
 Page 222 of 407 
E&F considered that the most serious risks to the organisation were 
already assessed and well managed, and the responsibilities cascaded 
down the chain of command. 
Some of the biggest risks are probably quite well managed.  We 
do research with things, where if the virus escaped it would 
probably kill half of central London.  Risk will be managed at all 
levels down to the researcher, so that actually most really serious 
risks are probably managed very, very well, probably.  It’s the 
ones that don’t have quite that impact that the college accepts, 
and somehow they’ll get by.  [T2A1 Manager] 
The implication was that risk management practices were well 
established in parts of the University.  The attendee was discussing H&S 
risk and there was no suggestion that such controls were linked to the 
implementation of the HEFCE risk governance.  
 
One E&F attendee expressed the view that the University’s ‘risk 
appetite’ was not geared towards taking risks to gain benefits, echoing DI 
sentiments. 
The question of risk appetite and the college’s risk appetite, I 
thought that was interesting because it seems to be the buzz 
phrase at the moment and we do seem to, our appetite doesn’t 
seem to be particularly strong at the moment.  [T3A4 Manager 
interview] 
Existing systems encouraged the local interpretation that acceptable risk 
was linked to not taking chances or spending as little as possible, and was 
reflected in narratives describing the senior management as risk averse.  
Significantly, existing management control systems played an important 
role in reducing risks to acceptable levels, acting at a remove from the 
risk register process. 
 
6.4.3 Influence of External Views 
This section explores how risk acceptability was influenced by external 
views.  The choice of a merger as the topic of risk discussions reflected 
the DI response to NPM and the introduction of a competitive market for 
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students.  One of the aims of the merger was to build on the brand image 
of both institutions. 
The [name] has a brand image that has been built up over many 
decades, so one objective could be to try and preserve and secure 
that image for the merged institution.  [T1A2 
Academic/Manager] 
The handling of staff issues post-merger could impact on external views 
of the group. 
If you get a reputation for asset stripping, the next time you start 
discussions with another Institution, that comes back to bite you.  
[T1A2 Academic/Manager] 
The group generally exhibited a keen awareness that external perceptions 
affected the overall success of the School, including measures such as 
RAE outcomes.  The E&F workshops revealed that it was not only press 
and media coverage, including league tables, but also the condition of the 
estate of the University influenced student perceptions.  An example of a 
building closure caused by boiler failure was cited. 
It is then affecting the reputation of the institution, which wants to 
be a globally high quality institution.  These things don’t look 
good.  [T3A4 Manager] 
This illustrated how local aims coloured the interpretation of risks such 
as reputation. 
 
An E&F trainee observed that growth in student numbers made 
accommodation of classes difficult. 
Happens with medical students doesn’t it?  They’re 
oversubscribed on the medicine, nobody wants to teach them 
now, because they can’t get in the rooms.  [T3A2 Manager] 
In an increasingly competitive environment, attraction of both overseas 
and home students could be influenced by the quality of the University 
facilities.  
If you speak to students that didn’t come and you actually say to 
them ‘was there a particular reason, we want to improve’, and 
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they say, ‘well, I went to the Hall of Residence and it was a 
complete shambles, and I wasn’t going to live in a place like 
that’.  Using the student feedback, that actually not to spend the 
money is actually costing you, and it could be they could be the 
next PhD, the next Nobel Prize winner or goodness knows what, 
and you are losing good people.  [T3A1 Manager] 
This E&F comment indicated a lack of awareness of any feedback about 
the quality of accommodation provided by the University, although this 
was included in the on-line survey that I completed as a student of the 
University in 2007 (University International Student Barometer).   
 
The awareness in E&F that external views of well-publicised H&S risks, 
such as asbestos, could be ill founded, illustrated the difficulty of 
controlling risks to reputation. 
We’ve lived and worked with asbestos for years, particularly at 
Kensington, it was all over the place.  As you say, leave it alone, 
don’t touch it fine, but again [name] magazine gets hold of it, the 
college is not following its proper procedures.  There’s asbestos 
putting staff at risk, and it is blown out of all proportion, and the 
full facts are not known.  [T3A4 Manager] 
An important aspect of this concern was that image and reputation can be 
tarnished even without valid cause, making the risk even harder to assess.   
 
Security personnel were used as the first point of contact for visitors in 
some reception areas in the University.  I experienced this first hand, 
when visiting various sites for training and interviews.  One E&F 
attendee described a familiar scene. 
What a nightmare, the first thing you see when you come in is this 
sort of bloke sitting behind the desk.  So, I asked where to go.  ‘ I 
don’t know’.  He didn’t even refer me to the proper reception, 
which is somewhere buried up on the first floor.  [T3A5 
Manager] 
In my own experience, it could be difficult to find a reception area, with 
a few notable exceptions.  In some cases, the security staff did not know 
the location of the person you were visiting.  The number of different 
sites and buildings, some of which were quite small, complicated this 
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issue.  The NPM drive for efficiency savings would support the idea of 
combining security and reception roles.  However, an unintended 
outcome was a negative impression for visitors to some sites. 
 
In BHS, negative reports in the media constituted the main threat to 
reputation.  
Bad press, I would imagine, because of losing things like the 
Biology and things like that.  That’s what I would think, because 
it gets back, doesn’t it, to other students, prospective students?  
That would be my main concern.  [T4A4 Technical Manager 
interview] 
Damage to reputation could be exacerbated by public opinion about 
particular issues.  In the case of the use of bodies for medical studies, one 
interviewee identified public ‘dread’ (Slovic, 1987) in relation to the 
subject. 
People are so sensitive now about bodies, there is an area of that, 
I think, could lead us into great problems.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager interview] 
The attendee had particular concerns about the availability of bodies for 
training purposes. 
Well, it already is a problem that is real and there already, where 
we used to, years and years ago, have about 6 students to a body, 
we’re now already up to 12 students to a body.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager] 
The qualification of medical professionals was of public concern. 
You don’t want a surgeon chopping you unless they have been on 
a body before.  [T4A1 Technical Manager] 
Another area in BHS that was thought to be unacceptable to many of the 
public was genetic research. 
The thought of making babies out of pigs, is something that … 
and there are groups that do that here, well, we don’t do exactly 
that … [T4A3 Technical Manager interview] 
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These provided particularly good examples of how local perspectives 
reflected concerns that are irrelevant to other Schools.  Nonetheless, 
should one School receive adverse publicity, it may have an impact on 
student recruitment that could result in increased risk to the entire 
organisation.  Coincidentally, on a recent visit to another university, a 
poster campaign to encourage body donation dominated the main 
entrance hall, perhaps indicating this risk has stimulated senior 
management action in a competing institution. 
 
It was not only the quality and maintenance of University buildings that 
was considered a potential risk in terms of external perceptions of the 
University; the shortage of lecture space in BHS was also a problem. 
And feedback, top up fees, and they go back to their Schools and 
say ‘I wouldn’t go there, I sat cross-legged at the front of the 
lecture theatre, because there was no space’.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager] 
Despite criticism in the E&F workshops of the funding of new buildings, 
a shortage of teaching space was evident. 
Everybody wants more.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
Much of the equipment in use in the BHS was quite old, adversely 
affecting the attraction of new staff and students when compared with 
competing organisations. 
It is not actually up to date, and they are using geriatric 
equipment.  If we had more up to date equipment that they would 
use if they went outside the research environment … [T4A4 
Technical Manager] 
External views influenced internal perceptions of the organisation, 
reflecting self-referential expectations of others in the competition for 
staff and students in a competitive market place.  An unexpected finding 
was the local slant placed on risk concerns in relation to reputation. 
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6.4.4 Degree of Control 
This section examines the relationship between acceptable risk and the 
ability to control it. The successful DI merger with another organisation 
relied upon the actual management of the integration, illustrating the 
importance of control within risk management activities. 
But the risk is actually turning that opportunity into a practical 
one, from a theoretical to a practical, because actually running a 
fragmented organisation could actually lead you to be less 
effective and so, you have to give serious thought about how you 
structure that, getting people together, so you can see an 
objective of the advantage of getting all the staff together, critical 
mass, and so on, but if you are suddenly working now on 3 or 4 
or 5 sites, we already have experience of that ourselves, and that 
actually presents particular challenges and actually 
fragmentation, so I would have thought that following on from 
that, we’ve got clear financial risk.  [T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
To achieve the DI merger successfully it was necessary to exert control 
to ensure that staff did not view the change negatively, and chose to leave 
the organisation. 
Somebody is leaving the potential sinking ship, and if we don’t 
merge with a going concern and key people have moved away 
before we clinch the deal, yes, we could acquire something that is 
diluted down.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
The ability to manage staff perceptions in both organisations before a 
merger was important. 
I think a loss of staff would be a key thing, because there is such a 
long run in period, if we agreed the money today, we wouldn’t 
actually get together physically, in whatever formation, for a 
number of years.  That’s a long time to keep staff, unless you have 
a particular strategy to excite and get people on board and 
convince them that they’ve got security.  [T1A4 
Academic/Manager] 
This emphasised the role that time plays in risk assessment.  If the 
merger were planned in the next couple of months, people would not 
have time to leave, but a longer period increases the uncertainty about 
what staff will choose to do, and it is unclear whether this poses a severe 
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threat to the initiative.  Previous DI experience has highlighted the need 
to ensure such mergers are well managed. 
Once they got to know each other, and the fear factor had gone, 
that was a very well managed merger, and if you look at the 
income of the two in combination, the two Schools, I suppose a 
few years afterwards, where the income of [name] had gone up 
by about 300%, it was extremely successful.  Now, in the same 
time as the two hospital merger of [name] and [name] which was 
a disaster, and had less business, which has actually carried on. 
After considerable discussion in the DI workshop, one attendee summed 
up: 
On the balance of probability, assuming we cover the business 
planning process and we cover the safeguards, the impact is 
going to be on the high side of things, and the risk of it becoming 
a complete balls up is relatively low.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
However, even with a high degree of control the possibility of things not 
going according to plan was accepted. 
Although we will do careful business planning before we finally 
commit ourselves, there’s many a slip between cup and lip.  
[T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Within E&F, the narratives illustrated that access to resources was an 
important factor in relation to risk mitigation action. 
You can only tell them what the solutions are.  You can’t make 
them spend the money.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Delegation of responsibility needed to be accompanied by appropriate 
authority. 
Part of managing risks and dealing with the whole thing is 
empowerment, as well.  Does that come into this?  It’s that whole 
balance, actually.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Within E&F, lack of clarity about responsibility for risk management 
extended to the long established H&S system. 
The College Secretary said ‘well, there’s the Principal, you are 
the one that goes to prison’ he said, ‘well no, couldn’t be me, 
must be H&S’, and H&S say ‘oh, no, I’ve delegated that to 
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Estates’, well ‘it can’t be us’, and then it goes round and round.  
[T2A2 Manager] 
The picture of assignment of responsibility and authority emerging from 
E&F shows confusion among staff members about management of many 
risks, both in relation to existing control processes and recently 
implemented risk governance.  Another E&F anecdote revealed the lack 
of formal lines for responsibility in the event of a problem. 
When there was a previous regime in the college and there was a 
problem in one of the labs, and somebody was injured or killed, 
and basically the senior members of the college turned up and 
spun a bottle to find out which one, who was to blame, and then 
that person had to go away and sort it out.  Or, if you weren’t 
quick enough to get to the meeting, and you were absent or on 
leave, you were the one.  […]  It was hopscotch really, to try and 
make sure that it didn’t land on your plate, which is not the right 
way of doing it.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Another added. 
I’m not the risk manager at the moment.  [T2A1 Manager] 
When responsibility is assigned after an event, there is little opportunity 
for risk prevention; the group for individual would not treat information 
on the topic as a stimulus to action.  
 
A potential E&F hazard within the University illustrated the need for 
planned and regular monitoring of some risks. 
Now the problem we have with asbestos is, if it’s assessed and 
it’s in very good condition, but lets say it is not mechanically 
protected, what could happen in that situation is that it is given a 
very low risk, because it is not damaged in any way, somebody 
comes along with a trolley, gauges it, it immediately goes up 
from low, straight up to high, so again in looking at that, some 
people would say that that needs to be protected and additional 
measures taken, or it needs to be removed.  [T3A1 Manager] 
The chosen mitigation action provided an example of ‘satisficing’ 
(Simon, 1997a) in which an acceptable solution had been found, and 
although it was not optimal, the search for other solutions ceased.  The 
mitigation provided evidence of compliance with external requirements, 
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demonstrating control.  The easy action was to monitor the issue, using 
in-house staff, a hidden cost, since other options required funding 
approval.   
 
Once a risk had been communicated and the issue ignored, for the 
individuals concerned it seemed unfair to have to deal with negative 
outcomes. 
If I was in the Principal’s shoes, you would not be in a position 
where, with all these demands that are being made, it would 
come down to priorities, it would come down to risk.  The only 
problem I have is where you advise them that this risk is there.  It 
is real, it is going to happen, and when it does happen, the first 
thing that happens, they go ‘well, what are you going to do about 
it?’.  [T3A1 Manager] 
An important aspect of control is the ability to plan.  E&F revealed a lack 
of planning associated with room allocation requiring ad hoc and last 
minute arrangements. 
At the moment there is no clear strategy of where these people 
are actually going to go.  [T3A4 Manager] 
The existing procedure for recruiting new staff did not require an 
appropriate space or facilities to be designated for them. 
I’m looking to recruit someone, and in my proposal to HR, 
there’s nothing in there that says where you are going to put 
them.  [T3A5 Manager] 
Once again, this E&F risk could only be managed by balancing some 
needs against others. 
It is an absolute nightmare, robbing Peter to pay Paul, the space; 
you can’t move anybody in until somebody else moves out.  
[T3A4 Manager] 
In this process, there was reliance on local management to juggle 
requirements in a reactive manner, with little or no emphasis on 
planning. 
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Within the E&F Department, there were concerns about the ability to 
control activities in Halls of Residence. 
We do have some good ones.  They are expensive, but the kind of 
issues that we have in Halls of Residence are things like, well, 
one of the big topics at the moment, is the number of false fire 
alarms.  [T3A1 Manager] 
In addition to such nuisance issues, there were safety concerns. 
The other issue is with students falling out of windows.  So, 
again, there are regular checks on the windows to make sure that 
they can’t, because the little darlings dismantled the windows 
and the safety devices, and things.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Such checks had been introduced as a risk reduction measure, increasing 
the degree of control.  The attendee did not suggest that a formal risk 
assessment activity culminated in these checks.   
 
During the course of an interview, one E&F attendee expressed the view 
that even with appropriate controls and mitigation measures, risk could 
not be eliminated. 
You put all these things in place, you’ve still got some risk and 
what are you going to do about that?  [T4A6 Technical Manager] 
The comment revealed uncertainty about what constituted ‘acceptable 
risk’ to the organisation.   
 
A BHS attendee suggested that inappropriate assignment of 
responsibility for current processes that contribute to risk management 
results in unacceptable levels of risk.   
But I think that’s just scandalous that, emergency planning like 
disaster planning is something that needs to be done, I think in 
security issues it needs to be done by our Health & Safety 
Department.  The College Health & Safety Department, who 
farm out the policy and practice, to the individual Schools, who 
can then adapt them.  It is passing the buck.  [T4A5 Technical 
Manager] 
 Page 232 of 407 
Despite this ‘buck passing’, there was no indication that the individual 
considered preparation of such plans as part of the role or responsibility 
of the BHS, and the resulting risks were considered unacceptable.  
Specialist experts were interpreted as holding primary responsibility for 
H&S (Hutter, 2005), and in this case, their role was perceived to include 
disaster planning and security, thwarting the delegation of line 
management responsibilities to local groups.   
 
The increasing number of students in BHS placed additional pressure on 
existing control systems.   
So, something like 1,500 undergraduate students, […] so if we 
needed a one to one relationship with them, we would be failing; 
40:1 we would still be failing.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
The ratio of staff to students limited available supervision time and 
increased the risk of equipment damage, in addition to concerns about 
teaching quality.  Some accidental damage to equipment routinely used 
by students during classes was expected. 
They all play with it, they sit around and fiddle with it while they 
are being lectured to, and then you end up with broken 
equipment.  [T4A4 Technical Manager] 
However, an example of suspected deliberate damage was given, 
highlighting the difficulty of overseeing the use of kit. 
Yes, but, we’ve just had an incident where, someone has been 
sabotaging equipment, in the cardio-vascular group, and each 
time they’ve done it, it is a couple of thousand pounds a time.  
[T4A5 Technical Manager] 
Detection of this type of malfeasance was difficult with large numbers of 
students and, in some areas, lack of entry control.  In the event the culprit 
could be identified, the problem remained difficult to deal with. 
They haven’t got any hard and fast evidence, but they have been 
monitoring this particular student, and they’ve found that each 
time he is in the building this piece of kit gets damaged.  [T4A5 
Technical Manager] 
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The possibility of wilful damage or misuse by students was not raised as 
a risk in any preliminary interviews, nor in risk documents, but was 
suggested by two groups in the workshops.   
 
The workshops demonstrated variability in relation to IT within the 
organisation.  Some attendees acknowledged the use of local systems to 
mitigate poor central IT support. 
Well, it is mainly because there is a dedicated staff employed 
within our School, to deal with the sorts of risks and problems 
that crop up.  If we didn’t have those staff, it would have a bigger 
impact, because we would be struggling to find somebody that 
could solve the problem.  They don’t really do, they don’t come 
over to the Schools.  [T4A5 Technical Manager] 
The statement illustrates that action to increase control and reduce risk 
had been initiated locally without use of the risk register.  The experience 
of a flood in one area of BHS had resulted in arrangements with another 
organisation to prevent similar difficulties in future. 
On major risk assessments, the sort of cataclysm that happened - 
that this building opened with a major flood.  Teaching, the flood 
knocked out all the electricity for some months, so you can 
imagine.  So, since then we actually have a reciprocal agreement 
with another college.  It has not been tested, but we would teach 
in the evenings and weekends, at another college and, equally 
well, if that happened to them …  this is actually agreed for 
medicine, mainly medical teaching, but, well, I think we were 
honed to it by, I can’t remember how many weeks this building 
didn’t have power, but it was a long time.   [T4A3 Technical 
Manager] 
These local arrangements indicated the ability of groups to initiate 
change to reduce risks, by increasing degree of local control.  No use of 
formal assessment process was suggested as a trigger for these 
arrangements. 
 
The findings confirm that the authority to exercise control and mitigate a 
risk was an important influence on risk acceptability.  Furthermore, the 
introduction of local controls can reduce risk to the group.   
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6.5 Uncertainty in the System 
The exploration of the ontology of risk forms the basis for this research 
question.  The link between socially constructed aims and risk, and an 
understanding of the broad nature of operational risk leads to the conclusion that 
there is little available statistical data to work with, and assessment has to cope 
with an environment of uncertainty. 
 
6.5.1 Risk Assessment Output is not a Form of Measurement 
Since risk registers were the tool used to manage risk, it was important to 
establish the validity of the assessment process that provided the inputs 
to these documents.  An aspect of risk that was difficult to quantify 
related to the continual uncertainty about future access to funding. 
 
Reliance on external funding and the tight budgets that the organisation 
worked with created a significant source of risk. 
One greatest threat, I think, is there not being enough money to 
go around, and that could be because we are facing increased 
energy costs, or there’s always the possibility that one day 
Gordon Brown might get out of bed in the morning and realise 
he’s got his sums wrong, and a lot of the funding we rely on 
vanishes.  [T3A3 Manager interview] 
Future funding levels were a major source of risk for all participants in 
the study. 
The possible insecurity of the funding stream coming through 
from the hospital side, on which we depend.  [T1A4 
Academic/Manager] 
In this statement, the use of the word ‘possible’ indicates inability to 
even assess whether this insecurity existed.  The link to the NHS brought 
additional possibilities for unexpected change, linked to NPM 
performance management. 
Well, something like a risk from the NHS may have another 
barmy scheme of targets or something.  That’s not inconceivable, 
totally unpredictable.  You would watch the 10 o’clock news and 
the Health Minister suddenly says ‘all patients have got to be 
 Page 235 of 407 
treated within 24 hours’ or something.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
In DI, risk was also associated with uncertainty about personnel changes. 
If you were to say ‘what are the implications of [name] handing 
his notice in?’.  Now, it could be from a wide spectrum of things, 
good that the guy’s gone because he has given us a hard time 
with overhead and we’ll get somebody new and it could be a 
positive, who says ‘you are giving a bad time to the Dental 
Institute with a £2m overhead.  We’ve got to deal with them 
fairly’, or you could get somebody who is even more draconian, 
and it will probably change.  Someone will come in with a 
different approach to it, no doubt, it won’t be the same animal, it 
will be somebody different, so there is a risk of change, one way 
or the other.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
This comment revealed the complex nature of change in day-to-day 
activities in relation to risk assessment.  It was very difficult at the time 
of assessment to estimate whether such changes were beneficial or 
detrimental. 
If you get a new Chief Executive who came in and said ‘enough of 
this we are going to buy all our pathology services from some 
commercial lab somewhere’, there might be some real problems 
for us.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Changes at a high-level in the hierarchy could result in significant risk 
for other individuals in the organisation. 
 
The difference between the assessments of one-off risks in DI against 
recurring events was considered a difficulty by one attendee. 
So, the frequency of the [merger] is a one off, but for other 
things, do you sort of consider the risk to your reputation, from 
all these things, the general risk and then sort of say, there could 
be something every month, a person going off the loop and doing 
stuff, but you see the actual impact would be different depending 
on which one it is.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager] 
The training session advice suggested a scale from Low (once per 10 
years or greater) to High (once per month, or all the time).  The problem 
arose about how to consider a one-off risk that was a planned 
opportunity. 
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Because it is a one off issue isn’t it?  I'm just saying, how do I 
record a one off thing?  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
The type of opportunity risk being considered would be planned, and is 
not unlikely to occur simply because it was low frequency.  This raised 
the question of how to include such risks on the frequency scale.  The 
attendee expressed difficulty in comparing risks that were expected at 
some time, and one-off risks. 
From time to time, there’s a flood, so, it might be category 3 
because we just expect a flood once a year, or something, a 
major flood that wipes out … but something like the [merger], or 
the movement of our funding in the Health Service, are one off 
risks.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
Two examples given of one-off risks were different in character, in that 
the merger was planned and reduction of funding arose outside the 
system.  The movement of funding could be accommodated on the 
suggested scale, perhaps as being likely every 5-10 years, in contrast 
with the difficulty of using the scale for a one-off event that was very 
likely to occur.  In addition, one DI attendee found the scale difficult to 
use for low-level risks that were ongoing. 
The other thing that that doesn’t record is something that’s 
continuous, if you like, high probability, but low risk, like 
deterioration of estates.  [T1A2 Academic/Manager] 
This reconfirmed that participants ignored long-standing low-impact 
problems, especially since the model did enable an appropriate rating to 
be assigned.   
 
One of the interesting interrelationships to emerge during the DI 
workshop was an increase in the impact of some risks when the 
frequency of the event increased. 
If we had riots among the students occurring every month, the 
risk to our reputation would be such that we might get funding 
withdrawn or students may not want to come here, and so the 
effect of the impact on this would actually be great.  [T1A2 
Academic/Manager] 
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During this risk assessment, the impact scale was confused with the 
frequency scale, and this was evident in one or two other examples.  
Interestingly, this type of mixture was present in the course material 
before it was updated for the workshops, illustrating how easy it is to 
confuse these concepts.  The process was complicated and confusing 
when participants included frequency within the impact descriptions. 
 
One DI interviewee felt that it was difficult to put numbers for frequency 
and impact against operational risks. 
It was quite testing to put numbers onto everything.  [T1A2 
Academic/Manager interview] 
The comparison of different risk types or groups with DI presented some 
difficulty. 
How do you quantify a risk and then compare different types of 
risk?  I can see the practical difficulties, but I don’t see any way 
around.  I mean if you try and do it in words then you are still up 
against the problem of comparables.  High risk is that the same 
in my area, which is the laboratory field, if we’re asked about a 
risk relating to patients?  [T1A2 Academic/Manager interview] 
In addition, difficulties remained whether numbers or words were used in 
the assessment.  
 
Within DI, the differing emphases on risks suggested a need for ability to 
compare local outputs with each other. 
When you are comparing it with other people, and if their 
understanding is the same as yours, and particularly in the 
college, and even in the Institute, if, say, it was research focused 
or teaching focused, but if you are putting the 2 together then see 
how far apart everybody is, that would be very useful.  [T1A3 
Administrator/Manager interview] 
This was difficult without an ability to assign good estimates of financial 
loss (or gain) for operational risks.   
Whether the interpretation of them is the same, so if everybody 
knew a 5 was an impact of £x million, but obviously if we all put 
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different figures in, it’s a problem, but with caution it could be 
useful.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager interview] 
The same attendee felt that numerical assessment did not assist in 
everyday business. 
For day-to-day use, I don’t think it is very helpful.  I think you do 
that in your mind anyway.  [T1A3 Administrator/Manager 
interview] 
E&F attendees were aware that gaps in data and information exist. 
We are not in possession of all the facts, are we?  [T2A2 
Manager] 
There were examples illustrating the difficulty of assessing the cost of 
building closures, where losses were not limited to the cost of corrective 
action.  Failure to maintain or replace plant that was past economic repair 
incurred costs through loss of productivity. 
We have had several heating failures at the [name] where we’ve 
had to send sort of 2,500 people home and shut the building for 2 
or 3 days, but is that acceptable?  Is that an acceptable risk?  
[T3A1 Manager] 
There was uncertainty about what constituted acceptable risk linked to 
the inability to quantify the cost of such failures.  This raised one of the 
significant themes that emerged, the acceptance of risk by default.   
 
One E&F attendee expressed the idea that assessment was futile, since 
you could not know all the risks that may occur. 
The known knowns and the unknown knowns aren’t the problem, 
it’s the unknown unknowns that are the problem, because they’re 
the one’s that most dramatically affect your business, that you 
don’t know are coming sort of left field.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Interestingly, in the workshop on that day, there had been several 
discussions that included incidents recalled by attendees, all of which 
were reasonably predictable, and there was little evidence of 'unknown 
unknowns'.  One example was the loss of a central server for a second 
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time, disrupting the web site and e-mails, the risk not having been 
mitigated in the interim.   
 
One E&F attendee illustrated how assessment of risk was a matter of 
judgement. 
If I close the building, you know it is serious […] because 
sometimes you have to take a stand, because unless you do, 
people will think ‘oh, you just go along with it’; but you have to 
be able to live with the decisions you make, and a lot of the 
decisions you make you base on ‘if it was my child’ in those 
situations, and would I allow it to go on, because if you wouldn’t, 
you shouldn’t be doing it to anyone else’s children.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
The basis for the decision-making in this example lay in the personal 
values of the individual concerned, and pointed to the need to accept the 
use of such qualitative assessments in the absence of numbers to crunch. 
 
A DI attendee observed that differences in individual risk tolerance 
influenced risk identification and assessment. 
People differ in their willingness and comfort and ease with 
which they can live with uncertainty.  Some people like 
everything to be just so, and other people need a certain level of 
…, a bit of edge.  [T1A2 Academic/Manager interview]  
The view was confirmed by an E&F attendee. 
Also, in a more general sense, anybody’s assessment of this 
depends on their own risk appetite, doesn’t it?  [T3A5 Manager] 
What is tolerable to one may seem very risky to another.  One E&F 
attendee expressed quite high-risk tolerance. 
You would hedge your bets, apart from the bulk of the campus 
blowing up; you’d probably find it quite difficult to move into the 
high …  Somehow Glasgow survived, City survived it, even 
Hampton Court has survived, and Windsor, with the odd fire.  
[T2A1 Manager] 
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Other individuals showed more willingness to consider rating risks as 
severe, but since no risk ratings were agreed during the workshops, 
resolution of such differences was not revealed.   
 
There were indications of reliance on qualitative evaluations in E&F, 
even in relation to H&S. 
It comes back to experience, to knowledge, to really evaluating, 
and even if it is on the hoof, actually evaluating, what could go 
wrong, and if it were that serious, I mean we’ve only, well since 
I’ve been here, 17 years now, but in that time, we’ve had one 
fatality.  [T3A1 Manager] 
The availability of personal experience enabled a historical perspective to 
be taken for some risks.  There was little data available to inform 
operational risk discussions.  One E&F attendee identified some 
information that could provide useful input to the process. 
There is a limited way you can pickup the student end of it, 
because of the student satisfaction surveys, and that is one of the 
key items in the strategic plan.  The happier they are, the more 
they come back apparently, and this may be an overall measure 
of that.  Somewhere, but that would be almost impossible to pick 
up across the college.  [T3A5 Manager] 
Although the individual was aware of the survey, there was hesitancy 
about where the data exists, and whether it would prove comprehensive 
enough to be helpful.  However, for some operational risks, data was 
available to assist in such calculations. 
So, things like accidents; you know exactly how many you’ve got, 
the cost per square metre basis for both utilities and 
maintenance, the number of calls that we field and did we do it in 
the response time?  All those things are factual.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
There was no evidence of the use of any such data in any of the 
workshops.  
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One E&F attendee was well aware of risk assessment methods before 
attending the training and was aware that some risk ratings were easier to 
have confidence in than others. 
I actually wrote the risk assessment policy for the Department.  
So, that’s a document which is medium, [...], if you start getting 
close to the edges, I’m worried about the edges because it is a 
judgement call.  The medium that on 2 and 3 in there, I am 
comfortable with because there are at least 2 mediums the other 
side, but as soon as you start nudging up against the highs...  
[T3A1 Manager] 
The banding on the rating grid provided a wider target when similar 
ratings were present in adjacent cells, so that expectational ambiguity 
increased the likelihood of assessment outcomes being correct.  The 
comment also served to highlight the fact that part of assessment relied 
on judgement, and consequently reflected individual or group 
perspectives. 
 
In the first E&F workshop, it was observed that certain combinations of 
events raise the impact of a risk.   
I think today is the day that they do the salary run, I mean, that 
could have an impact on the whole of the staff not being paid on 
time.  [T2A3 Manager] 
The need to consider a wide range of risks, and the accompanying 
circumstances, added to the complexity of risk assessment.  It was akin to 
having a programme in which ‘if’ statements increase or decrease risk by 
a certain factor.  In this case, the impact would have been rated as more 
severe, if it had prevented the salary run proceeding as planned. 
 
For one E&F interviewee, there was a suspicion that the qualitative 
aspects of assessment mean that different ratings would be given by the 
same individual at a different time. 
You often find that you actually go back and say ‘here’s a blank 
form, remember the course you did, fill it in again’ you’ll 
probably get some different answer, which is why I am convinced 
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a lot of people put all 5s, so that they don’t have to worry about 
getting it wrong.  [T3A1 Manager interview] 
There was an underlying issue within this statement in relation to blame 
avoidance.  If people chose high numbers to avoid being wrong or 
bearing responsibility for assessing a risk at a lower rating than was 
subsequently made evident, that would make distinguishing between 
serious and minor risks more difficult.  
 
The influence of local interpretations of risk on assessments was 
emphasised by one E&F trainee. 
I think there must be some grading and I think probably, for us to 
have done it on that course was quite difficult, because you don’t 
know whether you are comparing apples with apples or apples 
with pears, and everyone has different views.  But I think, if 
you’re taking the bigger context, I think it might take somebody, 
almost, not with an external view, but somebody with a bigger 
view of all of the college numbers to get them into some 
perspective, because locally you can have all sorts of things, 
which to you seem absolutely like the end of the world and you 
can say it is 10, and actually really it’s somebody else would say 
‘well that would be a shame’, but there are other things which 
you might think ‘oh, that’s alright’.  The e-mails went down, ‘oh, 
well, oh God, that was good, we didn’t get any e-mails for the 
day’ is actually catastrophic to some others, so I think it is 
difficult again, because you’ve got your own perspective.  [T3A2 
Manager interview] 
The trainee observed that local perspectives of organisational risk reflect 
genuine concerns (Adams, 1995). 
You take the view of how it impacts on you and your view of the 
organisation.  So, obviously, I think that’s what is difficult, but it 
is useful to see how other people view risk, because people don’t 
just make it up, I mean, there is obviously a reason that they’ve 
said it.  [T3A2 Manager interview] 
Another E&F attendee provided confirmation of the qualitative nature of 
the assessment, with reliance on local views. 
People make a judgement, but it is perception, at the end of the 
day.  [T3A1 Manager interview] 
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These statements supported the view that operational risk ratings were 
not true risk probability calculations.  
 
An illustration of how difficult it was to make a quantified financial 
estimate in relation to risk was evident in the discussion of the impact of 
the lack of planning during a recent closure of one part of the campus, 
during which it was unclear who was in charge of the site. 
Someone who is there who’s got access to all the procedures and 
access to all the people who are involved.  Not just someone 
coming ‘oh, no, so and so is off sick today’, or ‘she’s on holiday’ 
and so the junior porter is responsible for the site.  It should not 
really happen.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Another attendee at the same E&F workshop expressed an alternative 
view that, even if it was clear who was in charge, it may not alter the 
event’s impact, except to improve the way the incident was perceived. 
… except the cuddly feeling.  Well, I think it would just have 
made it all a little bit more managed, and would have given a 
better impression.  [T2A1 Manager] 
It would be difficult to assess what, if any, additional costs were incurred 
owing to lack of established procedures.  Furthermore, in planning for 
events such as a major fire, there are costs involved in preparing for such 
an incident, and if it never happens, the organisation is right to adhere to 
fire safety guidelines, and hope that it doesn’t happen.  The effect of time 
is to make the outcome unpredictable in the present (Luhmann, 1998).   
 
The cost of preparing for serious incidents can be difficult to justify in 
the absence of financial estimates of potential losses.  Cost avoidance 
was cited by E&F as a reason for the lack of progress in this area. 
I had two sample emergency plans created, one was for an 
office/academic building and one was for a Hall of Residence, 
because of the differences, just basically to give an idea.  Those 
plans, when people saw them, because basically when you open 
the emergency plans, one side was covered with text about all the 
persons in the building, what to do, the other side was all 
drawings, so the two, you’ve got the pages matched up so what 
you were reading here, you were looking at there, right.  Went 
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back to the college and said, right, we’d like to do this for every 
one of our buildings, how much are they?  They are £3,000 each, 
and they are the only two emergency plans that ever got 
completed.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Once again, it was impossible to calculate whether expenditure on 
emergency planning would save money in the longer term.  It was not 
possible to re-run events over the previous two years and compare 
balance sheets.  Interestingly, the group did not use the examples as 
templates to produce others themselves.  
 
In BHS, one attendee perceived a difference between the assessment of 
H&S and risks that arose when the broad range of threats to business 
were considered. 
The examples, you’ve gone through, are very tangible things like 
the equipment, but there are a whole range of other ones that are 
much less tangible.  Where the college’s good name may be 
called into doubt, I mean, things to do with the Human Tissue 
Act.  Things to do with, for instance, if anything is likely to go 
wrong there, somebody comes in and sees their granny 
embalmed.  This may, all those things are much more difficult to 
tie onto these.  If we lost a body, an example that has nearly 
happened, is where the undertaker actually brought the wrong 
body, and it was within a gnat’s whisker of being shaved and 
embalmed, because all the paperwork was correct, it just wasn’t 
the right person.  Now, if those sort of things came out into the 
public area, it doesn’t fit very easily into that sort of thing. [T4A3 
Technical Manager] 
Another BHS trainee commented that qualities, rather than quantities, 
might be more appropriate to the assessment of operational risk. 
I think it was quite tricky putting a number to what I would have 
regarded as a reasonably tangible risk, like H&S risk.  Whereas, 
with a financial, business risk, I think it is even less tangible, and 
you just wonder, if you are, when you started talking about the 
gap on either side of those numbers, I was thinking, well this is 
fitting into low, medium and high.  [T4A5 Technical Manager 
interview] 
This comment supported the view that operational risk assessment can be 
considered qualitative and described by words, rather than numbers.  One 
central server failure was cited as costly. 
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Oh, the server, that was another thing.  I mean that was very 
expensive.  [T4A3 Technical Manager] 
Another BHS attendee knew that costs associated with flood risks were 
high, but was vague about numbers. 
I mean, what was the cost?  It was in many, many millions.  So it 
was a severe, it wasn’t just a, something that just happened and 
the ceiling fell down, it was very severe.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager] 
The actual figures were not known for either incident, contributing to 
uncertainty about the financial impact of risks. 
 
One BHS attendee expressed the difficulty of assessing the risk when 
balancing conflicting organisational aims. 
We are a research organisation, but it still does teaching and, yet, 
if the people who are involved in teaching… there is always 
tension, I don’t see how you do assess the risk.  [T4A3 Technical 
Manager] 
A further difficulty arose when attempting to predict future developments 
in knowledge, particularly when dealing with novel materials.    
Something you’ve been doing for many, many years, as long as it 
doesn’t go wrong, there is no problem.  So, if there is an 
experimental technique which goes on for years and years and 
years, and then suddenly you find out all the workers there, 
because they have now discovered this chemical was actually a 
very severe carcinogen, which shows after 10 years, the college 
would have tremendous difficulty, what do you do?  [T4A3 
Technical Manager interview] 
This particular risk falls into the H&S category; such an assessment 
could only be made in the light of available evidence.  These assessments 
are more likely to be based on epidemiological data and statistical 
techniques than most operational risks, and could be considered 
quantitatively valid.  Nonetheless, should such a change in the state of 
knowledge occur, the University would still have to deal with the 
aftermath, particularly in relation to staff who fear an increased threat of 
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cancer.  So, even when assessing a relatively quantifiable risk, the 
unknowable future can make assessments potentially unreliable.  
 
The presentation contained risk severity categories for some risk types, 
but was not exhaustive (see Appendix 4).  One BHS attendee queried 
why some categories of risk did not appear in the severity assessment 
matrix. 
Where does security fit into that?  Security issues? […] It doesn’t 
fit squarely on there.  [T4A5 Technical Manager] 
The course emphasised that since different types of risk were being 
assessed, the impact scale would need to be tailored to the threat being 
considered.  In the case of security, severity ranged from petty theft, 
through staff assault, to terrorist attack.  
 
The recomended financial loss scale was inappropriate. 
It is quite interesting because the low risk of financial loss is set 
at <10k.  Which actually is the limit that’s the excess on the 
college insurance policy.  [T4A5 Technical Manager] 
In this instance, it would be better for an area to lose a piece of 
equipment valued at £15,000, and claim against the insurance, than one 
valued at £8,000.  Consequently, if financial values can be calculated, the 
risk scale needs to be considered in the light of University insurance 
arrangements. 
 
In addition, another BHS attendee observed that the financial impact at 
different levels in the hierarchy could result in additional modifications 
to the assessment scale. 
I think it is very arbitrary, I mean, you were giving examples, 
where […] costs of equipment lower than £10k and you were 
saying you could change things, I mean if I can change things 
individually, I don’t understand, how can I really compare my 
number to somebody else’s number?  So, it has either got to be 
the same, or we are ending up with multiple scales, kind of thing.  
[T4A2 Technical Manager interview] 
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For an integrated risk register, variation in the setting of such scales 
reflected hierarchical impact, but resulted in systematic assessment 
differences. 
For the individual, if they have lost a piece of equipment because 
something has fallen over, there is no insurance cover for them, 
and, yet, that has a major impact on potentially what they do.  
[T4A5 Technical Manager] 
Since small losses can have large impacts on individual research projects, 
a single financial scale for the whole organisation was inadequate to 
express local difficulties encountered because of an event.  However, 
since the narratives illustrated the difficulty of estimating financial loss, a 
tiered approach would not assist in ranking many risks faced by the 
organisation.   
 
The narratives illustrated many forms of uncertainty in relation to 
operational risk, a lack of confidence in available data and 
unpredictability of the actions of others.  Unknowability in the Keynesian 
sense was present, and risk assessment outputs could not be considered a 
form of measurement. 
 
6.5.2 Uncertainty Surrounding Aims and Objectives 
The emphasis on achievement of organisational aims suggests that any 
ambiguity or lack of clarity about objectives will have a serious impact 
on risk assessment, as well as strategy implementation more generally. In 
DI, the risk register process was linked to strategic issues, rather than 
day-to-day concerns. 
If you said to me an operational risk register, I feel threatened 
because I don’t get sufficient support from personnel or 
something.  That’s an internal risk, because I think that 
somebody is not supporting me, but a strategic risk register, I’m 
worried about the RAE and so on, funding or something, I’m 
much more concerned about recording those issues, rather than 
operational risks.  [T1A1 Academic/Manager] 
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This perspective on risk identification implied acceptance of 
responsibility for reviewing external risks to achievement of aims, but 
less willingness to consider operational or administrative risks.  The 
senior academic management role did not include day-to-day operational 
risk management, but was concerned with higher-level planning and 
strategic activities. 
 
One DI attendee was curious about the governance aims. 
For my part I like to know where these concepts come from: and 
the starting point was the risk register, via HEFCE, and I don’t 
know whether your background could have furnished us with the, 
how important it is for HEFCE and what, how it emerged, or how 
it compares in the wider world with risk registers.  [T1A2 
Academic/Manager interview] 
The comment illustrated a desire to understand regulator aims and private 
sector practices, as an input to local implementation.  
 
E&F received information from senior management about the desire to 
be a ‘world class’ organisation, which group members found hard to 
reconcile with spending decisions.  Consequently, the aims of the 
organisation were unclear at the local level for this group. 
I think there is a serious issue there that needs to be addressed, 
because it almost seems like there is an expectation at one level, 
and there’s a ‘don’t understand’ at the next level, of what it is 
that we are actually being asked to do.  There is very little 
feedback.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Concern about the lack of a link between the senior management of the 
University and other staff members was expressed. 
There is a problem with linkage between the senior college 
management and the operational level.  [T3A1 Manager 
interview] 
Staff members were unsure about whether they understood the 
Institution’s aims, adding a further level of uncertainty to the risk 
assessment process (Henry & Walker, 1991).  Consequently, the 
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implementation the Strategic Plan was difficult to translate into 
operational terms in E&F. 
If you look at the Strategic Plan, then it can mean different things 
to different people; it is good as a framework, but it does need 
some flesh putting on it for people to try to get closer to the 
centre to understand what they are trying to deliver.  [T3A1 
Manager] 
The risk management training encouraged E&F staff to consider both the 
long-term and short-term in relation to a range of risks.  
Let’s look at the high-level review, and let’s take it right through 
to the operational coal face, as it were, to basically see how do 
you keep all these balls in the air, because if you start 
concentrating on the high-level, you start to miss out on the basic 
stuff you need to get right; and if you just concentrate on the 
coalface stuff, you start to diverge from what the expectation is, 
not that we know what the expectation is.  [T3A1 Manager 
interview] 
The lack of clarity about the organisational goals made it difficult for the 
group to align short-term planning with long-term aims. 
The introduction of the PFI approach to funding public buildings resulted 
in partnership arrangements with Ecovert to provide services on some 
University sites.  The second workshop within E&F considered them an 
expensive option. 
We can’t understand why are they charging us £3,000 for cable 
that we can have installed for £900.  [T3A1 Manager] 
In one building, there was a 25-year contract with Ecovert for support 
that reflected a lack of focus on longer-term potential cost savings. 
If they spend £half million a year on electricity so what are the 
consequences?  College pays that; there is actually no incentive 
for them to reduce their energy bill.  [T3A1 Manager] 
These contractual arrangements were also evident in relation to catering. 
Somebody was telling me that they were trying to have a party for 
some member of staff who was leaving and they weren’t allowed 
to bring in outside contractors.  They had to pay Ecovert for the 
sandwiches and whatever, which was an outrageous sum of 
money.  [T3A5 Manager] 
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The costs involved in such long-term contracts were interpreted as a 
significant risk to the University. 
And we’ve got them for another 17 years […] and, of course, you 
pay for every single thing.  [T3A2 Manager] 
Attendees expressed impotence and a lack of control. 
But what can we do?  [T3A5 Manager] 
With Ecovert, they’ve got the college by the proverbials.  [T3A4 
Manager] 
The E&F attendees showed a lack of awareness of the type of PFI 
arrangement that public institutions were being encouraged to participate 
in, and arrangements with Ecovert were interpreted as an unintended 
outcome of poor contractual arrangements.  Consequently, it was 
questioned whether new buildings were the best approach for estates 
development. 
There must be something wrong with the strategy, then.  There is 
something fundamentally wrong there.  [T3A5 Manager] 
Inherent in these E&F discussions was the impression that funding could 
be found for major new works, but attendees were unaware that since 
these may have been PFI arrangements, there was no need for the 
University to provide the initial investment.  Communication had not 
been successful in enabling this strategy to be understood by workshop 
participants. 
 
The lack of availability of policy guidelines to BHS members of staff 
was considered a problem. 
Well, it just makes it more difficult for us to manage that, because 
we are not getting guidance from the college over what should be 
policy decisions really.  [T4A5 Technical Manager] 
This comment illustrated that lack of clear organisational aims increased 
the difficulty of implementing local controls.  Other comments illustrated 
a lack of awareness about the Risk Management Policy. 
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I don’t think it will happen unless it gets from you to [name], to 
whoever it is doing it, and then there becomes a policy document.  
[T4A3 Technical Manager interview] 
Unless somebody actually writes us into the system, into the 
process … [T4A5 Technical Manager interview] 
There was no reason for staff to look for policy or procedures unless they 
related to their role. 
I don’t know if I’ll actually be involved in it.  [T4A4 Technical 
Manager interview] 
The group selected for training in BHS provided empirical illustration of 
the failure of senior management to cascade communications to those 
lower in the organisational hierarchy. 
 
These findings illustrated a significant difference between the 3 groups.  
The DI executive committee were clear about their aims (but these were 
not necessarily those of the university), E&F illustrated the difficulty of 
implementing strategic aims and BHS staff, who are less senior, were 
largely unaware of aims and issued policies, impacting on their ability to 
undertake operational risk assessment. 
 
6.5.3 Uncertainty Associated with Process Control 
The risk assessment model recommends calculating net risk by taking 
account of existing controls, consequently, their effectiveness has an 
impact on the severity or frequency of risks occurring.  Whilst producing 
contingency plans reduces uncertainty about the action to take in the 
event of an incident, one of the DI trainees expressed concern about the 
effort required locally. 
What could we do if a great piece fell off the tower, […] or 
something horrible, or there was a terrorist attack, or an 
outbreak of legionnaire’s disease in the tower or something?  
Now, to actually think through that would be a substantial piece 
of work, and none of us have the time or opportunity, and I don’t 
have somebody sitting around doing that.  We just haven’t put 
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that sort of contingency plan in place.  [T1A1 
Academic/Manager] 
All E&F participants who expressed a view on the matter consider 
contingency planning poor.  The importance of contingency planning to 
reduce uncertainty about what to do in the event of an incident was 
stressed. 
We must have robust mechanisms in place for emergency 
situations, be they terrorist, animal rights.  [T3A4 Manager 
interview] 
I think the college has never addressed this in a joined up 
fashion.  [T2A3 Manager] 
There was uncertainty about the action to take should an incident occur. 
What would we do if there was a major terrorist attack, a major 
animal rights attack on this building, how would you actually 
respond, and to be honest we’ve never really ever tackled it, we 
just hope and pray, and it doesn’t mean that on a day to day 
basis the building isn’t secure.  [T3A2 Manager interview] 
Such external threats were considered to be outside the University’s 
control. 
That’s a tough one to answer.  We have external threats in terms 
of natural disasters, lightening strikes, which you can’t really 
mitigate for.  More importantly, I think we’ve got terrorist action, 
not necessarily levelled at the college but, as a consequence of.  
So, if there was a dirty bomb in the West End, for example, it 
could affect the college.  [T3A2 Manager interview] 
Several E&F interviewees were aware of the risk posed by such external 
threats, and were able to interpret them from a local historical 
perspective. 
If there was a major incident at [station name], I mean, that’s a 
terrorist target or, even though it doesn’t affect us now, the 
hospital, it’s a huge risk, because of course they would be a 
number one, they would be a receiving centre, and we would 
probably all sit here looking out of the window, with people being 
brought in from a major bomb blast, it happened when they took 
them all to [hospital] from the terrible one 2 years ago.  [T3A2 
Manager interview] 
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This view of risks arising from the external environment, with the group 
unable to prevent such occurrences, did not stimulate action that would 
mitigate the threat; it was outside the scope of E&F to influence such 
events.   
 
The need for contingency planning also related to routine infrastructure 
failure within the system. 
Part of the function of the Estates team is to actually state the 
risk and the likelihood, and talk about things, about how quickly 
the situation can be recovered.  If you have a plan in your back 
pocket that will say well, it is going to be off for 3 days, and then 
we can actually get the building heated again.  [T3A1 Manager] 
Poor planning resulted in E&F having to respond in a non-programmed 
way. 
 If we are all just making it up as we go along … [T3A2 Manager 
interview] 
Lack of planning was mitigated by the experience of local E&F staff, 
who were able to react to new situations without procedural guidelines. 
But a lot of it is good will, staff that have been there for a long 
time, know what needs to be done, and get on and do it, but there 
is nothing actually written.  [T3A4 Manager] 
Risk avoidance increased if procedures were not generally available. 
A lot of business risk is attached to not having standard ways or 
approved ways of doing things, so people feel uncertain and 
won’t take risks, ‘more than my jobs worth’.  [T2A2 Manager] 
Programmed decisions incurred smaller risk (Martin, 2001). 
It’s a confidence thing; it’s policies and procedures, again.  
[T2A2 Manager] 
In an organisational culture where procedures guide actions, E&F 
individuals would be unwilling to make decisions in their absence, in the 
hope of blame avoidance. 
 
 Page 254 of 407 
One BHS attendee cited a recent incident that posed a difficulty due to 
the lack of pre-planned processes. 
I think it sits there in the background until a problem becomes a 
problem.  So, for example, just recently we had a scare, or a 
potential scare with […] letter bombs to forensic science 
departments.  So, as we have a Forensic Science Department, we 
started to think about that, and when you started to delve under 
the surface about what was in place to deal with that.  There 
wasn’t anything formal in place, and we were devising it on the 
hoof and probably didn’t do it properly.  [T4A5 Technical 
Manager]  
The individual concerned was unsure about how well the problem was 
managed.  In such situations, feedback would increase confidence in 
relation to future actions.  The attendee was also concerned about the 
lack of evacuation planning. 
Nor is there anything other than a fire evacuation plan, so there 
is not an incident evacuation procedure.  [T4A5 Technical 
Manager] 
One BHS trainee questioned whether preventative actions were part of 
the remedial work undertaken after a flood occurred. 
If that happened again, would the water still come straight 
through in the same manner as it has done, or have they put in?  
[…]  So, the basement would be flooded.  [T4A6 Technical 
Manager] 
This comment contained the implication that, despite risk management 
processes, senior management did not implement risk mitigation, even 
after an incident.  The attendee interpreted this as a signal about how 
seriously the organisation treated risk management activities. 
 
There was awareness in BHS that contingency planning could reduce 
costs and uncertainty in the event of an incident. 
 If we’d had emergency power, we wouldn’t have lost as much.  
[T4A3 Technical Manager] 
The same incident was described by another attendee, and loss of 
research material was considered alongside data and financial losses. 
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We didn’t lose much data.  The flood happened before the 
building opened.  […]  Nobody had moved in, they lost samples 
in research areas.  [T4A1 Technical Manager] 
For individuals involved in research projects, the loss of samples may 
require certain parts of an experiment to be rerun.  In some cases, 
significant time could be wasted.  
 
An interesting description of increasing uncertainty resulting from 
information overload was described in an E&F workshop. 
If you don’t have that in place, people are then, sort of, in terms 
of their risk appetite are bulimic and all they do is just pass it up, 
and then that doesn’t help anybody, because at the top, they can’t 
sort the wheat from the chaff, because they have got so much 
information.  So, it goes back down again, and comes back up.  
[T2A2 Manager] 
This conceptualisation indicated a possible link between responsibility 
and risk appetite.  
 
The workshops groups all exhibited concern about contingency planning, 
but despite increased uncertainty locally as a result, they did not accept 
responsibility for the activity, and cited lack of resources as a reason why 
someone else should be doing it.  Furthermore, lack of confidence in 
process effectiveness was expressed many participants and this 
uncertainty increased net risk assessment values. 
 
6.6 Observations from a Dental Institute Executive Meeting 
I was invited to attend an Executive Meeting on 29th March 2007, to investigate 
how risk management forms part of the activity in these forums.  The meeting 
was well run, with a chair and agenda, commencing promptly at 8:30am with 9 
attendees.  Notes (not detailed minutes) were issued for each meeting.  I did not 
record the discussions, but noted key points during the meeting.   
 
The discussions were wide ranging and covered many of the categories of risk 
HEFCE (2001) identified.  These included students, research, H&S, facilities, 
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staffing, finance and organisational issues.  In addition, the potential merger was 
covered briefly alongside discussion of expected changes relating to moving or 
new institutional arrangements and a possible opportunity to expand activities.  
Furthermore, there was evidence of informal risk assessment (i.e., a need to 
mitigate was recognised without assessment of probability or severity), resulting 
in risk reduction actions for one particular issue.  Attendance at the meeting 
confirmed that these routine management discussions represented an important 




The narratives from workshops and follow-up interviews provided a more 
detailed description of the risk assessment process than the first stage interviews 
because of the particular setting during data gathering. Appendix 6 contains 
reflections on workshop data validity and Appendix 8 provides an analysis of 
the data from session feedback forms.  The discussions in this chapter provide 
input to cross-case analysis in the following chapter, which draws on the 
workshop findings and the interview data in the previous chapter, to address the 
research questions. 
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7 Analysis of Empirical Findings 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the empirics illustrated in the previous two chapters 
with the aim of answering the research questions.   The SST analytical 
framework is evident in the categories developed to draw together multiple 
perspectives of risk assessment.  This structure facilitated comparison to provide 
an input to the DDE normative analysis presented here. This chapter 
sequentially analyses the four research questions.  As the analysis progressed, 
the questions being asked, interacting with the data, encouraged further 
definition and focus.  Each of the four analyses explicitly acknowledges the 
more detailed development of the questions during the study period.   
 
7.2 Analysis One 
Research Question 1 asks: 
How are operational risk assessments being carried out in the University? 
 
This question was explored through a range of perspectives, and data reveals it 
to be the most complex of the analyses, in which normative analysis was 
complemented by evaluation of informal risk management activities and formal 
documentation was compared with narrative accounts.  This section begins with 
a comparison of the 2005 and 2007 iterations of the risk register and goes on to 
analyse contemporaneous participant narratives from each phase of the study 
with relevant risk register outputs, comparing and contrasting them with 
participants understandings of risk as expressed during the study period utilising 
the SST theoretical perspective.  Insights from this comparison were valuable 
for the analysis that follows, in which compliance with normative guidance was 
analysed by overlaying the DDE model (Figures 3.1 and 7.2) on the HEFCE 
(2005) framework, utilising understandings developed through interaction of 
data with the SST framework. To complete the analysis of question one, the SST 
framework was used to examine the ‘who’ of risk assessment, revealing the 
development of the ‘how’ research question to form an additional analytical 
 Page 258 of 407 
category.  Furthermore, the presence of an informal risk management system 
(i.e., normal management practices, not recognised as performing a risk 
management function) required the investigation of two parallel ‘how’ 
questions, investigated under headings used in the previous two chapters.   This 
section concludes with a summary of key findings. 
 
7.2.1 Risk Register Analysis 
This section aims to critically evaluate differences in risk interpretation through 
comparison of written and oral empirical contributions.  The first section 
provides an overview of the differences between the two corporate risk registers 
that provide the data for this comparison.  A review of the templates reveals 
process changes between 2005 and 2007, with additional headings evident in the 
most recent register. 
 
The corporate risk review (June 2005) was contemporaneous with the first stage 
interviews, allowing comparison of data.  The formal process resulted in the 
production of the Corporate Risk Register, to highlight the most serious risks 
across the organisation.  This document represents the output of the second cycle 
of the risk review process.  Figure 7.1 illustrates the template used to record 
risks in the 2005 register. 
N° Risk Further Details 
and 
Consequences 
Likelihood of Risk 
 (scale of 1-5 
where 1 = low and 
5 = high) 
Impact of Risk 
(scale of 1-5 
where 1 = low 
and 5 = high) 
Potential 








Figure 7.1 2005 Risk Register Template 
 
The narratives reveal that an overall qualitative rating is more attainable than a 
calculated financial value, so the column ‘potential sum at risk’ is not applicable 
for many of the identified risks.  The action plan column implies the ability to 
define and implement mitigation, and may have contributed to local 
understandings that completion of the register only related to activities for which 
the group had overall authority and responsibility.  From the SST perspective, it 
does not make sense to add a risk for which the group is unable to define an 
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action plan, thus signalling that information on this topic is not for them, and 
such threats can be left for others to worry about. 
 
In comparison, Figure 7.2 illustrates the template used to record risks in the 
2007 register: 




















Impact  Net 
Risk 
Figure 7.2 2007 Risk Register Template 
These updated headings reveal the addition of categories that reflect the 
conceptual use of net risk, in addition to including responsibility for risks. 
Reviewing differences between the assignment of responsibility for managing 
risks in the two registers provided additional longitudinal data about the formal 
process. 
 
The 2005 register did not include a column to indicate responsibility, but 
identified a responsible officer for each risk in the body of the document.  Table 
7.1 lists the risk categories present, associated responsibility attribution and 
whether the assigned role was academic or administrative. 
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Staffing 3 College Secretary & Registrar  Administrative 
Students 2 College Secretary & Registrar  Administrative 





1 Managing Director of ‘University 
Business Ltd’ 
Administrative 
IT 2 College Secretary & Registrar Administrative 




1 Director of Resources Administrative 
Reputation 1 College Secretary & Registrar Administrative 
H&S 2 College Secretary & Registrar Administrative 
 
Table 7.1  Risk Owners in 2005 Key Corporate Risks Document 
The 2005 risk register listed 16 risks in total.  The responsibility for managing 
these risks resided with senior management represented by three administrative 
members of staff, highlighting a lack of academic engagement with the process.  
Table 7.2 provides comparable data for the 2007 register. 
 





Teaching*19 3 Vice-Principal (Students) Academic 
Research* 3 Vice-Principal (Research) Academic 
Value Added* 
 
1 Vice-Principal (Arts & Sciences) Academic 




4 Head of Administration & College 
Secretary 
Administrative 
Staffing 2 Head of Administration & College 
Secretary 
Administrative 
Financial 6 Director of Finance Administrative 
Estates 2 Head of Administration & College 
Secretary 
Administrative 
Facilities 2 Head of Administration & College 
Secretary 
Administrative 
Arts & Sciences 1 Vice-Principal (Arts & Sciences) Academic 
Health Schools 
/NHS 
8 Vice-Principal (Health Schools) Academic 
 
Table 7.2  Risk Owners in 2007 Key Corporate Risks Document 
 
                                                
19 *These risks are associated with key targets, indicating a link with strategic plans for 
5 of the 11 categories.    
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The register contained 34 identified risks in total.  The 2007 data showed that all 
risk owners remain senior managers.  However, the management of School risks 
had become the responsibility of Vice-Principals for the appropriate area, a 
major shift in responsibility from Administrative to Academic functions in 
comparison with the 2005 document.  It is important to note that these changes 
would appear positive from the perspective of the regulator, the compliance 
paperwork illustrates developments in line with recommended guidance.  
Notwithstanding, no member of the workshops indicated that liaison with the 
Vice-Principal included discussion of matters arising from the risk register.  In 
addition, there was no evidence of risk management training for designated risk 
owners.  The addition of key targets and categories such as ‘value added’ and 
‘identity’ illustrated a more managerial approach to the register in 2007 
compared with 2005.  A critical evaluation of the link between the risk register 
and strategy, represented by key targets revealed that while 13 identified threats 
could be linked to corporate strategy, the remaining 21 could not, suggesting 
strategic planning did not extend to cover the majority of potential risks and by 
implication, did not encompass several organisational aims.  This was 
particularly significant in relation to Arts & Science and the Health Schools, 
interpreted to show lack of engagement by academics in strategic planning 
activities, alongside a reluctance to be involved in risk management activities.  
For senior academics, such managerial practices were not interpreted by their 
psychic systems as ‘information’, they remain outside the academic role and 
could safely be ignored and left to administrators. 
 
The remainder of this section will explore the underlying register process in 
more detail, to contrast risk interpretation in the interviews and workshop 
discussions with the formal risk management documents.  Interviewees, from 
both phases of the study, were asked to identify the greatest risk to the 
University, and these responses enabled comparison with the Corporate Risk 
Register, with reference to the workshop narratives if discussions involved risks 
that were described as significant or major.   
 
Whilst some overlap was found between the Phase 1 interview responses and 
2005 risk register content, the corporate review process was not picking up a 
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number of major concerns.  Academic issues absent from the Corporate Risk 
Register related to teaching/research balance, Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) failure and staff stress: 
I guess that it’s easy and natural to focus risk around the next RAE, so 
the risk is that we do not perform substantially better than we did last 
time.  [Medical] 
The absence of such risks from the risk register reconfirmed a lack of academic 
engagement with the process.  In addition, a lack of capital investment and poor 
maintenance were raised as concerns by several interviewees, yet this centrally 
managed risk did not appear on the Corporate Risk Register, despite several of 
these interviewees having had the opportunity to provide input to the document.  
Issues extending beyond the control of staff members were overlooked in 
reporting School or Departmental risks, despite their impact at local level.  
However, cost and time overruns and poor estimation for building projects were 
on the register as an input from the Finance Department, who took responsibility 
for control of these risks. 
 
Several existing control systems were perceived to pose serious threats, 
including the admissions process, poor process implementation more generally, 
insufficient communication and a lack of planning.  Once again, these concerns 
were absent in the risk register.  It is possible that the anonymity of the 
interviews encouraged individuals to talk about risk concerns, which they would 
be reluctant to record in a formal document seen by the Principal.  Alternatively, 
it confirmed lack of involvement in the process by senior staff and suggested the 
template used for administrative responses ignored such risks.  All risks listed 
on the register were mentioned by at least one interviewee during the course of 
the interviews, illustrating that the risks listed were valid concerns, but the 
register represented only a sub-set of risks that worried the study participants. 
 
The comparison of Phase 2 interviews and workshop narratives reflects the 
difference in sampling between the two phases of the study, requiring a more 
detailed examination of the 2007 local registers that provided input to the key 
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risk document, for each of the embedded case studies, to reveal some interesting 
features of the process.   
 
The DI group had not previously prepared or submitted a risk register, and the 
training was arranged quickly after the initial contact, to provide guidance 
before undertaking the activity.  The local register listed 21 risks, of which 9 
appear in the 2007 Corporate Register.  The format used recorded likelihood and 
impact, but not potential sum at risk.  This change from the 2005 format 
suggests recognition of the lack of ability to calculate value for most 
organisational risks.  Qualitative ratings: Low, Medium and High, were given to 
each.  Using these values, I calculated the combined scores (using the HEFCE 
rating grid, Figure 2.1) and found that all risks with a ‘High’ outcome, with the 
exception of one that was being managed locally, were present in the 2007 
Corporate Key Risk document.  This provided an indication that for this group 
the process was enabling them to share major concerns with senior management, 
and could be said to be performing as the governance intended for the Detector 
element of control.  The use of SST motivated understanding of reflexive 
systems exploits the idea that it is important to change senior management self-
image in relation to the risk management activity, to lower barriers to acceptance 
of responsibility for the role.  This part of the study confirmed that SST can 
produce the kind of change that critical theory aims for, as increased 
understanding, in the DI in particular, led to a reflective ability to engage with 
the risk process in a more meaningful way.  
 
The group utilised the local risk register to transfer responsibility to other sub-
groups within the organisation for 3 risks related to IT and professional support, 
providing an instance of the use of the risk register as a tool for expressions of 
non-liability.  However, it could be interpreted as an attempt to ensure gaps in 
responsibility are clarified, and the use of the Register in this way cannot be 
viewed simply as a matter of blame avoidance.  Despite local impact, some risks 
were not manageable locally, suggesting the risk register provides a way of 
ensuring senior management awareness of the need for co-ordination or action. 
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The follow-up interviews suggested the E&F Department register was 
completed after the training sessions were held, and participants contributed to 
the register for the first time.  Of the 13 identified risks 2 were quantified, 
reconfirming the difficulty of providing cost estimates. The local register 
included 6 issues related to climate change (‘green legislation’ and energy costs) 
that were not reflected in the key risks, although these provided the Head of 
Department with sufficient concern for inclusion in the workshops to provide 
the local slant for discussions. Four entries were included in the key risks, one 
quantified at £22m per annum was given a low rating, others assigned 
‘unknown’ were rated 2 mediums and 1 high.  The high rating related to estates 
maintenance, and reflected local descriptions about the most serious threat for 
the group, indicating successful communication of this concern.   
 
A senior administrator in the School, who did not attend the risk management 
training, prepared the BHS register, listing 12 risks.  A £ value was given for 
quantification of 4 risks, 3 had qualitative comments, 5 were blank and one 
indicated ‘None’.  The latter highlighted the risk associated with loss of 
‘teaching only’ staff for which ratings were qualitative (medium for impact and 
likelihood), quantified as ‘None’, implying there was no financial impact.  
However, another risk on this Register showed a potential loss of £1.7m and 
noted that failure to achieve target student numbers was partly because of poorer 
than usual progression rates, a metric linked, in part, to quality of teaching.  
 
Another risk assessed to be Low x Low inexplicably resulted in qualitative 
assessment of High for the overall quantification.  The action plan for risks in 
relation to the RAE illustrated an element of ‘gaming’ of the system of external 
assessments (Bevan & Hood, 2006) in stating ‘maximise spend and publications 
up to census date’.  The register failed to reflect the concerns expressed by BHS 
study participants in the workshops and interviews. 
 
The choice of risk for inclusion in the corporate register might be expected to 
relate to magnitude of impact, but this was not clearly demonstrated, one risk 
assessed as £1.7m was not included, whilst one of £300,000 was.  There was 
less evidence of correlation between local assessment outputs and the top-level 
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risk document for BHS, particularly in relation to the accounts of tension 
between research and teaching emphasised by participants. It is tempting to 
compare this register output unfavourably with the other two groups, and to 
suggest a causal link between a lack of senior management involvement in 
training and completion of the register and less effective process outcomes, both 
locally and for the organisation as a whole.   
 
The review of the Key Corporate Risks in 2007 demonstrated that progress was 
being made towards feeding through concerns from some groups within the 
organisation.  The DI concerns were well represented in the most recent iteration 
of the corporate document, in comparison with previous issues (to which they 
made no input) and BHS risks (to which academic staff do not contribute). 
 
An analysis of the 2007 key corporate risks revealed that of 34 identified threats, 
12 were present on one or more previous issues of the document (2006, 2005 & 
2004).  Some risks from previous years had been removed, and new risks added 
during iterations, indicating that the activity was not a simple review of past 
records.  However, it was difficult to trace the changes between issues; the 2007 
document only noted one new risk, despite 21 others not being present on the 
2006 issue.  The changes indicated that identified risks shift over time.   
 
The risk register process was functioning and there was some evidence of 
process improvement in relation to completion of registers, although some risks 
identified in narratives were omitted from contemporary registers.  However, it 
is important to remember that producing risk registers does not in itself reduce 
the listed threats.  The following section utilises these findings to explore 
normative compliance with the HEFCE (2001) guidance. 
 
7.2.2 Normative Analysis 
This section builds on the previous risk register analysis to incorporate 
narratives from the previous two chapters to further examine the ‘how’ of risk 
assessment.  This section uses the DDE model (Figure 3.1) to critically evaluate 
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the model and illustrate compliance with the normative risk management 
guidance. 
 
The control system described by Hood & Jones (1996) was mapped onto the 
HEFCE framework (Figure 7.3) to identify ways of gathering information 
(Detector), ways of setting standards, goals or targets (Director), and ways of 
changing behaviour and enforcement to meet standards or targets (Effector).  
The HEFCE framework has been annotated to highlight the DDE elements of 









Figure 7.3   Director, Detector, Effector Elements of the HEFCE 
Framework  
(Source: HEFCE, 2005, p6, Figure 1) 
 
 
The narratives revealed the way in which this framework performed, 
illustrating enforced self-regulation in action.  This section considers two 
aspects of the normative model; firstly, difficulties the findings revealed 
in the diagrammatic model and text of the guidance, to provide feedback 
to the regulator; and secondly, implementation issues to provide feedback 
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Initial critical review of the diagram revealed one difficulty in the 
representation of the system (Figure 7.3) since it fails to illustrate how 
the Director elements of a risk management system interface with 
existing management controls, except strategic planning, despite stating a 
desire for integration in the text of the guidance.  
 
Furthermore, the diagram calls for integration of a disparate range of 
risks to provide a collated register.  The inability to assign a financial 
value to the majority of risks was a source of significant weakness in 
enabling the process to demonstrate selectivity.  In this situation, it was 
unclear how risks could be ranked and prioritised, and a lengthy 
document or one with potentially significant gaps is the implied result.   
 
The recommended risk assessment grid (Figure 2.1) had been adapted 
from existing H&S models that had been tried and tested over the years, 
in that context.  However, from a safety viewpoint there is no 
requirement for a positive scale in the rating grid, since it is unlikely 
more people will be created, as opposed to killed or injured.  If a 
potential business expansion is graded a high risk, for both impact and 
probability, it is positive for the organisation.  In the Dentistry workshop, 
it became clear that using the current framework, this would appear to be 
something that should be mitigated, not encouraged.  The rating could be 
similar to one for a risk that would close a section of the University.   
 
The Director suggests high ratings are something to be reduced to an 
acceptable level.  The DI participants illustrated how this presented a 
difficulty for users of the assessment framework in relation to 
opportunity risks.  High ratings needed to be reduced, indicating to 
participants that it would be safest to do nothing. A review of the Key 
Corporate Risks and Action Plan issued in June 2007 revealed that one 
new risk related to the failure to establish a new research centre.  This is 
particularly interesting since it represents a possible opportunity, 
expressed in a negative way, such that failure to grasp the benefits were 
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considered, not the impact and possibility of obtaining the gains.  This 
reverse perspective enabled the HEFCE framework to be utilised to 
assess loss of opportunity on the same scale as threats to the organisation.  
An explanation of how to use a single scale for the assessment of both 
opportunities and threats, illustrated here, would be a useful addition to 
the HEFCE risk management guidance.   
 
In summary, the findings confirmed that the University could use the 
private sector ERM model, despite the weaknesses noted above, since 
risks link to aims in both contexts.  Even in the private sector, the notion 
of profit as an aim does not produce a straightforward equation, but has 
to account for changes in the external environment, the tastes of 
consumers, the behaviour of competitors, stakeholder interests and many 
other factors that cannot be easily assessed.  However, one important 
difference stood out, the reliance of the University on HEFCE, NHS and 
other funding bodies as sources of vital resources placed a significant 
emphasis on external bodies’ aims, measures and monitoring methods.  
 
This section will now turn to the DDE analysis to establish the extent of 
normative compliance with the HEFCE (2001) guidance.  Firstly, an 
examination of the ‘Director’ element of the model focuses on 
communication from senior management to those lower in the hierarchy.  
The Risk Management Policy (June 2006) represented the local 
interpretation of the external governance (not updated at August 2009).  
This Director advised that Heads of Schools and Departments were 
responsible for “cascading down responsibilities for identifying, 
assessing, managing and reporting risks within their sub-departments, 
centres, functions and projects”.  The cascade concept requires 
transmission of information in the form of communications from the top 
management to the next level, who, in turn, transmit the information to 
their subordinates.  The interviews and risk training indicated that the 
first stage of the cascade was compromised, thereby preventing the 
mechanism from transmitting the information as intended by the 
Director.  That is to say, the PCT has not successfully communicated to 
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School and Department Heads the scope and meaning of operational risk 
management as intended by the governance; study participants 
interpreted the purpose of the risk register through central demands for 
annual returns.  The participants were aware that regulatory compliance, 
using recommended paperwork trails, reduced risk to the organisation.   
 
The risk management training acted as a Director, and clarified the 
meaning of risk management in an organisational context, 
notwithstanding a continued emphasis on normative compliance routines 
by participants.  The intention of the HEFCE Director as a support for 
decision-making in relation to both risk taking and control in institutions 
was not evident in narratives about use of the model.   
 
Secondly, the Detector element of the models was explored through 
examination of the local risk register outputs, designed to identify risks to 
the organisation.  Common features to emerge suggested that risks 
encountered frequently were ignored; these were not considered 
reportable risks in the formal risk management system, but were 
mentioned in narratives.  At the opposite end of the range of awareness 
of risks, those that had never been encountered, such as floods from the 
Thames, were not considered in the risk management workshops, since 
they were not remembered within the organisation.  Consequently, risk 
register outputs omitted both frequent and rarely encountered risks. 
 
Furthermore, the framework enabled each area to interpret ‘risk’ in 
relation to relevant inputs, and resulted in variability in risk register 
outputs.  There was variance between groups about which risks were 
considered significant, and a number of local issues were raised that 
would only concern part of the organisation.  Participants illustrated the 
difficulty in assigning frequency and severity in workshops.  The 
integration of Detected responses was problematic in the absence of 
financial assessment outputs.   
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The dominant approach of administrative completion of annual returns 
diminished the potential usefulness of local registers, both in terms of 
contribution to the corporate register and as a local decision-making aid.  
Participants described it as a return to senior management that they had 
in the drawer ready for audit, it was of no further use locally.  In terms of 
ticking boxes, the process was compliant, but failed to provide the 
decision-making support that HEFCE (2001; 2005) intended, despite 
process improvements in the development of the risk register template. 
 
Finally, this section moves on to evaluate the Effector element of the 
model, through analysis of narrative descriptions of internal 
communications.  There was no evidence of Effector elements of 
feedback in response to the risk register from the Principal’s Central 
Team (PCT) in any of the training workshops or interviews.  This 
indicated a failure in the implementation of the HEFCE framework, there 
was no Effector to encourage change in response to Detected risks.  A 
review of the Risk Management Policy revealed that the process did not 
require the PCT to feedback to those providing information to the risk 
registers.  The outputs functioned only to inform the Audit Committee on 
the status of risks and controls.  The implemented framework generated 
information that travelled upwards in the organisational hierarchy, 
enabling production of a corporate risk register that satisfied external 
demands for compliance.  The result was a lack of clarity about senior 
management risk responses as Effectors, and participants expressed 
diffidence about follow up actions, and who was undertaking them.   
 
In summary, the DDE analysis revealed that the organisation has utilised 
the model to provide controls aimed at compliance.  The risk register 
demonstrated that risks were managed.  There was a lack of integration 
with existing control processes, some of which, such as student 
assessment or research peer review, had existed for a long time in all HE 
establishments.  The participants demonstrated a lack of awareness of the 
Risk Management Policy, and they interpreted the Director element of 
the model through internal demands for completion of the risk register.  
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The Detector outputs had little value locally and there was no evidence of 
Effector activity in response to risk reporting.  This application of the 
HEFCE (2001, 2005) guidance resulted in a system that was compliance 
focussed and groups interpreted it as such; the risk register was 
completed as an annual exercise then filed in a drawer.  The important 
point here is that the adoption of a risk register template did function to 
increase regulatory compliance, and therefore did reduce risk to the 
organisation, despite lack of utility in other regards. 
 
The following sections investigate the ‘how’ of risk assessment from the 
SST perspective in greater depth, as the initial research question is 
broken down into detailed aspects of the question through the interaction 
of the data with the analytical framework. 
 
7.2.3 The ‘Who’ of Risk Assessment 
An important aspect of the ‘how’ question to emerge during the analysis, 
revealed a lack of clarity about ‘who’ should be involved in risk 
assessment, and this additional category aims to contribute to a greater 
understanding of this issue.  In addressing this topic, there were two 
systems to consider, the formal and informal.  The workshop attendance 
illustrated senior management involvement, addressing formal requests 
for completion of the risk register from the principal, but the interviews 
and critical analysis of the corporate registers indicated that 
administrators were more commonly involved in practice.  Consequently, 
there was little suggestion of academic contribution to the formal 
process, except after the DI training.  By contrast, informal systems 
illustrated how academics responded to external stimuli, recognised a 
potential risk, and were able to respond through the introduction new 
ways of working (e.g., PhD completion deadline adherence), although 
participants were not able to recognise these as risk management 
activities, despite their link to organisational aims.  
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The choice of attendees for risk management training provided an 
indication of the Heads of Schools and Departments perception of 
responsibility for the activity.  Three of the four Heads of School chose 
to train themselves and senior academics or managers (with a senior 
administrator from two academic groups), whilst one academic manager 
chose not to attend, and nominated administrative staff and less senior 
academics with technical support roles. 
 
Significantly, the failure to gather senior academics in Humanities for 
two training dates suggested that potential attendees did not consider the 
training relevant to their role; consequently, no data was gathered from 
this group.  One of the invited attendees e-mailed me to ask what it was 
about, and whether he needed to attend, implying he may have been 
included on the invite by mistake; risk was clearly not part of his role.  
Insufficient numbers caused the planned Humanities sessions to be 
cancelled.  This outcome also reflected the more traditional academic 
structure within this School, of loosely federated departments, with a lack 
of centralised authority, which emerged in the initial interviews.  This 
contrasted with the more managerial approach and existence of an 
Executive Committee in the DI.  The differences in attendance indicated 
that involvement in risk management activities also varied in relation to 
local management arrangements. 
 
Although there were differences in participation between cases, staff 
attending each training session had similar roles and levels of seniority, 
apart from the inclusion of an administrator in one and a member of staff 
from another department in another.  The inclusion of staff from a 
different department illustrated ability to identify gaps or overlaps in 
management controls, highlighting boundary assumptions, indicating a 
potential benefit to be gained from mixing groups in risk assessment 
sessions. 
 
The risk register process did not clarify who had access to the document, 
raising a potential problem.  Keeping the circulation to a small circle of 
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senior staff, made it difficult to engage other people in the process.  
However, widening the circulation to encompass more staff increased the 
unwillingness to disclose some significant risks on the risk register.  
Reporting risk outside the boardroom can portray a weakness, signalling 
an opportunity for competitors to exploit (CIMA, 2007).  The HEFCE 
guidance does not provide any advice on how to balance this conflict.  
The written identification of first-order risks presented a second-order 
risk of disclosure to others, in an organisation preoccupied with its 
reputation. 
 
The contrast between DI, with senior management staff, who were aware 
of the register, and BHS, who, with one exception are not, provided 
evidence of how this problem manifests itself.  The first group 
emphasised the need for confidentiality, whilst the second stressed the 
need for wider circulation to include staff that participate in the process, 
requiring a balance to be struck.  More importantly, BHS expressed 
unwillingness to participate if, as was the case, they would not share in 
the outcomes of the process.  
 
To consider the question of who should be involved in risk assessment, 
analysis revealed that the activity is less worthwhile for those without 
authority to act.  Consequently, this research favours limiting 
participation to the higher echelons of the organisation, at least initially. 
 
The ability of senior academics to sidestep responsibility and place risk 
register completion in administrative hands had important consequences 
for the formal risk management system, and the validity of concerns 
represented on the risk register.  A lack of clarity in relation to 
responsibility, authority and accountability for risk management 
undermined the formal process.  However, senior academic involvement 
with existing practices stepped into the breach, to ensure potential threats 
were mitigated. 
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7.2.4 Interpretation of HEFCE Governance 
This section provides a brief summary of participant interpretations to 
complement the DDE normative analysis of the risk management 
guidance, outlined previously.  A significant strength of the SST 
perspective was its contribution to a critical evaluation of how a range of 
HEFCE communications were treated.  The findings revealed some 
requests were ignored, or given lower priority (e.g., Pay & 
Modernisation, teaching peer review).  By contrast, other HEFCE signals 
were treated as ‘information’ by the system (e.g., RAE, research-led 
teaching), as reflexive interpretations focussed on financial threats to the 
system.  
 
Interestingly, compliance with paperwork demands did not require local 
knowledge of regulatory guidance, the template was available, could be 
completed (however inadequately) and no further knowledge was needed 
to satisfy demands.  The DI group were most aware of the recommended 
risk framework and criticised several elements of the HEFCE risk 
management guidance, suggesting that it encouraged inertia by 
rewarding risk reduction. By contrast, other study participants revealed 
little awareness of the detail of risk management guidance from HEFCE, 
the requirements were interpreted through management requests for a 
risk register.  Consequently, some attendees in DI questioned whether 
satisfying the demands of the Principal, by producing a risk register, 
actually benefited the organisation, or merely demonstrated the 
procedural nature of the risk management.   
 
Interpretation of HEFCE governance placed emphasis on practices that 
could be measured or assessed, and were linked to funding access, either 
directly or through the influence of published data.  
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7.2.5 Competing Aims 
Groups within the organisation worked with quite different system 
interfaces, and the aims and objectives of partner organisations had an 
influence on local risk assessment outcomes.  The Medical Schools 
displayed the close interdependency of their system and that of an 
external group, and had to take account of aims unrelated to teaching or 
research, such as NHS patient care statistics.  An additional complexity 
was present where there was a need for groups to accommodate the aims 
of partners within their own internal framework of objectives. 
 
The concept of competing and multiple goals within a single organisation 
(Luhmann, 1995a, Perrow, 1970; Mikes, 2004) was confirmed within the 
study, opening the way for a ‘double bind’ (Dunsire, 1978) in which 
satisfaction of one aim compromised success in achieving others.  An 
analysis of HEFCE aims revealed several interesting examples.  The first 
related to measures used to assess excellence in research, in which 
theoretical studies competed against applied research, resulting in better 
RAE outcomes for the former, revealing the presence of sub-goals within 
University research aims.  The findings illustrated that the HEFCE aim of 
enhancing the contribution of HE to the economy and society was given 
a lower priority, since HEFCE funding decisions were based on RAE 
outcomes.   
Since publications only counted for the RAE if they were in 
refereed journals, publications became more biased towards these 
and away from professional and more popular journals.  This in 
turn resulted in a reduction of dissemination to potential users of 
research (Elton, 2000, p277). 
In this case, the aims of partner-funded research projects were difficult to 
reconcile with RAE success. 
 
A conflict arose from emphasis on RAE outcomes in relation to teaching, 
which competed with research activities for resources, such that 
mitigating one risk increased the rating of the other.  The unintended 
effect of the RAE was to confirm research dominance: 
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But above all, teaching suffered.  Research pressures on creative 
staff reduced their ability to be creative and innovative in their 
teaching, an effect that first became apparent in the Enterprise in 
Higher Education Initiative in about 1992.  This is not a research 
finding, but the Higher Education Advisers in the Employment 
Department all noted the effect (Elton, 2000, p278) 
Access to funding in relation to teaching, based on student numbers, not 
QAA assessment outcomes20, did not represent a difference to existing 
ways of working, so no threat was perceived, the aim of high quality 
teaching could be safely ignored to enable a focus on research excellence 
(Luhmann, 1995a). 
 
Furthermore, the findings illustrated that the emphasis on research 
presented a barrier to implementing managerial change in the 
organisation, since promotion prospects were described as being 
dependent on research output, not management record, providing an 
example of how a risk identified as a threat to individual career success 
could impact on organisational outcomes.  Many academics were 
described as ‘under pressure’ owing to competing demands for their time 
and attention.  The data indicated that the primary aims of research, then 
teaching, took priority over other goals.  In some areas, significant 
changes to the teaching portfolio had been made in recent years, 
reflecting the emphasis on research. 
We are trying to take seriously the college injunction to make 
sure that the teaching; the whole portfolio is linked to those areas 
of research expertise, which is why we’ve curtailed the rest of the 
teaching programmes.  [Academic] 
This statement illustrated the ability of the University to adapt to satisfy 
measures and access funds.  RAE assessments resulting in poor 
outcomes, for example, 3* ratings, were cited as leading to the closure of 
some teaching programmes. 
                                                
20 The QAA audit included a peer review of teaching observation and staff development 
as part of their report on institutional teaching quality, but this is not linked to funding. 
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We are actually getting rid of a whole range of degree 
programmes, Biological Sciences, Environmental Sciences,  … 
[Academic] 
The HEFCE research emphasis contributed to these decisions. 
We had too much a traditional approach for the Research 
Council funding, molecular stuff, molecular genetics stuff which 
is all specific to that area, and, to a lesser extent, some of the 
teaching areas were beginning to be impacted upon by national 
down turns in numbers of applicants.  [Academic] 
The findings illustrated how unintended outcomes arose when 
interpretation of communications was subject to double contingency 
(Luhmann, 1995a) and outcomes differed from the intent of the stated 
aim.  The University had closed courses in areas that had received poor 
RAE assessments, thereby removing them from the research assessment 
to improve overall RAE outcomes.  However, the literature suggests the 
government intended to improve research quality in these areas, and the 
closures were regarded as an unwelcome outcome of the stated aim of 
‘research-led’ teaching (King, 2006), resulting from the chosen method 
of measurement for the aim that took priority, the RAE.  
 
Participants revealed that informal forms of risk management juggle 
competing aims, as part of ‘normal business’ (Power, 2004a).  However, 
no evidence of assessment of frequency or severity to drive risk 
mitigation was found, and it was not risk assessment in the formal sense.  
Nonetheless, the need to take precautionary measures was identified, e.g., 
the RMAG internal assessment activity before RAE, to enhance 
achievement of selected organisational aims. 
 
The omission of competition as a factor in the HEFCE risk framework 
impacts on the way the regulator sets targets, resulting in a lack of 
balance, e.g., prioritising peer-reviewed research quality at the expense 
of other aims. Since risks could not be eliminated, a criteria for balance 
had to be found, producing outcomes that may be interpreted as 
unreasonable by regulators.  The methods used to assess achievement of 
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aims influenced organisational perspectives, and when goals competed 
one aim was given preference over the other using information from the 
environment to set priorities. This represents a significant finding for 
regulators, improving understanding of the unintended consequences that 
arise when perspectives develop through reflexive interpretation of 
threats to system survival. 
 
While the organisation demonstrated capability to prioritise risks and 
implement control processes in association with transparency demands, it 
is surprising and significant that these decisions were divorced from the 
risk register process. 
 
7.2.6 Implementation is ‘Fit for Audit’ 
The empirical findings, as detailed in the DDE analysis, revealed an 
emphasis on being ‘fit for audit’.  Furthermore, asking the ‘how’ 
question uncovered ‘why’ organisation members were undertaking risk 
assessment.  Groups and individuals undertook the risk register process 
with the aim of reducing the non-compliance risk.   Integration of the 
formal risk management system into day-to-day control activities was not 
necessary to fulfil this function. 
 
In several narratives, fulfilling regulatory demands was likened to game-
playing, necessitating the production of auditable outputs that meet the 
required criteria.  This was especially the case, since the only feedback 
evident from senior management was to chase registers that had not been 
submitted.  This is not to diminish the risk register’s value as a 
compliance tool. 
 
7.2.7 Communication in the Organisation 
The findings revealed many criticisms of internal communication, 
including lack of awareness of strategy, policies and procedures, and the 
absence of feedback mechanisms in relation to organisational controls.  
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Since social systems are constituted as ‘action systems’ through 
communication (Luhmann, 1995a), inertia is an expected outcome of 
lack of communication.  Nonetheless, this was not the case for all 
processes; feedback to senior management was designed into many 
academic controls, such as 6 monthly reviews of post-graduate progress.  
It was possible for the University to implement such procedures, despite 
the difficulties suggested by Dearlove (1998a, 1998b, 2002) in relation to 
the management of academics, but these did not form part of the formal 
risk management process. 
 
Compliance with H&S risk assessments using a ‘tick box’ approach 
enabled blame avoidance by individuals in the E&F Department. 
Associated with this, the risk register was perceived as a tool to transfer 
responsibility up the hierarchy within the organisation.  There was 
awareness of the value of denial of knowledge, those lower down the 
hierarchy displayed a desire to ensure more senior staff were informed of 
threats.  The findings indicated some unwillingness to acknowledge 
formal receipt of information about some risks, since communication of 
ignorance relieves responsibility (Luhmann, 1995a).  Lack of 
acknowledgement enables statements of ignorance to be made at a later 
date, if necessary. 
 
Risk management training functioned as a form of communication about 
risk when responsibility for the activity was accepted, but was likely to 
be ignored when not relevant to group role.  Recognition that the activity 
was already being performed encouraged participants to take a more 
positive attitude to the introduction of formalised operational risk 
management by seeing it as part of the role they undertook already, thus 
requiring less change to group values to incorporate the risk register 
process.  This was a significant strength of utilising SST within the MRT 
framework, fostering critical reflexive awareness in research participants, 
facilitating change. 
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7.2.8 Uncertainty Reduction 
Both informal and formal systems confirmed a desire to reduce 
uncertainty (Bernstein, 1996a; Bradac, 2001).  This was achieved by 
completing formal tick box exercises, and was also demonstrated by 
groups acting to mitigate risks that could be controlled locally, again, not 
driven by risk assessment outputs.   
 
In addition, ‘expectational ambiguity’ (Luhmann, 1995a) reduced 
uncertainty about the achievement of goals.  The management of estates 
projects incorporated a modular approach (some work being dropped if 
necessary) to achieve budgeted spend.   
 
The risk assessment process itself functioned to reduce uncertainty, by 
utilising risk ranking to prioritise those risks that were of greatest 
significance.  One of the most surprising findings of the study was the 
reluctance of workshop participants to provide values for risk ratings, 
especially when, for the majority of them, this was coupled with a 
preference for the use of numbers.  In this instance, uncertainty reduction 
may increase risk, presenting the appearance of control, reducing 
autopoietic concerns, but not reducing the risk itself. 
 
7.2.9 Summary of Question 1 Analysis 
This question investigated how risk assessment was being carried out in 
the organisation.  The review of the risk registers revealed that the 
system has been implemented and developed, and could be seen as an 
encouraging sign for the regulator.  However, critical analysis revealed 
that this paperwork fulfilled its role of compliance but was of no 
additional value to study participants.  Significantly, the findings were 
unequivocal in illustrating the reason why risk assessment is being 
performed; the risk register outputs are needed to demonstrate 
compliance with governance. 
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The normative analysis highlighted significant difficulties in the use of 
the recommended model, and illustrated how the implementation 
deviates from the ‘best practice’ model.  The study particularly revealed 
how poor internal communication compromised the risk assessment 
process, and illustrated an environment that was severely deficient for 
formal risk assessment activities.  Furthermore, the organisation needed 
to clarify who should be involved in the formal process, and, more 
importantly, so did the regulator.   
 
In addressing the question about how risk assessment was undertaken, 
the most significant contribution from the study was the difference 
between formal and informal systems.  Informal systems did not make 
any calculative assessment of risks, but they did result in structural 
changes and practices aimed at enhancing achievement of targets linked 
to funding.  The formal system produced a list of risks, sometimes with 
associated severity and frequency estimates, but the only change evident 
in working practices, linked to the risk register, was to a process to 
ensure the document was ready in the drawer in the event of an audit.  
Both formal and informal systems displayed autopoietic responses, based 
on reflexive interpretation of communications from systems that formed 
their environment. 
 
7.3 Analysis Two 
Research Question 2 asks:  
Does the organisational setting of the risk assessment affect the way it is 
conducted? 
 
This section reviews an important aspect of the risk management framework, 
since integration of local risk registers assumes that integrating these varying 
perspectives can form a representative picture of the whole.  This study utilised 
an embedded design to explore this question in greater depth.  The question 
developed to examine the character of the three embedded groups; their 
conflicting perspectives; competition between groups; conditioned expectations 
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and boundary effects. Consequently, the question revealed aspects of hierarchy, 
responsibility and authority alongside the aims of the group and exposed 
conflicts that emerged.  Luhmann (1995a) emphasised the reflexive influence of 
role on identification of ‘information’ that ‘makes a difference’. In describing 
each group, I recognise that my interpretations were dependent on interactions 
with them, and that my understandings were drawn from these. 
 
7.3.1 Characterisation of Groups 
This section is included to provide the context for SST analysis that 
follows, since the theory does not explain the historical system states 
from which autopoiesis proceeds (Luhmann, 2006).  It provides an 
overview of differences of the embedded cases in this study.  The 
contrasting views expressed in initial interviews provided confirmation 
of the influence of role on risk identification.  A more detailed 
examination of differences between workshop groups, and reflections on 
my interaction with them, is presented here. 
 
The DI was the first area to receive training, and treated me as a free 
management consultant, with the added benefit of the potential to 
feedback their concerns to Internal Audit.  In the preliminary interviews, 
the Head of the DI considered the greatest threat to the Institute is failure 
to maintain RAE 5* status.  However, in the training session, at which he 
was present, this was no longer the focus of his attention.  The effect of 
time on risk identification was illustrated; the attention of the group had 
shifted, supporting the view that risk is a socially constructed concept 
(Hacking, 1999), and can change recursively with information received 
from the environment.  Consequently, other matters, such as a potential 
merger, provided a greater stimulus for attention than the RAE.  This 
confirms the idea that risk priorities are likely to change over time in 
response to self-referential views or information from the environment.   
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Surprisingly, in a group with laboratory facilities and patient care 
responsibilities, no H&S risks were identified in the workshops or 
follow-up interviews.  Reviewing this finding in the light of my 
interaction with the group, the managerial approach of the Executive 
Team was evident, and this influences my interpretation that established 
management systems confirmed to them that H&S risks were under 
control.   
 
In general, the DI group appeared very open in their talk about risk.  
Discussions included an example of an unfavourable external 
assessment, and the group agreed that they had not identified the risk 
before the visit.  This indicated to me that the group were not defensive 
about negative outcomes, and were willing to disclose and discuss the 
problem, illustrating an attempt to learn from past events, enabling the 
system to adapt and improve survival chances.   
 
The selection of a merger opportunity as a source of risk for discussion 
reflected local objectives, linked to an aim of the organisation as a whole; 
the achievement of ‘world class’ status.  I received the impression that 
the group were ambitious, were well aware that size matters, and were 
willing to accept risks to achieve long-term aims. 
All opportunities have risk.  [T1A4 Academic/Manager] 
Underlying this approach to risk was an awareness of the need to gain 
advantage over, or merge with, competitors, reflecting the influence of 
NPM on this group in the University.  An associated shift in concern 
related to increases in transparency and the formal recording of risks, 
with the potential for secondary risk to reputation and increased 
bureaucracy.  
 
Overall, DI had an entrepreneurial approach to risk, in their willingness 
to countenance short-term losses for long-term gains.  They were the 
only group to demonstrate a clear awareness of risk as the potential for 
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beneficial outcomes, and view risk avoidance as potentially damaging to 
the overall success of the organisation.   
 
The E&F training workshops were attended by staff with considerable 
knowledge about risk management in relation to physical hazards.  The 
participants treated me as a research student, with potential to provide 
feedback that would enhance the implementation of risk management 
through study outputs.  The Head of E&F nominated his senior 
management team, and broadened the scope of risk beyond H&S by 
selecting ‘green legislation’ as a focus for discussions.  The two training 
sessions covered several issues in common, including estates and 
facilities, organisational issues, reputation, contingency planning and 
discussions on the risk management process itself.  Not surprisingly, 
many of the major risks for the E&F Department related to H&S and 
threats to buildings. 
Water management, legionella control, lifts, asbestos, electrical 
safety, falling from heights, flood and fire … [T3A1 Manager] 
The preliminary interview with the Head of Department suggested that 
the greatest threats facing the organisation were under-funding of 
maintenance, H&S and business issues.  The workshops and follow up 
interviews confirmed these issues were of concern to other staff in the 
area.  It was notable that the focus on ‘green legislation’, suggested by 
the Head of School, was only briefly considered by other group 
members.  Their concerns reflected instead the risks identified in his 
initial interview, revealing that tailoring of the presentation had not 
biased responses in this group.  ‘Green legislation’ was only treated as 
‘information’ by the Head of Department, who played a more strategic 
role in the organisation than other attendees.  
 
Working within tight financial constraints reduced the opportunity to use 
risk assessment outcomes to target actions, since the budget was 
effectively allocated as soon as it was available, albeit on those issues 
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that posed the greatest H&S risk, the organisation’s most serious threat in 
relation to estates.  
 
E&F illustrated a focus on the Department’s aims as sources of risk.  The 
issues discussed related to building maintenance, H&S and security, all 
of which were local staff responsibilities.  Lack of contingency planning 
reflected local impact in terms of dealing with emergencies or shut 
downs, and was emphasised in both groups. 
 
The group’s awareness of the link between authority to act and the 
willingness to accept responsibility for the management of risks, 
emphasised that both aspects need to be addressed if accountability is to 
be successfully delegated within the organisation. 
 
The final workshop was held in BHS, and the participants were unaware 
of HEFCE risk management guidance, treating me as a representative of 
senior management, informing them about recently introduced formal 
management requirements.  The preliminary interview with the Head of 
BHS suggested that a major risk was perceived to be the 
research/teaching balance, which was strongly echoed during the 
workshop sessions.  A reflexive interpretation revealed this as an 
outcome of a major recent reorganisation in the School, with a transfer of 
power to those heading Research Divisions.  With the closure of a 
number of courses, the group reflected their deep-seated mistrust of the 
changes that challenged traditional values, structures and historical 
academic and teaching emphasis.  The group provided an example of use 
of communication to attempt to change decisions that were not 
favourable to the group (Luhmann, 1995a), through expressions that 
structural changes threaten the quality of teaching and the ethos of the 
University. 
 
Staff instructed to attend training in BHS were not involved in the risk 
register process, undertook technical roles, and were less senior than 
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other group participants.  This was evident in statements made about 
authority to act and lack of involvement in decision-making activities.  It 
was more difficult to get this group talking about risks in the workshops.  
The attendees were unaware of regulatory changes and the introduction 
of the risk register.  However, once started, all attendees contributed, 
with the exception of one, who remained reluctant to participate.  
 
Local aims were less clear for this group and discussion focussed largely 
on the wider aim of high quality teaching and research that provided the 
focus in the training.  The expressed concerns about teaching and 
research balance echoed several preliminary interviews. 
 
These interactions with the workshop attendees informed my 
characterisation of the groups.  This reflection on the embedded cases 
enables contextualised interpretations of risk to frame reflexive concerns, 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
7.3.2 Interpretation of Operational Risk Assessment 
This section examines a concept that developed during the analysis; how 
groups utilise their interpretations of risk to allocate and accept 
responsibility for the activity.  All three groups, and the majority of 
interviewees, interpreted risk to mean physical hazard (Adams, 1995); 
the majority of participants expected risk management discussions to be 
about H&S.  As one trainee from E&F explained, attendance at the 
course enabled a wider range of risks to be assessed: 
Some people, they would have simply concentrated on H&S as 
being the risk and it made people think, there is more to this risk 
than the H&S approach, the financial business type of issues, that 
helped.  [T2A3] 
In the first stage interviews, a number of academics were reluctant to talk 
about risk; they did not feel sufficiently informed about its management. 
Four of the nine Heads of School asked for their local senior 
administrator to be present (only one was successfully persuaded that it 
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would not be necessary).  Administrative staff were perceived as being 
more likely to be able to answer the questions, confirming risk 
management fell outside the role of senior academics. 
 
In E&F, risk management was associated with crisis management and the 
hurried resolution of issues after an event, rather than improved ability to 
take decisions.   
 
As the definition of risk expanded to embrace organisational aims, 
members of the DI group displayed some dismay at the range of potential 
risks, and the ‘risk management of everything’ was an intimidating 
prospect.  The training acted as ‘information’ to enable a more focussed 
approach to the problem. 
 
The study revealed two important aspects of interpretation of risk 
assessment.  Firstly, the interpretation of ‘risk’ as ‘H&S risk’ (an 
administrative role) influenced the authority and responsibility for formal 
risk management.  Secondly, existing control processes that informally 
assessed risks to the organisation were not recognised as performing that 
role, until training improved reflexive understanding of the nature of 
operational risk. 
 
7.3.3 Conflicting Perspectives 
This section examines how the organisation established a balance in 
relation to a wide range of perspectives used to interpret and identify 
risks.  
 
There were different responses to RMAG activity; some groups, taking a 
target focus, welcomed the activity to strengthen research performance, 
while others viewed the process negatively, expressing doubt about its 
ability to improve the quality of research, reflecting a less results based 
interpretation. 
 
 Page 288 of 407 
Other reflexive differences were present.  Attendees in the BHS training 
session were aware of negative aspects associated with managing 
multiple sites.  In contrast, the E&F Department considered that the 
distributed nature of the estate reduced risk to the organisation overall: 
[University] has the benefit of not being all on one campus.  [T2 
unattributed] 
If there were a fire or flood in one part of the University, the other sites 
would be largely unaffected.  The difference of perspective between the 
two groups illustrated how risk identification linked to the reflexive 
concerns of the groups.  Furthermore, the management of student 
recruitment presented different problems for those Schools that struggled 
to attract enough good quality students when compared to those Schools 
where improved ‘A’ level grade attainment resulted in over-recruitment.  
 
It is interesting to note that risks to reputation were influenced by 
reflexive concerns.  From the perspective of E&F staff, the potential for 
run-down buildings, boiler failures or inadequate classrooms to impact 
on student perceptions highlighted local interests.  The BHS group raised 
concerns in relation to bodies and genetic research, and showed 
awareness of the way in which external perceptions of dread (Slovic, 
1987) in relation to such issues could impact on the organisation. The DI 
participants were concerned about the impact of server failure on 
successful delivery of their on-line courses.  
 
There were differences within and between Schools.  Position in the 
hierarchy also influenced the interpretation of risk.  For example, course 
closure decisions: individuals at risk of redundancy would hold a very 
different view to those in senior management, who identified a need to 
improve RAE assessment outcomes.   What was favourable to some was 
indeed unfavourable to others.  
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The analysis revealed that organisational setting influenced reflexive 
interpretations that varied within and between organisational groups, 
illustrating the impossibility of reducing all risks to all parties.   
 
The important finding here is that groups may interpret and respond to 
the same communication in different ways.  The narratives provided a 
window onto psychic systems (Luhmann, 1995a), illustrating how history 
and experience conditioned responses to information.  Consequently, 
aims need to be set in the context of the groups producing these varying 
responses to communications, some of which may be welcomed, while 
others will be misinterpreted, ignored or actively disputed.  This is 
particularly significant as an indicator of potential unintended outcomes. 
 
7.3.4 Competition between Groups 
The organisation placed greatest emphasis on mitigation of risks directly 
associated with the primary aims of research and teaching, and risks 
linked to support services, such as IT, HEFCE Human Resource 
Management governance and estates were given lower priority. 
 
Some recent internal reorganisations had resulted in gains and losses in 
different groups, with some appearing to gain advantage over others.  It 
was, therefore, not surprising that some participants expressed the view 
that some groups had more authority and power than others.  
Consequently, some areas saw other groups as sources of risk.  The 
systems exerted little control over each other, experienced little 
interpenetration through contact or communication, and had different 
aims and objectives.   
 
In addition, there were tensions between the roles of academic managers 
and administrative managers. 
If the nature of academic work has in the past implied 
independence and self-management, the increased emphasis 
placed on institutional management of teaching in a mass system 
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raises questions about the role of the academic community in an 
area where it had traditionally been unchallenged (Lapworth, 
2004, p305). 
Academics found themselves in an increasingly managerial environment, 
with oversight demanded centrally, to satisfy external requests.  
Resistance was evident; the academic role did not include administrative 
returns.  However, despite this their influence remained strong, the 
findings illustrate academic aims win the battle for funding.  At the same 
time, the apparent diminution of academic authority in management 
decision-making was unwelcome.  
 
Competition between universities was also evident in the need to monitor 
and keep pace with competitors in the HE sector.  A fear of falling 
behind other institutions was expressed, both in terms of transparency 
measures and of ‘missing out’ on the claimed benefits of improved risk 
management. 
 
The findings revealed an increasingly competitive NPM environment, 
both within and between organisations.  The competition between groups 
within the organisation for access to limited funding illustrated the 
importance of authority and power in the prioritisation of risk 
management activities within the organisation. 
 
7.3.5 Boundary Effects 
This section evaluates how the boundaries to the responsibility and 
authority for sub-groups and individuals within an organisation impact 
on risk management activities.  Participants described boundaries to 
responsibility, both in terms of the formal organisation structure and the 
nature of their work.  These boundaries acted as barriers.  Responsibility 
for activities that overlapped beyond reflexive interpretations of role 
required senior management intervention to enable boundaries to be 
redefined, or to co-ordinate activities across groups. 
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In all embedded cases, since contingency planning did not fall within 
their normal day-to-day role, there was a perception that responsibility 
must rest at a higher level within the organisational hierarchy.  
Participants frequently raised the question of who was, or should be, 
responsible for emergency planning.  If contingency plans existed, the 
staff, particularly in E&F, that would need to implement them were not 
aware of them, but despite the increased threat to the group concerned 
should the event occur, responsibility lay elsewhere.  One of the most 
surprising findings for me (with past experience of management system 
assessment and a ‘show me’ mentality) was the assumption that others 
‘must’ be dealing with such risks. 
 
Stories about organisational risks described control as a procedure or a 
set of actions with clearly defined spatial and social boundaries (Soin & 
Scheytt, 2006).  The findings illustrated that internal boundaries resulted 
in gaps in control systems, highlighted by the assumption that financial 
estimates associated with estates investment were produced by E&F, 
since the calculations are not performed in the Finance Department.  
With both groups represented at the same workshop, it became apparent 
that neither accepted responsibility for undertaking such analyses; they 
were not done at all.  To mitigate these problems, joint working 
arrangements for Medical Schools ensured involvement of both groups to 
prevent a situation in which neither group was taking responsibility for 
management of particular issues, at the expense of duplication of activity.   
 
The findings provided fresh insight into reflexive interpretations of group 
and role boundaries, and were particularly significant in relation to 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for risk management if a threat 
extends beyond these invisible borders. 
   
7.3.6 Summary of Question 2 Analysis 
This section has investigated whether the organisational setting of the 
risk assessment affected the way it was conducted and confirms that it 
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did.  The findings revealed conflicting perspectives about what 
constituted a risk and that competition between groups was present in the 
organisation.  Within Schools, the roles of academics and administrative 
staff were demarcated, with risk falling into the domain of the latter, with 
significant impact on formal risk assessment outputs.  In weighing the 
risks, balances were struck through the ability to implement risk 
mitigation, closely tied to authority and access to financial resources, 
confirming Luhmann’s suggestion that hierarchy is used to settle 
conflicting demands.   
 
All interviews and workshops provided evidence of the influence of local 
aims and role boundaries on the identification, assessment and 
management of risk, confirming the organisational setting had a 
significant impact on the way risks were identified and assessed. 
 
7.4 Analysis Three 
Research Question 3 asks:  
What is acceptable or tolerable risk to individuals in the University and 
what factors influence this understanding? 
 
This section investigates this question, using analytical concepts that developed 
through data interacting with the theoretical frame, to reveal the influence of 
conditioned expectations, existing management systems, external views, and the 
impact of degree of control (Adams, 1995) on the acceptability of risks. 
 
7.4.1 Conditioned Expectations 
This section examines how conditioned expectations influence the 
identification of risk, which functions to detect differences between the 
system and the environment.  The findings confirmed the SST idea that 
the system ignores signals that are frequent and expected.  Threats 
considered ‘normal’ were not risks to be included in the risk registers.  
One such example related to the general perception that IT support is 
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poor and presents local problems to staff.  Another concern related to 
access control and security.  However, neither issue appeared on previous 
risk registers.   
 
Most participants gave the impression that, although IT support was a 
problem, they were used to working within the existing system.  Personal 
experience as a student suggested that members of staff more recently 
recruited to the organisation were more critical of the IT infrastructure, 
network and backup facilities.  Systems developed an immune system 
and omitted on-going, low-level risks from risk registers, although they 
were recognised as threats in the interviews and workshops. 
 
The DI attendees were aware of the influence of conditioning and 
suggested that others from outside the group could provide different 
responses to familiar scenarios, and they saw value in obtaining and 
utilising such views.   
 
In addition, past events conditioned the way that attendees imagined 
potential risk scenarios, and past risks that had resulted in problems were 
more likely to be considered when identifying risks.  Furthermore, the 
findings suggested that historical factors influenced the system’s 
willingness to change, with those Schools and Departments that had 
undergone restructuring or mergers more open to such ideas.    
 
Individuals and groups concentrated on selected aspects of risk and 
ignored others (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), particularly in accepting 
continuous low impact risks.  Academics worked longer hours to support 
research contracts that did not provide full overhead recovery, 
additionally undertaking administrative roles and reducing investment in 
facilities and infrastructure.  Based on my own experience as a student 
(observer-participant), these arrangements were the normal way of 
working; only one Phase 1 interviewee saw it as a risk.  One workshop 
attendee raised the interesting suggestion that system conditioning 
enables lack of funding to excuse organisational inertia, providing the 
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justification to continue without change.  The acceptability of risk was 
strongly influenced by conditioned expectations. 
 
7.4.2 Existing Management Control Systems 
One of the most significant findings about the interpretation of risk 
related to existing controls, revealing that by default, if a funding request 
is refused, those affected considered the risk to be acceptable to the 
organisation.  The research illustrated how spending decisions provided 
feedback for staff at lower levels in the organisation in relation to 
acceptable risk.  The unwillingness to make financial commitment 
contributed to the view that the organisation had little ‘risk appetite’; 
senior management responses indicated to participants that no change 
was the preferred approach.   
 
My observation of the DI Executive meeting confirmed the role of 
existing management forums in the identification and control of risk, 
albeit without formal assessment of severity and frequency.   
 
While several formal systems were described as ineffective, this was not 
the case for many existing controls that were not recognised as 
performing a risk management function.  The inability to recognise 
existing management controls as risk controls undermines an assessment 
model that compares the net rating of a risk to the ill-defined corporate 
risk appetite.  
 
7.4.3 Influence of External Views 
This section examines how acceptable risk is influenced by external 
groups that interpret organisational information, and findings confirmed 
that the outputs of the risk assessment process were designed with 
stakeholders in mind (Clarke, 1999) in the form of the risk register.   
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Maintaining the University’s reputation was regarded by the majority of 
the participants as very important to the future development of the 
organisation.  The nature of this risk was complex: 
First, reputation risk potentially pervades all organizing activity 
in such a way that it can be regarded as the purest man-made risk 
of organizing as such, namely the risk of how one is perceived by 
others.  Second, because reputation is a communicative construct 
beyond the direct control of the organization, often embedded in 
media-friendly external measures such as ranking and ratings, 
then ‘reputational risk’ poses distinctive management issues, not 
least being that it defies traditional accounting conventions of 
materiality (Power et al, 2009, p173). 
The risk was manifest in the ability to retain research funding and high 
quality students, but was perceived to arise from a wide variety of 
sources. 
I think it is anything that brings it into disrepute.  [T4A3 
Technical Manager interview] 
Information about risk was received by the system from external sources, 
and NPM transparency tools such as published league tables and funding 
body targets influenced internal views of acceptable risk, since what was 
measured was what mattered (Otley, 2003).  Improvement of measured 
outcomes and achievement of targets became a focus for risk mitigation 
activities, evidenced by changes to internal control processes.  
Significantly, these actions did reduce risk.  Even if the focus was at 
variance with the intended aim of the performance measure, the risk 
associated with poor external perceptions of internal control were 
reduced to an acceptable level for the organisation, but without utilising 
formal risk assessment processes.  The transition to an environment of 
market driven competition increased the influence of transparency 
measures to determine acceptable risk. 
 
7.4.4 Degree of Control 
This section examines an important relationship between ability to 
mitigate and risk acceptability, and the findings confirmed a link between 
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responsibility and authority and risk appetite.  If a risk could not be 
controlled by a particular group, the group expressed the view that 
something should be, or might already have been, done by others.  Risks 
for which they accepted responsibility, and more importantly, had 
authority, were considered adequately managed, and therefore tolerable. 
 
The DI recognised that degree of control was an important aspect in the 
conversion of opportunities into benefits for the organisation, indicating 
that the HEFCE framework focus on control of risks had some benefit, 
even in the case of opportunities. 
 
For some risk types, such as research fraud and those relating to student 
activities, there was a stated lack of ability to exercise direct controls, 
increasing reflexive concerns about such threats.  In contrast, some local 
arrangements (e.g., site sharing arrangements, IT support) had improved 
the ability to manage risks through increased control. 
 
The degree of control was also reduced when responsibility for managing 
an adverse outcome was assigned after the event, described as crisis 
management.  This was particularly unwelcome to E&F participants, 
especially after requests for funding to mitigate the risk had previously 
been refused.  The partnership arrangements under PFI also served to 
reduce control, and the associated risks were increased from the 
perspective of E&F and BHS attendees. 
 
In all workshops, participants indicated that a lack of contingency 
planning increased risk for members of staff who were unsure about how 
incidents should be handled.  This applied both to external threats such as 
bombs and pandemics, and to the management of internal infrastructure 
failure, such as boilers or the IT network. 
 
The findings were unequivocal that the design of risk management 
systems must incorporate authority and responsibility to enable risk 
management to be successfully delegated. The lack of authority in some 
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groups reduced ability to take mitigating action; the risk had to be 
acceptable.  Risk assessment activities were less worthwhile for those 
with a low degree of control.  This is a potentially unwelcome finding, 
since it would require devolving spending authority, and to involve those 
lower in the hierarchy implies a loosening of financial controls, with 
associated budget increases, to fund risk mitigation.  The involvement of 
a wide range of voices in the process, recommended by HEFCE (2001) 
has a serious hurdle to overcome.  The findings confirm that a high 
degree of control is closely associated with acceptable risk. 
 
7.4.5 Summary of Question 3 Analysis 
The analysis revealed what was acceptable or tolerable to individuals in 
the University and uncovered a number of significant factors that 
influenced this understanding.  The conditioned expectations of 
participants enabled a number of regularly recurring risks to be ignored, 
while those not encountered previously were unlikely to be considered. 
 
The evaluation of existing management systems revealed a lack of 
internal feedback mechanisms, reducing local groups’ ability to 
understand the organisational ‘risk appetite’.  This absence of 
information suggested a significant finding in relation to the extant 
literature; lack of internal communication led to the use of financial 
decision-making to interpret organisational risk priorities and acceptable 
risk, and also coloured the local understanding of institutional aims.  The 
acceptance of risk by default was the outcome. 
 
External views were most clearly evident in changes linked to 
performance measures, league tables and assessment outcomes, such that 
those became the focus of management activities.  Most surprisingly, this 
took place without use of formal risk management processes, suggesting 
no need to implement such additional controls, since the organisation 
would manage risks anyway, as it has always done.   
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The importance of degree of control had two elements, firstly the ability 
to control increased confidence in risk mitigation, increasing risk 
acceptability; secondly, a lack of control caused concern despite lack of 
awareness of how well others were managing risks.  In both these cases, 
the acceptability of risk had little to do with the net risk in some 
measurable sense, but did have a bearing on willingness to accept 
responsibility and accountability.   
 
7.5 Analysis Four 
Research Question 4 asks: 
What uncertainties are apparent during risk assessment activities?   
 
This section critically evaluates an important element that is evident, but not 
explicitly recognised within operational risk assessment. Facets of uncertainty 
revealed in the inputs to the process illustrated that risk assessment was not a 
form of measurement.  Consequently, the outputs of the assessment process 
were themselves uncertain, linked to calculability problems associated with 
estimating the potential frequency and severity of events in an unknowable 
future.  
 
7.5.1 Risk Assessment Output is not a Form of Measurement 
The recommended risk management framework relies on ability to rate 
and rank risks, and assumes that outputs represent a realistic assessment 
of severity and likelihood.  If outputs are not a form of measurement, this 
core assumption of the model is undermined.  There was little data use as 
an input to the risk assessment process and narratives suggested that 
experience and historical events provided the best guidance for 
assessment.  Risk registers and training sessions demonstrated that 
available data frequently made it impossible to calculate financial loss in 
any meaningful way; decisions about risks had to be made with 
insufficient facts (Adams, 1995).  
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Discussions uncovered uncertainties associated with the lack of a simple 
cause/effect relationship of some risks.  In many cases, combinations of 
events resulted in more severe outcomes than if each had occurred at 
different times, increasing the difficulty of imagining possible outcomes 
during risk assessment discussions.   
 
A major source of uncertainty in the calculation of risk ratings was the 
environment in which HE establishments operate.  There was a 
perception of continual change, requiring internal systems to adapt to 
keep in step with regulatory and other external demands, described as 
unpredictable.  The Health Schools also had to take account of potential 
changes in Health Services provision and aims, exacerbating this 
uncertainty. 
 
The difficulty of evaluating changes, such as the impact of new senior 
personnel in an organisation, highlighted that quantitative assessment 
was not helpful for such operational concerns, since it was not possible to 
estimate the future behaviour of another (as yet unknown) individual.  
However, it was evidently a reasonable cause for concern, utilising 
historical information. 
 
The complexity of assessment increased when comparing 'apples' with 
'pears' in relation to different risks present in the organisation.  In the 
absence of ability to generate financial loss/gain estimates, the 
comparison of risks identified by different groups in the organisation was 
difficult.  There were vague notions of outcomes that were ‘very 
expensive’ or ‘cost them dear’, but ignorance of actual values, illustrated 
the difficulty.  Furthermore, some risks, such as reputation or 
unpredictable changes in regulation, could not be calculated in terms of 
financial loss and illustrated ‘unknowability’ (Keynes, 1973).  Several 
attendees expressed the view that operational risk ratings were not true 
risk calculations, but were more akin to value judgements. 
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In addition, there was confusion about the use of frequency and severity, 
with descriptions indicating that severity increased if an event occurred 
more often.  The two concepts need to be treated separately to enable the 
use of the rating grid (Figure 2.1).  Training activity helped to clarify this 
aspect of assessment. 
 
Across the organisation, different levels of assessment were evident.  
While some risks impact on the whole organisation, others affect 
particular groups or localities and, at the individual level, personal risks, 
in terms of job security, promotion opportunities and accountability.  The 
participants confirmed that:   
What is good for one part of an organization is not always good 
for a larger social system of which it is a part (March, 1991, 
p104). 
Risk assessments can be skewed to maximise local gains, as values and 
perspectives colour interpretation of the benefits to be gained.   
 
A significant feature of training sessions was unwillingness to assign risk 
ratings (19 of 20 participants).  I interpreted this as a response to the 
problematic nature of qualitative assessment, with demonstrable lack of 
relevant data, the need for comparison of different risk types, and the 
consequent inability to perform a simple mathematical calculation to 
provide an answer.  Paradoxically, the majority of follow-up interviews 
revealed a preference for the use of numbers to prevent the process 
becoming ‘a bit vague’.  This paradox sheds some light on the emphasis 
placed on calculative techniques in organisational analysis; the data 
confirmed a cultural leaning towards such methods, despite awareness of 
their limitations. 
 
In attempts to assess risk in all workshops, risks that were more serious 
occurred less frequently, and less serious risks occurred more often.  As a 
result, the overall value tended towards a similar rating regardless of 
whether the worst case or best-case scenario was considered. 
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The analysis revealed that, within their groups, people generally agreed 
with what others had to say and there were no major disagreements.  
However, since there was little attempt to assign ratings, the discussions 
did not reveal individual differences in assessment in terms of frequency 
and severity.  One risk tolerant individual from E&F expressed the view 
that even if a very serious incident did occur, it would be unlikely to 
close the University, providing an example of how individual preferences 
for risk taking could influence ratings.  Another participant suggested 
that ratings assigned by individuals would be different on another day, 
reducing the value of such assessments.   
 
In summary, since risk register outputs were not a form of measurement 
the process could not summarise the key risks to the organisation with 
any degree of confidence and did not assist with increasing selectivity 
and decision-making.  There was little evidence of systematic use of 
statistics or other information sources in workshop risk assessments; 
historical events, organisational stories and shared experience formed the 
basis for assessment in the sessions.  Participants could not use the 
recommended framework effectively.  In the absence of the ability to 
produce comparable values to rank different risks and compare them with 
the organisation’s risk appetite undermined the ‘best practice’ approach 
to risk management. 
 
7.5.2 Uncertainty Surrounding Aims and Objectives  
This section investigates how a lack of clarity about organisational aims 
presents an impediment to the implementation of risk management, 
undermining a control system approach that places emphasis on 
institutional capacity to set definite goals and convert them into 
quantified decision rules (Hood & Jones, 1996).   The organisation had to 
translate external aims from different funding bodies and partner 
organisations into a coherent strategy that organisational members could 
implement.  Several participants displayed an inability to reconcile the 
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stated desire to be ‘world class’ with unwillingness to authorise funding 
requests that aligned with the strategy.   
 
Misunderstanding of PFI arrangements created further confusion about 
aims, interpreted through spending decisions.  The workshops illustrated 
that the University failed to communicate the strategic reasons for PFI 
arrangements; the result was incomprehension leading to the 
interpretation that poor management practices were increasing long-term 
costs for the organisation. 
 
The vast majority of interviewees and workshop participants showed 
little awareness of strategic plans, and although E&F attendees were 
aware there was a plan, they made the point that it was unclear what it 
meant locally.  While the University was good at writing strategic plans, 
they were described as poor at implementing them.  The use of strategic 
planning to prioritise competing aims was not evident in this study, 
although key targets had been added to the key corporate risks document, 
this was not circulated beyond PCT and Internal Audit staff.  
 
The DI attendees demonstrated a clearer appreciation of aims and goals 
than other groups, largely since they appeared to have established their 
own, but whether this reflected the strategic plans for the organisation as 
a whole remained unclear.  Other interviewees and groups illustrated 
how lack of awareness of aims, and how to satisfy them, undermined the 
ability to assess risks.   
 
7.5.3 Uncertainty Associated with Process Control 
This section investigates how uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
existing management controls impacts on risk assessment outcomes.  
Interviewees and group members in all workshops raised concerns about 
risks encountered as a result of poorly implemented management 
processes, especially internal communication and contingency planning, 
but also business planning and plagiarism.   
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A lack of awareness of policies and procedures (organisational tools for 
reducing variability and uncertainty), was made evident by several 
participants, particularly during the BHS workshop session.  The E&F 
and BHS groups illustrated that when uncertainty increased, because of 
lack of procedures, one outcome was blame avoidance and lack of 
willingness to take responsibility (‘more than my job’s worth’).   
 
Procedures removed the need for individuals to make decisions, enabling 
automatic responses and removing doubts about authority to act (Perrow, 
1986).  Furthermore, while a lack of coherent processes increased 
uncertainty for the individuals concerned, it also increased ratings for 
those risks where institutional processes played a part in mitigation, 
particularly in relation to contingency planning, or the lack thereof.  
Furthermore, while the lack of procedures for contingency planning was 
clear, the potential impact of this uncertainty remained shrouded in an 
unknowable future. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding many existing processes has an additional 
impact; the effectiveness of controls is an input to the assessment of the 
net risk calculation, potentially raising risk values across the 
organisation.   
 
7.5.4 Summary of Question 4 Analysis 
The analysis has revealed significant uncertainties that were apparent 
during risk assessment activities.  Operational risk assessment had little 
quantitative data to support assessment.  The influence of different levels 
of assessment and individual judgements based on experience and the 
aims of the group resulted in differences in assessment outcomes 
between sub-groups.  The ability to predict future outcomes was 
hampered by ‘unknowability’ in the Keynesian sense.  The risk 
assessment process was not calculative, and the numbers or qualitative 
labels produced did not represent true values. The study illustrated that 
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risk mitigation activities focussed elsewhere for ‘information’, and risk 
register outputs were ignored. 
 
Uncertainty about organisational aims and how to implement them 
contributed to an inability to rate and rank risks.  Lack of confidence in 
internal processes would increase net risk ratings, if any participants had 
shown a willingness to estimate them.  Paradoxically, the study 
confirmed that most participants would prefer to stick with the use of 
numbers, illustrating a desire to reduce uncertainty by providing a 
semblance of order and forcing decisions that might otherwise be 
avoided. 
 
7.6 Summary of Empirical Findings 
This chapter has analysed the evidence from the previous two chapters to draw 
out the significant features of the case and to provide answers to the research 
questions asked.  The comparison of narratives and the risk register paperwork 
illustrated the omission of academic concerns in the registers, except notably, 
after the DI group attended the Phase 2 workshops.   Although there was some 
process improvement between the two phases, with updated risk register 
headings and inclusion of academics with responsibility for risk management, 
the narratives suggested these remained purely administrative improvements.  
However, these changes would be seen as a positive sign in the event of an audit 
that focussed on paperwork compliance.   
 
The DDE normative analysis raised a number of issues in relation to the 
implementation of the guidance, and detailed recommendations on improving 
compliance with the spirit of the governance are included in Appendix 10 of this 
thesis (Recommendations for the Project Sponsor). Overall, a number of 
concerns about the implementation of the risk register process were revealed.  
Firstly, the document’s circulation; secondly, deciding who should be involved 
in local operational risk assessment; thirdly, the perception that the process is 
aimed at compliance; fourthly, lack of feedback from the centre, or more senior 
members in the hierarchy, to those providing input, both in relation to aims and 
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risk reporting; fifthly, a lack of focus on opportunity risk and finally a lack of 
integration with existing risk management practices. 
 
The ‘how’ of risk assessment revealed that the risk register process fed 
information upwards within the organisation, with little or no information 
flowing in the other direction.  Lack of communication was interpreted as 
information by the research participants (Luhmann, 1995a) with the outcome 
that the Effector element of the process was absent.  So, no action was required 
in relation to reported risks.  The risk registers were perceived to be of no 
additional value, and this could be postulated as an important mechanism in 
encouraging lip service to the process.    
 
Importantly, informal risk assessment was present within existing management 
controls, illustrating that a lack of formal assessment of frequency and severity 
did not prevent management intervening successfully to reduce risks, 
particularly in relation to access to funding, e.g., maximising RAE ratings and 
improving 4-year PhD completion rates.  However, since these activities were 
not recognised as risk management, the organisation was unable to point to them 
to satisfy transparency demands. 
 
The influence of organisational setting was confirmed in the study.  There was 
little disagreement amongst participants at each session, confirming similarities 
between attendees in each group and their risk concerns (Luhmann, 1995a, 
Krimsky, 1992).  The organisational setting influenced risk identification in 
relation to group influences, hierarchy and individual role.  Common features 
emerged in ideas relating to risk transfer, lack of contingency planning, the 
ability to ignore certain low-level threats, such as IT or building maintenance.  
Furthermore, certain risks were described as the responsibility of other areas, 
and interestingly, it was assumed such risks were being mitigated, despite lack 
of relevant information.  Crucially, this question revealed the presence of 
competing and conflicting aims, resulting in variation in risks that cause 
concern, and differing priorities, undermining establishment of an organisation-
wide ‘risk appetite’.   Empirical evidence reveals how mitigation of one risk can 
increase the threat associated with others, such that a balance needs to be struck. 
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Risk acceptability is a complex construct that incorporates much more than a 
comparison of a risk value against a pre-determined level of acceptability.  The 
study illustrated how degree of control interacted with internal management 
controls and interpretation of external demands to determine the acceptability of 
risks. An important aspect of external influences on risk identification was the 
filtering or distortion of aims, associated with the means of satisfying 
transparency demands.  The regulatory and funding bodies need to take account 
of the way conflicting demands and measurement methods impact on 
interpretations of acceptable risk.   
 
In the absence of a stated ‘risk appetite’, it was impossible for organisation 
members to assess risk in the context of the risk tolerance of the University.  The 
general feedback about risk appetite suggested that a more risk taking, 
entrepreneurial approach to risk would be welcomed by several who attended 
the DI and E&F workshops.   
 
The discussions and interviews illustrated numerous sources of uncertainty, both 
in relation to lack of data, poor internal communication and the assessment of 
possible future outcomes.  The prediction of infrequent events posed a problem, 
as it is in many quantitative assessments (Kunreuther et al, 1984).  In addition, 
double contingency (Luhmann, 1995a) was present when groups attempted to 
interpret communication about aims into local objectives.  Participants seemed 
unsure whether senior management communications had been interpreted 
correctly, feedback to enable completion of the information exchange was 
absent.  In short, the use of risk assessment to support decision-making was not 
evident, although participants described the system as compliant with regulatory 
demands.  The research makes a significant contribution to understanding the 
assessment of operational risk, demonstrating that outputs were not a form of 
measurement, and questioning the usefulness of a calculative model. 
 
One uncertainty that the organisation could significantly reduce is the lack of 
clarity about responsibility for risk. Several attendees in the E&F workshops 
were aware of responsibility for risk being passed back and forth in the manner 
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of pass-the-parcel, particularly after the occurrence of an unwanted event.  
Authority was an essential factor in the acceptance of accountability for risk.  
The DI emphasised the impact of authority and funding decisions to allow 
opportunities to be translated into organisational benefits.   
 
The in-depth analysis illustrated the richness of the data, revealing fascinating 
insights into a real-life implementation of risk management governance, and 
drawing conclusions in relation to each of the questions asked.  The final chapter 
of this thesis illustrates how the case study findings make a significant 
contribution to the literature reviewed earlier in this thesis and evaluates the 
effectiveness of SST in generating useful perspectives from the narratives.  The 
chapter also discusses limitations to the research and provides suggestions for 
further work.  The thesis concludes by summarising the significant contributions 
to knowledge that the study makes. 
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8 Conclusions: Research Contributions and Future Research 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter begins by drawing the research findings and the existing 
scholarly research together, to illustrate the significant contributions the case 
study makes to the literature in the fields of risk management, management 
control and strategy more generally.  It moves on to review the value of the SST 
theoretical perspectives adopted for the analysis and considers limitations of the 
research.  Suggestions for future work follow and the thesis draws to a close 
with reflections on the study and concluding remarks. 
 
8.2 Contribution to the Literature 
This section draws together the analysis from the previous chapter and the 
literature that provided the background for the development of the research 
questions. It will focus on the research questions and the contribution made by 
this thesis to the literature in the fields of risk, control systems more generally 
and governance implementation.   
 
8.2.1 The ‘How’ of Risk Assessment 
The study reveals how the University adapted to incorporate private 
sector management practices (Hood, 1995).  The process of convergence 
between regulatory ambitions and organisational interpretations was not 
guaranteed (Hutter & Power, 2000) and unintended outcomes emerged 
(Merton, 1936).  The study illustrated several examples of the way in 
which regulatory aims were thwarted through emphasis on targets and 
measures, with rich descriptions of the way in which the aims of policy 
were filtered or distorted (Hood et al, 2001).    
 
The organisational oversight and accountability dimensions of risk 
management are emphasised in ERM, and participants responded to 
institutional pressures to make risk management practice auditable 
(Power, 2005; 2007).   
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The most recent bright idea in management-speak is the dreaded 
"Risk Register".  Like most ideas, this was sensible until the 
auditors got hold of it.  The basic idea is that you sit down and 
think of the 10 worst things that might go wrong and work out 
what you can do to stop them.  You look at materiality - will it be 
devastating or harmless?  Then you look at likelihood - will it 
actually happen?  Multiply materiality by likelihood and you get 
a completely fatuous figure, which you can pretend is a "real 
measure of risk", and this will make the auditors go away 
(Knight, 2004). 
Several participants were well aware of the risk register’s value as a 
compliance tool, but did not regard the activity as beneficial in terms of 
local operational performance.  The autopoietic system relied on ‘tick 
box’ responses to facilitate external oversight, reducing non-compliance 
risk, despite lack of utility locally (Power, 2005).   
 
Most significantly, a gap in the literature was identified; while existing 
management controls actively performed mitigation activities, they could 
not be cited, since they were not ‘risk management’. 
 
Decline of organisational trust and low morale (Power, 2005) were 
suggested in a few narratives but are difficult to link causally to increased 
use of audit practices. Reflexive comments suggested wider concerns 
were present since employees could not rely on stability in organisations; 
there were no longer jobs for life and individuals were faced with 
knowledge of change (Handy, 1996), including the outsourcing of 
support functions and teaching roles.   
 
The study reveals decoupling of the risk register with day-to-day 
activities, some gaps in its content in relation to narrative data and a 
general lack of recognition of existing risk controls.  Audit activities are 
remote from ‘what is really going on’ (Power, 1997).  Consequently, the 
DI group questioned the functional benefit of risk assessment, and 
because the process had little analytical value, it did not provide a basis 
for effective action (Raban & Turner, 2006).  
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Since risk is conceptualised as failure to achieve corporate aims the study 
illustrates that both non-academic and academic staff had already been 
carrying out risk management without knowing it and workshop follow-
up interviews suggested more willingness to be involved if they were 
made aware of this through training (HEFCE, 2005).   
 
The University had been managing risks successfully for many years, 
and it seems appropriate to ask whether there is any benefit to aligning 
internal systems with the suggested risk management framework. 
Clearly, some decisions do not need full explicit quantitative 
treatment of uncertainties (or any at all): sound risk management 
decisions are often made and have been made for a long time 
without any such analysis (Paté-Cornell, 1996, p98). 
Compliance with HEFCE risk governance could be more meaningfully 
demonstrated through an understanding and acknowledgement of the 
way the University already manages risks. 
 
The University had to balance a number of elements that interacted with 
each other (Treasury, 2004).  The workshops illustrated interactions 
between risk and other management controls (Mikes, 2009).  Assessment 
ratings should reflect net risk by taking account of such management 
controls (HEFCE, 2001).  The narratives indicated variability in 
implementation of processes across the organisation and where risk 
mitigation was concerned, the vast majority of comments indicate 
internal controls would be considered ineffective, although a few good 
local H&S systems were mentioned.   
 
The study reveals aspects of three types of controls that Perrow (1986) 
suggests organisations implement.  Direct controls were present in 
surveillance and scrutiny of statistics, such as RAE outcomes, and rules 
and regulations, including post-graduate progress monitoring and the 
requirement for completion of a risk register.  Bureaucratic controls were 
embodied in specialisation and hierarchy, and were found in long 
standing College Committee structures and the functional split of 
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administrative and academic roles.  Fully unobtrusive controls influenced 
the cognitive premises underlying action and the narratives from groups 
and individuals revealed norms that informed appropriate courses of 
action.  This type of control utilises the systems view of itself (Luhmann, 
1995a) and not surprisingly, in the HE context, were most evident in the 
emphasis of participants on academic excellence.  Although, perhaps 
surprisingly, in relation to PhDs, the 4-year completion target had come 
to take precedence over thesis quality, illustrating the strong influence of 
financial rewards or sanctions on the alignment of strategic aims. 
 
Furthermore, the findings shed light on Simons’ (1994) four ‘Levers of 
Control’ to drive business strategy.  Firstly, narratives illustrated belief 
systems in relation to the primary aims of research and teaching, defining 
basic values, but distortion of these beliefs was evident in a focus on 
metric production; strategy became equated with achieving compliance 
aims.   
 
Secondly, boundary systems, or formally sanctioned rules, were evident, 
but several accounts decried the lack of credible threat of punishment in 
relation to management controls.  An increase in centralised control over 
reporting for external scrutiny was evident; sanctioned rules were 
effective in asserting paperwork delivery deadlines.   
 
Thirdly, the rift between formal and informal management of risks was 
most evident in diagnostics control systems, which monitor 
organisational outcomes compared to preset standards of performance, a 
normal practice in existing management controls, but not evident in the 
formal risk management system.   
 
Lastly, interactive control systems were weakened by poor feedback 
mechanisms, except when financial penalties were identified.  The lack 
of response from senior management to risk register submissions 
indicated a failure to support the decision-making of subordinates.   The 
narratives revealed a lack of clarity about strategic aims, and the levers of 
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control direct strategic goals towards achievement of regulatory 
compliance and favourable transparency reports.  The case illustrates 
how risk intertwines with strategy, since both relate to enhancing 
organisational aims and the distorting effect of performance measures 
was evident. 
 
The participants expressed difficulty in implementing some management 
controls, including strategic plans, since ineffective communication 
prevented organisation members being kept informed of policies, 
procedures and objectives to which they were expected to conform 
(Drury, 2005).  However, this was clearly not the case in all control 
systems since the University had implemented systems to enhance RAE 
outcomes in all academic groups.  In addition, new processes contributed 
to success in topping the league of PhD completions within 4 years, with 
92% qualified in time against a benchmark of 79% (Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 5/10/07).  Indeed, at the time of writing this 
conclusion the University was named ‘University of the Year’ in a 
newspaper University Guide based on measures of a number of criteria 
including student satisfaction, research quality, academic peer review, 
entrance qualifications held by new students, degree results achieved, 
student/staff ratios, dropout rates and graduate employment levels.  In 
every one of the criteria, the University had improved its position, the 
only university to do so.   
 
Management of risk was obviously working well in relation to 
transparency measures, although unconnected with formal risk 
assessments.  In the light of this success, this thesis reveals that 
implementing formal risk management models is a waste of time, since 
the University demonstrates that successful risk management, as defined 
by HEFCE (2001), forms a normal part of academic life.  Although the 
outcomes may seem unreasonable to regulators, increased access to 
funding and high quality students can be gained through maximising 
target measures, and thus represents good risk management in terms of 
enhancing achievement of organisational aims.   
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Furthermore, as Beach, (1997) suggests probability theory cannot 
accommodate causal relationships, and the workshops illustrated that 
decision makers were not doing probability calculations badly, they were 
doing something else entirely.  Probability calculations were not utilised 
in a process in which people tried to understand causal forces for 
decision-making.  However, several participants indicated a preference 
for the use of numbers, including those who were reluctant to assign 
values in the training session, reflecting wider cultural anxieties and the 
need for numbers (Porter, 1995; Power, 2004a).  Numbers were 
described as familiar and the best way of comparing different issues, 
despite having no calculative or statistical basis.   
 
One participant expressed concern that when risks scores were assigned 
the values became significant, despite their questionable basis (NRC, 
1981; Power, 2004b).  The participants stated a preference for a tool that 
produced numbers as an output, while supporting the suggestion that the 
methodological challenges confronting risk assessment reinforce its 
procedural rather than its substantive utility (Rothstein et al, 2006a).  A 
paradox is evident, risks were incalculable, but participants expressed the 
view that numbers enabled risks to be more easily compared against each 
other. 
 
The assessment of NPM outcomes will depend on the aims or values of 
the assessor (Gruening, 2001); the ESRC will point to statistical 
improvement in timely PhD completions as an indication of  success, 
while others will be concerned about its impact on PhD quality.  In 
relation to the RAE, some viewed developments positively, while others 
were concerned about the disincentive to undertake applied research 
activities, since they are associated with lower RAE ratings.   
 
The thesis confirms that the concept of operational risk captures all of the 
risks not covered in quantifiable categories (Mikes, 2009), including less 
measurable and qualitative aspects of risk, related to both internal and 
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external goals.  Consequently, operational risk was an interactive 
phenomenon (Adams, 1995), with risks emerging and changing over 
time (Berry et al, 2005) and risk meant different things to different 
people (HEFCE, 2005; Hutter, 2005; Gregersen, 2003).  The conception 
of risk as a social construct (Renn, 1992; Beck, 1992; Luhmann, 2005) 
has serious implications for the calculability of operational risk 
outcomes.  The suggestion that risk, as opposed to danger, implies a form 
of management oriented towards decision-making (Luhmann, 1996) 
leads to the notion that organisational decisions contribute to the 
construction of risk (Holzer & Millo, 2004).  Governance as a driver of 
accountability linked risks to decision-making within the University.  
 
While DI embraced an opportunity perspective on risk, taking the view 
that risk was not something to be avoided (Anderson, 1999), other 
participants more commonly associated risk with threats and the potential 
for blame. 
 
Many academics considered risk management to be an administrative 
role, one they knew nothing about.  They were unable to recognise 
existing practices such as ‘double marking’, external review of marking 
and formalised marking schemes as risk management controls, although 
they functioned to support the aim of high academic standards.  
Academics’ lack of willingness to accept responsibility can be traced to 
interpretations of risk assessment as a H&S practice.  The common 
interpretation of risk as a way to deal with physical hazards created a 
significant misunderstanding, leading to interpretations that operational 
risk management was a H&S concern (Adams, 1995).  The empirical 
evidence reveals that this interpretation of ‘risk’ results in academic 
reluctance to get involved, presenting difficulties for the introduction of 
risk management within HE (Dearlove, 2002).  
 
The detailed empirical data illustrates various ways of seeing risk in 
organisations, with implications for the taking and appropriation of 
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responsibility for risk (Hutter, 2005), providing a motive to consider who 
should be involved in risk management processes.   
The question of whether more effective risk assessment and 
management is facilitated by narrow or broad participation is 
hotly contested (Hood & Jones, 1996, p169).   
HEFCE (2001) recommend involvement of a broad cross-section of staff.  
However, the DI group were vociferous about ensuring confidentiality to 
enable disclosure while the BHS were unwilling to participate if outputs 
were not available to them.  The study indicates the aspect of disclosure 
risk is not considered in the HEFCE (2005) review; widespread staff 
involvement is encouraged in their guidance. 
Pooling of observers seems to have advantages in some 
situations, but in the absence of a clearer formulation of the gains 
and losses involved, it is hard to specify the precise conditions 
favouring such a strategy (March et al, 1991, p11). 
While wider participation results in a fuller understanding of risks across 
the organisation, some serious risks could be omitted to reduce secondary 
risk.  Encouraging widespread involvement of staff did provide a 
complex means to share responsibility among many members, reducing 
the possibility of blaming a particular individual for errors (McGrew & 
Wilson, 1982). 
 
The conflict between a desire to involve staff in the process and yet 
retain confidentiality provides a good example of the ‘double bind’ 
(Dunsire, 1978).  However, it was difficult for those without authority to 
participate in risk management activities, making involvement less 
worthwhile for those individuals.  Consequently, a preference for 
limiting initial implementation to senior staff is a significant finding of 
this study for practitioners. 
 
The reluctance or limited availability of academic staff to participate led 
to a split in responsibility and authority in relation to risk management.  
Many academics would not take responsibility for formal risk 
management activities and many administrative staff did not have the 
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authority to implement risk mitigation, consequently neither group 
accepted accountability.  A crucial relationship was evident in relation to 
accountability and authority; those without the power to implement 
change abnegated responsibility for risk management (Perry & 
McWilliam, 2007).  Where authority was lacking, capability was 
reduced, responsibility was undermined, risk mitigation was not possible 
and procedural conformance was used as a defence against accountability 
and blame (Sillince & Mueller, 2007). 
 
The study reveals self-regulatory targets were a potential source of risk, 
with statistics sustaining disciplinary surveillance (Culpitt, 1999).  The 
indirect supervisory role of HEFCE required the University to 
demonstrate a sound system of internal control.  Auditability was 
internalised by research participants (Power, 1997), to satisfy compliance 
measures (not to enhance organisational performance, a different aim).  
Regulatory targets and measures of performance represented the 
indicators of success or failure.   
 
The private sector governance reforms were designed to penalise 
inattention just as much as malfeasance (Crouhy et al, 2006), and the risk 
register enabled the organisation to demonstrate to external reviewers 
that organisational control was being exerted (Power, 2004a, Rothstein et 
al, 2006a; Hood et al, 2001).  The traditional distinction between legal 
regulation, voluntary code and organisation-specific rules is not 
empirically useful, even if it matters for jurisprudence, since risk 
management governance was effectively experienced by organisational 
participants ‘legalistically’ (Power, 2007).  Compliance with HEFCE 
governance was a stated aim for many of the participants in the study, 
despite the risk management governance being guidance, with no 
requirement for assessment. 
 
The use of external measures as a focus for risk identification has 
resulted in implementation that could be considered ‘fit for audit, not fit 
for action’ (Power, 1997).  An increased focus on performance 
 Page 317 of 407 
evaluation schemes has resulted in the design and operation of systems of 
control that make it easier to meet the external demands of accountability 
(Power, 2005; Jacob & Hellström, 2003).   
 
Furthermore, the risk register demonstrates how unintended outcomes 
emerge when attempting to comply with external targets and measures in 
which a synecdoche (taking a part to stand for a whole) is used (Bevan & 
Hood, 2006).  To demonstrate that risk management was embedded in 
University management practices, the reporting tool used was the risk 
register.  In practice, this reporting tool provided little evidence about 
how risks were being managed within the University.   
 
Bevan & Hood (2006) suggest there are four possible outcomes when the 
synecdoche is compliant with external monitoring requirements.  Firstly, 
the ideal outcome, the organisation is performing as controllers intended; 
in this case, the organisation failed to achieve the aim of embedded and 
integrated risk management.  Secondly, the outcome has been achieved, 
but at the expense of poor performance in relation to other aims; 
competing and conflicting objectives vied for access to resources, and 
emphasis was placed on those targets directly linked to financial 
incentives, to the detriment of others.  Thirdly, although performance as 
measured appears to be fine, the actions being taken are at variance with 
the goals behind the targets; course closures illustrate how the University 
hits the RAE target but misses the educational point (Bevan & Hood, 
2006).  Finally, targets have not been achieved, but data has been 
manipulated to satisfy external demands; empirics revealed some gaming 
or manipulation of assessed data, but there was no evidence of 
falsification of data.   The study contributes to knowledge about the 
design and use of synecdoches, an important factor in the regulatory 
oversight of the HE sector, particularly in the light of the ‘single 
conversation accountability process’, which emphasises statistical returns 
(HEFCE, 2008). 
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This study makes an important empirical contribution to developing a 
deeper understanding of how organisations assess risk, and provided 
examples that confirm perspectives in the literature, with the following 
four exceptions.   
 
Firstly, the case study organisation formed a different picture to the one 
that Dearlove (1998a, 1998b) drew of universities, shifting from a 
situation of professional authority held by academics in disciplines down 
in the departments, towards the dominance of central authority in relation 
to some risks.  New control systems had been successfully implemented 
throughout the University in relation to RAE and PhD completion, 
involving academic management.  Central control could be exerted when 
understood to increase local access to financial rewards or avoid 
sanctions.  It was evidently possible to involve academics in risk 
management, provided it was not called ‘risk management’. 
 
Secondly, an important contribution is made to the governance literature 
by illustrating that while self-regulation enables organisations to decide 
on internal processes to achieve external targets and aims (Culpitt, 1999; 
Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), the data illustrated that standardised 
responses were utilised, based on observing external signals, both from 
other HE Institutions and the guidance from HEFCE.   
Hence, the circulation of generic risk management standards and 
principles creates isomorphic pressures on organizations to 
conform to these models and to apply them: a ‘good’ 
organization is one which manages risk in accordance with 
established frameworks. (Power et al, 2009, p169). 
Pre-defined approaches were easier for the organisation to deal with.  
Research participants saw standard approaches as a way of reducing the 
risk of non-compliance in the event of an audit.  If the elements of the 
HEFCE model had been mandated the effect would be little different; 
standardised approaches were the preferred option anyway, reducing 
uncertainty about auditability and transparency demands.  The risk 
management guidance provided by HEFCE (2001) did not require the 
 Page 319 of 407 
use of a risk register, yet ‘good practice’ was demonstrated by use of the 
document across the sector (HEFCE, 2005).  
 
Thirdly, although Hood at al (1992) suggest risk management has come 
to be merged with management more generally, this is not supported by 
the findings.  An important contribution is made by revealing the 
presence of two distinct systems; the formal compliance focussed risk 
management implementation and an active management control system 
that successfully improved organisational assessment outcomes.  Most 
significantly, the lack of interaction between the two systems reflected 
organisational participants understanding of risk, which, perhaps 
surprisingly, revealed an inability to recognise risk management, even as 
they engaged in the activity.  This contribution to knowledge reveals how 
risk interpretation seriously undermines the implementation of ‘risk 
management’ best practice as an integrated control system. 
 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the findings provide a body of 
evidence that contradicts the conclusions from a review of risk 
management implementation that found that HE institutions were moving 
from achieving technical compliance with governance, to constructively 
address new patterns of risk (HEFCE, 2005).  Risk registers were 
certainly available.  However, the University did not find the 
recommended framework a valuable decision-making aid.   
 
Whilst it can be difficult to generalise from the single case to the wider 
social system, the body of data suggests that once risk compliance 
paperwork has been produced it is put away until the same time next 
year, and similar lack of utility can be expected in other universities and 
organisations.  Most significantly, this does not mean that organisations 
are failing to manage their risks.  
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8.2.2 Organisational setting 
Risks were considered from differing perspectives, including threats to 
the individual, group or the organisation as a whole.  Participants had 
differing views on what was best for the organisation (Bazerman, 1994) 
and these views were influenced by local aims and past events: 
The structure of internal competition and conflict divides many 
organizations into advocates and opponents for organisational 
policies and actions.  The contending groups interpret history 
differently and draw different lessons from it (March et al, 1991, 
p3). 
There were winners and losers in the achievement of organisational aims, 
and what reduced risk for some, increased risk to others (Mayer-Foulkes, 
2002).  Power and financial authority to act became important where the 
resolution of conflicts was necessary in the management of risks 
(Luhmann, 1995a).  However, the validity of different perspectives was 
difficult to assess.   
Risk concerns may provide a rationale for actions taken on other 
grounds … hidden agendas need to be brought to the surface of 
the discussion (Sheahen, 1987, p1049). 
The E&F Department emphasis on funding for maintenance as a major 
source of risk reflected their desire for increased spending in this area to 
support local aims (Mikes, 2009), but it was difficult to evaluate the 
magnitude of this risk.  In view of the dominance of academic aims 
within the organisation illustrated in narratives, the E&F Department 
budget remained unlikely to significantly increase, despite the use of a 
risk register to communicate concerns to the PCT.   
 
The case study illustrates how risk assessment had little alternative but to 
include qualitative factors, and that consistency of the numerical values 
was of less interest than variability in the selection of the types of risks 
for assessment (Hutter, 2005).  The study narratives strongly supported 
the contention that organisations create sub-goals (Berry et al, 2005), 
linked to individual, group or role function, partner interests or regulatory 
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concerns (Hutter, 2001).  The presence of multiple, competing and 
conflicting objectives (Perrow, 1970; Mikes, 2004) emphasised authority 
to act in the resolution of risk management priorities.  Risk discussions 
revealed that in addition to the formal structure of the organisation, 
participants perceived that some groups were more powerful than others, 
with informal power structures that developed.  These views were 
sustained by funding decisions, reflecting power in the hierarchy 
(Luhmann, 1995a).   
 
Competition was present in the organisation, both with other HE 
establishments, and between sub-groups and roles within the University 
(Gates, 2006).  Barriers to the implementation of governance included 
the need to balance conflicting objectives and aims of funding and 
regulatory bodies; some goals were given priority to the detriment of 
others. 
Research-oriented academics are still free to undertake research, 
but the RAE ‘has led to a much more interventionist approach 
from the “management” of universities in respect to academic 
departments’ (Shattock, 1999, p279), and the quest for research 
funds has tempted academics to shift their research so that it 
meshes with the missions of research councils (Dearlove, 2002, 
p364). 
The RAE proved a particularly revealing example of the complexity of 
competing aims (Perrow, 1970; Mikes, 2004).  It was difficult establish a 
balance between the RAE measures and applied research studies, despite 
customer satisfaction with the latter, militating against the stated HEFCE 
aim of ‘enhancing the contribution of HE to the economy and society’.  
The research funding mechanism encouraged the University to align 
research with high ranking studies, based on previous assessment 
outcomes, to increase access to centralised funding.  The organisation 
was more effective in satisfying assessment measures, but may be less 
effective in disseminating useful information beyond the boundaries of 
the academic world (Elton, 2000).  In addition, the RAE threatens the 
cherished notion of academic freedom to undertake research based on its 
value for knowledge production, rather than its journal ranking.  At the 
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same time, the academic focus of the University made it difficult for 
those in support departments to gain access to resources for IT and 
infrastructure investment, despite their underlying impact on academic 
aims.  
 
Internal boundaries were described as barriers for groups dependent on 
other sub-groups for support.  Additionally, informal boundaries were 
established in relation to the activity or role of the sub-group (Soin & 
Scheytt, 2006).  For the organisation as a whole, this resulted in gaps in 
control systems with some risks being ignored by all, since they were 
seen to extend beyond the job description, or operational umbrella of the 
group (Power, 2004a). 
 
Joint working arrangements were in place to prevent gaps developing 
between the University and the NHS.  The influence of outside groups 
was strengthened when particular external boundary interfaces were 
established, to facilitate interpenetration, as in the case of the DI and the 
NHS.  The environment focused individual’s and group’s attention on 
partner concerns, making that information more salient to the system 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
 
The qualitative nature of operational risk assessment reflected sub-group 
judgements (Krimsky, 1992), reflexive values and environmental 
influences (Luhmann, 1995a; Gregersen, 2003).  Schemas that emerged 
in sub-groups were more specific and more generally shared than those 
emerging across the organisation’s entire membership (Harris, 1994), 
reflecting sub-goals, although some common themes were also evident in 
relation to research dominance, poor communication and lack of 
contingency planning. Most significantly, the study supports Gates 
(2006) finding that the greatest impediment to ERM implementation is 
‘competing priorities’ and thus makes an important contribution to this 
little researched area. 
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The findings reveal the significance of the common interpretation of risk 
as H&S in acceptance of responsibility.  Since roles tell organisation 
members how to reason about the problems and decisions that face them 
(Simon, 1991): if H&S risk management did not form part of the 
systems’ role, then information on operational risk management was 
ignored, explaining academic reluctance to accept any involvement in 
what was seen as an ‘out of role’ function. 
 
A significant empirical contribution is made to the field of organisational 
analysis, revealing the complexity of influences on risk assessment 
within and between groups and providing supporting evidence for the 
literature cited.  The study significantly enhances the understanding of 
difficulties associated with balancing competing aims, confirming that 
what is most important to some is of little interest to others.  Most 
significantly, the influence of role and interpretation of ‘risk’ uncovered 
the reason for lack of academic involvement in formal risk management, 
providing fresh insights into a previously little understood aspect of 
responsibility attribution.  The interpretation of risk as H&S interacts 
with role boundaries to prevent academics paying any attention to risk 
management communications. Whilst they were actively involved in the 
development of existing management controls that reduced risk, they 
were unable to interpret this as ‘risk management’. 
 
8.2.3 Acceptable risk 
The study contributes to a detailed understanding of how acceptable risk 
cannot be assigned a value that would be accepted by all participants, 
since there are competing and conflicting aims within the organisation 
(Berry et al, 2005; Mikes, 2004; Perrow, 1970; Dunsire, 1978). 
 
The use of SST enabled analysis to reveal the influence of conditioned 
expectations on the acceptability of risk, with long-standing, low-level 
risks being continually ignored to enable a focus on signals that reveal a 
‘difference’ to the system (Luhmann, 1995a).   
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A critical analysis of the influence of existing management systems on 
the determination of acceptable risk revealed a surprising outcome, 
uncovering a gap in the literature.  Internal views of risk acceptability 
were interpreted from the outcome of financial decision-making within 
the organisation, treated as communication about risk, in the absence of 
other feedback.   Refusal of funding indicated that the risk was 
acceptable. 
 
The study confirmed the difficulty of evaluating dynamic control systems 
(Otley, 2003), with variable implementation of management controls 
across the organisation, their effectiveness was difficult to measure and 
there was little evidence of defined scales or targets to provide an input 
to net risk assessment.  It was difficult to define a single risk scale that 
enabled acceptable risk to be assessed, even if it did not need to be exact 
(HEFCE, 2001).  
 
The key elements of the Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 1999) that influence 
the design of risk management systems illustrated how aspects of 
performance that are more difficult to quantify and measure get relatively 
less emphasis (Otley, 2003).  Firstly, the narratives confirmed that the 
University could provide compliance evidence for disclosure 
requirements, and these were easily audited.  Secondly, the assessment 
aspects of internal controls were subject to the calculative difficulties 
associated with operational risk, but signs of compliance were produced.  
Finally, however, for the less measurable aspects related to internal 
control system requirements, such as how embedded risk management 
practices were, there was no measure of compliance, and they were 
overlooked (except in the funding of this PhD study).   
 
The case reveals how the adoption of private sector practices has 
increased transparency through external reporting and monitoring (Hood, 
2007; Roberts, 2009) and influenced reflexive understandings of 
acceptable risk.  The implementation of NPM and enforced self-
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regulation guided interpretation of acceptable risk and drove compliance 
with transparency requests.   
In this way, league tables, rankings and indices which may start 
life as meaningless and unimportant to internal management 
measures of performance have the potential to shift motivations 
and missions by constructing self-reinforcing circuits of 
performance, particularly where small changes in relevant 
variables can have large effects on rank position (Power et al, 
2009, p176). 
The shift towards accountability in terms of results (Hood, 1995) linked 
risk and responsibility in relation to achievement of objectives.  
Consequently, when measures were in place to monitor achievement of 
aims, compliance became the priority, especially when linked to funding 
decisions or publicised league tables, resulting in particular emphasis or 
‘narrowing’ (Propper &Wilson, 2003). 
 
Changes made in relation to RAE readiness and 4-year PhD submission 
illustrated how reducing risk to acceptable levels could equate to 
‘gaming’ to ensure process measures were maximised (Bevan & Hood, 
2006); there was awareness of the potential negative aspects of this 
approach, and some participants were happier with this than others.  
 
The ways in which the University complies with external monitoring 
could be described as good management or gaming, depending on the 
perspective taken, since measures are manipulated to achieve its own 
ends (Otley, 2003).  The internal RMAG process is designed to maximise 
contribution of the desired type of high quality research, selected with an 
eye to the RAE assessor values, illustrating how the RAE process has 
become enmeshed in the audit culture (Tapper & Salter, 2004).   The 
emphasis on measures challenged traditional university values and 
generated strategic behaviour and gaming of variables (Bevan & Hood, 
2006). 
 
The introduction of NPM private sector approaches has fostered an 
approach in which the University’s students have become customers who 
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utilise statistics and league tables as measures in exercising market 
choices, making these important as a focus for risk.  The University 
operated in a competitive pseudo-market environment to attract high 
achieving students, aiming to maintain or increase funding and esteem, 
illustrating how customers contribute to enforcing self-control and self-
policing (Gabriel, 2005).  
 
While Broadbent & Laughlin (1997) consider that NPM is driven in 
general by the desire to generate ‘good management’, this raises the 
question of what constitutes good management.  Self-regulatory control 
had resulted in change within the University; the risk register process had 
been introduced, but there was no suggestion that the organisation was 
more effective as a result.  All participants indicated that the documents 
served no local function, but significantly it did reduce one particular 
type of compliance risk, and consequently could be interpreted as ‘good 
management’, when viewed from the perspective of risk reduction.   
 
This thesis makes a significant empirical contribution to the debates 
about transparency as a method of control, which has stimulated many 
criticisms that are illustrated in narratives, including de-contextualisation, 
blame avoidance and the transformation of organisational purpose into 
management of performance indicators (Roberts, 2009; Strathern, 2000; 
Hood, 2007; Power, 1997, 2007).  In addition, ‘blame prevention 
engineering’ (Hood et al, 2001) is evident, as individuals follow 
prescribed processes to limit the risk of being held accountable for non-
compliance, which is seen as an unacceptable risk.  In this case, the risk 
register helped the organisation to reassure external monitors about the 
achievement of acceptable risk levels (Clarke, 1999).   
 
While it is difficult to establish causal links in social systems in which 
many changes occur concurrently, the study does provide illustrations 
that open up understanding of how governance outcomes can appear both 
reasonable and unreasonable depending on viewpoint and associated 
reflexive concerns, since what is acceptable depends on your perspective. 
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A lack of control served to reduce tolerance to risk (Adams, 1995) and 
encouraged organisation members to attempt to pass responsibility to 
those with authority.  Where authority was adequate some sub-groups 
reduced risk by increasing local control, e.g., additional IT support.  All 
groups expressed the view that others should be doing something about 
controlling risks that fell outside the boundary of the group.  There was 
less concern expressed about risks that could be controlled locally, and in 
many cases participants expressed the view that these were adequate.   
 
A decision to act on a risk problem depended less on the magnitude of 
the risk than on the organisational possibility of acting (Otway, 1992). A 
risk that was easily addressed was selected for action in preference to one 
that was more difficult to manage, and lack of authority undermined 
ability to take mitigating actions. 
 
The study confirms the HEFCE (2005) suggestion that the concept ‘risk 
appetite’ is under-developed in Universities.  The risk appetite of the 
organisation was not clearly defined in risk documents.  However, the 
participants' view of the institution's low tolerance to risk taking is 
common to all who expressed an opinion.  
 
The HEFCE guidance skims over the integration of risk silos, but even if 
this could be achieved, since risk appetite was poorly defined, there was 
little to align values against in terms of acceptability.  The risk 
assessment process was severely flawed in this regard.  Varying 
perspectives prevent the calculation of a ‘risk appetite’ that is appropriate 
to all organisation members, against which risk acceptability can be 
judged.  The study contributes to the debate about the implementation of 
ERM and raises the question about how usable the model is in a real-life 
organisation, where such circumstances are the norm, whether in the 
private or public sector.    
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8.2.4 Uncertainty 
All participants illustrated a lack of clarity due to lack of knowledge 
(Grandori, 1984).  The E&F participants described how uncertainty 
existed about the aims of an activity and the expected outcomes, and the 
Dental Institute participants and interviews displayed concern about the 
means or how an aim was to be achieved (Henry & Walker, 1991).  In 
addition, uncertainty existed at sub-group level about PCT preference 
selection when decisions related to conflict among divergent interests.  
The study illustrates how unreliable assessment outputs could be used to 
support preferred aims (Grandori, 1984). 
 
Concerns about the RAE assessment process, that the criteria for 
assessment are not clear or consistent are acknowledged by HEFCE 
(1999) are confirmed by participants. 
 
Lack of communication increased uncertainty (Luhmann, 1995a).  For 
example, many participants displayed a lack of understanding of the PFI 
contractual arrangements that provide initial funding for estates projects 
and interpreted subsequent high running costs as evidence of poor 
management within the organisation. 
 
The discussions illustrated the difficulty of comparing apples with pears 
when risk was placed in silos with ill-defined assessment criteria (Mikes, 
2009).  Assessing risk in silos assumes that aspects of problems can be 
treated in isolation without endangering the overall solution (Meier & 
Hill, 2005), and the study develops deeper understanding of the 
difficulties of reintegration of risks in the absence of financial estimates.   
 
The qualitative outcomes of assessment were difficult to compare, 
explaining the preference for quantitative models where possible, despite 
their known limitations (Krimsky & Golding, 1992).  For risk assessment 
to be a form of measurement, rather than ‘guestimates’ or judgements, 
risk scores need to be replicable (Power, 2004b), but the study suggests 
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that ratings could be different for the same assessor at another time.  The 
narratives illustrated that the future decisions of others were not easy to 
assess, especially since they were made in the flow of interacting 
networks (Gregersen, 2003).  Furthermore, risk assessment topics 
systematically varied in relation to local responsibilities and ever-
changing and competing aims.  The process was also hampered by a lack 
of clarity about organisational aims and how to translate them into local 
goals. 
 
Participants suggested that discussions in workshops provided a greater 
mutual understanding of the relevant issues in relation to particular risks 
and potential causes, and was beneficial to them, not for risk estimates 
generated, but for the qualitative narrative content (Otway, 1992).  The 
risk register process did not capture such discussions, unlike the minutes 
of meetings or committees in which many (risk) management decisions 
were made.  During the follow-up interviews, several participants 
observed that they found discussions with colleagues useful, but this may 
be more to do with confirming reflexive views than assisting in the 
assessment of risk (Luhmann, 1995a).   
 
The training activity functioned to reduce uncertainty (Bernstein, 1996a; 
Bradac, 2001) by enabling individual views to be checked for 
consistency with other group members’ descriptions of risk, and in this 
case embedded group accounts agreed within workshop sessions, but 
could not be assumed to be the only valid interpretation.  Goffman (1974, 
p37) notes how storytelling overestimates the ‘causal fabric of 
experience’ as organisational members establish orderly sequences of 
causes and effects as a means of organising and rationalising 
remembered experience (Gabriel, 2000).  Causal links revealed during 
discussions could have been illusory.  
Incorrect predictions are not noticed or are interpreted as 
irrelevant anomalies or measurement errors.  Missing data are 
experienced as consistent with the model and are remembered as 
real.  Information is gathered and distributed more to interpret 
decisions than to inform them.  Meetings are organised more to 
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share stories and explanations than to take action.  Organizations 
develop robust understandings that are resilient to contradictory 
information (March et al, 1991, p6). 
The value of risk assessment discussions in prioritisation of risk concerns 
remained difficult to assess, especially since, in this case, there was no 
evidence of action stimulated by risk register entries.   
 
Operational risk assessment workshops were not exercises in probability 
calculation and therefore the activity did not align conceptually with the 
origins of risk analysis.  The discussions centred on unknowable futures 
(Froud, 2003; Keynes, 1973) and could be characterised more 
appropriately as uncertainty assessment (Power, 2009).  Uncertainty was 
evident in statements about changes in personnel, lack of information and 
the difficulty of imagining future scenarios and possible outcomes.  The 
presence of ineradicable uncertainties in discussions provided evidence 
of poor alignment of the recommended model with unknowability since 
the governance assumes risk is calculable (Froud, 2003).  Consequently, 
the risk management process was actually concerned with controlling 
uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is therefore transformed into risk when it becomes an 
object of management, regardless of the extent of information 
about probability (Power, 2007, p6). 
A significant empirical contribution is made through revealing how one 
University planned for, represented, managed and was accountable for a 
range of risks that lacked historical frequency data to guide probability 
judgements (Power et al, 2009).  
 
The DI workshops supported the findings of a study of risk management 
in a banking context (Mikes, 2009), and emphasised the unpredictability 
of the behaviour of others and the difficulty of measuring it.   This study 
makes an important contribution to improved understanding of the 
qualitative aspects of risk assessments, relevant in both the private and 
public sector (Crouhy et al, 2006).  
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The ontology of risk revealed in narratives indicated a fundamental 
problem with the implementation of a model that relies on the tacit 
assumption that risks can be treated as concrete physical entities that can 
be precisely defined and unambiguously measured in objective terms 
(Hood & Jones, 1996).  This research confirms that socially constructed 
risks are not amenable to calculative models, undermining the application 
of a technical approach to operational risk management (Froud, 2003; 
Adams, 1995).  Refining scientific tools is unlikely to address the 
problem (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992). 
 
The narratives strongly supported the view that data for operational risk 
assessment is both thin and conceptually problematic (Power, 2003), 
contributing to the surprising finding that all participants (with one 
exception who gave one reluctant value) were unwilling to assign ratings 
in all the workshop sessions.  Since the case study risk assessments could 
not be considered a measurement their value was limited. 
No change in how the individual attributes are rated qualitatively 
can guarantee that a qualitative risk rating system will give 
accurate or useful results (Cox et al, 2005, p656). 
The study supports the idea that it may be better to reflect the imprecise, 
but useful knowledge about potential risks present in narratives than 
precise number outputs (Cox et al, 2005), but adds a significant 
corollary; management meetings already do this, a special ‘risk 
management’ forum is redundant.   
 
The impact of the effectiveness of internal controls presents an additional 
measurement challenge, in requiring organisations to assess dynamic and 
interrelated processes (Otley, 2003) to reach net risk assessment values.  
However, the unwillingness to assign numbers during risk assessment 
meant that discussion about risks, their causes and possible future 
outcomes, formed the focus of the workshops.   
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The findings make an important contribution to understanding difficulties 
encountered because of the presence of uncertainty in the assessment of 
operational risks, with concomitant effects on the risk management 
process as a whole.   In particular, the empirics provide a valuable 
extension to the work of Power (2003, 2004a, 2009) in explaining and 
illustrating the detail of risk management practices in one organisation.    
 
Most significantly, the study reveals a shift in the ontology of risk 
towards achievement of socially constructed aims and targets that does 
not align with statistical calculations that form the basis for traditional 
risk assessment (Taleb, 2007).  Risk assessment outputs did not represent 
a form of probability measurement.  This study provides detailed insight 
into the misalignment of the recommended risk assessment model and 
the nature of risk in organisations (Froud, 2003).  This misalignment has 
serious implications.  Conceptually, the notion of risk has changed, but 
the interpretation of the benefits to be gained from formal assessment has 
not, and remains rooted in predictive modelling, providing false 
confidence in the ability to control unfolding events.  Consequently, it is 
not surprising that the expected gains have not materialised in either the 
public or private sector21. 
 
 
8.2.5 Summary of Significant Contributions 
This section has illustrated how a more detailed understanding of how an 
organisation undertakes risk assessment provides new empirical depth to 
critiques of risk management models and approaches to governance.   
The influence of group and role in the presence of conflicting and 
competing aims, contributes to knowledge about how organisations 
prioritise risks, and yet are unable to satisfy all goals, enabling analysis to 
reveal how these conflicts are resolved.  The investigation of acceptable 
                                                
21 For example: Long-Term Capital Management (1998); Northern Rock (2007); Baby P 
(2007); Icelandic Banks (2008); Lehmann Brothers (2008); the sub-prime banking crisis 
(2009); CAA (2010); BP (2010). 
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risk provides vital new evidence that this is a much more complex 
process than measuring a risk rating against the organisational risk 
appetite, with the influence of funding decisions determining risk 
acceptability in the absence of other information.  Furthermore, 
insufficient control increases the unacceptability of risks, while 
responsibility for risk management is tightly linked to capability and the 
authority to mitigate risks.   The detailed examination of the ontology of 
risks in organisations and the nature of uncertainty in participant 
descriptions contributes to debates about widespread adoption of ERM 
models, questioning the value of formal risk assessment in this context.  
Since operational risk lacks appropriate data for calculative approaches, 
there is a significant reduction of benefits to be gained from such formal 
risk management practices.  However, it is important to note that the 
implementation of formal systems does not hamper existing management 
controls that continue to act to reduce risks to the organisation. 
 
This section has framed the study findings with relevant literature to 
highlight the significant contributions the study makes to understanding 
risk in an organisational context, establishing links to studies in the fields 
of governance, management control systems, ‘strategy as practice’ 
(Johnson et al, 2007), risk assessment and risk management.  It highlights 
gaps in the existing literature in relation to the inability of organisational 
participants to recognise existing risk management activities and the use 
of financial decisions as communicative events in relation to risk 
acceptability.  The next section reflects on the analytical value of the 
chosen theories within an MRT approach to case study research. 
 
8.3 Review of the Analytical Value of the Research Approach 
This section explores the value of the theoretical framework and MRT approach 
developed during the study.  It reviews how the analytical constructs interplayed 
with empirical illustrations of reflexive influences on risk understandings to 
operationalise and contextualise key elements of the theory.  The skeletal 
framework was complete in its social reach and none of the rich narrative data 
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was difficult to include within the analysis, with some analytical categories 
being easy to define, and others that interacted with the data and research 
questions to develop the theoretical frame.  Luhmann’s SST provided a 
theoretical perspective to understand and contextualise conflicting responses to 
the same communicative event, utilising the notion of difference between 
referring to self and to something other enabling complex systems to be 
analysed.  
Luhmann’s autopoiesis makes it possible to approach the study of 
organizations consisting of multiple organizing logics (Hernes & 
Bakken, 2003).  
Reflexive concerns and environmental stimuli were reflected in the way in 
which risks were identified and assessed, and this skeletal concept was 
particularly valuable in relation to the constructivist approach adopted, as 
conflicting views were expected and sought.    
 
In addition, systems are conditioned through past interactions, and an immune 
system (Luhmann, 1995a) enabled the research to reveal one of the mechanisms 
underlying the ability to focus on selected aims.   The conceptual understanding 
that communications are only ‘information’ when treated as such by the 
recipient is a valuable analytical tool that further reveals reflexive influences.   
 
This study provides support for the utility of the notion of the connectivity of 
communicative events in the analysis of organisational behaviour, enabling 
issues such as responsibility, authority, perceived boundaries and effectiveness 
of control systems to be drawn out of narratives.   
 
The ‘autopoiesis’ of interactions is illustrated in the mutual perception of 
persons who are able to respond to each other in real-time, and this concept 
underlies the explanation of existing controls that minimise risks to 
organisational success.  The reference to other could be seen in relation to risk 
management governance.  The theoretical construct was developed to illustrate 
that organisations recognise the communication of regulatory goals and 
objectives as information, which instructs the attention of internal and external 
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observers of the organisation.  This theoretical approach reveals dual risk 
management processes; the risk register process as a response to non-
compliance risk, and the existing management control systems as a response to 
measures designed to enable access to funding.  Both systems provide 
illustrations of an autopoietic response. 
 
The risk management training was a communicative event for attendees.  Two 
out of the three cases were stimulated to respond, confirming Luhmann’s 
(1995a) suggestion that social systems use communication to enable them to 
engage in action.  Significantly, this fleshing out of the theory extends the scope 
of SST to include a ‘critical theory’ role within a MRT framework to enable 
both organisational change and ability to influence self-referential views, 
refuting criticisms of this aspect of the theory by Habermas (Habermas & 
Luhmann, 1973). 
 
The notion that a system maintains itself by dynamic conservatism in the face of 
environmental disturbance sheds light on the general view that not to spend 
constituted the least risky option for senior management, contributing to 
organisational inertia.   
 
In the case study context, the notion that liability could be avoided by 
communication of ignorance forms an important element of the theoretical 
frame.  It was evidently preferable not to receive messages about potential 
problems, to remain in ignorance and avoid the possibility of accountability and 
blame.  The other side of this construct demonstrates that when communication 
about a risk was issued the sender expected responsibility for managing it 
transferred with the message; but the recipient kept quiet, perhaps ignorance 
could still be claimed should the risk become a negative outcome. 
 
One important advantage of the use of SST over the more traditional MRT 
approach of using skeletal theory derived from Habermas, is the inclusion of the 
effect of power relations in the organisation (Broadbent, 1992; Soin, 1996).  
Luhmann’s idea that hierarchy channels conflict and, in relation to financial 
authorisations for risk reduction measures, only superiors can decide, whereby 
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disagreements within the organisation are resolved.  In the absence of other 
communications, financial decisions become information on which 
understandings of risk acceptability are founded.  The theoretical frame 
interacting with the data illustrated the impact of power and financial authority 
on risk management activity, reducing the benefit of involving those without 
sufficient authority to act.   
 
The SST framework was developed and fleshed out into analytical categories 
that provided the section headings for Chapters 5 & 6 of this thesis.  Through 
interaction with the empirics, the theory provided concepts and illustrations that 
were insightful for the analysis and understanding of risk management 
implementation in an organisational context.  Furthermore, the skeletal frame 
encourages second order observing, proving unexpectedly good at drawing out 
issues relating to responsibility and authority as understood by organisation 
members.   
 
In addition, the DDE framework made use of interpretations developed through 
the SST analysis.  The DDE alignment with the recommended model facilitated 
the normative analysis of the findings.  This two-tier approach provides a 
contribution to the debates about the MRT research approach (Laughlin, 2004; 
Lowe, 2004; Gurd, 2008), confirming that use of alternative theoretical frames is 
compatible with the research approach and can enhance MRT in a critical theory 
role. 
 
Reflexively, I note that the development of SST in this study draws on my 
experience of management system assessment22, and the categories developed 
are likely to reflect my understandings of systems analysis, and may explain 
why SST was accessible and insightful for me, even though Luhmann is famous 
for a writing style that is hard to read (Gumbrecht, 2006).  This section has 
highlighted both the contribution the theory made to generating important 
revelations about risk assessment processes and organisational risk, and how the 
empirical evidence fleshed out the theoretical constructs to develop SST in the 
                                                
22 As a qualified ISO9001, ISO14001, EFQM and CMM assessor with over 15 years 
experience of audit and assessment  
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field of operational risk.  Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the debates about 
utilising an MRT approach to research, illustrating that different theoretical 
frames can be used within a single study, and that there are benefits from doing 
so. 
 
8.4 Limitations of the Research 
The first stage of the study gathered data from the Head of School or 
Department.  The selection of senior academic management, senior 
administrative management and technical management staff for the training 
sessions reinforced this perspective.  No views were elicited from more junior 
members of staff.  Consequently, the study does not reflect the views of the 
lower levels of the institutional hierarchy, but since the findings reveal little 
benefit to involving those without authority to act, concern about this bias 
reduced as the analysis progressed.   
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been useful to directly question 
workshop participants about the aims of the organisation on the feedback forms 
(enabling individual responses to be gathered) to facilitate cross-case analysis.  
The responses in the first stage provided some interesting data, and I regret not 
having given myself the opportunity to explore it further. 
 
While the interviews and risk training workshops involved a small number of 
staff (39), each participant provided detailed narratives.  A review of the data 
gathered confirmed that each session added some new material to the overall 
study.  Each interaction provided new perspectives and did not merely reiterate 
what had been covered previously, but also revealed features in common with 
other transcripts.  Since the sampling did not approach saturation point, 
additional groups could have provided further risk perspectives (Morgan, 1997).  
Notwithstanding, the data provided rich insights into what was understood to 
constitute risk to participants.  Since the analysis did not require a minimum 
number of data points to ensure statistical validity, the detailed discussions of 
relatively few staff provided vivid illustration of commonalities and differences 
to enable valid conclusions to be drawn, e.g., use of internal communications to 
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transfer responsibility for risk.  Whilst additional data might illustrate how local 
differences (including position in hierarchy and other roles) influence risk 
concerns, the data set was more than sufficient to provide answers to the 
research questions being asked.   
 
8.5 Suggestions for Future Work 
The thesis opens up new areas for investigation through the identification of 
gaps in the literature.  The detailed understanding of risk interpretation, 
combined with theoretical model development, could be used to design a survey 
instrument to gather less detailed, but more numerous, responses across a range 
of organisations to shed light on the extent of identified barriers to the 
implementation of an integrated approach to risk management.  Furthermore, the 
use of financial decision making as an organisational communication about risk 
raises interesting questions for future research into other management control 
systems, particularly in relation to staff perceptions of organisational strategy. 
 
The research in the area of operational risk assessment could be further explored 
by comparison of a HE case study with a similar one in a private sector 
organisation, but obtaining research access for a similar in-depth 3-year study 
poses a significant barrier to this potentially valuable comparison.  The literature 
indicates that qualitative assessment remains an issue to be clarified and 
resolved in both contexts (Crouhy et al, 2006).  Similarly difficult to access, a 
comparison with another HE institution would have benefits in relation to data 
validity and could indicate whether it is possible to generalise about the role of 
internal organisational context in relation to influences on the risk assessment 
process. 
 
In addition, the data suggested a potential benefit to including members from 
different groups in training sessions.  One session included a member from a 
different group in the workshop, enabling gaps in organisational practices to be 
identified.  Future research should consider how to include individuals from 
different parts of the organisation, if a similar workshop method is used. 
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Furthermore, the data set gathered here is of significant value in itself.  The 
MRT research approach suggests there may be benefit is developing an 
alternative theoretical frame to investigate the same narratives.  For example, 
analysis could focus on Simon’s (1994) Levers of Control to draw out the links 
between risk management and ‘strategy as practice’. 
 
The study findings in relation to the implementation of HEFCE governance 
could be distilled into a ‘white paper’ to provide feedback to the regulator to 
enable the development of governance and monitoring in the future, building on 
the summary of recommendations to the regulator (Appendix 11). 
 
From the perspective of practitioners, the recommendations for the project 
sponsor (Appendix 10) could form the basis for an ‘action research’ study that 
would further test and examine these research findings, to develop ‘best 
practice’ guidance based on an empirical foundation.   
 
The use of workshops proved to be a useful way to access discussions about 
risks, and provided in-depth discussions that resulted in a rich data pool of 
illustrative and informative comments that shed light on the assessment of 
operational risk.  This approach could be utilised to investigate other aspects of 
organisational practice for which training is being provided. 
 
The focus on risk management could be broadened to examine other 
management control systems utilising the theoretical insights developed in this 
case study.  The broad scope of risk management encourages interdisciplinary 
work in several related fields. 
 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
As I reflect on the journey from initial study planning, while drawing final thesis 
conclusions, I have to admit that if I had really grasped the complexity and 
scope of risk management in organisations, I might have decided that I had 
 Page 340 of 407 
bitten off more than I could chew.  It was impossible to keep this study within 
my original planned focus on risk assessment, as narratives enforced 
investigation of wider risk management, responsibility and governance 
implementation issues that act on the assessment of risk recursively.   
 
However, as I near the end of my PhD experience, I realise how lucky I was to 
have the luxury of over three years research access to undertake such a detailed 
study.  Coming to the study from a management systems assessor background, I 
had vague unease about the applicability of a risk assessment framework to the 
analysis of operational risk in organisations, especially one derived from safety 
assessments (which, experience has taught me, are difficult enough).  The 
rewards of this study lie in the theoretical understanding that developed as the 
illustrative narratives began to populate the analytical framework.  Furthermore, 
in wrestling with ontology, methodology and theory development during the 
course of the study, I have developed the necessary skills to undertake a critical 
academic study, a process I did not find easy. 
 
The study provides a firm platform for a critique of formalised risk management 
frameworks and encourages the focus to shift from improving mathematical 
tools towards enabling organisations to recognise risk management within 
existing practice.  This is vital to enable formal risk management to be 
embedded in an organisation.  From a practitioner perspective, in the 
recommendations for the project sponsor (Appendix 10), the research develops 
practical suggestions for improving risk governance implementation.  The 
findings are used to support the aim of a more integrated and embedded 
approach, with greater utility than the existing approach of producing a risk 
register to put in a drawer in preparation for external audit. 
 
One problem that arose was one that I had not expected.  The rich narratives and 
complex theoretical frame provided many insights that are significant, making it 
difficult to decide which are the key findings in this study.  Using the SST 
frame, reflexive concerns of the reader will place greater emphasis on some 
aspects of the research than others.  The following paragraphs attempt to 
summarise key issues, to complement the findings detailed in the previous 
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chapter, and the contributions to the literature outlined at the start of this chapter, 
to draw this thesis to a conclusion.   
 
The study forms a preliminary step towards a greater understanding of what 
operational risk means to different organisational participants and how concerns 
are assessed.  It seems appropriate to revisit the definition of risk management 
discussed in the literature review.  When risk is interpreted as H&S risk, as it is 
by the majority of participants, academics will avoid contact with risk 
management systems, and are able to deflect responsibility to administrators, 
with serious consequences for the utility of the risk register.  Despite the lack of 
consensus about what ‘risk’ is in the literature, this study contributes to an 
understanding of how risk is manifest from organisational members 
perspectives, and provides valid and enlightening views, even if risk itself 
remains an essentially contested concept.  The role of risk management has 
expanded the scope of the activity from the traditional focus on calculable 
probabilities, to a more qualitative setting, and confirms the notion of the ‘Risk 
Management of Everything’ (Power, 2004a).   
 
This study contradicts the Better Regulation Group (2004) suggestion that 
universities behave unreasonably in response to regulation.  In acting to 
maximise access to funds and attract high quality students, from the perspective 
of the organisation’s aims they are acting in accordance with risk governance 
demands.  The study supports the notion of a slide towards a “compliance 
culture” in the HE sector that doesn’t offer intelligent challenge to such external 
demands (Better Regulation Group, 2004).  However, rather than examine the 
outcomes from the perspective of those regulated, it is easier for regulators to 
dismiss regulatory malfunctions as the result of human fallibility or human 
idiocy, rather than representative of inherent systemic dysfunction (Gregersen, 
2003; McGoey, 2007).  The participants did expect unreasonable regulation, 
however, they did not interpret regulation unreasonably, but attempted to reduce 
risks to acceptable levels.  
 
A lack of academic engagement with the implementation of NPM accountability 
regimes has contributed to negative outcomes for the development of 
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governance frameworks (Better Regulation Group, 2004).  This study represents 
a move towards a critical engagement that enhances the ability to challenge 
regulatory approaches, using the in-depth case study approach to highlight 
potential weaknesses, and enable a dialogue that is based on a structured 
theoretical perspective fleshed out by illustrative narratives.  The descriptions 
illuminate an area about which little is known; how formal methods are actually 
used in practice in an organisation (Langley 1998), enabling the implementation 
of risk management governance to be understood from participant perspectives.  
The normative emphasis and the procedural difficulty of implementing the 
HEFCE risk management guidance are evident, while existing controls continue 
to mitigate risks to the organisation, but cannot be recognised as ‘risk 
management’ practices.  
 
The empirical contribution is valuable, both in the sense of new data to shed 
light on a little explored facet of organisational life, but also in providing 
feedback to regulatory and funding bodies and the project sponsor to enable 
barriers and weaknesses in the model and its implementation to be more fully 
understood.  In relation to those who participated in the workshops, there is the 
additional contribution of utilising reflexive theory within an organisational 
context to reduce self-imposed barriers; the role is already within their normal 
range of activities.   
 
In conclusion, this study provides rich descriptions of the separation of formal 
risk management processes from other existing controls to demonstrate how this 
undermines an important relationship. The institution displays an inability to 
implement high-level control systems, except in a most superficial way.  The 
strategic plan should be guiding the organisation towards achievement of aims, 
as should the risk management process.  The accounts provide compelling 
evidence that neither formal system had utility for those that participated in the 
research.  Mitigation actions are more deeply embedded in informal risk 
management practices, such as traditional meetings and existing lower level 
control systems.  For those lower down the hierarchy the organisational 
environment was severely deficient for the formal risk assessment process in 
relation to clarity of aims, preferred means of achieving them and calculative 
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difficulties, compounded by the evidence that senior management had no idea 
what constituted acceptable risk to the organisation.  Most significantly, 
responsiveness to financial threats associated with transparency measures was 
strongly evident, but participants were unable to recognise associated changes in 
organisational practices as ‘risk management’.   The University is ready for a 
compliance audit of risk governance, despite weaknesses identified in 
implementation, while paradoxically, it continues to manage risks as it has 
always done, through existing management practices, without reference to any 
formal risk assessment. 
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Thesis Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Information Sheet 
 
Risk Assessment at [University name]  Protocol Number REPSSPP(W)-05/06-83 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS   
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project.  You should only 
participate if you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before 
you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask me if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information 
 
1. This study will take place during risk management training sessions in which the volunteer will be 
requested to participate.  Such participation is entirely voluntary.   
 
2. The study takes place in the context of HEFCE guidelines recommending the use of risk 
management within HE establishments.  The college council is funding this study to gain a better 
understanding of the issues involved in implementing their guidance.  Risk assessment is a key 
process in the recommended risk management model.  The project aims to gather data illustrating 
how qualitative risk assessment decisions are reached.  The study is aimed at understanding the 
organisational context in which these decisions are reached, and whether professional background 
has an impact on assessment outcomes.  The aim is to ensure that risk assessment processes will be 
easier for staff to use and local issues are taken into account in guidance documents.   
 
3. Participants will be invited to take part in 2 hour training sessions.  Internal Audit has produced a 
course that will be delivered by the researcher, in the role of training consultant. The research aspects 
relate to the audio and video recording of risk identification and risk assessment activities during the 
course. 
 
4. There are no exclusion criteria for this project, but Internal Audit and local management will take 
part in agreeing who should be trained. 
 
5. No risks, inconvenience or discomfort may reasonably be anticipated. 
 
6. It is hoped that benefits to the volunteer will accrue as a result of the risk assessment process being 
appropriate to different schools and departments across the college. 
 
7. Anonymity and confidentiality of personal information will be preserved by non-attribution of 
quotes.  Where naming a department would provide a clue to the identity of the individual, quotes 
will not be used, but summarised in a way that prevents such identification.  Data will not be stored 
using individuals names.  The information will be accessible to the PhD student and the project 
supervisors.  All data will be stored in accordance with college requirements. 
 
8. In the event of your suffering any adverse effects as a consequence of your participation in this study, 
you will be compensated through the [University] 'No Fault' Compensation Scheme. 
 
Please contact Sharon Wheatley ([e-mail address]) should you require any further 
information or clarification. 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision 
not to take part, will not result in adverse consequences. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Protocol for First Stage Interviews 
 
Each interview was prefaced with the following standard introduction, or as near as 
possible, depending on interviewee questions or comments. 
 
This project explores how risk is managed in the College, and aims to develop 
and evaluate systems that suit a research lead university. 
The aim of these interviews is to produce a general overview of hazards and 
perceptions of risks in the different schools within the college.  We need to work 
with schools to establish how risks are currently managed. 
The interviews are expected to last around one hour.  We will be asking general 
questions about the types of hazards present in your schools, the systems you 
have for monitoring and managing them, the availability of data on incidents or 
events where control has failed and evidence related to where risk control has 
succeeded. 
We would like to request permission to record this interview.  The interviews 
will then be transcribed and you will be able to comment on the transcription. 
The data from these interviews will be used to provide a report summarising the 
current state of play within the University.  The anonymity of all interviewees 
will be protected.  All recorded data will be treated as confidential. 
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The numbered points below are the interview questions.  Prompts, to be used when 
interviewees are unable to respond, are indicated by a lower case letter. 
Some general questions about your School or Department. 
1 Can you tell us how many staff and students you have in your 
School/Department? 
2 On what sites do the School/Department’s activities take place 
 
Some general questions about the objectives of the College and threats that your 
School/Department experiences. 
3 What are the aims of the university and school/department? 
a. No prompt required, just see what perception each school has, if any 
4 What risks do you actively manage in your school/department? 
5 What threatens your school/department achieving its objectives? 
a. Health &Safety 
b. Threats to research – reputation, staff retaining, recruitment, teaching 
commitments, PhD completions 
c. Threats to teaching – reputation, poor students, PhD completions, academic 
appeals, student numbers 
d. Regulatory compliance – data protection, freedom of information, 
environment, safety 
e. Staff issues – employment law, recruitment and retention 
f. Facilities (including IT) 
g. Security – fire, theft 
6 Which areas of risk are you most concerned about? 
7 How do you know about the risks or threats that exist? 
a. Monitoring systems 
b. Incident reports 
c. Specific responsibility placed on individuals 
8 Do you record or keep any data relating to threats or risk incidents or events? 
a. Student appeals 
b. PhD failures 
c. H&S records 
d. Environmental breeches 
e. IT breeches 
f. Data protection requests 
9 Can you tell us about any incidents or events which were prevented as a result 
of awareness of possible threats to the school? 
a. Can you direct me to a source of information?  People, records or reports. 
10 Can you tell us about any failures that have occurred or things that we could 
learn lessons from? 
a. Can you direct me to a source of information?  People, records or reports. 
 
Thank you very much for your co-operation.  We will forward the transcript as soon as we 
have done it. 
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Appendix 3: Data from the Pilot Study 
 
Features of the Pilot Case and Demographics 
 
All members of the Risk Management Centre were invited, and half were able to attend.  
The participants include a lower proportion of students than academic staff, which 
provides greater similarity with the proposed training groups. 
 
Identifier Role Seniority Length of 
service 
P1A1 Academic Senior Long 
P1A2 Academic Senior Recent 
P1A3 Academic Junior Long 
P1A4 Academic Student Medium 
P1A5 Administrator Junior Recent 
P1A6 (part-time) Academic Senior Long 
P1A7 (observer) Administrator Senior Recent 
 
 
Discussion of Narrative Data 
 
The group identified risks to the successful implementation of a new course in relation 
to changes in organisation within the University.  The Risk Management Centre were in 
the process of being moved from the [name] Institute, to form part of the Department of 
Geography.  Consequently, this raised a number of uncertainties about administrative 
issues and future arrangements.  Adding to this uncertainty was an acknowledged lack 
of experience in running teaching courses within the Risk Management Centre, which 
historically focussed on research activities.  Use of Geography Department systems 
(e.g., student monitoring and complaint handling) was seen as the best way to mitigate 
this risk, providing that members of staff within the group were not alienated as a result.  
Other factors included the availability of key staff, student quality, availability of 
teaching rooms and student expectations.   
 
Despite experience of Risk Assessment in the group, the recruitment of the required 
number of students was not considered until prompted by the researcher.  The reflexive 
academic emphasis of the group made the quality of students of greater interest and 
concern than the numbers.  In the ensuing discussion it emerged that the situation was 
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unclear, and that around 6 unconditional offers had been accepted; some way short of 
the target of 15. 
 
The attraction and completion of research contracts was also considered, and the two 
aspects separated as different sources of risk.  In the attraction of research funding 
reputation and publication history were seen to be key factors.  Insufficient time was a 
threat to proposal preparation, and failure to include other departmental inputs and 
authorisations in planning for achievement of deadlines.  It was notable that the balance 
of research grants, in which some provide full recovery of overheads, and others not, 
was not considered, although it was an identified source of risk for the organisation as a 
whole. 
 
In the completion of projects some internal administrative arrangements were identified 
as a risk: 
Personnel department and their processes, it’s not just the people, it is the whole 
process we have to go through.  So, you actually have to get the money in our 
bank before they let you advertise, which means that you are already 3 months 
behind.  [P1A1] 
In addition, management arrangements for research contracts were perceived in a 
similar vein.  Poor IT arrangements were cited as a risk. 
 
The Risk Assessment discussion first focussed on reputation, and then considered what 
control systems were in place to prevent student dissatisfaction, and use of Geography 
Department systems was identified as the safest approach.  
 
Concerns about the quality of students related to the high proportion of overseas 
candidates, with qualifications that may be difficult to equate to UK degrees and 
potential difficulties with fluency of English.  The possible impact was assessed as 4 or 
5.  In considering the frequency, more general issues about the grades of students 
applying for the course were raised in relation to perceptions of the University and 
marketing strategy, since the grades of applicants were lower than anticipated when 
preparing the course.  There was considerable difficulty assigning frequency rating to 
the risk from poor quality students, but the group expert in Risk Assessment sums up: 
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So, for these two what do they come out as, they come out as a 3 and a 3, a 3 
and a 3 is medium, and a 4 and a 5 or even a 3 and a 5 would have been high, 
so it doesn’t really matter whether we said that it’s a 3 or a 4 or a 5.  [P1A1] 
This illustrated a potential problem with a rating system based on banding across a grid, 
in that you can work backwards to assign a number to produce the overall rating that is 
desired. 
 
The group briefly discussed mitigating actions that might be taken to improve student 
quality for the following year, mainly focussing on admissions procedures.  This 
reiterated a number of concerns about current arrangements: 
You’ve got me more and more worried about all these things.  [P1A7] 
This attendee confirms that the risk workshop focuses attention on issues relevant to the 
group, and could be considered a good Risk Assessment session.  Actions to be taken as 
a result were discussed after the presentation was complete. 
 
The pilot study provided confidence that the risk management workshops would be a 
valuable approach to collecting narratives during risk identification and assessment 
activities, and gave the sponsor the opportunity to review the course delivery to confirm 
that data gathering would not prevent achievement of the intended learning outcomes.  
Furthermore, participants explicitly stated that the presence of video and audio 
recording equipment did not influence their discussions, since they forgot it was there 
once they started.
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Appendix 4: Training Session Slides 
 
The following pages contain the training material used in the two Estates & Facilities 
workshops.  Those slides that were tailored to focus on local issues are indicated by an 
asterisk next to the slide number, where appropriate.  The remaining material was 






















































































































































There was insufficient time in the training sessions for this workshop discussion, except 
very brief comments.  Furthermore, there were no risks rated (as ‘high’ or any other 
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Appendix 5: Anonymity Coding for Training Attendees 
 
All participants had been with the organisation longer than 5 years, except where 
(recent) is indicated 
9  
Code Group Role Experience H&S 
T1A1 Dental Institute Academic/Manager  Y 
T1A2 Dental Institute Academic/Manager Y 
T1A3 Dental Institute Administrator/Manager Some 
T1A4 Dental Institute Academic/Manager  Y 
T1A5 Dental Institute Academic/Manager N 
T2A1 Estates & Facilities Manager Y 
T2A2 Estates & Facilities Manager Y 
T2A3 Estates & Facilities Manager N 
T3A1 Estates & Facilities Manager Y 
T3A2 Estates & Facilities Manager Y 
T3A3 Estates & Facilities Manager Y 
T3A4 Estates & Facilities Manager No data 
T3A5 Finance Department Manager (recent) No data 
T4A1 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager N 
T4A2 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager N 
T4A3 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager Y 
T4A4 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager No data 
T4A5 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager Y 
T4A6 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager N 
T4A7 Biomedical & Health Sciences Technical Manager No data 
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Appendix 6: Reflections on Workshop Data Validity  
 
For each training session, the balance of conversation between attendees during 
workshops was analysed.  The following graph illustrates the percentage of comments 
attributed to each individual in their session. 
 
 
Figure A10.1  Attendee Participation in Training Sessions and Follow-up 
Interviews 
 
One individual contributed over 40% of the comments attributed in the first session, 
whilst the remainder accounted for between 10% and 17% each, indicating remarks 
were fairly well distributed amongst other members. 
 
The second session had only three attendees, who all contributed over 18%, with two 
members being more vocal than the other.  The third group came from the same 
Department as the second.  One individual dominated this session with over 40% of the 
comments, with one member making less than 5% contribution.  The remaining 
attendees accounted for between 15% and 23% each. 
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The final session had the most attendees of any workshop and two individuals provided 
over 60% of the comments between them, another provided over 17% and consequently 
the remaining four members of the group contributed less than 10% each, with two 
below 5%.   
 
Whilst I was aware of imbalances in contribution between members, and attempted to 
involve those who are not participating, it was difficult to disrupt the natural dominance 
of individuals in groups, particularly where this related to seniority, as in the first three 
cases.   
 
The 13 follow-up interviews allowed the researcher to compare willingness to 
participate in follow-up interviews with contribution in the workshops.  In the first two 
sessions, the dominant speakers did not volunteer to take part in the interviews, 
encouraging the researcher to assume they had expressed their views on the subject 
adequately during the session, taking into account other work commitments.  Figure 7.2 
illustrates that the uneven participation does not indicate a lack of engagement with the 
training, and the majority of those who agreed to be interviewed were those who 
participated least, and took the opportunity to express their views in the interview.  Only 
one member of staff who contributed less than 5% did not agree to be interviewed.  In 
addition, several expressed the view that it was informative to hear the more vocal 
colleague, with perceived gains from understanding their perspective.  There was no 
expressed resentment about any conversational imbalance in the workshops.  An 
analysis of the data on the feedback forms is included in Appendix 8. 
 
The interviewees confirmed that they felt able to talk freely in the sessions: 
I think everybody here is quite open.  [T2A3 Manager interview] 
There was no problem about any reticence to say what you felt.  [T3A4 
Manager interview] 
Another felt that although there was no intimidation within the area he/she worked in, 
some other parts of the College might not encourage staff to express their views freely: 
I can see that could be a problem with some groups.  [T3A4 Manager 
interview] 
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From a data-gathering point of view, the workshops and interviews provided rich and 
varied descriptions of operational risk and from that perspective were very successful.  
However, the tailoring of sessions made comparison of the resulting narratives more 
difficult.  Since sessions in different Departments or Schools were focussed on different 
issues, this introduced an artificial element of differentiation between groups.  
Nonetheless, common themes emerged, and detailed data provided rich descriptions of 
the influence of local views on the risk assessment process.  The tailoring was important 
to enable attendees to engage with the training material, and, in this sense, provided the 
accounts desired. 
 
Reflexively, the three training groups took a different approach to the researcher as 
presenter of the training material in the role of participant-observer.  The DI members 
treated me as a management consultant linked to the Internal Audit Department.  They 
took the opportunity to provide feedback to the Internal Audit team about risk 
management process concerns and were interested in discussing possible methods to 
integrate the requirement with existing practices.  The E&F group considered me as a 
PhD student, providing input to senior management through research outputs.  The BHS 
group, by contrast, treated me as an emissary from senior management, delivering 
communication on organisational requirements.  However, in all cases the data supports 
the view that attendees felt able to discuss risks openly, but reflexive considerations 
indicate that many of the narratives contained in this study represent attempts by 
individuals to communicate with senior management via the researcher.   
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Appendix 7: Workshop Evaluation Form 
Basic Workshop Information













Timing, Pace and Level
tick one: too fast too slow
tick one: too long too short
tick one: too high too low
Comments:
As a Participant your feedback is important to us in monitoring the value of the Workshop and to enable us to make improvements 
for future sessions.  We would therefore be grateful if you would answer the following questions as fully and honestly as possible.  
Please tick the appropriate box and add your comments in the spaces provided.
Pre-Workshop Administration & Organisation:
Catering Arrangements:
Training Room & Equipment
What sessions did you find most helpful and why?
What sessions were least helpful and why?
Understanding of your needs:
Quality of Visual Aids (handouts, slides, etc.):
Appropriate balance between theory & practice:
Workshop content relevant to your work:
Yes/No
Knowledge of the subject & handling questions:
Presentation Skills - clear and understandable:
Maintained an environment conducive to learning:
Was the duration of the workshop:




Thank you for taking the time to complete this form.  Please hand to facilitator at end of session.
Estates/Facilities* (delete as appropriate)
Job Title:
Department:
Experience of Risk Analysis: Length of ServiceY/N
Would you be willing to participate in a 15 minute follow-up interview?
Was the pace of the workshop:
HANDLING RISK WORKSHOP
EVALUATION FORM
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Appendix 8: Analysis of Training Feedback Forms 
 
Feedback forms were completed by 19/20 trainees, and the data gathered shows that the 
training was generally well received, with over 87% of responses in the ‘Good’ or ‘Very 
Good’ scale.  The following graph illustrates the feedback assessment categories and the 


















































































Figure A6.1: Feedback Form Data Analysis 
 
The project did not fund catering at the training sessions, and there was some variability 
in whether the local area provided refreshments during the training.  This was reflected 
in the poor ratings received for catering.  If the catering scores are removed from the 
analysis, the ‘Good’ and ‘Very Good’ ratings increase to approximately 95% of the 
responses. 
 
The forms enabled written comments to be added and this information (provided by 10 
of the 20 trainees) stated the training was helpful, useful or good.  No negative 
comments were received on the feedback forms. 
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The data confirmed that the training needs of the programme were being met, and in 
fact, surpassed the researcher’s expectation of satisfaction with the training.  As one 
attendee stated: 
I thought when we were first starting ‘oh, we’ll never fill up 2 hours’ on that sort 
of thing, but, of course, once you get into it, and you know the academics 
certainly followed up afterwards and sort of said how useful it was. 
 
In addition, some E&F staff felt it was nice to think that senior management are 
interested in views of staff across the organisation, and makes engagement with the 
Risk Management process seem more worthwhile. 
 
Overall, the feedback confirmed that the content, pace and length of the course were 
considered about right by the vast majority of attendees.  
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Appendix 9: Interview Protocol for Training Follow-up Interviews  
 
I just wanted to ask you about the training session you attended, particularly the 
workshop sessions, more than the actual training material.   
 
Confidentiality and anonymity will be ensured, as outlined at the previous meeting.   
 
5 What did you think was most useful about the risk workshops, in which local 
issues were discussed? 
6 What did you think was least useful about the workshops? 
7 Did you think the use of numbers in the assessment was helpful? 
8 Did you think the sessions would lead to any follow up action? 
9 Was there anything that you thought should have been discussed that 
wasn’t? 
10 What do you think is the greatest threat to the [name of School or 
Department]? 
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Appendix 10: Recommendations for the Project Sponsor  
In recommending changes to the implementation of HEFCE risk management 
governance within the organisation, it is important to consider the question of what 
operational risk assessment is intended to achieve.  Although theoretically it should be a 
means to improve risk management within an organisation by forcing senior managers 
to be accountable for the identification, assessment and control of risks they manage, 
the current implementation favours compliance with external targets, with use of a Risk 
Register to demonstrate compliance.  This approach does reduce risk to the institution, 
but does not provide the other claimed benefits of the governance.   
Recommendation: Clarify organisational interpretation of the role and purpose 
of the Risk Register, and include in training material 
Most participants did not identify local Risk Registers as part of any risk management 
controls they used, even when prompted.  At present, within the University, the Risk 
Register is an artefact to show an external assessor that the University has taken HEFCE 
risk management requirements seriously and have taken steps to comply.  This does not 
undermine its usefulness.  Indeed, there are many who feel that that is the ‘point’ of a 
Risk Register; it enables an organisation to make itself auditable.  
 
However, the focus on the Risk Register as a compliance tool reduces the system’s 
ability to recognise that other control systems are acting as risk management systems.  
Risk is associated with H&S and formal Risk Register activity, both of which are 
identified as administrative roles, reducing the incentive for academic staff to engage 
with the process.  The question arises as to whether the current risk management 
practices are designed with the organisational characteristics of Higher Education 
institutions in mind.  As the literature review illustrates, academic freedom is one of the 
fundamental premises for academic work, but relies on large measures of autonomy 
both on an individual and organisational level.  The imposition of enforced self-
regulation and accountability is unwelcome to academics, who reserve the right to resist 
managerial control, and the individual Schools have the capacity to ignore changes that 
are seen to challenge their freedoms.  Many Schools in Higher Education institutions 
remain conservative when it comes to organisational change, and provide a good 
example of ‘autopoiesis’ in attempting to change as little as possible in the face of 
environmental disturbances; only stimulated to respond to signals they interpret as a 
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threat to the survival of their system, linked to access to funding.  In an increasingly 
competitive environment, there is a need to reduce the reluctance of academics to take 
responsibility for operational risk management.   
Recommendation: include day-to-day examples of existing control processes 
within the policy document, describe them as ‘Risk Management’ and thereby 
demonstrate the involvement of academic staff in such activities (e.g., student 
progression). 
By demonstrating their participation in existing controls, reflexive views can be used to 
encourage the notion that Risk Management is indeed part of their normal role.  This 
also has the benefit of facilitating integration between formal risk management 
processes and existing controls, which act to mitigate risks, but do not include risk 
assessment as part of the process. 
Recommendation: utilise Risk Register outputs to enable integration with 
existing ways of working in the form of action plans, linked to existing processes 
(e.g., RAE concerns and RMAG activities). 
To successfully implement risk management systems, clear and defined accountability 
must be attached to senior management.  The narratives suggest organisational control 
systems can only be embedded with senior management action and commitment.  There 
is not sufficient authority to embed from the bottom up.  Sharing risk between many 
individual staff members is not effective; everyone thinks someone else is doing it.  
Control systems have to be developed, implemented and maintained from above. 
Recommendation: the existing Risk Management Policy is updated to strengthen 
and clarify the accountability for Operational Risk. 
This clarification enables the PCT to consider who should be involved in the annual 
review of Corporate Risks, an identified weakness in the current implementation.   
Recommendation: the existing Risk Management Policy is updated to specify 
whom to involve in Risk Assessment. 
It is clear that those involved in the process expect to see some feedback (in the form of 
the Corporate Risk Register), and are unwilling to participate otherwise.  In addition, 
the data provides evidence that power and authority are necessary to implement changes 
or mitigation actions, and reduces the benefit of including those at lower levels in the 
hierarchy.   
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Concerns about the confidentiality of the data recorded on these documents pose a 
threat in the form of secondary risk, should some concerns become widely known or 
publicised in the press.  In a competitive environment, the type of information marked 
‘Company Confidential’ in many commercial organisations also presents a danger if the 
communication passes to a competitor.  The confidentiality status of the local risk data 
and Key Corporate Risk document is currently unclear. 
Recommendation: to enable full disclosure risk documents should be 
confidential, with a limited distribution, further reinforcing the suggestion of 
limiting involvement with formal risk documents to senior staff. 
One of the major hurdles to address is whether the Risk Register is a tool for passing 
information upwards within the organisation, or whether it is intended to stimulate 
feedback about risks, and act to influence behaviour as a result, in line with the HEFCE 
framework.  As well as improving communication up the line, a vital part of such a 
control system is an interactive loop of information flow.   
Recommendation: the existing Risk Management Policy is updated to include 
the content and frequency of the feedback to be provided to those involved in the 
process. 
The competition between parts of the organisation can undermine attempts to reduce 
risk.  The more powerful voices within the college are seen to shout down other less 
powerful voices.  E&F and other infrastructure departments appear to have much less 
voice in an organisation where academics form the most powerful professional group. 
Recommendation: the existing Risk Management Policy is updated to take 
account of competing aims within the organisation and to highlight the role of 
the PCT in enabling balances to be achieved. 
The risk assessment workshops provide strong evidence that the ratings produced 
cannot be considered a form of measurement, and that participants had difficulty in 
comparing risks.  Some participants suggested that the narrative sections of the process 
were more valuable than attempting to rank risks.  The difficulty of assigning numerical 
values, particularly of realistic costs, suggests that the process should not focus on 
methodologically difficult quantification. 
Recommendation: simplify the risk assessment process by using qualitative 
assessments, and include summaries of narratives about causes and outcomes. 
It is clear that the existing semi-quantitative assessment is making it harder to engage 
people in risk assessment, with the majority refusing to quantify risk even in the most 
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superficial way.  Moving to a qualitative assessment makes the assessment process less 
daunting, especially if frequency and severity are less important than descriptions of 
potential risk causes and ways to reduce negative outcomes.  Existing management 
meetings are familiar to participants, and informally act in this role, if assessment 
ratings are not a mandatory feature of the outputs, and should be a recognised part of the 
risk management system in the University.  As suggested by one group, inclusion of a 
risk review within meetings that are held as a matter of course could integrate risk 
management within existing practices.  This may not produce a risk register, but would 
demonstrate a better understanding of how risks are actually managed in the 
organisation, and could be used to provide local inputs to registers as reportable risks 
arise. 
 
One workshop illustrates the difficulty of inclusion of opportunity risks on the same 
scale as threats to the organisation.  However, the 2007 Corporate Risk Register 
demonstrates that if these are framed in a negative way, as failure to grasp the potential 
gains, they can be included on the same scale. 
Recommendation: the Risk Management Policy should include guidance on the 
Assessment of opportunities; consideration of impact and likelihood of failure to 
achieve potential gains can be used to enable comparison with threats to the 
organisation.   
The training course delivered to departments was useful in ensuring that staff took a 
broad view of risk, in particular clarifies that the activity is not primarily concerned with 
H&S, and the training could be the means through which guidance reaches those staff 
conducting risk assessment.  The training improved the implementation of the 
governance for two of the three areas trained. 
Recommendation: training is provided for all those involved in the Risk Register 
process.   
The 2007 Risk Register accountability structures suggest that training should be 
provided for the PCT and nominated as risk owners as a starting point. 
 
These recommendations aim to improve the implementation of the Risk Management 
system, to embed controls into local ways of working.  They also highlight a number of 
barriers to implementation and suggest possible approaches to reduce them.
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Appendix 11: Recommendations for the Regulator 
A11.1 Introduction 
 
In 2001, HEFCE stated that the underlying principles of the Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 
1999) had been accepted by HEFCE and the HE sector, and in their Accounts Direction 
(HEFCE Circular Letter 24/00), set a timetable for the implementation of risk guidance 
(HEFCE, 2001) adopting an ERM model that had been developed in the private sector.  
Against this backdrop, in order to improve their risk management strategy, a long-
established UK university funded a three-year PhD study that commenced in 2004.  
Consequently, unusually privileged access to members of the organisation and to 
documents was granted.  This summary report provides an overview of the research 
methods used and outlines the key findings of the study, which provide the evidence 
used to identify recommendations to the regulator that follow.   
 
The organisation under study is a research-led University, and based on the narrative 
accounts gathered, was considered by HEFCE to have compliant risk management 
practices.  The research aimed to describe, compare and analyse risk interpretation in 
different groups within this single institution and to critically examine and understand 
the influences that shaped them.  In order to provide an analysis of risk from the 
participants’ perspective, the findings draw on narrative accounts of risk management 
practice in the higher education sector, three to five years into the implementation of 
HEFCE risk management governance. 
 
The introduction of HEFCE risk management governance led to a ‘Risk Management 
Policy’ and the production of a ‘Corporate Key Risks’ document (risk register)23.  The 
register ranks the major risks to the organisation by integrating local risk registers and 
forms an important source of data for comparison with interview and training narratives.   
The methods used to gather the research participants’ descriptions of risk are outlined in 
the following section. 
 
                                                
23 It is interesting to note that the term ‘risk register’ does not appear in HEFCE’s 2001 
guidance yet their production has been a common response throughout the sector.  The 
research participants interpreted adherence to common methods as a means to reduce 
the risk of non-compliance with ‘best practice’ guidelines. 
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A11.2 Research Methods 
 
The researcher gathered narrative data from interviews and risk management training 
workshops, over a period of 3 years.  The sample included recorded interviews with 20 
of the 21 Heads of Schools and Departments (one chose not to participate).  This first 
stage: interviews with senior managers in the organisation, led to a training stage with 
members of staff selected by local managers and the choice of attendees provided 
further data in relation to interpretation of responsibility for risk.  Three embedded 
cases, selected purposively, from widely differing groups in the organisation, provided 
the opportunity to deliver risk management training and to arrange 12 follow-up 
interviews.  The training sessions included workshops in which participants identified 
and assessed risks.  This talk about risk in the organisation was filmed and audio 
recorded.  The interview and workshop recordings were used to provide transcripts for 
content analysis, using a theoretical framework derived from Luhmann’s Social 
Systems Theory (1995) to analyse risk meanings. 
 
The study embraced a constructivist approach, from the perspective of the different 
participants, multiple and conflicting views were accepted as valid.  This in-depth 
narrative source opens the possibility to make a more detailed examination of the 
implementation of risk governance than has tended to occur previously, making a 
significant contribution to an area that has been little researched, and the key findings 
are outlined in the following section. 
 
A11.3 Key findings 
 
The purpose of risk management is to improve organisational ability to achieve aims 
and this is set in the context of a mirrored desire on the HEFCE’s behalf to achieve their 
own objectives.  The satisfaction of organisational aims is something that organisations 
do, and have been doing, long before the implementation of formal risk management.  
Such everyday activities are not recognised as risk management.  The majority of risk 
mitigation that was evident, during the period of study, was set within existing 
practices, and no formal assessment was required to identify a need for change to satisfy 
evolving aims and target measures.  The omission of competition as a factor in the 
identification of risk fails to recognise an organisational inability to satisfy divergent 
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aims or to balance one aim against another.  The informal management of risk is placed 
under tension by internal forces.  The image of the organisation being monitored is one 
of ‘good practice’, as targets and measures are achieved, funding is accessed, but the 
aims of the regulator are given significantly different priorities, those that do not impact 
on funding levels can be safely ignored. 
 
This study reveals how a shift in the meaning of risk in organisations, from a calculated 
probability of harmful events, towards less measurable threats associated with the 
achievement of aims, brings all management control systems within the risk 
management framework.  However, this shift has a potentially dangerous aspect as 
organisations attempt to manage uncertainty rather than risk, to portray an illusion of 
control.  Two major concerns are evident.  Firstly, the formal process was interpreted as 
an administrative role: form-filling, while the inability to provide useful risk assessment 
outputs undermined the process’s value.  The risk of non-compliance with regulatory 
requirements was reduced, and participants viewed this as the risk register’s main 
purpose.  Secondly, as transparency measures form an increasingly familiar part of 
organisational control, existing management controls responded to enhance success in 
achieving targets, but not necessarily by improving the outcomes that the measures were 
intended to assess.   The following section provides recommendations based on these 
findings, and are grouped within the two categories outlined above.  Firstly, formal 
HEFCE risk management governance and secondly, informal risk management systems. 
 
A11.4 Recommendations to improve the embeddedness of HEFCE risk governance 
framework 
 
The recommendations in this section provide suggestions to overcome identified 
barriers to implementation of the HEFCE risk management guidance.  It provides a 
critical evaluation of the recommended framework, illustrating difficulties encountered 
by participants during risk identification and assessment activities, while also 
highlighting areas of non-compliance with the guidance.  Furthermore, improvements in 
compliance monitoring to assess the effectiveness of risk management implementation 
are included in this section.   
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4.1 Problematic nature of operational risk assessment 
The study reveals that the majority of identified risks related to decisions made 
by others, both internal and external to the organisation.  Most surprisingly, 19 
of 20 participants from 3 different groups in the organisation were unwilling to 
assign any rating during workshop sessions, despite encouragement to do so.  
The inability to perform a calculation to provide a ‘Value at Risk’ or other 
comparable measure reduced the value of the risk register, since participants 
were unable to provide outputs that facilitate risk prioritisation. 
Recommendation: reduce the emphasis on formal risk assessment 
process for risks that are not amenable to statistical analysis. 
4.2 Assessment of opportunities 
Risk assessment training workshops revealed that it was difficult to include 
opportunities using the recommended assessment grid.  The risk assessment 
framework had a single scale, derived from safety frameworks, with no potential 
positive outcomes to consider.  Since the guidance recommends reducing risk 
ratings, the rating grid implies to some participants that it is safest to do nothing.   
Furthermore, interviews and workshops revealed only one group that clearly 
embraced the notion of risk as opportunity, as defined by HEFCE, linked to 
experience of positive outcomes in strategically focussed mergers.  Other 
participants focussed on negative aspects (e.g, RAE failure, RAE impact on 
teaching quality, Health & Safety incidents, reduction in funding) and 
characterised risk as a threat.  However, one additional example was evident in a 
risk register containing an example of an opportunity framed in a negative way, 
such that failure to grasp a potential benefit provided the risk rating, enabling the 
grid to be utilised.  If this is the intended use of the framework, then this should 
be clear in the HEFCE guidance.   
Recommendation: make explicit how the recommended assessment grid 
can be utilised for the assessment of opportunities. 
In addition, there is asymmetry between the HEFCE definition of risk, stating 
possible positive and negative outcomes in relation to objectives, whereas the 
control or mitigating actions definition only reflects reduction of unwanted 
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events, a more negative interpretation of risk.  In the context of opportunities, 
chances of a successful outcome need to be enhanced, not mitigated against, but 
perhaps with a negative framing of the opportunity, the definition has some 
benefit.   
Recommendation: review the control actions definition; explain what 
mitigation means in the context of an opportunity.   
However, it may be better to utilise a different approach for opportunities and to 
consider them in relation to a scale in which increased ratings are positive.  The 
mixing of opportunities and threats in one risk document demonstrated little 
benefit, and many participants overlooked opportunities completely.  A 
separation of these two aspects of risk may encourage the more entrepreneurial 
interpretation of risk to form an acknowledged part of university risk 
management.  Indeed, the study reveals that a link between the risk register 
process and strategic planning was only superficially established in the case 
study organisation, and failed to provide the recommended input to the risk 
process, there was little evidence of interaction between these two formal 
systems. 
Recommendation: consider the benefit to be gained by focussing risk 
register activity on threats, while integrating strategic planning 
processes to replace the risk register for opportunity risk. 
4.3 Inability to define risk appetite 
The study reveals that it is impossible to define a risk appetite that reflects 
concerns of all organisational participants because of competing and conflicting 
aims.  Furthermore, the risk appetite of the university was not defined, resulting 
in a gap in the control loop of the assessment process.  There was nothing for 
participants to compare risk ratings with, to evaluate their acceptability to the 
organisation. 
Recommendation: shift emphasis from formal risk assessment towards 
recognition of risk management within existing work practices; no 
benefit can be derived from comparing values that cannot be produced 
against an appetite that cannot be defined.   
4.4 Who should be involved? 
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Despite the HEFCE recommendation to include a wide range of staff in the 
process, it remains unclear who should actually be involved in the formal risk 
management process.  Crucially the study reveals a lack of benefit to involving 
those without authority to act.  One group suggested a way of integrating formal 
risk reporting with a pyramidal approach in which senior managers provide 
input that includes risks from the perspective of their group, enabling the views 
of those lower in the hierarchy to be integrated without their formal 
involvement, and there may be a benefit to taking this approach.   
Recommendation: limit involvement with the formal risk register process 
to those in senior roles.   
4.5 Confidentiality of risk reporting 
The findings suggest that difficulties arise in relation to confidentiality of risk 
documents when a wide range of staff are invited to contribute to the process.  
Staff stated an unwillingness to participate if they were not to see the outcomes 
of the process (i.e., the corporate risk register).  At the same time, staff in 
another group were vociferous about unwillingness to disclose potential risks if 
the register was widely available; competitors could gain awareness of potential 
weaknesses.  This further reinforces the suggestion of limiting direct 
involvement with risk registers to senior staff. 
Recommendation: make confidentiality of risk registers clear, with a 
defined distribution.  
4.6 The Role of the Risk Register 
The findings are unequivocal in explaining the purpose of the risk register from 
the perspective of participants: it fulfils a compliance role.  Despite lack of 
utility in other regards, it is important to note that the register is perceived to 
reduce risk to the organisation, by fulfilling regulatory transparency requests.   
Recommendation: state that if a risk register has no utility other than as 
a compliance tool, organisations may choose not to produce one. 
Most importantly, the study highlights a disconnection between the register and 
the management of risks.  Risk mitigation that was evident in organisational 
change was unrelated to risk register content, and not recognised as risk 
management, such that the register provided little information about how risk 
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was actually being managed in the university.  The study raises questions about 
the value of the method adopted for compliance with HEFCE risk management 
governance.  Whilst risk registers may be easy to audit, they tell the regulator 
very little about the management of risks in the university. 
Recommendation: increase emphasis on recognition of risk management 
activities within existing practices. 
4.7       Interpretation of risk in the formal risk management system 
This case study reveals that ‘risk’ is most frequently interpreted to mean Health 
& Safety risk.  This has traditionally been an administrative task, in some cases 
undertaken by experts, but most importantly, not senior academic managers.  In 
consequence, the study reveals that academics were unwilling to take 
responsibility for risk management, since it was something they knew nothing 
about.  However, the study illustrates their active involvement in much of the 
risk management that was evident.  The post-training interviews revealed a 
reduction in their unwillingness to be involved once they became aware of 
undertaking risk management within existing roles. 
Recommendation: provide day-to-day examples of existing university 
control processes, describe them as ‘Risk Management’ and thereby 
demonstrate the involvement of academic staff in such activities (e.g., 
student progression, course validation, RAE/REF preparation). 
4.8 Feedback to local register participants  
The study found a failure in the implementation of the model, since there was no 
feedback to those providing input to the local registers.  Consequently, the 
register’s utility was undermined, such that once it had been produced it was put 
in a filing cabinet until required for input the following year.  Most significantly, 
checking for the presence of a risk register will not reveal this compliance 
failure. 
Recommendation: Compliance checks should include evidence of 
feedback to senior management in each area, in response to submission 
of local risk registers. 
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A11.5 Recommendations in relation to existing management control systems that 
act to reduce operational risk 
 
The findings reveal an organisation with an active and effective risk management 
system, but one that does not rely on the assessment of frequency or severity to 
prioritise and direct mitigation and control activities. 
 
5.1 Interpretation of risk in the existing management systems 
Unfortunately, the emphasis on assessment led to confusion with Health & 
Safety risk processes and existing management practices were not recognised as 
‘risk management’ by study participants.  This had a deleterious impact on the 
linkage between the formal risk management framework and existing controls, 
seriously undermining the implementation of risk management best practice as 
an integrated control system. 
Recommendation: as a minimum, risk management training for 
designated risk owners is mandated, and forms part of compliance 
checks, to enable participants to recognise existing practices as risk 
management, opening the possibility of an integrated approach.   
5.2 Conflicting perspectives 
The findings strongly support the idea that organisational risk identification 
reveals conflicting views about which risks should be prioritised for mitigation, 
such that a unitary representation of the greatest risks to the university cannot 
reflect the complexity of the organisational landscape.  This was especially the 
case where the university had funding links to external organisations with 
different aims to those of HEFCE, such as the NHS, who were more concerned 
with patient care statistics than educational aims.   Furthermore, applied research 
funded by Health Organisations did not fare well in the RAE assessment against 
more theoretical research, published in peer review journals.  This resulted in a 
difficult juggling act for those who managed or were research active in these 
areas, the perspectives were in conflict and could not be reconciled. 
Recommendation: recognise the role of university management in 
establishing a balance between conflicting perspectives.  Communication 
between the regulator and the regulated needs to consider ways of 
 Appendix  Page 406 of 407 
reducing evident conflicts, while accepting that risk mitigation cannot 
reduce risks from the perspective of all interested parties. 
5.3 Competing aims 
Utilising the HEFCE definition of risk as enhancing the achievement of 
organisational aims, it is important to recognise that risk management will 
always be happening, it is what people in organisations do as part of existing 
practice.  Perhaps the most significant finding of the study is the importance of 
recognising how study participants identify regulatory aims and associated 
measures as risks to the organisation.   Crucially, universities have to balance the 
competition inherent in HEFCE aims.  For example, the study reveals how the 
emphasis on RAE outcomes, with associated prestige and financial rewards, 
gives pre-eminence to research over teaching activities, which have no link to 
excellence for access to funding, other than pseudo-market league-tables that 
influence student choice of institution, since funding is linked directly to student 
numbers.  Furthermore, the findings reveal how the importance of RAE 
outcomes undermined the HEFCE aim of contribution to society, through the 
emphasis on peer-reviewed journal publications. 
The findings reveal the impact of measurement and assessment measures on the 
identification and mitigation of risk, albeit in existing management forums, 
rather than formal risk assessment exercises.  One interesting example relates to 
the Economic & Social Research Council requirement for 4-year PhD 
completion.  The University had introduced new review mechanisms and 
support infrastructure for PhD students, to achieve a very successful 92% 
completion rate.  Several study participants saw these changes in a favourable 
light.  However, there were others who were aware that in some cases this had 
undermined the long-standing aim of academic excellence, since external 
examination activities suggested a decline in the standard of theses being 
examined.  Hitting the target became the overriding organisational objective.    
The findings illustrate how HEFCE aims and governance requirements compete 
for access to resources (e.g., Teaching Excellence and Research Excellence; Pay 
& Modernisation and Risk Management) with some being ignored, while others 
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were satisfied through administrative compliance reports, and yet others 
triggered organisational change to meet the aims that promised the most 
lucrative incentives. The study revealed that it was not dysfunctional for 
Universities to direct attention towards targets and measures that were perceived 
to offer the greatest financial gains.  Rather, it illustrated risk management in 
action.  Monitoring and funding structures give more emphasis to some aims 
than others.  Is this the intention? 
Recommendation: review HEFCE aims, acknowledge areas of conflict 
between them and evaluate the impact of assessment measures adopted 
in relation to funding.  
A11.6  Conclusions 
These recommendations aim to offer intelligent challenge to regulatory demands for 
risk management, through a detailed understanding of practices in one University in the 
UK.  The findings reveal that the private sector governance can be utilised within the 
public sector, with a shift in emphasis from profit to organisational aims in both 
contexts.  Consequently, many of the recommendations above are also of interest to 
private sector organisations, whose operational risks will also be subject to calculative 
difficulties, conflicting perspectives and competing aims.  However, one significant 
difference is highlighted, the reliance of the HE sector on HEFCE for access to funds 
places heavy emphasis on regulatory aims as a source of risk to universities, as existing 
management controls act to enhance favourable outcomes.  Therefore, it is crucial that 
public sector regulatory bodies are aware of the impact of the measures and assessment 
methods, used to prioritise access to funds, on organisational practices.  What may 
initially appear an irrational response to regulatory demands can be interpreted as 
rational, once understood as risk reduction by those being regulated.   
 
This report represents an opportunity for HEFCE to enhance the recommended private 
sector model, and demonstrate that the HE sector can provide ideas that may be of 
benefit to the private sector, in which risk management implementation continues to fail 
to provide the protection against unwanted outcomes that the model aims to provide.  
These recommendations aim to foster an academic engagement with the regulator, and 
by providing an in-depth analysis, to facilitate the development of the risk governance 
framework, in the hope of offering improved outcomes for both the regulator and the 
sector as a whole.  
